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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 77 Records
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1974 (11) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n any part of the deed to show an intention on the part of the deceased to treat them as properties belonging to the joint family. It was also found that there was no evidence of any clear intention of the deceased to waive his separate rights. Accordingly, the Board came to the conclusion that the said document was not a partition deed relating to the joint family property. In the circumstances, we find no sufficient ground for remanding the case. 25. As a result of the above we accept the appeal, discharge the answer given by the High Court to the question referred to it and answer that question in favour of the revenue and against the accountable person. Our answer is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the entire value of the property known as "Mayavaram Lodge" is liable to be included in the principal value of the estate of the deceased as property deemed to have passed on his death. The appellant shall be entitled to the costs of the appeal.
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1974 (11) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the complainant in the particular case. It is unrealistic to assume that he was so flooded with work that he could remember no details of an important murder trial. 13. Soney Lal who gave the First Information Report at the police station also implicated Shri Ram but, apparently, the High Court was not impressed by his evidence. If has relied' on the evidence of Om Prakash Dubey in, order to hold that Shri Ram had played an important role in the murder of Kunwar Singh. Considering the serious infirmities from Which the evidence of Dubey suffers we are of the opinion that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court in favour of Shri Ram. Soney Lal's evidence seems to us insufficient to sustain the conviction of Shri Ram. 14. In the result we dismiss the appeal of Sia Ram and confirm his conviction and sentence. We allow the appeals of Violet and Shri Ram and acquit them. These two shall be set at liberty forthwith.
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1974 (11) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bject of killing Haiku. We do not find in the judgment of the High Court any discussion of the substantial reasons given by the Sessions Court for not accepting the testimony of the eye-witnesses in regard to Bhawani. The view taken by the Sessions Court was in any event a reasonably possible view of the evidence in so far as the case against Bhawani is concerned. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was in error in reversing the acquittal of Bhawani and the appeal, in so far as it relates to him, must succeed. 6. We accordingly allow the appeal in so far as it relates to Bhawani Appellant No. 4. We acquit Bhawani appellant No. 4 of the offences charged against him and since he is on bail, we direct that he need not surrender to his bail and that the bail bonds be discharged. So far as other appellants, namely, Mehtab Singh, Ram Singh, Sukhram, Maniram, Nandram and Than Singh are concerned, the appeal is dismissed. These appellants will surrender to their bail.
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1974 (11) TMI 104 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e reading and interpretation of the Master Plan alone. It was primarily and essentially within the domain of the criminal court where the prosecutions were pending to arrive at its own conclusion on appreciation of the entire evidence placed before it. It is, no doubt true that the onus squarely is on the prosecution to bring home the charge to the accused by proving all that would be required to be proved for establishing the guilt Under Section 29(2) of the Development Act. The persons prosecuted will undoubtedly have adequate opportunities of defending themselves and to show that ingredients which were necessary to be proved and established by the prosecution had not been so proved or established. 11. For the reasons stated above, we allow these appeals, quash the judgment and orders of the High Court and direct that the prosecutions against the accused respondents shall be proceeded with and brought to conclusion in accordance with law. We shall make no order as to costs
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1974 (11) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... missing the appeals are, however, set aside and the appeals are remanded to the High Court for disposal in the light, of the observations with reference to Section 13(1)(f) and/or (f) whichever is applicable. The landlords may now be given by the High Court an opportunity, if they so wish, to adduce evidence with regard to such further requirements under (f) and/or (ff) as may be applicable and the High Court will call for a finding from the appropriate court in that behalf and, thereafter, dispose of the appeals on merits. Since success is shared, there will be no orders as to costs in these appeals. ORDER In accordance with the majority judgment, the appeals are allowed with costs; the cases are remanded to the High Court, and the High Court is directed to dispose of the case in the light of the directions and observations made in the majority judgment. It will be open to the Court seized of the matter to direct, in its discretion, amount of costs to be incurred hereafter.
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1974 (11) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... regarding the submission of applications of the intending exporters, the issue of permits and the payments of Administrative Surcharge." The stand taken in the petitions of appeal was not pursued at the time of the hearing. It is, therefore, clear that the administrative surcharge levied by the State Government on the export of tapioca,as it was bad. The realisations thereunder were without the authority of law. It will, however, be open to the State Government to impose tax or fee, as they may be advised to do in accordance with law and if permissible under it, for permitting the respondents to export tapioca outside the State of Kerala. The debatable question as to the nature of impost, its constitutional validity and legal justifiability will have to be gone into then. On the facts as they stand in these appeals, we uphold the orders of the Kerala High Court for the reasons given by us. The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed
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1974 (11) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... osing a sentence of imprisonment. 8. We may point out that there are two decisions, one of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Biddika Jogannadham v. Superintendent Central Jail Visakhapatnam and Anr. WP No. 711 of 1974 decided on September 24, 1974 and the other of the Bombay High Court in Narayanan Nambeesan as, the State of Maharashtra, 76 Bom. L.R. 690 where the same view in regard to the interpretation of Section 428 which has found favour with us, has been taken. The Delhi High Court has, however, taken a different view in the case of this very petitioner in Mr. Boucher Pierre Andre v. The Superintendent, Central Jail Tihar, New Delhi and Anr. Crl. Writ No. 21 of 1974, decided on September 27, 1974. The decision of the Delhi High Court must be regarded as incorrect and it must be overruled. 9. We are, therefore, of the view that the detention of the petitioner in jail since 12th August, 1974 is illegal and we accordingly direct that the should be set at liberty forthwith.
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1974 (11) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt in the particular case. It is unrealistic to assume that he was so flooded with work that he could remember no details of an important murder trial. Soney Lal who gave the First Information Report.at the police station, also implicated. Shri Ram but, apparently, the High Court was not impressed by his evidence. has relied on the evidence of Om Prakash- Dubey in order to hold that Shri Ram had played an important role in the murder of Kunwar Singh. Considering the serious infirmities from which the evidence of Dubey suffers we are of the opinion that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of acquittal passed, by the trial. court, in favour of Shri Ram. Soney Lal's evidence seems to us insufficient to sustain the conviction of Shri Ram. In the result we dismiss the appeal of Sia Ram and confirm his conviction and sentence. We allow the appeals of Violet and Shri Ram and acquit them. These two shall be set at liberty forthwith. Appeals partly allowed.
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1974 (11) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. If not detained, he was likely to indulge in such activities in pursuance of his design and conspiracy. It is not an ordinary case of finding a person once in possession of stolen goods of ordinary type. To find a man carrying such huge quantity of Telegraph Copper Wires could reasonably satisfy the detaining authority that he was acting and was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The petitioner and his associates acted like seasoned criminals when on being challenged by the public, they said that they were carrying an ailing Muslim lady inside the cart which on search was found to be a "lady" of 11 bundles of Copper Wires. 6. No other infirmity in the detention of the petitioner could be pointed out or found. The petition therefore is dismissed and the rule is discharged.
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1974 (11) TMI 98 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... viction is based is wholly unworthy of acceptance. Learned counsel appearing for the, appellant argued that the violation of section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act has caused prejudice to the accused and has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Were it necessary we would have upheld this contention because the order giving permission to Kewal Ram to investigate the offence gives no reasons and the illegality committed has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Kewal Ram misled the Magistrate into granting the permission and he had himself more than a personal interest in the case which he sought permission to investigate. It is, however, unnecessary to pursue this point as it is impossible to uphold the conviction on merits. In, the result we allow the appeal and set aside the order of conviction, the substantive sentence as also the sentence of fine. Fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the widow of the deceased appellant, who has prosecuted the appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (11) TMI 97 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... place all the relevant facts before the Court and if there is any delay in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention which is prima facie unreasonable, the State must give reasons explaining the delay. Vide Sk. Serajul v. State of West Bengal.( W.P. 2000 of 1973, decided on September 9, 1974 ) Since in the present case no explanation for the delay has been given in the affidavit-in reply filed by the District Magistrate, we are not at all satisfied that the District Magistrate applied his mind and arrived at a real and genuine subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. The condition precedent for the making of the order of detention was, therefore, not satisfied and consequently the order of detention must be quashed and set aside. We accordingly quash and set aside the order of detention and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith. Petitioned allowed.
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1974 (11) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ould only say that since there are no restrictions, they must have run more miles and that cannot be said to be a purely speculative assessment. If the petitioners and the appellants had a case that contract carriages were not running more miles on an average than the stage carriages, it would have been open for them to place relevant materials before the Court as the materials were within their exclusive knowledge and possession. In these circumstances, we think there is the presumption that the classification is reasonable, especially in the light of the fact that the classification is based on local conditions of which the Government was fully cognizant. Since the petitioners and the appellants have not discharged the burden of proving that the classification is unreasonable, we hold that the levy of an enhanced rate of vehicle tax on contract carriages was not hit by Article 14. We dismiss the writ petitions and appeals without any order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (11) TMI 95 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r powerlooms owned by the firm. However, it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the firm is having not four powerlooms as contended by the petitioner but it is having eight powerlooms. If that is so, the firm also would be liable to pay higher excise duty on the basis of having more than four powerlooms. That all depends on whether the firm is having four powerlooms as contended by the petitioner or eight powerlooms as contended by the respondent. With this observation, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 3. Apart from the merits, the petitioner also has not exercised the remedy open to him under Section 35 and 36 of the Central Excise Act for filing an appeal and thereafter a revision to the Central Excise Collector and to the Central Excise Board, before involving the writ jurisdiction of this Court. On this ground also, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocates fee ₹ 100/-.
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1974 (11) TMI 94 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... entral Government made on 24-4-1962. only exempts handloom fabrics from the levy of excisable duty and it does not change the nature and character of the goods as excisable goods within the meaning the Act. The Notification proceeds an the assumption that the handloom fabrics are excisable goods. If the handloom fabrics are not excisables goods, there was no need or occasion for exempting the same from the levy of excise duty. We are unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner that once the handloom fabrics are exempted from excise duty, they cease to be excisable goods. As we have already pointed out, the character as excisable goods does not depend on the actual levy of duty, but on the description as excisable goods in the First Schedule to the Act. We are, therefore, unable to interfere with the orders of the respondents. 8. The writ petitioner accordingly fails and it is dismissed. The rule nisi is discharged. But there will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (11) TMI 93 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ds. Hence his order is clearly unsustainable. He should be directed to examine this question and then to decide afresh whether these two types of vehicles are exigible to excise duty. 17. In case the Dy. Collector holds that these two types of vehicles are adapted for use upon public roads, and hence come within the ambit of Item No. 34 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Act, he should further examine whether any parts of these two types of vehicles should not be taken into account for the purposes of that item, as provided in the explanation to that item. In the result, we quash the order of the Deputy Collector of Central Excise, dated 25-2-1971 (Annexure II) and direct him to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the aforesaid elucidation of law and after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to produce materials and to adduce evidence in support of its contentions. 18. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1974 (11) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the umpire as sole arbitrator had jurisdiction to enter upon the reference and pass the award?
Whether the direction in the award to return the security deposit of ₹ 1,81,000 to the appellant can be said to be a matter arising, out of the second contract and referred to arbitration, under point 2(a) or point 2(d) of the points of reference?
Held that:- As already said, paragraph 5 of the order in O.P. 11 of 1972 leaves no room for doubt that it was a consent order. The Board made no endeavour to have that order vacated by filing a review, if the statement in that order that it was passed on the basis of consent proceeded from a mistake of the court. On the other hand, we find that the Board participated in the proceedings before the umpire without any demur to his jurisdiction. The only inference from this conduct on the part of the Board is that it had not objection to the order revoking the authority of the arbitrators. Therefore, by acquiescence the Board was precluded from challenging the jurisdiction of the umpire.
As it was contended for the Board that point 2(a) of the reference related only to the sum still payable for the work done under the second contract and therefore the return of the security amount would not be covered by point 2(a). And, as regards point 2(d), the contention of the, Board was that it related to the claims of the Board against the respondent in respect of or under the agreement. The Board, therefore, contended that the matter was not referred to the arbitrators either under point 2(a) or 2(d). The High Court did not express any final opinion on this question - Allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court
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1974 (11) TMI 91 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it is permissible for the State Government to auction licences for carrying on the business of selling foreign liquor which is neither manufactured nor imported by the State Government?
Held that:- The grant of a lease either by public auction or for a sum is a regulation pertaining to liquor One of the purposes of regulation is to raise revenue. Revenue is collected by the grant of contracts to carry on trade in liquor. These contracts are sold by auction. The grantee is given a licence on payment of auction price. For these reasons we hold that the State has the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. The State grants such right or privilege in the shape of a licence or a lease. The State has the power to hold a public auction for grant of such right or privilege and accept payment of a sum in consideration of grant of lease. The appeals and the writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed.
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1974 (11) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of the detention of the petitioner under an order of detention dated 3rd November, 1973 passed by the District Magistrate, Malda under sub-section (1) read with subsection (2) of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 challenged
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The material from the history-sbeet, which was not disclosed to the petitioner, did not form part of the grounds of detention on which the order of detention was made by the District Magistrate and approved by the State Government, but merely constituted "other particulars" communicated by the District Magistrate to the State Government under section 3, sub-section (3). There was, therefore, no obligation on the District Magistrate or the State Government to disclose this material to the petitioner and the nondisclosure of which to the petitioner did not have the effect of invalidating the approval of the State Government to the order of detention.
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1974 (11) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a person who is put on the black list by the State Government is entitled to a notice to be heard before the name is put on the black list?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. With regard to the case of the petitioners, it is made clear that the authorities will give an opportunity to the petitioners to represent their case, and the authorities will hear the petitioners as to whether their name should be put on the blacklist or not. This is made clear that the decision on this question will not have any effect on the proceedings pending in Calcutta High Court where the petitioner has challenged the adjudication proceedings under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act. Any decision of the authorities on the blacklisting will have no effect on the correctness of any of the facts involved in those proceedings.
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1974 (11) TMI 88 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... C. 118 (All.). were discussed and held to be no more good law. A Bench of this Court held following the view of the Supreme Court that after conversion of black-gram and green-gram into dal they become two different commodities and thus the proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) is applicable. 12.. On the aforesaid analysis, we would hold that beams, rafters, planks and railway sleepers are not timbers, though they are made of wood. By a process of manufacture in the saw mill of the assessee, the timbers were converted into different commodities known in the commercial market differently and utilised for different purposes and sold in that converted form but not in its nascent form as timber. Thus, the proviso to section 5(2)(A)(a)(ii) of the Act is squarely attracted. 13.. Accordingly, we would allow these references answering the question in the affirmative in favour of the revenue against the assessee. Hearing fee Rs. 100. S.K. RAY, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly.
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