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Showing 1 to 20 of 76 Records
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1974 (2) TMI 99 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... just disposed of. In the particulars furnished to the petitioner it was mentioned that he had committed theft of an electric copper wire and of an aluminium conductor wire on the 16th and 24th April, 1972. In the affidavit filed in this Court by the Deputy Secretary, Home (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal, it is stated in paragraph 8 that the record shows that the petitioner was "a notorious anti-social and criminal indulging in wagon breaking and theft of overhead electric copper wire". The particulars furnished to the petitioner do not refer to any incident of wagon breaking and therefore the petitioner had no opportunity of making an effective representation to the Government. It is clear from the affidavit that the detaining authority was influenced by the consideration that the petitioner was concerned with incidents involving breaking of wagons. This order in also in violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and must therefore be set aside.
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1974 (2) TMI 98 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le 226 for which a special procedure is prescribed by the Constitution. The argument is, therefore, not sound." 15. For the reasons given above, my answer to the question referred is that Section 5 (2) (a) of the Act has no impact on writ petitions or special appeals arising out of them in which judgments or orders passed in suits or proceedings relating to declaration of rights in land covered by a notification under Section 4 of the Act are in challenge and they will remain unaffected by the provision. Hirdai Narain Seth, J. 16. I agree. Kunwar Bahadur Asthana, J. 17. I also agree and have nothing to add. BY THE COURT 18. The answer to the question referred is that Section 5 (2) (a) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act has no impact on writ petitions or special appeals arising put of them in which judgments or orders passed in suits or proceedings relating to declaration of rights in land covered by a Notification under Section 4 of the said Act are in challenge.
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1974 (2) TMI 97 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to purchase the shares of Barooah because, if I do this, I will be doing great injustice to Barooah who has started this company, had majority shareholding and controlled the company from the inception, as such majority shareholder. The actual management was entrusted in the hands of his friend Khaund. It is unfortunate that for some reasons, Barooah and Khaund had differed. Only by the impugned resolution, Khaund became the majority shareholder. If I pass an order to allow Khaund to buy out the shares of Barooah, I do not think that Barooah could be compensated properly. If, on the other hand, the impugned resolutions, dated 14 and 20 January, 1971, are set aside and the company is restored to the position before the passing of the said resolutions, in my view, there will be end of the matters complained of. 179. In the premises, the appeal is dismissed. The cross-objection is allowed. I agree to the orders passed by my learned brother. I agree also to the order for costs.
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1974 (2) TMI 96 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt the inference that no satisfaction was really arrived at by the District Magistrate or that the satisfaction was colourable or no satisfaction at all as required by the statute. The satisfaction which the District Magistrate is required to reach in order to support the order of detention is that it is necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a particular manner & that satisfaction can obviously be founded only on a reasonably anticipated prognosis of future behavior of the petitioner made on the basis of past incidents It is not possible to say that the incidents referred to in the grounds of detention were such that they could not reasonably lead to the satisfaction which the District Magistrate reached when he made the order of detention. This contention urged on behalf of the petitioner must, therefore, be rejected and the order of detention must be held to be valid. 3. The petition, therefore, fails and the rule is discharged.
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1974 (2) TMI 95 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es. Supplies and stocks, if hijacked by wholesalers, upsets the delicate control scheme. So also transport and delivery to each center according to its requirements n thrown out of gear by these private operations. And Bihar, hopping harrowingly from drought to floods, can ill-afford to have the wheels of distribution, of which supplies and services are two facets, wobble or break down. Anyway, we cannot hold the order bad, in economics or law. 17. Counsel referred to the quantity being but 50 bags of rice-too small to thwart supplies to the community. While that is of little avail legally, it suggests cynically that larger black-marketers are easy in their bosom while deserving to be behind bars. That is not our province as judges, and our views as citizens are out of place. 18. In conclusion, we would like to express concern at prolonged detentions without trial without periodical review of each individual case in changing circumstances. The petition fails and is dismissed.
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1974 (2) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on reasonable probabilities and legal inferences arising from proved or admitted facts. The trial court Considered that as the vendor and the vendee and the alleged owner Laxman were dead, it was "not possible to obtain evidence to conclusively establish or rebut the allegation about the benami nature of Ex. 91 and therefore the case must be dealt with on reasonable probabilities and legal inferences arising from proved or admitted facts". But the trial court fell in error in relying on documents of dubious evidentiary value. The documents were, as already discussed, also consistent with the real ownership of Jankibai. So the trial court was wrong in thinking that it was reasonably probable that Laxman was the real owner of the suit land. In our view, the High Court has correctly appraised the entire evidence and has come to the right conclusion that the real owner of the suit land was Jankibai, and not Laxman. 31. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1974 (2) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... 1) nor Section 71 (2) of the Act em-powers the State Government to make rules prescribing any time-limit for the submission of notice or intimation under Section 63 (1). In the circumstances, Rule 4 (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Partnership (Registration of Firms) Rules, 1957 is ultra vires of the powers of the State Government under Section 71 (2) of the Act. The said Rule is, therefore, struck down, and the proceedings of the Registrar of Firms in F 2/8052/72, dated 30-11-1972 are quashed. It cannot be said that the intimation in this case about the change in the constitution of the firm has not been sent to the Registrar of Firms within a reasonable time. Therefore, the Registrar of Firms is directed to make a record of the notice in the entry relating to the firm in the Register of Firms and file the notice along with the statement relating to the firm filed under Section 59 of the Act. 14. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/-.
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1974 (2) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r with expenses and need for more licences. Since risk to life and health is avoided by the latter interpretation, we hold that the storage, even though for short spells and on (sic) hoc basis and without intent to sell at that place but as part of the sales business, comes within the scope of storage for sale’ in Section 18(c) and Rule 62. To loosen the law in its joints is to play with life and therefore anti-humanist. 12. On the admitted facts, the offence is not serious . On the face of it, the law is a little defective. Our interpretation makes the accused guilty and clarifies the legal position although the Central Government will do well to tidy up and tighten the provisions by a close second look at the law in the book. We need hardly say that a law is effective not by making it perfect on paper but by providing a sufficient and conscientious cadre of officers. 13. The sentence is light but here it is enough. We dismiss the appeal for the reasons above set out.
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1974 (2) TMI 91 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ; in Section 11 of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case as found by the second Appellate Authority Durga Prasad cannot be found in law to be holding the property allotted to the share of Nabin. Therefore, the Additional Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the income relatable to the property allotted to Nabin would not be assessed to agricultural income tax in the hands of Durga Prasad notwithstanding the admission of Durga Prasad that he was actually possessing the property on behalf of the true owner. After all the scheme in Section 11 of the Act is for a convenient method of assessment. 8. We would accordingly answer the question referred to us by saying. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Assessee could not be made liable to agricultural income tax in regard to the income arising out of the share of Nabin Kumar by virtue of Section 11 of the Orissa Agricultural Income Tax Act. We make no order as to costs. K.B. Panda J. 9. I agree.
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1974 (2) TMI 90 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... will be inequitable to dismiss their suit on the ground of limitation without giving them an opportunity to discharge their onus in this regard. 10. In the circumstances, the case is remanded to the trial court with the direction that he shall give an opportunity to plaintiffs in the first instance to discharge their onus that they came to know of the transfer under Ex. A/1 within 12 years of suit and also give the defendants to rebut the same and, thereafter, ultimately decide as to the date of knowledge of the plaintiffs and then dispose of the question of limitation and the suit finally. In doing so, the court must regard the findings as to the other ingredients of Article 61 (b) of Limitation Act as rendered above in this judgment and as to the nature of Ex. 1, final and not liable to be reopened before him. 11. In result, therefore, the suit is remanded to the trial court for fresh disposal after adjudicating the question of limitation only. Costs will abide the result.
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1974 (2) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be considered is that if the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 8 and 9 was not reliable enough for convicting A-5 - whose case according to the Counsel was almost identical with that of the appellants - it could not be deemed safe and sufficient for convicting the appellants. 42. We do not find any merit in this contention, either. Times out of number, this Court has pointed out that the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus should not be mechanically applied in this country. The mere fact that the evidence of these witnesses was unsafe for convicting A-5 was no ground for rejecting the whole body of their testimony. The High Court acquitted A-5, only as a matter of abundant caution. It did not find that the evidence of these witnesses regarding the implication of A-5, was necessarily false. 43. For all the reasons aforesaid, we would negative the contentions canvassed on behalf of the appellants, maintain the convictions and the sentences of the appellants and dismiss their appeals.
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1974 (2) TMI 88 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rther appears to me that they brought the suit only after the construction had been completed. In these circumstances, no case has been made out for issue of a mandatory injunction for demolition of the impugned construction. The suit has therefore, been rightly dismissed by the Courts below, and the judgment and decree under appeal do not call for any interference. 12. In the result, I dismiss this appeal, but without any order as to costs. 13. Before parting with the case, I wish to observe that the parties will be well advised not to rake up further disputes in respect of the use of this 'sal' which seems to be for the use of worshippers of both the temples, viz. the temple of Neelkanth Mahadeo and the temple of Lord Krishna and if ever any question as to its repairs and rejuvenation arises, they should settle the same amicably. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant prays for grant of leave under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. Lease is declined.
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1974 (2) TMI 87 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ule of seniority is a rule of law and inheres in Article 124(2) of the Constitution, any writ that may be issued by this Court, will be futile as he would be entitled to immediate re-appointment on the basis of this rule. (3) Even assuming the consultation contemplated by Article 124(2) of the Constitution to be mandatory, the issue of a writ of quo warranto will be futile as Justice A .N. Ray could be immediately re-appointed as the Chief Justice of India as he possesses the qualifications prescribed by Article 124(3) of the Constitution and there is no legal impediment in the way of his re-appointment. For these reasons, I dismiss the writ petitions. The arguments in this case have been comprehensive and the questions involved are purely legal. In these circumstances, I do not think it will be proper to make any orders as to costs and I do not make any such orders. Jagjjt SINGH. J. I agree. S. N. Shankar, J. I agree. V. S. Deshpande, J. I agree. Prakash Narain, J. I agree.
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1974 (2) TMI 86 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed in the apparently single solitary incident communicated to the petitioner. To quote the words of one of us in Anil Dey v. State of West Bengal, W.R. No. 20 of 1973 decided on 22-2-1974 (reported in AIR 1974 Supreme Court 832) "the very proficiency and daring displayed by the petitioner, with his associates, in doing what he did, amounts to the attribution of a series of activities" more fully put down in paragraph 7 of the affidavit of the District Magistrate. It is, therefore, not possible to say that in arriving at the requisite satisfaction the District Magistrate relied on any ground not communicated to the petitioner, or that in making the order of detention he was guilty of any violation of the statutory provision in Section 8 or of the constitutional safeguard in Article 22, Clause (5). 3. This was the only contention urged on behalf of the petitioner and since there is no substance in it, the petition fails and the rule is discharged. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (2) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... therefore, bound to send the petitioner to the Court of the Special Magistrate. Visakhapatnam in compliance with the warrant for production and he acted according to law in doing so. The, production of the petitioner before the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam, could not, therefore, be said to be illegal and his subsequent detention in the Central Jail, Visakhapatnam. pursuant to the orders made by the Special Judge, Visakhapatnam, pending trial must be held to be valid. This Court pointed out in B. R. Rao v. State of Orissa(4) that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted "Where person is committed to jail custody by a competent court by an order which prima 'facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction wholly illegal". The present case is clearly covered by these observation and the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to free him from detention. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed and the rule nisi is discharged. Petition dismissed.
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1974 (2) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... along with his associates, on January 30, 197Z and August 1, 1972, are, mentioned. The particulars of any past crime committed by him, which were necessary for showing how he was a veteran railway criminal, were not communicated to the detenu. In respect of the uncommunicative material, nor privilege under Art. 22(6) was claimed'. In the absence of those material particulars, the detenu could not ,exercise his constitutional right of making an effective representation. In other words, the grounds communicated to the petitioner suffered .from vagueness. For the reasons aforesaid, all the three petitions are allowed and the petitioner in each of them is directed to be set at liberty forthwith. Nothing in this judgment, however shall preclude, the State Government /District Magistrate, if so advised, from passing fresh orders of the detention of the petitioners or any of them, after full and meticulous 'compliance with the procedure prescribed by law. Petitions allowed.
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1974 (2) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fested by criminals and due 'lo his close association with them. he developed criminal propensity. His mode of living is beyond his means and as such he started committing petty thefts against property. He came in contact with copper wire criminals of the locality and started committing theft in respect of P.T. 'telecommunication cables and D.V.C. cables in the area. He is dangerous and desperate in character What has been quoted above shows that the detaining authority must have been greatly influenced in ordering the detention by this undisclosed material, not the whole of which was germane to the grounds on which preventive detention can be ordered under the Act. In any case, omission to communicate this material to the detenu must have seriously prejudiced him in exercising his right of making an effective representation. We, therefore, allow Jiten Ninia's petition also, set aside his detention and direct that he be set at liberty forthwith. Petition allowed.
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1974 (2) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... xpress no final opinion on the many wide-ranging problems in public law of illegal orders and violations thereof by citizens, grave though some of them may be. But we do hold that an order which is void may be directly and collaterally challenged in legal proceedings. An order is null and void if the statute clothing the administrative tribunal with power conditions it with the obligation to hear, expressly or by implication. Beyond, doubt, an order which infringes a fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alteram partem rule is a nullity. When a competent court holds such official act or order invalid, or sets it aside, it operates from nativity, i.e. the impugned actor order was never valid. The French jurists call it L'indevistence or outlawed order (p.127) Brown and Garner, French Administrative Law) and could not found the ground for a prosecution. On this limited ratio the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. We allow his appeal. P.B.R. Appeal allowed
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1974 (2) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the supply of electricity. We are not, therefore, inclined to interfere in this matter merely because there has been a delay of 5 months before the detention order was passed. 5. Mr. Mittal thereupon, pointed out that the petitioner is under detention from 29.7.1972 and still continues to be in detention. It is undoubtedly true that a very long period has elapsed since the date of his internment. We however assume that the cases of all detenus are being periodically reviewed by the State Government with a view to see if the petitioner should be required to continue in detention. It should not happen that once a person is detained and the court has also thought that the detention is not invalid, the detenu should continue in detention indefinitely without his case being periodically reviewed. 6. In this case, however, the detention not being shown to he invalid, the petition must be dismissed.
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1974 (2) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... king the detention order. No other circumstance was taken into account by the District Magistrate in ordering the detention of the petitioner As such, it cannot be said that the petitioner was in any way handicapped in making an effective representation against his detention. The decision of this Court in the case of Shaik Hanif v. State of West Bengal W.P. No, 1679 of 1973 decided on February 1, 1974. to which one of us was a party, cannot be of much assistance to the petitioner. In that case the District Magistrate took into account a theft committed by the detenu on November 3, 1973 but that fact was not communicated to the detenu. It was in view of this circumstance as well as the other facts of the case that this Court held that the detenue had not been able to make an effective representation. As mentioned earlier, the petitioner was not in the present case prevented from making an effective representation. 7. As a result of the above, the petition fails and dismissed.
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