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Showing 1 to 20 of 79 Records
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1975 (4) TMI 142 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he above case was found to have been determined by efflux of time and subsequent occupation was not in pursuance of any contract, express or implied but by virtue of the protection given by successive statutes. In the case of Pooran Chand, Subba Rao, J. as he then was, said at 912, when a similar argument was advanced before him It is not necessary in this appeal to express our opinion on the validity of this contention, for we are satisfied that the term of the tenancy had expired by efflux of dine; and, therefore, no question of statutory notice would arise. No notice is necessary if a lease of immovable property determined under Clause (a) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act by efflux of the time limited thereby. 15. In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the decree of eviction passed against the appellant and in favour of the respondent by the lower Appellate Court as affirmed by the High Court. In the circumstances we shall make no order as to costs.
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1975 (4) TMI 141 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e appellant, he can, if so advised, take other steps which may be open to him under the law. An order for costs should not become a substitute for such other action with which we are not concerned here. Moreover, in the case before us, the petition itself was not filed by the 2nd respondent Chagla. In these circumstances, we do not think that there should have been an order for costs payable by the appellant to the second respondent Chagla. We, therefore, set aside the order awarding ₹ 3,000/- as costs to Chagla. We also reduce by half the costs awarded to the successful petitioner, that is to say from ₹ 12,000/-to ₹ 6,000/-. We, however, think that the appellant must pay respondents 1 and 2 in this Court their costs occasioned by his appeal to this Court. 51. The result is that, subject to the modifications of the order for costs, to the extent indicated above, this appeal is dismissed with costs to respondents 1 and 2 on whose behalf appearance was put in.
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1975 (4) TMI 140 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion. Viewed in this light also the wages as a general term would include bonus. 7. But the Civil Procedure Code exempts from attachment only the wages of labourers and domestic servants. Therefore, 'bonus' due to a person would become exempt from attachment only if he is a labourer. There is no evidence as to the nature of the work which the appellants do and whether it requires any skill or training. Neither the executing court nor the lower appellate court has adverted to this aspect. The question whether the appellants are labourers should be decided before holding that bonus payable to them is or is not liable to be attached. I set aside the order of the lower appellate court and remand the case to the executing court for fresh disposal. An opportunity will be given to the parties to establish whether the appellants 1 to 3 are labourers or not coming under Section 60(1)(h) of the C. P. C. The appeal is allowed as above. The patties will bear then respective costs.
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1975 (4) TMI 139 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e adhered to, the meaning of the word 'before as given in Chambers' 20th Century Dictionary is previous to the expiration of. If this meaning is given to the word 'before as used in Section 3 of the Act., it will mean that an application under Section 3 of the Act, it could be filed before the expiration of or not later than the 1st day of April 1970, that is, before the expiry of 1st April 1970, which is the date specified in Section 3 of the Act. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the application filed by the applicant on 1st April 1970 was within time. 14. In the view which I have taken, therefore, it is not necessary to consider the question as to whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply to the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. 15. In the result therefore, the revision application must fail, though on different grounds. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 16. Application dismissed.
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1975 (4) TMI 138 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... im under Section 29 also, when situation warrant. As already mentioned, even during the pendency of the O.P. advertisements were made in the newspapers calling for tenders, about which the petitioner was aware. For all those reasons, we hold that the Corporation acted in good faith and its action under Section 29 was not done arbitrarily. 20. Sri Sivarama Sastry, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent contended that the Corporation is at liberty to take over the management of the industrial concern and sell on the basis of the terms of the agreement alone without having recourse to Section 29 of the Act. We have already held that Section 29 is a valid provision and the action taken under the same is legal and valid. So, it is not necessary to consider this contention raised on behalf of the 2nd respondent. 21. No other points are urged before us. 22. This writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fees ₹ 100. 23. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (4) TMI 137 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this court for suitable orders making provision for matters specified in sub-section (1) of section 394 and/or for making Company Petition No. 4 of 1975, absolute in terms of prayers (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h) and (i), within fifteen days of the filing with the Registrar of Companies, Maharashtra, of a certified copy of the order made by the appropriate court under section 391(2) of the Act in the application filed by the transferee-company in such court for sanction of the scheme herein; (5) Liberty is meanwhile reserved to the parties and to persons interested in the scheme to apply to this court, if and when occasion arises, for suitable orders and directions as contemplated by section 392 of the Act; (6) Company Application No. 31 of 1974 and Company Petition No. 4 of 1975 shall stand over till this court is moved by a judge's summons as directed in clause (4) above or till further orders and all consequential orders including order as to costs shall be made then.
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1975 (4) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... heless, it is right to stress that counsel should not rush in with a razi where due care will make them fear to tread, that a junior should rarely consent on his own when there is a senior in the brief, that a party may validly impugn an act of compromise by his pleader if he is available for consultation but is by-passed. The lawyer must be above board, especially if he is to agree to an adverse verdict. As for classes of legal practitioners, we are equally clear that the tidal swell of unification and equalisation has swept away all professional sub-castes. Anyway, that is the law. Such artificial segregations as persist are mere proof of partial survival after death and will wither away in good time. Anyway, that is our hope. We dismiss the appeal, but in view of divided judicial opinion in the High Courts and the Constitutional obligation of this Court under Art. 141 to resolve and settle the law we direct the parties will bear their costs in this Court. Appeal dimissed.
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1975 (4) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o be levied on the entire undistributed balance of the net income of the company. In other words, even if the Income-tax Officer finds that the apportioned dividend in any part of the company’s business is less than the dividend that ought to have been declared by application of the statutory percentage, the additional supertax has to be levied on the whole of the undistributed profits of the company. The High Court was therefore in error in holding that the profits of the two parts of the company’s business should be treated as if they were the total income of the company for all purposes. In taking this view, the High Court overlooked the concluding words of Explanation 2 by reason of which the legal fiction has to be limited to its duly appointed purpose. In the result we set aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeal with costs. Appeal allowed. (1) Willis v. Thorp (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. 383, 386, gee also Craies in Statute Law, Sixth Ed., p, 529-530.
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1975 (4) TMI 134 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... e the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, grant the appellant's writ petition and issue a mandamus to the respondents to determine and pay in accordance with law the compensation to which the appellant may be found to be entitled for her land which was acquired in 1935 or to restore the possession of the land to the appellant. If the Government treats the land as having been properly acquired in 1935, the amount of compensation would be payable to her according to the market value and potential value of 1935, along with the statutory interest and solatium. If, however, the acquisition proceedings are sought to be now regularised by issuing a fresh notification, the market value at which the compensation would be payable to the appellant would be of the date on which the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is issued. The appellant would be entitled to her costs in the appeal as well as in the writ petition. Counsel's fee ₹ 300/-.
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1975 (4) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT
Housing Society which allotment is coupled with the right to transfer their shares of the Society and interest in the said flat which is the property of the Society.
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1975 (4) TMI 132 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mplete it in accordance with Chapter XIV of the Old Code. Section 167 of that Code could not enable the Magistrate to remand the appellants to jail custody during the pendency of the investigation. The police could seek the help of- the Court for exercise of its power of remand under section 344, bringing it to the notice of the Court that sufficient evidence had been obtained to raise a suspicion that the appellants may have committed an offence and there will be hindrance to the obtaining of further evidence unless an order of remand was made. As we have said above, invoking the power of the court under section 344 of the Old Code by the Investigating Officer would be a part of the process of investigation which is to be continued and made in accordance with the Old Code. That being so, we hold that the appellants in this case cannot claim to be released under proviso (a) to section 167(2 ) of the New Code. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (4) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... same date. The date has as much to do with the accrual of the commission as it has to do with the accrual of the profits. It was faintly suggested that the managing agency was not a business but this is immaterial for income-tax purposes because Section 13 will apply to cases both under Sections 10 and 12, so we refrain from deciding the point. We may, however, point out in passing that in two cases, Tata Hydro-Electric Agencies Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay 1937 5 I.T.R. 202, and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay Presidency v. Tata Sons Ltd. 1939 7 I.T.R. 195, it was assumed that the managing agency is business but the point was directly decided in Inderchand Hari Ram v. Commissioner of Income- tax, U.P. and C.P. 1952 22 I.T.R. 108 that it is so. For the foregoing reasons, we accept the view taken by Viswanatha Sastri, J., and allow the appeals. The respondent shall pay the cost of the Commissioner both in this Court and before the High Court. Appeals allowed.
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1975 (4) TMI 130 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondent is liable to pay enhanced fee brought about by amendment of the rules on April 25, 1964?
Held that:- The contention that the enhanced levy of licence fee cannot operate as from April 1, 1964 is to be negatived.
A fair reading of the rule giving full effect to the words used in Rule XXVI of the Excise rules and the explanation added to Rule IV (of the Foreign Liquor Rules already extracted) leave us in no doubt that the balance of stocks envisioned by the rules and subjected to enhancement or reduction of duty is such surplus stock as is held immediately before the expiry of the previous license. So construed, in this case the quantity held over on March 31, 1964 becomes liable to enhancement of license fee on April 1, 1964 and that is precisely what the Stats has claimed.
For, otherwise, some persons who by accident have huge stocks left over will not have to pay the enhanced rate of licence fee while others with 'virgin' licences for that year and begin with no stock-on-hand have to pay at a higher rate. Again, if only the respondent had surrendered his surplus stocks on 31-3-1964, as ordinarily he would have had to, had he not been permitted to retain that quantity in view of his getting a fresh licence for the same premises, he would have had to pay the enhanced rate for such left-over stock. Thus(the respondent) had to pay the higher fee on the balance of stock as on April 1, 1964. The High Court erred in its interpretation of the rules as applicable to the present situation. Appeal allowed
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1975 (4) TMI 129 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ining a previous Division Bench decision rendered by T.V.R. Tatachari, J. (as he then was), in Fitwell Engineers v. Financial Commissioner (Civil Writ Petition No. 590 of 1973 decided on 26th April, 1974). In the result, however, there having been no hearing of the petitioner nor even a finding on the question discussed, I have to adopt the same procedure that Basu, J., adopted in the abovesaid case, namely, to quash the notice as well as the order of cancellation (annexures P 6 and P 7) and direct that a fresh finding be given on this point after issuing, if need be, a fresh show cause notice setting out precisely the stand of the revenue giving an opportunity to the petitioner and then decide the matter according to law as explained in this judgment. The writ petition is accordingly accepted and the show cause notice as well as the order of cancellation (annexures P 6 and P 7) are quashed. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsel fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1975 (4) TMI 128 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s knives and it can be presumed that the framers of the notification must have in mind the meaning of a knife as understood in common parlance. It is well-settled that the terms not defined in the U.P. Sales Tax Act or the Rules made thereunder have to be given their ordinary meaning as understood in common parlance or in the commercial circle. If the framers of the notification intended razors also to be exempted from tax, they would have included them in the notification. The exemption given to knives cannot be extended to razors by analogy or by giving this term technical meanings. We are of the opinion that the view taken by the Judge (Revisions) is not correct. We, accordingly, answer the question by saying that the razors are not knives as mentioned in Notification No. ST-911/X dated 31st March, 1956, and, as such, their turnover is not exempt from tax. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1975 (4) TMI 127 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a writ of certiorari questioning the provisional assessment made for the year 1973-74. Under the provisional assessment orders, the assessing authority had levied sales tax at the rate of 24 per cent on the turnover relating to liquor of Sikkim origin under item 70(a) of the First Schedule to the Act. We have held in W.P. No. 389 of 1974 that the levy in respect of liquor imported from Sikkim could only be under item 70(b) of the First Schedule to the Act and not under item 70(a). In view of this judgment, the levy at the rate of 24 per cent would be illegal. The writ petitions are directed only against the provisional assessment orders and the final assessments have not yet been completed. We have no doubt that the assessing authority will pass a final assessment order in accordance with our view expressed in W. P. No. 389 of 1974. As the final assessment has yet to be completed, we dismiss these writ petitions with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each. Ordered accordingly.
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1975 (4) TMI 126 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the dealer intended to include the sales tax in the price of the tractor itself. The Price Control Order itself, which later on came to be made under the Essential Commodities Act, injuncted the dealer from selling the tractor at a price exceeding the sale price fixed by the Government of India. Therefore, we have no doubt that the sales tax paid by the dealer to the Maharashtra Government and collected by them when they sold tractors to the various purchasers in this State under the separate heading is not liable to be included in the taxable turnover of the assessee. We, therefore, dismiss the revision in so far as this point is concerned. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal is set aside in so far as it related to the turnover of Rs. 45,325.77 relating to the sale of the medicinal and toilet preparations, and in other respects, the order of the Tribunal is confirmed. The revision is accordingly partly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1975 (4) TMI 125 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... section 18-A authorises is that the countervailing duty of such amount as the State Government may by notification specify from time to time, shall be levied on all liquors imported, exported or transported. If really, there was a notification by the Government of Tamil Nadu levying countervailing duty on all liquors imported, exported or transported, the learned counsel might have been well-founded in his contention, as factual nonlevy would be irrelevant if legally it could have been levied. But, the learned counsel is not able to state that there was any notification imposing the countervailing duty on such goods. So long as there is no notification under section 18-A, there could not have been a legal levy and, therefore, the assessees could not claim any exemption. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside and it is accordingly set aside. The tax revision cases are allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each. Petitions allowed.
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1975 (4) TMI 124 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955, the legislature should have made a specific reference in item 3. In fact, in 1972, by a notification the Government have exempted those goods, which have been subjected to excise duty under the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955, from the levy of sales tax. But, that notification is not applicable to the assessment years in question, We are, therefore, of the opinion that the medicinal and toilet preparations manufactured by the assessees were not entitled to the exemption under section 8 of the Sales Tax Act. Since we have come to the conclusion that the goods are not at all exempt from the levy of sales tax, the further question whether there was any error or mistake of law on the face of the record, which could only be on the basis that the goods are exempt, does not arise. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss these cases with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (4) TMI 123 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at is not the case here we are concerned with the period prescribed for assessment having run out before the said amendment came into effect. In the circumstances, the impugned notice dated 25th November, 1966 (annexure C), has to be and is hereby quashed. A further question was sought to be argued on behalf of the petitioner that in respect of the sum of Rs. 3,170.25 deposited as sales tax for the year in question a direction should be given for refund of the same. To the question put by me-how the petitioner could ask for a refund of an amount which the petitioner had, of his own accord, deposited-Mr. Randhir Chawla, the learned counsel for the petitioner, fairly replied that without having to decide this question, he was not pressing this relief in respect of Rs. 3,170.25. The writ petition is accordingly accepted and the impugned notice dated 25th November, 1966 (annexure C to the petition), is quashed. In the circumstances, I make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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