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Showing 1 to 20 of 109 Records
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1974 (8) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e. Of course, the appellant being a party and guilty has to suffer the penalty. We are holding against him that he got the handbills printed and distributed but on other grounds we have exonerated him for want of compelling, probative material. 57. The appellant, in this case, is less guilty than the 1st respondent depicts him but is less innocent than he professes. Electoral purity must claim its victim and we set aside the appellant's election, noting that the virus of corrupt practices cannot be controlled save by comprehensive systemic changes with emphasis on a fearless enforcement instrumentality and a national political consensus to abide by norms--a consummation devoutly to be wished. Today the yawning gap between law in the books and unlaw in action has made inhibition of corrupt practices a once-in-a-blue-moon tribunal phenomenon. 58. For the reasons set out above, we dismiss the appeal with the direction that parties will bear their respective costs throughout.
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1974 (8) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f Punjab (1). Fortunately, the failure of the High Court to examine the defence evidence has led to no miscarriage of justice. 70. Balak Ram's conviction must, therefore, stand. On the question of sentence, there is no reason for interference. Balak Ram was carrying a pistol and he fired from that pistol without any provocation either from Tribeni Sahai or from Radhey. Neither of them was armed, not even with a walking stick, and all that Tribeni Sahai did was to ask the precisionists to desist from shouting vulgar slogans. Politics may or may not be a clean game but no court can suffer with equanimity such flagrant defiance of law by members of political parties, whatever their colour or creed. They must know that it will not pay to carry pistols in processions for being used as weapons of offence against political rivals. Accordingly, we confirm the order of conviction and the various sentences including the sentence of death imposed on Balak Ram and dismiss his appeal.
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1974 (8) TMI 132 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the meaning of Section 26(3) of the Travancore Contract Act..... When the entire claim is not barred, but only a portion thereof the maximum that can be said is that the consideration for the settlement is inadequate. The position however is different when the entire claim is barred; in such a case, there is no consideration at all and the agreement will be void unless it is saved by Section 26(3) of the Travancore Contract Act." We respectfully follow the rulings cited above and hold that the account stated in Ex. A. 1 on 30-5-1964 relates to a claim which was clearly time-barred on that date, and there being no express promise within the meaning of Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, to pay the time-barred debt, the plaintiff cannot rely upon it to save his claim from the bar of limitation. Both these points are answered against the plaintiff. 10. In the result, the judgment and decree of the trial court are set aside and the appeal allowed with costs throughout.
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1974 (8) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itself, however strong it may be, is not sufficient to take the place of proof and warrant a finding of guilt of the accused. Another weakness of the prosecution case is that as many as four persons have been involved in this case. Even if it may be assumed that the dead bodies which were recovered from the place in front of the house of the accused were those of Harbans Singh and Bachan Singh deceased and that their death was homicidal, it is difficult to say whether the dastardly crime was the act of one or two culprits or of a larger number of them. In any case it is difficult to fix their identity. 17. In an appeal against the judgment of the High Court recording a finding of acquittal, this Court does not interfere with the appraisement of the evidence by the High Court unless that appraisement be vitiated by some glaring infirmity. No such infirmity has been brought to our notice. There is, in our opinion, no merit in this appeal. It accordingly fails and is dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Clause 2 notes the fact that the landlord is not in possession of the premises and has to put the appellant (tenant) in possession as soon as the lease was executed. Hence Clause 2 states that the landlord should take such steps as may be required to obtain and deliver possess on to the tenant (appellant) as soon as possible, which makes the giving of possession to the appellant the starting point of the lease. In other words for the purposes of Clause 4 the starting point of the lease for determining the period of 10 years is the obtaining of possession of the theatre. In any view of the matter the appellant is entitled to possession. 9. Accordingly we allow the appeal, reverse the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and the first appellate court. The appellant will be put in possession under the terms of Exhibit D on payment of ₹ 18,000/- stipulated under the said Exhibit to the first respondent. The appellant will have his costs in this Court from the respondents.
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1974 (8) TMI 129 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Another finding of the High Court was that Rajeshwari Devi had tried to show a number of persons of eye witnesses of the occurrence, even though they were not present at that time. 13. After having been taken through the evidence of Rajeshwari Devi and the judgment of the High Court, we find no such infirmity in the appraisement of the evidence of Rajeshwari Devi by the High Court as might justify interference by this Court. 14. In an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court does not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the High Court unless that finding is vitiated by some glaring infirmity in the appraisement of evidence. The fact that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on record would not justify interference with the judgment of acquittal. The judgment of the High Court in the present case has not been shown to suffer from any such weakness as might induce us to interfere. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... even findings of fact in a Letters Patent appeal from a first appeal heard by a learned Single Judge, though generally speaking the Letters Patent Bench would be slow to disturb concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below. But there is no doubt that in an appropriate case a Letters Patent Bench hearing an appeal from a learned Single Judge of the High Court in a first appeal heard by him is entitled to review even findings of fact. The contention of the appellant therefore that the Letters Patent Bench was not in law entitled to reverse the concurrent findings of fact must be negatived. In view of this decision and the consistent view held by almost all the High Courts in this country on the question under consideration, this appeal must succeed. 3. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court and remand the matter for being heard and disposed of in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1974 (8) TMI 127 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 981.50 Nps. and determined the excess amount of ₹ 30405.16 Nps. He allowed 6% P. A. interest from the date the Collector took possession of the lands till the date of payment of the excess amount. In our calculations, the market value inclusive of 15% solatium comes to ₹ 34559.80 Nps. The excess amount over and above that paid by the Collector, works out to ₹ 9983-46 Nps., and this figure shall have to be substituted for ₹ 30405.16 Nps. determined by the Additional District Judge. We order accordingly. The State appeal is allowed with proportionate costs and that filed by the claimants dismissed. The direction as to interest is maintained. There is nothing much to write about the other appeals which we may now take up except the Khasra numbers involved, the amount of award determined by the Land Acquisition Officer and that determined by the Additional District Judge and the amount which according to us should have been the compensation payable. xxxxx
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1974 (8) TMI 126 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n addition thereto obtained 1/6th share in the joint family property as inhere of Shridhar. Thus she is entitled to 1/2 share in the joint family property and upon her death this 1/2 share is equally divided between her husband Narayanarao and her daughter, the plaintiff. Thus the plaintiff on the facts of the present case is entitled to 1/4th share in the suit property. 31. Having regard to the questions referred to us plaintiff Shushilabai is entitled to 1/4th share in the property in which she is entitled to claim a share. If the rears other question s if any to be decided in this appeal, the same will be considered by a Division Bench in the light of the quantum of share of Shushilabai, the plaintiff, determined by us in this case and appropriate directions will be given and decree will be passed while disposing of the appeal. 32. The question of costs of hearing of this appeal will be dealt with by the Division Bench while disposing of the appeal. 33. Order accordingly.
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1974 (8) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... igh Court to reverse the judgment of the trial court whereby it acquitted the 13 accused. Learned Sessions Judge had given convincing and cogent reasons in support of the conclusions at which he arrived. The view taken by him can by no means be described as unreasonable. Even if the High Court felt that on the material on record, a different view was also possible that fact, in our opinion, did not justify interference with the judgment of acquittal. If two conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence on record, the High Court, as already mentioned above, should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in reversing the judgment of the trial court whereby it had acquitted the accused. We accordingly accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court whereby the accused had been acquitted. Appeal allowed.
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1974 (8) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ts, 6 bighas and 7 biswas, which they alleged were retained by them in khewats Nos. 2 and 3. No amount of oral evidence can establish this fact when in fact they could have established (it) by a registered document. As pointed out, by the High Court, even the Patwari was not asked about it. For some reason, which the appellant must know best, they have not produced the sale deed either in the High Court or even at this stage. The sale deed is a public document and could have been easily looked into if they would have asked for it to be admitted at the appellate stage. The suppression of the document justified the drawing of an adverse Inference that if it was produced, it would have established that the appellants had no lands left after they sold them on 19-5-1969 (59?). As the appellants have not established that they are co-owners in the lands sold on the date of the decree they are not entitled to a decree of pre-emption. In this view, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1974 (8) TMI 123 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the adoptive family. Nasib Chand D.W.2, said that at the time of adoption Bachan Singh and his wife were present here and they said the boy was his (Maghi Singh's) and that Maghi Singh took the son. Pritam Singh D.W.3, said that Maghi had taken Kartar in his lap and Bachan Singh had asked him to take his son. Kashmiri Lal D.W.4, said that Maghi had taken Kartar in his lap and Bachan Singh and his wife were present there and were saying they had given their son to him. Wasawa Singh D.W.5, said that when Maghi asked for his son Bachan Singh said he had given his son to him in adoption. Bachan Singh D.W.7, said that Maghi had taken his son Kartar Singh from him, that he was made to sit in the lap of Maghi, that his (D.W.7's) wife was near him and he had obtained her consent. There cannot be clearer evidence than this. 9. The judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge restored. The respondents will pay the appellant costs throughout.
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1974 (8) TMI 122 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... contract was void at its inception and this is not a case where it became void subsequently. Nor could it be said that the agreement was discovered to be void after it was entered into. As pointed out by the Trial Court the plaintiff was already in the business of mining and had the advantage of consulting its lawyers and solicitors. So there was no occasion for the plaintiff have been under any kind of ignorance of law under the Act and the Rules. Clearly, therefore this is not a case to which s. 65 of the Contract Act applies. Nor is it a case to which s. 70 or s. 72 of the Contract Act applies. The payment of the money was not made lawfully, nor was it done under a mistake or under coercion. We agree with the Trial Court that the plaintiff should have been aware of the illegality of the agreement even when it entered into it and therefore s. 65 of the Contract Act cannot help it. The appeal is therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 121 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pinion, it must be relating to or arising out of the relief sought in the action which is before the Court, and that any other injunction cannot properly be granted in the action." The principles stated in the above decision have been followed by this Court and it is only in cases where the defendants' claim to relief arises out of the plaintiffs cause of action or is incidental to it that he can ask for a temporary injunction against the plaintiff. 4. In the instant case, the cause of action for the plaintiff's suit, as stated earlier arose in the year 1970, whereas the cause of action for the defendants arose in the year 1973. The two causes of action are different. Therefore, the courts below were wholly in error in granting temporary injunction prayed for by defendant 1. 5. For the reasons stated above, I allow this revision petition, reverse the orders of the Courts below and dismiss defendant-1's application, with costs throughout. 6. Petition allowed.
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1974 (8) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s allowed because within few months of its purchase the scooter was sold to the Delhi Branch for only ₹ 6,001. These two items, namely ₹ 9,827/- and ₹ 2,100/- which are allowable to the Liquidator come to ₹ 11,927 the other two items for ₹ 7,689/12/- and ₹ 2,184/- which relate to the purchases actually made by the Bombay Company in pursuance of their offer and in pursuance of the majority resolution of April 25, 1953 and the difference between the book value and the purchase value of the car by the Bombay Company were also allowed. Apart from this, item (5) for a sum of ₹ 2,686/3/- in connection with the wrongful remission to the Hyderabad Company was also allowed. There seems to be no dispute on this account because the whole of the amount as claimed has been allowed. In the result we find no reason to interfere with the Judgment of the Bombay High Court under appeal. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 119 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... , after notice to the Income-tax Department, Patiala, within one month from today. The respondent would inform the said Income-tax Department about the date and time to be fixed within one month from today when the aforesaid G. C. notes would be returned to the petitioner with intimation of the same to him (petitioner ). In case the Income-tax authorities still persist to seize the G. C. notes, they may do so subject to the powers available to them under law, in presence of the petitioner or his duly authorised agent, or even in his absence if the notice of the date and time for the return of the G. C. notes has been duly served upon him. The writ petition respecting the other reliefs, that is, quashing of the show-cause notices and prohibiting the respondent from proceeding with the adjudication of confiscation of the G. C notes and gold and for imposition of personal penalty, is dismissed. Having regard to the special circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1974 (8) TMI 118 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that persons or authorities designated in that section are alone competent to file complaints under the statute in question. It is not necessary in view of the Supreme Court's authoritative pronouncement to discuss Municipal Health Officer and Food Inspector, Koshikode v. Artbala Tea Estate Co.. 9. No other point was pressed before me. 10. I must mention one circumstance that I have noticed in this case. The learned Magistrate imposed a fine of ₹ 200/- when Section 16(1)(f) categorically prescribes "and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees". The learned Magistrate was, therefore, clearly in error. The case relates to the year 1937 and the applicant is said to be a small shopkeeper therefore I did not consider it expedient to issue a notice for enhancement. 11. In my opinion the applicant has been rightly convicted for sailing adulterated coriander and his conviction calls for no interference. 12. This revision fails and is dismissed.
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1974 (8) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... possibility of a petition being dealt with by a court on the assumption that it has been sent by a prisoner even, though it has in fact not been sent by him. o p /o p In the absence of the above safeguard, there is always the risk of someone doing mischief by sending by post a frivolous petition purporting to be on behalf of a prisoner even though the prisoner concerned might be unaware of .such a petition. An adverse order on such a petition may cause prejudice to the prisoner’s case and create other complications. We, therefore,. decline to quash the impugned order of the Registrar. o p /o p In the result all the three petitions are dismissed. o p /o p A copy of this judgment may be sent to the Registrar of the Bombay High Court for being placed before the learned Chief Justice of that court for such action as may be deemed necessary in the matter of’ prompt supply of the copies of judgments to the accused. o p /o p Petitions dismissed. o p /o p V.M.K. o p /o p
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1974 (8) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... port Tribunal had evolved its own formula that overlapping beyond five miles should not be permitted. This limit set by it did not, in my opinion, contravene any provision of the scheme which is silent on the matter. in any case, I do not see why Courts and not those who can fill up gaps by amending a scheme should 'be called upon to convert into a prohibition what seems, on grounds given above, to be permitted to citizens as incidents of their rights to use highways. For all the reasons given above, I see no reason whatsoever to take a different view from the one I took in the judgment of 17-5-1974. The result is that I would dismiss this appeal with costs. ORDER In view of the majority decision, we allow the appeal and direct the Regional Transport Authority to comply with the requirements of the Scheme as stated by us in respect of any permit granted or in respect of renewal of any such permit made in favour of the third respondent ,during the pendency of this appeal.
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1974 (8) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... make the recommendation. We see no reason why the Division Bench should have departed from the procedure prescribed by the statute. The observance of the procedure laid down by statute before depriving a person of his property is necessary to generate the feeling that rule of law prevails in this country. When a procedure is prescribed by the legislature, it is not for the court to substitute a different one according to its notion of justice. When the legislature has spoken, the judges cannot afford to be wiser. We quash the declaration published under s. 6 of the Act and direct the Land Acquisition Collector to enquire into the objection after giving an opportunity to the appellant of being heard and make the necessary recommendation to the appropriate Government. The appropriate Government will proceed further in the light of its decision on the recommendation. We set aside the order of the Division Bench and allow the appeal but make no order as to costs. Appeal allowed
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