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Showing 1 to 20 of 104 Records
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1973 (8) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e concluded as far as possible within six months from the presentation of the petition to the High Court. The reference to trial is in a larger sense and deals with the steps in a trial rather than in a narrower sense of a trial commencing after the notice of the petition is directed to be served on the respondent. The marginal note of Section 86, namely, Trial of election petitions does not indicate that under Sub-section (1) of Section 86 an election petition cannot be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions set out therein, unless notice is issued to the respondent. Where the language is clear and can admit of no other meaning such as is evidence from Sub-section (1) of Section 86, the marginal cannot be read to control that power. 6. We are clearly of the view that the non-deposit of the security along with the election petition as required under Section 117 of the Act leaves no option to the Court but to reject it. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1973 (8) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... reasonable and has resulted in miscarriage of justice. We accordingly accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and convict the accused-respondents for the offences for which they were convicted by the trial court. As regards the sentence for the offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, we find that a period of more than two years has elapsed since the acquittal of the accused-respondents by the High Court. It would, in the circumstances, be appropriate if the extreme penalty for the offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Codes is not exacted from the accused-respondents. We, therefore, sentence the accused-respondents for the offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code to imprisonment for life. The sentences imposed upon the accused-respondents for the offences under Section 302 read with Section 34, Section 307 and Section 307 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code are maintained. The sentences of each of the accused-respondents would run concurrently.
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1973 (8) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ether the acts alleged against the 2nd respondent can be said to be in purported execution of his duty. But facts subsequently coming to light during the course of the judicial inquiry or during the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to depend from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case (see observations in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari (supra). In Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava v. N.P. Misra (supra) also it was pointed out that it would be open to the appellant (the 2nd respondent in this case) to place the material on record during the course of the trial for showing what his duty was and also that the acts complained of were so inter-related with his official duty so as to attract the protection afforded by Section 197, Cr.P.C. 5. This appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order of the learned Judge of the High Court is set aside.
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1973 (8) TMI 174 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s 13 to 15 the judgment proceeded). It is always difficult to prove bias of mala fides by direct evidence. It has to be inferred from the conduct of the authorities in the light of the fact and circumstances of each case. After taking into account all the facts and circumstances of this case it appears to us that the action of the Collector was not fair but was arbitrary and mala fide and as such is liable to be quashed. We, therefore, allow the petition and quash the order of the Collector, Hoshangabad. Annexure 'D' rejecting the application of the petitioner for solvency certificate. The application of the petitioner shall be considered afresh by the Collector, Hoshangabad on the basis of the material on record and such other material as may be placed by the petitioner before him in support of his title to the house. We do not, however, make any order as to costs, in the circumstances of this case. The outstanding security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.
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1973 (8) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the case of a mortgage decree it is not necessary for a son to allege or prove that the debt was incurred for an illegal or an immoral purpose and he can succeed if it is proved that the mortgage was not for legal necessity or for the payment of antecedent debt. We have already referred to the decision of the Court on this point. We must also hold in view of the reasons already set forth that the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ishwar Dayal v. Amba Prasad (A.T. R. 1935 Allahabad 667) is not a good law. As regards the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bishan Sarup v. Musa Mal(A.I.R. 1935 Allahabad. 817) there is nothing to show whether the alienation was made by the manager of a joint Hindu family and therefore the decision is not in point. We, therefore, hold that the decision of the High Court was not correct and allow this appeal with costs. The plaintiffs would be given a month's time for paying the necessary court fee. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (8) TMI 172 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ;s judgment. The petitioner is trying to get away with the ex parte dismissal of the claim and escape the liability under the promissory note which be executed in favour of the Bank without an adjudication on that question, for (be mere accident that the President of the Bank who represented it in the proceeding happened to be not present, when the case was called for bearing. All that the arbitrator has done by the impugned order is to give an opportunity to the claimant to prove the claim against the petitioner. This is a fit case, where the Tribunal would have set aside the ex parte award, and remitted the case for disposal on the merits, if the Bank filed an appeal in the matter. I can, therefore, find no justice in favour of the petitioner in his seeking to quash the impugned order. The extra-ordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked in favour of such a party. This original petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
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1973 (8) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... show that the applicants were using the name of the firm "Amin Chand and Sons" under which the respondent Shiv Dayal and his partner are carrying on the business, on the goods manufactured by the applicants. In these circumstances, we do not see how the respondent has committed any contempt by disobeying the order of this Court There can be no dispute that the respondent was entitled to file a complaint on the ground that the applicants were manufacturing goods under the trade marks as being manufactured by the firm of "Amin Chand and Sons" and were passing off the goods as manufactured by the respondent firm. It would appear that the applicants have filed a petition under Section 561-A of the CrPC before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana far quashing the order of the Magistrate holding that the complaint was maintainable. The High Court will pass the appropriate order on that petition. 28. We see no substance in this petition. We therefore dismiss it.
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1973 (8) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the Code and before reaching its conclusion upon fact the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; & (4) the allowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses Sheo Swarup Ors. v. The King Emperor 61 IA 398 Satwant Singh and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan 1961CriLJ766 and Sohrab v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1972 (3) SCR 751. We have been taken through the judgment of the High Court, and we find nothing in it which runs counter to the principles enunciated above. The judgment of the High Court in our opinion, calls for no interference. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed.
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1973 (8) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the judgment-debtors, as stated above, had not been controverted by any material put forward by the decree-holders. 21. We, therefore, think that there is enough evidence to indicate that the judgment-debtors had suffered substantial injury so far as the sale of the two bungalows numbers 8 & 10 on Tej Bahadur Sapru Road, Allahabad, is concerned. 22. The result is that we allow this appeal to the extent that we set aside the judgments and orders of the High Court and of the execution Court with regard to the sale of bungalows Nos. 8 & 10, together with their compound, and dismiss it as regards the other properties. We also set aside the execution sale of 7-5-1955 of these two bungalows with all the land in their compound. We order that these two bungalows will be sold afresh after judicially considering and deciding the question whether they can be sold separately and what particulars should be inserted in the sale proclamation. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1973 (8) TMI 168 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the burden of establishing that the interest is excessive lies on the debtor setting up a plea that the interest charged is usurious and that it is only when that is established the presumption under Explanation (1) to Section 3 (1) of the Usurious Loans Act, as amended by the Madras Amendment Act, arises. In the instant case, the defendants have not established that the interest charged is excessive. There is neither pleading nor evidence on record to support such a plea and the defendants have failed to discharge the burden which clearly lay on them. The mere fact that interest was charged at 8 1/2 per cent per annum with monthly rests by the plaintiff-bank, ft cannot be presumed that the interest is excessive and that the transaction was substantially unfair on the date on which the loan was advanced by the bank to the defendants firm. 56. In the result all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants fail and this appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1973 (8) TMI 167 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f a person. Goodwill may be an intangible property as argued by the learned counsel for the revenue, but as earlier observed, in the instant case, after the death of Hari Ram, the same did not pass on to the heirs who in the partnership firm during its continuance are only entitled to receive the share of profits. Goodwill has no value in a going concern of partnership and its quantification is not possible and as such the value of the so-called share held by Hari Ram in the goodwill of the firm could not legally be included in the principal value of the estate of the deceased. In this view of the matter, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in excluding the sum of ₹ 8,917 alleged to be the share of goodwill of Hari Ram in M/s. Ved Parkash Vijay Kumar. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative. The assessee shall be entitled to his costs from the department which are assessed at ₹ 150. Question answered in the negative.
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1973 (8) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 20 of the Act of 1963), is not to be exercised arbitrarily but on sound and reasonable grounds "guided by judicial principles so that it is capable of correction by a court of appeal". It appeared, quite rightly, to the High Court that the Trial Court had gone completely astray in the exercise of its discretion on the footing that the Plaintiff-Respondent enjoyed an "unfair advantage" over the first Defendant-Appellant, whereas, on the facts and circumstances of the case, it was the first Defendant who was placed in a position to exploit the need of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's allegedly insecure position under the first agreement. It is clear that the Plaintiff-Respondent had dealt very fairly and squarely with the first Defendant-Appellant. The Trial Court's error in the exercise of its discretion on an utterly untenable, fanciful and unsound ground was rightly corrected by the High Court. 26. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.
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1973 (8) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... much harmful effect it would have upon the health of the person consuming it. All that is required to be shown is that the article of food in question was adulterated. So far as that aspect of the matter is concerned in the present case we find that the coconut oil which was purchased from Pranjivan was adulterated as it did not confirm to the prescribed standard. According to Section 2 of the Act, an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated if inter alia the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed limits of variability. The High Court has on account of special reasons awarded a sentence to Pranjivan which is less than the minimum prescribed by the Act. We see no cogent ground to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in the matter of sentence awarded to Pranjivan. 7. We accordingly accept the appeal of Shrimati Manibai set aside her conviction and acquit her. The appeal so far as it relates to Pranjivan Morarji, is dismissed.
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1973 (8) TMI 164 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... er had been withdrawn much earlier and the application to sue as a pauper, as such, did not survive for being dismissed on July 18, 1949. In law, therefore, there was no rejection of the plaint in the suit and, therefore, the suit continued to remain on the file. While it continued on the file the plaintiff applied to the court and paid the court fee ,as ordered. On the acceptance of the court fee by the court, the document, namely, the plaint would by virtue of Section 149 C.P.C., have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance viz. on the date it was presented to the court i.e. January 2, 1948. In our view therefore, the suit must be regarded as properly filed on January 2, 1948; and that being admittedly the last date on which the suit could have been legally filed to avoid the bar of limitation, the plea of limitation made on behalf of the defendants must fail. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (8) TMI 162 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on the. nature and effect of an order passed under S. 31 (2). Suffice it to say that different views have been expressed by the High Court,,;. As already stated, one item of the properties has been ,old by the Administrator-General with the sanction of the Court and the proceeds of the sale are with him. We pass a decree against the respondent-defendants directing them to pay the appellants the principal amount due under the two mortgages together with 6 per cent interest from June 1, 1950 on the principal amount up to the date of payment or realization. The amount decreed will be a charge on the sale proceeds of one of the properties which are being retained by the Administrator-General and, on the entire interest in the other property under the mortgages. The decree of the High Court is set aside and a decree in terms as aforesaid is passed. The appeal is allowed in the manner and to" the extent indicated above. The parties will bear their costs here. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (8) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1955 to be circumstances indicating that the 'defendants themselves had put an interpretation upon the original lease which the Division Bench accepted as correct by finding out the meaning of the deed of 1931 first. We have not found it necessary to rely upon anything in the agreement of 27--5-55 either for interpreting the terms of the lea-se of 17-9-31 on as all admission on any question or as providing a basis for an estoppel or as a circumstance supporting our views. As indicated above, we have reached our conclusion, quite apart from the contents of the subsequent agreement or the conduct of the parties, by interpreting the lease deed of 17-9-31 on its own language and terms. We think that, on the language of the lease itself, the interpretation adopted by us is the only one, which could give effect and meaning to all its parts read as a whole. We therefore, affirm the decision and decree of the Division Bench, and dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (8) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nsic search and cannot undo the effect of evidence otherwise sufficient. Motives of men are often subjective, submerged and unamenable to easy proof that courts have to go without clear evidence thereon if other clinching evidence exists. In the case on hand the enmity with Sita Ram being active and admitted,, the pique against Hariba, his loyal dependent, is understandable. While striking the deceased he was asked in a tell-tale manner, whether he would still stay at Vasti (Kadamwadi, with Sita Ram). That betrays the motive. We affirm the finding of the High Court. Two men in their twenties thus stand convicted of murder and have to suffer imprisonment for life because the punitive strategy of our Penal Code does not sufficiently reflect the modern trends in correctional treatment and personalised sentencing. We do riot wish to consider these facets as they fall outside our scope here. We confirm the conviction and sentence and dismiss the appeal. K. B. N. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (8) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ve any decision on any dispute between co-defendants-respondents regarding the right to possess any property which may have vested in the Custodian, Evacuee Property. A decision on such a dispute is not necessary for deciding the case before us. There is, therefore, no question of res-judicata between co-defendants on the points raised. And, we cannot allow the plaintiffs-appellants to raise any such question on behalf of the Custodian, Evacuee Property, as their learned Counsel seemed to be attempting to do, in a desperate attempt to clutch at a straw. The result is that we affirm the judgment and decree of the Punjab High Court and dismiss this appeal. An application on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants (C.M.P. No. 2487 of 1967), seeking permission to introduce additional questions in respect of Banjar land, is also dismissed for the reasons already given. In the circumstances of this case, we order that the parties will bear-their own costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (8) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rns in the region for the purpose of determining basic wages and dearness allowance of the workmen of the Woolcombers, the Tribunal should bear in mind that the selected concerns are as nearly similar to the line of business carried on by the Woolcombers as possible. The selected concerns should not be disproportionately larger than the Woolcombers. The concerns should as far as possible be compared with the Woolcombers as to their standing, extent of their labour force, extent of their customers, their profit and losses and an other relevant considerations. We direct the Tribunal to record a fresh finding on the quantum of the basic wages and dearness allowance by applying the region part of the industry-cum-region formula and in the light of our judgment. Parties are allowed to adduce their evidence on this limited question only. The Tribunal should send its finding to this Court within four months from the receipt of the record from this Court. Costs will abide the event.
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1973 (8) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r cases are similar to the case of the appellant in C.A. No. 275 of 1971. In C.A. No. 248 of 1971 the appellants were permanent teachers of the Training Institute. Their duty was to coach the trainees in certain subjects. As the trainees did not offer the subjects in which the appellants were specialists, they became surplus. Their cases also resemble the case of the appellant in C.A. No. 275 of 1971. On the facts of these cases the appellants cannot complain of discrimination because it could not be and has not been shown that the Government servants similarly situated had been allowed to remain in service. The High Court was correct in all the three appeals in coming to a conclusion that the abolition of post does not attract Article 31 1. For the aforesaid reasons the appeals fail and are dismissed. In view of the fact that the High Court did not make any order as to costs in these appeals each party will pay and bear his own costs in the three appeals. Appeals dismissed.
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