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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 111 Records
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1973 (7) TMI 119 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rd books was construed and the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court were inclined to give a wider meaning. This case is accordingly of no assistance to Us. 11. The case of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Venkateswarlu (1960) 11 STC 561 related to Sarees and Dhotis with which we are not concerned here. 12. We have also considered the argument of the learned Counsel that the roll registers are not included in the word exercise books . But we might say again that the exercise books intended to indicate items of stationery of all kinds wherein people write to give an exercise to their minds and are certainly different from roll registers employed by examining body. We are not very much impressed by Mr. Shrimal's argument that the argument not having been put earlier could not be raised because the question referred to us for answer clearly permits the contention. 13. The net result is that our answer to the question is in the negative. We make no order as to costs.
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1973 (7) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... .....which set out the prejudicial acts under which the suspected actions of the detenu will fall and for which the detention is made, It is immaterial whether the detaining authority is satisfied that the grounds on which the detention is being made for preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or for preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State alone, because in either case, one of the objects is to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State. The variation in the enumeration of the prejudicial acts have nothing to do with fresh facts. There being no fresh facts on which the impugned detention order is made, that order is invalid and the detention of the petitioner cannot be sustained. In the view we have taken, it is not necessary to deal with the other contentions. The petitioner is directed to be released forthwith.
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1973 (7) TMI 117 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is printed upon, drawn upon, or written upon is not a product of paper, though it may be said that it is no more paper and it has acquired a new characteristic or utility -the characteristic or utility of a book or picture. This is what has been said by the American Supreme Court in James Pott's case 26 Law. Ed. 909, already cited "No man of literary culture..........would call a book, paper or a manufacture of paper............................................." A book is neither paper nor a product of paper; that is how it is commonly understood too. In the case before us, the position is, therefore, quite simple. The printed material supplied by the petitioner using even his own paper is neither paper nor a product of paper. It cannot then come within item 42 of Schedule I of the Sales Tax Act; and the State has no other claim to tax the petitioner. The revision case is allowed and the assessment is set aside. The petitioner will also get his costs before us.
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1973 (7) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... elating to the debits and the credits in the accounts of the business of Wattal & Co. were the subject- matter of the arbitration. We do not agree with the learned Judge that it was possible to bring in any dispute of the parties within the scope of the arbitration proceedings. We do not, therefore, think that the agreement was bad on account of vagueness or uncertainty.' The two grounds on which the High Court superseded the reference had not been substantiated. The award cannot be challenged either on the ground that it was made after the prescribed period or that the agreement for arbitration was defective on account of vagueness and uncertainty. Since the other points arising in the appeal before the High Court had not been dealt with, the case will have to go back to the High Court to be disposed of in accordance with law after hearing the parties on points not agitated before the High Court. The appellant shall get his costs from the respondents in this appeal.
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1973 (7) TMI 115 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not show that the amount should be paid merely on demand. It says that the amount should be paid on demand only by reason of the breach by the contractors. Hence the question whether breach was committed by the contractor or not is a collateral fact which has got to be adjudicated either by the arbitrators or by the Court. It is, therefore, clear from the very guarantee bond executed by the bank in favour of the Government that question of demand and payment arises only in case of breach and not simply on a demand, for the demand arises only when a breach is established. There is, therefore, no independent cause of action for the 3rd plaintiff is join in this suit and as we have already pointed out there was no relief sought with respect to the guarantee bond dated 13-5-1969 executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the 2nd defendant. 10. We, therefore, reject all he contentions raised by the appellants. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs . 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (7) TMI 114 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Deputy Government Advocate is of course more formidable. A perusal of the order sheets of the court below shows that neither there was any agreement between the parties to give evidence by affidavits nor was there any order permitting the Plaintiff to do so. It was, therefore, necessary for the court to have recorded evidence under Order 18 Rule 13 C.P. C. though it could have made a memorandum of a substance of what the witness deposed. Besides that, on looking into the affidavit, I have found that it had not been properly verified, and is consequently no affidavit in the eve of law. There being no other evidence in the case except the affidavit of the plaintiff which, as I have held above, is inadmissible, the decree granted by the lower court cannot be sustained. 13. Accordingly I partly allow the revision application, set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and remand the case to it for fresh trial in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1973 (7) TMI 113 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
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... ... ..... notice. That the alienee has been effecting valuable improvements in the property has been found by the court below and the decree provides for compensating the alienee on this account. But it is said that the court below was in error in limiting the value to the cost of improvements in the area which is to be ultimately surrendered to the plaintiff's under the final decree. We see force in this contention. Value of improvements is normally assessed not on the basis of cost of improvements but value determined in accordance with the accepted principles. We make it clear that what defendants 1 to 3 would be entitled to on account of improvements for the area to be surrendered towards the 6/8th share of the plaintiffs would not be merely the 'cost' of improvements, but as we said, their value. In the result the appeal is dismissed excepting for the modification regarding improvements which we have mentioned here. Parties are directed to suffer costs in this appeal.
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1973 (7) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a suit. it is unfortunate that this position in law was not noticed in the several Courts through which this litigation has passed, not even by the High Court which had specifically come to the conclusion that the period of limitation was the one laid down by the rules under U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. Since the Civil Court which entertained the suit suffered from an inherent lack of jurisdiction, the present appeal filed by the plaintiffs will have to be dismissed. As regards costs, we do not think that this is a fit case in which. the defendant should get his costs in any of the courts. Though he had no title to the property, he was trying to set up a title. But his attempt was negatived by all the courts. He did not urge also the contention with regard to the Jurisdiction of the court at any stage except in this Court. Therefore, while dismissing the appeal, we further direct that the plaintiffs and the defendant Shall bear their, own costs throughout. Appeal dismissed, S. N.
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1973 (7) TMI 111 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... respondents as deemed dealers under section 14-A of the Act their own dealings cannot be clubbed with their agency transactions and there should normally be a separate assessment on the respondents in respect of their agency transactions in respect of each of the non-resident principals. It is, therefore, clear that though the respondents are deemed to be dealers in respect of their dealings on behalf of the non-resident principals, such dealings have to be kept apart from their own dealings which come for assessment in their individual assessment. Hence, the licence in form IV, which has been issued to cover their dealings in hides and skins cannot be said to cover the transactions of the non-resident unlicensed dealers which have been carried on through the respondents as agents. In our view, the Tribunal s conclusion on both the points cannot be upheld. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the tax case is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1973 (7) TMI 110 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ch boxes have not been specifically referred to in that item. But it cannot be disputed that it forms component part of electrical goods. We have to therefore take the switch boxes sold by the assessees as falling under the first part of item No. 41. The learned Government Pleader does not dispute the fact that the other two factors necessary for the application of section 3(3) are satisfied in this case. The sale has been to a registered dealer and the fuse switch boxes have been used by the purchasing dealer as component parts of the electrical goods manufactured by them. We have to therefore uphold the view of the Tribunal as regards this item. The result is that the tax case is partly allowed and the order of the Tribunal is partly set aside as regards the canteen sales. The matter is remitted for the limited purpose of considering whether the assessees are entitled to the benefit of the G.O. referred to above. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1973 (7) TMI 109 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... al was that the ratio of the decision in V.B. Patil s case(1) cannot be applied to this case in view of the amendment to section 18(1) of the Act, which came into force on 1st April, 1966. Same is the contention urged before us now. We do not think that the amendment to the section has made any difference in the position of law as laid down in V.B. Patil s case(1). Further, a similar provision came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. A.B. Mfg. Co. 1973 32 S.T.C. 1 (S.C.) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1333. , and Khanna, J., while considering the scope of section 29-A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act (15 of 1948), which is in pari materia with section 18-A of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, said that such provision was beyond the legislative competence of the State under entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. In our opinion, the view taken by the Tribunal is correct. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed but no costs. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (7) TMI 108 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . 426 (S.C.). has held that after the amendment of the definition of business by Madras Act 15 of 1964 it is not necessary that the seller should be a dealer of that particular commodity, that if the goods sold are connected with the business of a dealer. then the sales could be treated as having been effected in the course of the business and could be brought to charge. Of course, this decision of the Supreme Court was not there when the Tribunal rendered its judgment. We have to, therefore, hold following the decision of the Supreme Court that the sales of fertilisers effected by the society to the cane-growers who are its members are taxable transactions. On the same reasoning, the press-mud which is a by-product obtained by the society in the course of manufacture of sugar when sold by the mills is liable to be taxed even though the mills is not a dealer in that commodity. The tax cases are, therefore, allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each. Petitions allowed.
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1973 (7) TMI 107 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s concerned, the assessing authority should find out whether apart from the use of the word sale in the account books in the context of debiting the cost of materials supplied, there was transfer of property in the goods under an agreement for a price paid or promised therefor. In this case we are not able to find any material apart from clause (1) of the agreement referred to above to suggest that there was any transfer of property in the goods under an agreement for a price paid or promised therefor. The fact that the cost of the materials supplied to the contractor stands debited against him on the date of supply can only be taken as a camouflage as has been pointed out in a similar case in D.C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib and Sons v. United Beedi Workers Union 1964 2 L.L.J. 633. We are, therefore, of the view that on the facts the Tribunal has come to the right conclusion in this case. The tax case is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (7) TMI 106 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ew that the batteries having been specifically referred to in item 3 of Schedule I, it is not possible to exclude the battery merely on the ground that it is not an article which requires any further adaptation for use as part of a motor vehicle. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that battery will fall within item 41 of Schedule I dealing with electrical goods is not acceptable, for the reason that the said item dealing with electrical goods does not refer to batteries as part of electrical goods, appliances or accessories. Even though a battery can be used for production of energy, it cannot be brought under that item, for the battery has been specifically brought under item 3 of Schedule I as part and accessory of motor vehicles. We are, therefore, of the view that the batteries have been rightly taxed under item 3 of Schedule I in this case. The tax cases are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
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1973 (7) TMI 105 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by section 8(1)(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act. It is only when the sale falls under section 8(1)(a), the question of furnishing D form declarations under section 8(4)(b) will arise. But, if the sale is held to be not to a department of the Government then the application of section 8(4)(b) will not arise. In this case, all the authorities have proceeded on the footing that the Housing Board is not a department or a limb of the Government. Even before us, the petitioners have not placed any material to show that the Hyderabad Housing Board is a department of the Government. We have, therefore, to accept the finding of the Tribunal that the Housing Board is not a department of the Government and, therefore, in respect of the sales effected to it the petitioners cannot get the benefit of concessional rate of tax. The result is all the contentions put forward by the petitioners are rejected and the tax case is dismissed with costs. Pleader s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (7) TMI 104 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng and telephone charges. In other words, the taxable turnover returned by the assessees is liable to tax and not liable to be deducted. It is also necessary to point out that, in respect of the assessment year 1958-59, the assessees were originally assessed at 2 1/2 per cent on the taxable turnover returned by them. It has been held in a number of cases that the rate of 2 1/2 per cent in respect of sales of food and drinks in a hotel was discriminatory and only 2 per cent is leviable as tax. Therefore, the taxable turnover returned by the respondent-assessees is liable to tax only at 2 per cent and not 2 1/2 per cent. The Tribunal had adverted to this fact also. The State also had not disputed this finding of the Tribunal in the grounds of appeal. We, therefore, hold that the turnover relating to apartment and board is liable to be taxed only at 2 per cent. The petitions are allowed to the extent noted above. But there will be no order as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1973 (7) TMI 103 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... States from the obligation of refunding the tax imposed under the authority of law as explained by the Supreme Court before the Bengal Immunity case 1955 6 S.T.C. 446 (S.C.).and that, in a way, related to the consumption sales covered by the explanation to article 286(1)(a). But the language of the Validation Act does not limit the saving to the explanation sales alone. For the Validation Act to apply, the test is whether there was a law prior to the Validation Act which authorised the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods which took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Since our view of explanation (2) to section 2(h) is that it does in substance and in truth levy a tax read with the charging section on an inter-State sale deemed for the purpose of inclusion as an inside sale, that provision, as we think, is covered by the Validation Act. It follows that the tax case fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (7) TMI 102 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e net turnover on which sales tax can be levied or imposed. Now, in the instant case, the turnover of foodgrains was notified as liable to purchase tax under section 3-D(1) of the Act with effect from 1st October, 1964. Sub-section (4) of section 3-D provides that on the issue of a notification under section 3-D(1), no tax shall be levied under any other section in respect of the goods so notified. Thus, the result of the notification under section 3-D(1) was that section 3, which is the charging section for the purposes of levy of sales tax became inoperative and the turnover of foodgrains ceased to be liable to sales tax. Such being the position, the turnover of foodgrains after the issue of the notification under section 3-D(1) could not be included in the gross turnover. We accordingly answer the question in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (7) TMI 101 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rovides that the price charged for the limestone is with reference to the rate of royalty payable on the date and that if there is any subsequent enhancement of royalty payable to the Government, such enhanced royalty amounts have to be borne by the buyer. In these two assessment years, the assessees have claimed and received enhanced royalty from the buyer. The assessees have claimed deduction of such amounts of royalty paid by the buyer. We do not see how the assessees are entitled to claim the said royalty as a deduction from the total turnover. The royalty paid adds to the cost price of the limestone and, therefore, even though royalty has been separately charged for and paid, it should be treated as part of the sale price of the limestone. Hence no deduction can be claimed in relation to that amount. In the result, the tax cases are allowed in part in so far as they relate to the freight and delivery charges. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1973 (7) TMI 100 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sales in question in the course of any business activity, this contention also has to be rejected. As a matter of fact, in Trustees of the Port of Madras v. State of Madras 1960 11 S.T.C. 224., the question arose as to whether the Madras Port Trust could be taxed under the Act on their supply of water to the ships which touched the Port of Madras. A Division Bench of this Court held that the Port Trust in supplying water to the ships and collecting a fee therefor was only discharging a duty imposed upon it by the Madras Port Trust Act, 1905, and was not doing any business so as to make it a dealer within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the Port Trust was not a dealer when it effected the sales in question and, therefore, the sales are not taxable under the Act. In this view the tax cases are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in T.C. No. 35 of 1970 alone. There will be no order as to costs in T.C. No. 36 of 1970. Petitions dismissed.
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