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Showing 1 to 20 of 68 Records
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1974 (1) TMI 116 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 3. Mr. Rajasekhara Reddy , then contended that because illicit distillation was going on, the petitioner could not lift the minimum guaranteed quota. There is no evidence in support of this contention. Even otherwise, because of any such illicit distillation , we fail to understand as to how the petitioner can get absolved of his contractual and legal obligations. No provision of any law or authority was cited to us in support of this contention. 104. Mr. Ramakoti's contention was that there was delay in issuing the licence. Therefore, the quota fixed for the month of January could not be lifted. The counter disputes this allegation. It says that the petitioner deliberately delayed in taking out the licence. We have no reason to doubt the correctness of the counter. 105. Since no other contention was raised by any of the petitioners, the result is that all the Writ Petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/- in each case. 106. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (1) TMI 115 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... said decision, we should refuse to interfere with the State Government 's order which , as stated earlier , is patently wrong . 25. Then what is the relief which we can grant to the petitioner ? In the light of what is stated above we can only direct the State Government to keep the position of law as indicated in the abovesaid Bench decision in view and dispose of the case remitted by the central government for the grant of mining lease. 26. For the reasons stated above. We would allow the appeal, and quash , the impugned order of the state Government and a direction will be issued to the State and a direction to dispose of the petitions Government to dispose , of the petitions filed by the petitioner and the 4th respondent expeditiously in the light of the Bench decision referred to above and in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Advocate's fee ₹ 100 in each court. 27. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (1) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Employees' Provident Funds Act. Section 2(e)(ii) of that Act defines an 'Employer', to the extent material, as the person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs of an establishment and where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director or managing agent, such manager, managing director or managing agent. Thus the responsibility to pay the contributions to the Fund was of the appellants and if they have defaulted in paying the amount, they are liable to be prosecuted under Paragraph 76(a) of the Scheme which says that if any person fails to pay any contribution which he is liable to pay under the Scheme, he shall be punishable with six months' imprisonment or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. Such a personal liability does not fall within the scope of Section 4(1)(a)(iv) of the Act. 9. We therefore dismiss the appeal and direct that the prosecution shall proceed expeditiously.
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1974 (1) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to him before hand continued to belong to him after the change in tenancy. The term "acquire" has not been defined in the Act and so we have to accept its dictionary meaning as, "To make property one's own. To gain permanently. It is regularly applied to permanent acquisition" (Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopaedia, Eighth Edition, Vol. I. P. 114)" These observations, in my opinion, contain a correct statement of law on the point. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that these two fields could not be included in the surplus area of the landowner, Smt. Lachman and s.10-A was not attracted to a disposition of these fields either by an order made under s. 18 or otherwise. In the result, I would dismiss both these appeals, leaving the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. ORDER In accordance with the Judgment of the majority, the appeals are allowed, but in the circumstances, the parties will bear their costs throughout.
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1974 (1) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it was found to be contrary to the rules framed under the Mysore Act. No such contravention of a statutory rule has been shown in the present case because of the lease of the distillery in question to the appellant. It may be stated that no allegations were made in the writ petition by respondent No. 1 that the act of the authorities in the grant of lease of the distillery in question to the appellant was mala fide. There arises consequently no occasion for us to go into that aspect. Nor has the above act been shown to be vitiated by an such arbitrariness as should call for interferences by the Court. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the matter is concluded by the decisions of this Court. As a result of the above, we accept the appeals, set aside the judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner and dismiss the petitions under article 226 filed by respondent No. 1. Looking to all the circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. S.B.W. Appeals allowed.
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1974 (1) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... that the appeal has abated and must, therefore, be dismissed. What the respondent contends is that in view of the dissolution of the Orissa Legislative Assembly, it has become academic to decide the appeal and hence we should decline to hear it. That is a wholly different contention which is not covered by the observations quoted above. We do not, therefore, think this decision throws any light on the contention raised before us. It does not compel us to take a different view from the one we are inclined to take on principle. We are, therefore, of the view that, the Orissa Legislative Assembly being dissolved during the pendency of this appeal, it is now wholly academic to consider whether the respondent was disqualified under s. 9A at the date of nomination and since that is the only ground on which election of the respondent is challenged, we think it would be futile to hear this appeal on merits. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with no orders as to costs all throughout.
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1974 (1) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... directions, was also invalid. A Mandamus shall therefore, issue directing the appellant to restore and refix the place of Manickyam in the list of seniority as on December 31, 1958, in accordance with the Railway Board's directions of October 16, 1952 and taking into account other relevant considerations, but ignoring the directions contained in the Board's communication of November 2, 1957 and January 13, 1961 to the extent they have been held to be unconstitutional and invalid. If as a result of the refixation of his seniority as directed, Manickyam becomes entitled to be promoted or to be considered for promotion, he shall be so promoted or considered for promotion on an actual or notional basis, with effect from the date on which such promotion or consideration for promotion, as the case may be, falls due. With the slight modification, indicated above, we dismiss this appeal. Appellant shall pay the costs of Respondent Manickyam, in this Court. Appeals dismissed.
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1974 (1) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... interpret the various provisions of the Act not in order to, consider their constitutionality or the reasonableness of the restrictions as reflecting on the constitutionality, but of their interpretation in so far as they are likely to lead to difficulties in actual application of the provisions of the Act. I think it would be good in the interest of all concerned if the Act is amended as early as possible to remove all the lacunae and the difficulties pointed out above. These difficulties have- arisen because of an attempt blindly to apply the provisions, which would be' quite workable if they are applied to conditions where the Factories Act would be applicable, where the labour is regular in its attendance- every day as well as over a period, to conditions of work which are vastly different as well as to people who work at- home without a conscious attempt to mould them to suit those conditions. The sooner that is done the better for all concerned. Appeals dismissed.
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1974 (1) TMI 108 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e set out in an earlier part of this judgment clearly provides that disputes and differences are to be settled by the Central Board of Arbitration. The charterers approached the Board. The Board has declined to arbitrate. Under Section 8, a vacancy has been caused- The court has to fill up the vacancy unless it was intended that the vacancy should not be filled. On a plain reading of the agreement in the context of the various terms of the charterparty the arbitration agreement, in my view, does not show that it was intended that the vacancy should not be supplied see M/s. Parbhat General Agencies, etc. v. Union of India and another, etc., 1971 (1) Supreme Court Cases 79(12). (56) I would, therefore, accept the application (IA 68 of 1974) and refer the matter to arbitration. I appoint Shri K. N. Wanchoo, retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs
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1974 (1) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ny gold is acquired a declaration has to be made in regard thereto, no matter how or by what means it is acquired. We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that the respondent was not liable to make under Rule 1261 a declaration as to the gold in his possession and that therefore Rule 126P is not attracted. The view taken by a learned single Judge of the High Court of Mysore in K. Vishnumoorthi v. State of Mysore and Anr.( 1971 2 Mys. L. J. 261.) that "gold" as defined in Part XIIA includes smuggled gold is, in our opinion, correct. We are not concerned in this case to determine whether on the particular facts of the case the Mysore High Court was right in refusing to apply section 4 of the 'Probation of Offenders Act to the case before it. The order of the learned Magistrate convicting and sentencing the respondent under section 135 of the Customs Act as also under Rule 126P of the Defence of India Rules must therefore be restored. Appeals allowed.
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1974 (1) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... annot successfully invoke s. 17. The award is an inseparable tangle of several clauses and cannot be enforced as to the part not dealing with immovable property. As already stated, various other relevant clauses constitute consideration for, clause (1), that is, for the creation of absolute rights in the factory and other properties in favour of the appellant. This is perfectly clear from a the note of the arbitrators appended to the award as clause 8. The appellant is not given a right to run the factory unless he had paid the awarded consideration to the respondent. For the reasons a ready discussed, we agree with the learned single Judge that the award requires registration and not being registered, no judgment could be pronounced upon it. In the view that we have taken, the special leave petition cannot be admitted. The appeal as well as the special leave petition are accordingly dismissed. The respondent shall get his costs in the appeal. Appeal and petition dismissed..
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1974 (1) TMI 105 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ner. In action of the nature disclosed in the case is not conductive to the maintenance of confidence of the litigant public in Tribunals constituted under special Acts. Although the Collector of Central Excise is entrusted primarily with administrative powers, yet in as much as he exercises quasi-judicial functions while disposing of appeals, his conduct at this stage must conform to rules of fair play, and must be such as to install faith in his objectivity of approach to the cause before him. The undue delay in the decision of the appeals preferred by the petitioner is not commendable. 3. The writ petition is accordingly allowed, and the respondent No. 2 is directed to decide the appeals preferred by the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date on which the petitioner submits detailed particulars of the appeals before him. The petitioner is entitled to its costs. A copy of this order shall be sent immediately to the respondent No. 2 for early compliance.
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1974 (1) TMI 104 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed before the taxing authorities that the entire payments he had received relating to the sale of photographs was nothing but remuneration towards his skill and labour. The assessing officer took the view that the substance of the contract was not the performance of skilled services, but the supply of finished goods. In our opinion, that is the only possible view which can be taken. We agree with the reasoning adopted by the Patna High Court in M. Ghosh v. State of Bihar 1961 12 S.T.C. 154., and the series of authorities referred to above which support the said view and do not think it necessary to reproduce the reasonings here to support our conclusion. 7.. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, shall be that The Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, was right in holding that the supply of photographs of customers on payment is a sale exigible to sales tax under the Act. There shall be no order for costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (1) TMI 103 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s were started in 1966 and 1968. Objections were filed by the petitioner before the respective Certificate Officers which were turned down on 28th January, 1967, in C.C. No. 1 of 1966 and the other on 12th December, 1968, in C.C. No. 32 of 1968. At that stage the petitioner could have gone to the civil court or could have come to this court if he had a genuine grievance but instead of doing so be unsuccessfully carried on appeals and revisions under the P.D.R. Act. If really his grievance was on any legal ground which he could not have agitated in any other forum, he should not have waited so long and file these petitions in July, 1971. Apart from lack of merit in the case we are also inclined to hold that there has been undue delay for which we are loath to interfere in the matter. The petitions, therefore, must fail and hence they are hereby dismissed with costs. Hearing fee of Rs. 100 (one hundred only). G.K. MISRA, C.J.I agree. B.K. PATRA, J.I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (1) TMI 102 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f Mr. Mohanty would lead to uncertainty. There would be no indication in the rule as to in whose favour the crossed cheque has to be drawn. As the crossed cheque and the bank draft have reference to the bank, the rule-making authority has put both the clauses together. It would, therefore, follow that the requirements of section 13 and rule 36 put together would be that the tax due must be paid on or before the due date by one of the four modes indicated above. Then only the entitlement under section 13(8) of the Act to rebate would be acquired. 5.. The delay on the part of the Sales Tax Officer to encash the cheque in the facts of this case is of no material consequence and the Tribunal has unnecessarily dilated upon it. 6.. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, shall be On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, rebate under section 13(8) of the Act was not admissible. We make no direction as to costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (1) TMI 101 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in exercise of power under section 8(5) of the Central Act cannot be permitted to run counter to section 15(b) of the Central Act. That view has been taken in Rafeeq Ahmed and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1969 24 S.T.C. 430., and we respectfully agree with the same. The tax to be refunded under section 15(b) of the Central Act is the tax levied under the State Act. The notification, in our view, is a misconceived one, though it was intended to avoid the hardship of the claim of refund. We hold that it is not enforceable. 6.. The legal position being what we have indicated above, the impugned order of assessment as also the appellate decision cannot be sustained. They are accordingly quashed. The assessing officer is directed to redispose of the assessment of the petitioner under the Central Act for the year 1967-68 in accordance with law. The writ application is allowed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 100 (one hundred). B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Application allowed.
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1974 (1) TMI 100 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the impugned resolution is squarely opposed to the provisions of section 11 of the Sales Tax Act. The valuable right vested in the commission agents to get the amount of sales tax paid by them reimbursed by their principals is being taken away by the impugned resolution. Where the market committee prohibits the commission agents from charging sales tax from their principals, it is nothing but a contravention of the provisions of section 11 of the Sales Tax Act. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the learned single judge that the passing of the impugned resolution is nothing but regulating the trade practices within the notified area. 22.. For all the reasons stated, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned resolution is illegal, without jurisdiction and unenforceable and is liable to be quashed. 23.. In the result, the writ appeals and the writ petition are allowed with costs and the writs shall issue. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each. Appeals and Petition allowed.
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1974 (1) TMI 99 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld that taxable turnover must be fixed at one-fourth of the said estimated gross turnover keeping the normal proportion in view. If the suppressed taxable turnover is estimated at fifty per cent of the estimated gross turnover, it may not be unreasonable. These we have indicated only as guidelines because we do not intend to make an estimate ourselves. In the next year also a similar procedure is open to be followed. 7.. Our answer to the second question, therefore, would be The enhancement of the gross and taxable turnovers by 20 per cent for the year 1964-65 and by 5 per cent for the year 1965-66 in the instant case seem to be arbitrary and unwarranted. 8.. It is for the Tribunal now, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, as also taking the law into consideration, to determine as to what should be the appropriate estimates of gross and taxable turnovers for the two years. We make no order as to costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1974 (1) TMI 98 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s been done away with in the statutory provision and since confiscation is co-related to an instance of sale only, it must follow that confiscation is a matter incidental and ancillary to taxation and is, therefore, within the legislative competence of the State in terms of entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 7.. On the aforesaid analysis, the irresistible conclusion which one can only reach is that the provision is intra vires. The petitioner s entire attack in this case was to the vires and to no other. In fact Mr. Ray had conceded during argument that if the statutory provision turned out to be intra vires, he had no further grievance against the impugned order. 8.. We would accordingly dismiss this petition. We, however, do not make any order as to costs because the petitioner appears to have rushed to court on the basis of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court without realising the distinction. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (1) TMI 97 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in annexure C to one of the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, very many discrepancies Prima facie have been detected. In such a situation, I do not think that this court would be justified in knocking down the whole action of the respondents for their failure to grant a receipt to the petitioners, as required by section 37(3) of the Act. To complete the formality, they would be directed to grant a formal receipt to the petitioners which may be in the form of a copy of annexure A, of course, showing the date also in that. 23.. For the reasons stated above, this writ application is partly allowed. Respondent No. 2 is directed to send a receipt to the petitioners or, to be more accurate, to petitioner No. 1, which may be in the form of a true copy of the original of annexure A. The petitioners, in my opinion, are not entitled to any other relief in this case. In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. N.P. SINGH, J.-I agree. Petition partly allowed.
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