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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 74 Records
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1973 (12) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in P.J. Irani v. State of Madras 1962 2SCR169 in reference to the earlier Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1949 which was in material respects in identical terms as the present Act, is intended to protect "the rights of tenants in occupation of buildings from being charged unreasonable rates of rent" and not to benefit landlords by conferring on them a new right against tenants which they did not possess before. 33. Since we are of the view that it is not competent to the landlord to apply for fixation of fair rent under Section 4, Sub-section (1) during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy, we set aside the decision of the High Court of Tamil Nadu which has taken the view that the Controller has jurisdiction to entertain the application of the respondents and allow Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1968. There will be no order as to costs all throughout. ORDER 34. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the respondents costs.
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1973 (12) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... facts within the knowledge of the detaining authority bear a rational connection with maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The order cannot therefore be said to have been passed on extraneous grounds. 8. On the last point it is not possible to hold that there was in the circumstances of the case an unfair delay in communicating to the petitioner the confirmation of the detention order by the State Government. The order was confirmed on July 30, 1973 and the affidavit in reply to the petition shows that on the very next day the Additional Superintendent of Police, D.I.B., 24-Paraganas, was asked by a written memorandum to serve the confirmation on the petitioner. In Deb Sadhan Roy v. The State of West Bengal, this Court observed that though the confirmation should be communicated to the detenu within a reasonable time, what is a reasonable time must necessarily depend upon the circumstance of each case. 9. For these reasons we dismiss the petition.
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1973 (12) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... capped in making an effective representation. The fact that the names of the associates of the petitioner were not mentioned in the grounds of detention would not go to show that they suffered from the infirmity of vagueness. The courts look with disfavour upon vague grounds of detention, because such grounds fail to convey to the detenu the precise activity on account of which he is being detained. The detenu is thus prevented from making an effective representation which he might possible have made, if he had been apprised of the objectionable activity which led to his detention. Where, however, as in the present case the requisite details of the activity for which the order for detention was made, have been conveyed to the detenu and he is not shown to have been prejudiced or handicapped in making an effective representation, the argument about the vagueness of grounds of detention must plainly be held to be not tenable. 7. The petition consequently fails and is dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntences by half. We maintain their convictions. But, as we are informed that the sentences awarded have been undergone almost for the whole period by each convict appellant, we think that ends of justice will be served by reducing their sentences to the periods already undergone. The result is that we give Jamuna Chaudhary, appellant, the benefit of doubt for the offence under Section 304 I. P. C. and acquit him of the charge for it. We, however, hold Jamuna Chaudhary guilty of offenses punishable under Section 147 I. P. C. with the other accused. We maintain all the convictions of the other accused persons also. But, we reduce the sentences of the appellants for various offenses of which they have been convicted to the periods already undergone. This appeal is allowed .to the extent indicated above. As the sentences of all the appellants are reduced to the period already undergone, they will be released forthwith unless wanted in some other connection. Appeal partly allowed.
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1973 (12) TMI 102 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om one Railway to another affects petitioner's seniority or chances of promotion that cannot invalidate the transfer which is made in exercise of the power conferred by the Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder. The learned counsel for the petitioner lastly drew our attention to the fact that the petitioner also prays in his petition that the Court should "direct the respondents to treat the petitioner on duty w. e. f. 4th May 1972 when he reported on duty and for making payment w. e. f. 1st December 1971." The facts bearing upon this relief are not admitted and as the matter relates essentially to claim of salary for the period in question we do not think it proper to investigate the matter in this writ petition. The petitioner can take recourse to civil suit for claiming any salary to which he may be entitled. The petition fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. The security deposit may be refunded to the petitioner.
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1973 (12) TMI 101 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e total sale of hardware articles amounting to ₹ 4,936.31 P. and 5 per cent discount on the remaining sum of ₹ 78,254.24 P. The total amount of discount comes to ₹ 4,308.72 P. On deduction of the amount of discount the principal amount which remains due to the plaintiff comes to ₹ 5,985.20 P. The amount of interest on the principal sum upto the date of suit at the rate of six per cent per annum comes to ₹ 180/-. The total amount due to the plaintiff thus comes to ₹ 6,165.20 P. upto the date of the suit, 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower court is set aside and the suit is decreed against the defendant for ₹ 6,165.20 P. The plaintiff shall get pendente lite and future interest upto the date of realisation at the rate of six per cent per annum on the principal sum of ₹ 5,985.20 P. The parties shall give and take costs according to their success and failure in this Court as well as in the court below.
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1973 (12) TMI 100 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the other portions without first holding enquiry and investigating fact arbitrary and unsustainable and the further fact that the petitioners- society is a charitable society it will be a proper exercise of discretion not to'refuse relief to the petitioner more especially when the time for filing appeal has pasted and when the same cannot be heard unless the amount of tax is first deposited by it. Such a course might result in working injustice I would, therefore, allow the writ petition quash the assessment dared 20th September, 1971 made by respondent No. 2 and remit the matter back to him for making fresh assessment in accordance with the law and on merits, and keeping in view the rbservation in this judgment. As the petitioners society was not , diligent in giving full facts to the assessing authority in the first instance and have thus also contributed to the case being remitted back to the assessing authority, there will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.
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1973 (12) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y payment of tax. The other is that if one authority will impose a tax of the balance sum left after considering the amount imposed by the State all the authorities may not impose taxes. That will be entirely a wrong construction. High Court was right in reaching the conclusion that the State as well as the authorities mentioned in Article 276 of the Constitution can each impose tax up to a limit of ₹ 250/-. One and the same person may be engaged in more than one of the items suggested in Article 276, namely, professions, trades, callings and employments. Such imposition of tax on more than one item in respect of one and the same person cannot be anything but taxes. The word "total" relates to an authority levying various taxes and not to all authorities put together. For these reasons the judgment of the High Court is upheld. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed. The parties will pay and bear their own costs as they did in the High Court. Appeals dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f Tamil Nadu and under those amendments the respondents who are the owners of 32 permits will not be entitled to consideration for grant of permit. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that it is impossible for their learned Counsel to meet the contention here because several other considerations may arise including the willingness of the respondents to surrender some of their permits in order to come within the permissible limit. We do not think we should deal with the matter, here. The Tribunal will not be considering the matter afresh and if it is open to the appellant to put forward this contention, he is welcome to do it before the Tribunal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. But the order shall not affect the carrying on of the business by the appellant and the respondents on the basis of permits granted as a result of stay orders till the Tribunal decides about the grant in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 97 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... principle fully applies to the present case also and the learned Civil Judge has rightly decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff No. 1 alone. So far as Ram Das is concerned there can be no application of Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act to him on the date of contract when no partnership existed and he alone entered into that contract with the Raja. 10. We are therefore of the opinion that the decree passed by the trial court is correct and this appeal is without any merits. The immovable property that was the subject-matter of the suit had during the pendency of the case been converted into money under the interim orders passed by the court and as such plaintiff No. 1 was entitled to get that money in lieu of the property which he had claimed in the suit. 11. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs to the contesting respondent. The stay order, if any, is discharged. The money deposited in court shall be disposed of according to the decree passed by the trial court.
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1973 (12) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... thout which the construction of the hospital would have been a half-done project. Thus the conditions failing, the charity proved abortive, and the legal consequence is a resulting trust in favour of the donor. The State could not keep the money and the suit was liable to be decreed. The Kannauj community, as the happy sequel to this unhapy litigation has turned out, has now got a bigger hospital and a memorial college. Shri Dixit has prayed for the dismissal of the suit for nonjoinder of other donors and the charity. We mention it out of deference to counsel but negative it as undeserving of consideration. The appeal fails and we dismiss it with costs, an added injury to the public exchequer which we regret we cannot help. May we hazard the hope that out of deference to the memory of Gomti Devi in posthumous furtherance, of Dubey’s project, the plaintiffs will donate the costs when realised, to the charity chest of the Kannauj Female hospital. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the exemption the latter class of industries. Picking out co-operative societies of sugarcane growers for favored treatment, to the exclusion of other new or substantially expanded industries, is wholly unrelated to the object of the exempting Provision and the policy or rule adopted by the State Government is not legally relevant to the exercise of the Power of granting exemption. We would, therefore, quash Annexure III and issue a mandamus to the Government of Andhra Pradesh in each of those writ petitions and the Civil Appeal to consider the applications of the writ petitioners and the appellant on merits and pass the proper order in each case without taking into account the policy decision contained in Annexure III. We would allow the writ petitions and the Civil Appeal without any order as to' costs. ORDER In accordance with the majority judgment of the Court, the Court dismissed the appeal and the Writ petitions with costs, one set. Appeal and Petitions dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e could be made. Dealing with the term "executive", the Judicial Committee held that it includes both a decision as to action and the carrying out of such a decision. Their Lordships further expressed disagreement with the view which sought narrow reading of Sections 49(2) and 124(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The case of In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 1951 S.C.R. 747 related to the delegation of legislative power and the difference between delegation of legislative power and conditional legislation. Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. 1959 1 Supp. S.C.R. 319 dealt with the procedure to be followed for nationalising transport service. None of the above cited cases, in our opinion, are of any real assistance to the appellants because the question involved in these appeals is materially different. 13. There is no force in these appeals. The same are accordingly dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.
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1973 (12) TMI 93 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nding on the question whether the two temples were his private property but since he has not done so the question cannot be gone into this appeal. The appropriate authority under the Act will however decide this question before applying the Act to these temples. In the result the appeals of the State are allowed. The direction given in the Writ Petition No. 50 of 1962, out of which Appeal No. 1083 of 1967 arises, that Rikhabdevji is a Swetamber temple and that the State of Rajasthan should constitute a Committee for its management as provided under the Act is set aside. In this appeal as also in appeals Nos. 1119 and 1647 of 1967, the decision of the High Court that s. 17(3) and s. 52(1) (d) and (e) are void and unconstitutional is also set aside. Appeals Nos. 1092 and 1087 of 1967 filed by the respective respondents are dismissed. In the circumstances, each party will bear its own costs. Appeals No. 1092 and 1087 of 1967 dismissed. Appeals Nos. 1119 and 1647 of 1967 allowed
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1973 (12) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ies and provisions obligatory and failure in that respect can only be visited with a dismissal of the petition." Since the above decision in Venkateswara Rao's case (supra) in August 1968, though Parliament has made certain amendments in s. 8 of the Act in 1969, it has not considered it necessary till now to amend the Act to confer, on persons challenging an election, benefits similar to those available to them under the proviso to the repealed s. 85 of the Act, for as we venture to think, it did not want delays to occur in the disposal of election petitions as in the past. For all these reasons we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election petitions or their trial and, in this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether there are any merits in the application for condonation of delay. The appeal as well as C.M.P. No. 7820 of 1973 are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.
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1973 (12) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s not passed upon the question whether the District Magistrate, in requisitioning the truck in question, was acting in an unreasonable or a discriminatory manner or the requisition of the truck was not for a public purpose. I think that the requisition of the truck by the District Magistrate was for a public purpose and that his action in so doing was perfectly reasonable. No other reason has been given by the High Court for declaring the provisions of s. 2 of the Act to be invalid. If section 2 is not invalid for the reasons given by the High Court, the ground on which the other provisions of the Act were struck down by the High Court will not survive. In my view, the provisions of s. 2 do not violate article, 14 and are not invalid for that reason. I uphold the action taken by the District Magistrate and would allow the appeals with costs. ORDER In accordance with the decision of the majority, the appeals are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re, during or after the attack. In the concluding portion of its judgment the High Court has observed that the injured-persons must have been present at the spot and as the occurrence took place in "broad daylight", there was no reason why their evidence should not be accepted, "even though they might have one reason or the other to falsely implicate one or the other accused". It was wrong to conclude that the incident had taken place in broad day-light and it was even more wrong that the High Court did not warn itself of the danger of accepting the evidence of witnesses who bad reason to implicate the appellants falsely. For these reasons we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence and direct that the appellants shall be set at liberty, if they are not already on bail. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (12) TMI 89 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed above, the success or failure of the plaintiff appellant will depend whether or not the duty in question was exempted under Notification No. 75 aforesaid, but that will be a decision on the merits of the suits. 10. This brings us to the question relating to the petitions for amendment of the plaints filed on behalf of the appellant There does not seem to be any valid reason, nor was any advance by learand counsel for the respondents, why the amendments as prayed for be not allowed, in the facts and circumstances of the present cases. 11. In the result, therefore, I would allow both these appeals, set aside the judgment and decrees, passed by the court below and remand these cases to it. The court below shall now make the aforesaid necessary amendments in the plaints and proceed to hear and dispose of the cases in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Appeals allowed and cases remanded.
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1973 (12) TMI 88 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the petitioner to his earlier communications dated 20-3-1973 and 3-4-1973 and stating that if those letters were not complied with within fifteen days, action would be initiated to stop the transactions in the warehouse. It is under these circumstances the writ petition has been filed. 3. Mr. Jumma Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that, so long as the property of the firm has been given as security, the Departmental officers have no authority to call upon the partners to produce solvency certificates individually. I am unable to accept this contention. Ex. B4. bond admittedly executed by the petitioner states that all the partners undertake the liability jointly and severally. Once the partners have undertaken the liability and severally it is certainly open to the Department to call upon each one or the partners to produce a solvency certificate with reference to the obligation they had undertaken severally. Hence this writ petition is dismissed.
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1973 (12) TMI 87 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... anufacturer occurring in section 3-A that will be the prevailing construction of that word in the statute and the notification. If a term used by the legislature in a particular statute has been judicially declared to have a particular meaning, the subordinate rulemaking authority cannot by its notification or rule change that construction. It was hence not open to the State Government to have made a notification which would have the effect of making those preparing mixtures of medicines liable to tax as manufacturer. In this view of the law the submission that the amending notification of 11th October, 1962, by implication made all those chemists other than medical practitioners liable to tax as a manufacturer cannot be accepted. In the result the question referred to us is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. Since no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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