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Showing 1 to 20 of 90 Records
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1973 (11) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation of his services, as per annexure A, is invalid. It is no use the University contending that its order is innocuous. It is clear that its annexure A carries a stigma with it since it expresses the unanimous conclusion that the...charges have been established against him and the termination itself is founded on the guilt so made out. We, therefore declare that Annexure A is void but further hold that the respondent has no right to continue in service and the direction to him that he should leave his post as Professor and Head of the Post-Graduate History Department is good. The High Court's order of re-instatement is quashed. 14. There is much in the circumstances of the case to show that both sides have been indifferent to the provisions of the law which changed from time to time and both sides have acted under misapprehensions, which warrant our direction that parties will bear their own costs throughout. The appeal is allowed subject to the above order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 104 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s the default continues and as long as there are telephone lines, installed for the benefit of the defaulting subscriber, available for disconnection. In view of the aforesaid reasons I am of the opinion that the petitioner was liable to pay arrears of telephone charges in respect of telephone number 491, installed in the name of his partnership firm Shakti Oil Mills. Since he did not comply with the demand of the Telegraph Department to pay up those arrears and committed default in discharging his liability, it was open to the Telegraph Department under Rule 443 to disconnect his personal telephone line-being telephone No. 184. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the action of the Telephone Department, impugned by the petitioner in this petition, cannot be called in question. The Telephone Department had full powers under Rule 443 to do what they have done. 16. In the result, I find no substance in this petition. The petition fails and is dismissed with, of order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and heard and not to draw inferences from what they see. The privilege of drawing inferences is given to courts not to witnesses. 11. One of the reasons given by the Sessions Court for rejecting the evidence of the eye-witness was that there was hardly any light at the place where Siba was murdered and therefore Ghanshyam could not have identified the assailants. Both the deceased and Ghanshyam were on their bicycles, the deceased being about 10 cubits ahead of Ghanshyam. The bicycle of the deceased had no light but that of Ghanshyam had a dynamo-light. Apart from that feeble light, the scene of offence was engulfed in rank darkness. The High Court does not seem to have noticed this circumstance while evaluating the testimony of Ghanshyam. 12. These are serious infirmities which make it impossible to accept the testimony of the sole eye-witness. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the order of conviction and sentence set aside. The appellant shall be released forthwith.
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1973 (11) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... had not been taken before the courts below. This is not correct. The point was raised in the High Court. But the High Court did not decide the point. It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the respondent can; support the decree on grounds raised by him and decided against him by the courts below on the analogy of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22, civil Procedure Code. The respondent, therefore, is entitled to recanvass the point here to support the decree of the High Court on ground rejected by it or even not considered by it. The only limitation in that behalf is that the respondent by relying upon such a ground cannot be allowed to mutilate or destroy the decree. Short of that, within the ambit of the law, he can support the decree on any ground available to him. The objection of the learned Counsel for the appellants is, therefore, of no avail. 12. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
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1973 (11) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... who are familiar with local conditions are agreed that in Bengal a distinction is made between churis and bangles. The explanation of the Circle Inspector that he committed a mistake in describing the articles may or may not be true but the fact that he made a significant error in a material part of the description of the articles seized by him shows that no implicit reliance can be placed on his word. It also seems to us important that the churis, after seizure, were wrapped in a loose sheet of paper and were not kept under Section 1. 7. Thus, the only evidence in support of the seizure of the wrist watch and the churis is that of the Circle inspector. For reasons aforesaid, that evidence fails to inspire confidence. We must therefore set aside the order of conviction and sentence and restore the order passed by the trial court. 8. Crl. M.P. No. 1419 of 1973 was filed on behalf of the State for a re-hearing of this appeal, but we found no substance in it and have rejected.
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1973 (11) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant being taken to that room from the lockup. The High Court differed from the trial court by saying that even if the parade-room was visible from the place where the witnesses were sitting, it does not necessarily follow that they could see what was going on inside the room. The point of the matter was that the appellant could be seen while on his way from the lock-up to the parade-room. 13. Thus the trial court had good reasons for discarding the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses. The reasons given by the High Court for taking a contrary view of that evidence are certainly not of the nature and character as would justify interference with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We will only add that for the various reasons discussed above the evidence of Ramnath and Bhanushali fails to impress us. 14. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court and acquit the appellant. He shall be set at liberty.
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1973 (11) TMI 99 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the respondent-company that the rights and obligations of the parties must, notwithstanding the winding-up order, continue to be determined by the provisions of the scheme of arrangement. 87. In the result this Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge in Second Appeal No. 1162 of 1963 is set aside and the order of. the execution Court dated November 13, 1961 is modified. We direct that the judgment-creditor be paid the decretal amount together with interest upto the date of payment from out of ₹ 3,701.15 deposited in Court by the garnishee. 88. The respondent-company will pay the costs of the judgment-creditor throughout and the same will come out of the assets of the company. 89. The judgment-creditor shall be entitled to withdraw the money, i.e. the decretal amount, from the Court on or after January 10, 1974. 90. Rule and interim stay granted in Civil Application No. 467 of 1971 is discharged with no order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 98 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ders, generally speaking, and they had taken preference shares on definite terms, as a matter of bargain, in a company registered under the Companies Act, the protection so given to them by the Article, cannot be either ignored or curtailed in any manner adverse to them, unless there is any provision in the Companies Act necessitating such a course. (27) There being nothing in the Companies Act to invalidate Article 7 as it has been framed the preference shareholders have right of repayment of capital (which is not disputed) and arrears of dividend (whether the same has been earned declared or not) up to the commencement of the winding up in priority to the equity shareholders. The reference by the Liquidator is answered against the Company and in favor of the preference shareholders, in the above said manner. (28) The costs of this reference alone would come out of the Company's funds. The other parties will, in the circumstances, bear their own costs of this proceeding.
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1973 (11) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... rding fares can be inclusive of tax. 45. The arguments advanced on behalf of the operators fail in view of the cardinal fact that tax was an element included in the fare structure. The retrospective validation cannot be said to be unjust because the operators collected the entire amount. The tax has always been paid by passengers and owners of goods. The tax is not on the income of the operators. There was and is no lack of machinery for collection of these taxes. The operators collected tax as well as fare. The directions regarding fare were validated by Act 34 of 1971 by reason of the litigation between the operators and the State. 46. For these reasons, the contentions of the operators fail. The petitions and appeals are dismissed. The decision of the Kerala High Court in Civil appeal No. 1875 of 1972 and other appeals is upheld. In view of the fact that the High Court directed the parties to bear their respective costs, parties will bear their own costs in these matters.
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1973 (11) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant be tried by another learned judge of the High Court who may be assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice of that Court. It seems indeed desirable that election petitions should ordinarily, if possible, be. entrusted for trial to a permanent judge of the High Court, even though we find that additional or acting judges or those requested under article 224A of the Constitution to,, sit and act as judges of the High Court, if assigned for the purpose by the Chief Justice, are legally competent to hear those matters. 'We, therefore, set aside the order dated August 10, 1973. The election petition filed by the appellant shall now be heard by a permanent judge who may be assigned for the purpose by the learned Chief Justice. The case may, therefore, J be placed before the learned Chief Justice for necessary orders. The appeal is accepted accordingly. The parties in the circumstances shall bear their own costs of this Court and in the High Court. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s authority in his intemperate averments in both petitions. But having regard to the fact that he is a senior judicial officer who has at some stage in his career displayed zeal and industry and is now in the sombre evening of an official career, a punishment short of imprisonment would have met the ends of justice and inspired in the public mind confidence in the justice administration by showing that even delinquent judges will be punished if they play with or pervert the due course of justice, as the contemnor here has done. A heavy hand is wasted severity where a lighter sentence may serve as well. A fine of ₹ 1000/- with three months' imprisonment in default of payment will meet the ends of justice and we impose this sentence in substitution of the infliction of imprisonment by the High Court. With this modification Civil Appeal No. 41 of 1973 is dismissed. On the appeal by the State the course adopted in the leading judgment of Palekar J. has our concurrence.
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1973 (11) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e Constitution of the Rating Committee merely on the ground that there is a dispute or difference between the Board and the licensee as to whether the provisions of the Sixth Schedule had been complied with or not and such a dispute was referred to the Authority. Nor are we referred to any provision in the Act which makes such a dispute between the Board and the licensee referable to the Authority. 24. We have, therefore, to conclude that the finding of the High Court on which relief was given to respondent No. 1 cannot be sustained in law. It appears that some other issues had been also raised before the High Court but they were not dealt with in view of the finding recorded. The parties, therefore, are agreed that the case will have to go back to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law after considering the other issues raised in the Special Civil Application. Accordingly the case is remanded to the High Court for disposal. The costs shall be costs in the cause.
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1973 (11) TMI 93 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hers AIR1961MP322 ,. The Court in this case held that the filling of a reply to the application of the plaintiff for securing temporary injunction and arguing the said application did not amount to taking steps in the proceedings within the meaning of section 34. Facts of this case, however, show that in the reply that the defendants filed they had expressly mentioned the subsistence of an arbitration agreement and had urged that reference to arbitration was the correct remedy for the plaintiff to follow. It was in this background that it was held that the mere filing of the application was not a step in the proceedings. (20) We are, Therefore, of the view that the defendants had taken steps in the proceedings of the suit filed by the plaintiff and the learned single Judge, for this reason also, was right in holding that the suit could not be stayed under section 34. (21) In the result F.A.O. (O.S.) 49 of 1971 fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 200.
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1973 (11) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... were living as husband and wife to the knowledge of the respondent; (2) the appellant took the lease of the shop premises from the respondent in 1959; (3) from the time of the letting a Chemist's business was carried in the shop by Sohan Singh with the occasional help of the appellant. The question to be determined was whether in the above circumstances it was likely that the appellant had sub-let the premises to Sohan Singh. The negative answer given to it by the Rent Courts is merely the factual common sense inference which did not call for the application of any principle of law. In out view, no question of law-much less, a substantial question of law-was involved in the second appeal and the learned Judge was in error in disturbing the concurrent findings of fact of the rent control authorities. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the Rent Control Authorities is restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court took a clue from the statement made by the appellant under Section 342 of the CrPC admitting the particular signature to be his. It must not, however; be over looked that the admission made by the appellant must be read as a whole, for what he has stated is that he had made his signature in the account books of the branch office after an audit objection was raised that he ought to have signed the books at the end of every day in his managerial capacity. The statement of the appellant on this aspect is not capable of dissection because the particular part thereof on which the High Court relies is inextricably connected with the other part which the High Court has not taken into consideration. 9. This is thus a case in which there is no credible evidence in support of the charge leveled against the accused. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant. The bail bond furnished by the appellant is discharged.
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1973 (11) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hould be treated in this manner by his superior officers. We hope that, although the claim of the appellant has been found to be barred by limitation, the Union of India will consider the equities of the case and see its way to giving such relief to the appellant as we are precluded under the law from granting to him due to the operation of the law of limitation. The result is that we modify the decree passed by the High Court to the extent that we hold that the amount which falls due to be paid to the appellant within three years of the filing of the suit (i.e. within the period of limitation) in accordance with the above mentioned statement of the learned Counsel for the North Eastern Railway will be calculated on the correct basis now stated to us by the learned Counsel. To this extent we allow the appeal, but we dismiss the rest of the appellant's claim. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs throughout. P.B.R. Appeal allowed in part.
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1973 (11) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding, of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the Rent Court could have-as distinguished from must have-been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super Court sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court. Since in the instant case, there was a clear admission in the compromise, incorporated in the decree, of the fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under. s. 12 (3) (a), the Executing Court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lved that a positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin methods of not being tempted into forensic show-downs where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957. This second appeal strikes me as an instance of disregard of that policy." All these words from the Bench, hopefully addressed to a responsive Government, may, if seasonable reactions follow, go a long way to avoidance of governmental litigiousness and affirmance of the image of the State as deeply concerned only in Justic-Social Justice. The phyrric victory of the poor appellant in this case is a sad justification, for the above observations. Appeal allowed-
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1973 (11) TMI 87 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the order requiring the petitioner to deposit ₹ 15,000/- wag made after hearing him and on merits. It cannot, therefore, be said that he was deprived of the right of being heard in appeal. For the aforesaid reasons the arguments on this score cannot be accepted. The result is that the rule issued on this petition is discharged with costs. 8. Mr. Shethna seeks leave to appeal under Article 133 of the Constitution but he is unable to point out that this case involves a substantial question of law of general importance and that in the opinion of this Court such a question requires to be decided by the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact while deciding the case, we have followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Assistant Collector of Customs (supra). This case in our opinion does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which requires determination by the Supreme Court. Hence the oral application for certificate for leave to appeal is rejected.
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1973 (11) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fecting the fundamental rights in Article 19 without any legislative authority or in purported exercise of power conferred by any pre-emergency law which was invalid when enacted". Therefore, if it can be shown that the executive action taken during the emergency has no authority as a valid law its constitutionality can be challenged. The Cotton Textiles Order 1948 was continued by Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The, impugned orders are made under pre-emergency Cotton Textiles Control Order. The validity of the impugned orders is challenged under Article 19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution on the ground that it is a pre-emergency executive order which could have been challenged under Article 19(1) (f) and (g) before the, proclamation of emergency. From that point of view the petitions are competent though the challenge is insupportable on all grounds. For these reasons, the petitions are dismissed., The parties will pay and bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.
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