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Showing 1 to 20 of 133 Records
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1975 (7) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... decree for pre-emption was made by the first Court. In the circumstances of this case therefore we are not inclined to accept the second submission made on behalf of the appellants. 6. The third point urged on behalf of the appellants is also not fit to succeed. A copy of the order of eviction passed by the Assistant Collector was incorporated in the supplementary paper book and place before us. The order shows that eviction was allowed from the entire land. The appellants were directed to be ejected forthwith from a portion and their actual eviction from the rest of the land was deferred till the allotment of the surplus land. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellants did not continue to be tenants of any portion of the land sold to respondent 1 and 2 on the date the decree for pre-emption was passed in their favour. Hence the decree was not sustainable in respect of any portion of the land. 7. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss this appeal but without costs.
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1975 (7) TMI 164 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nment is the prosecutor or prosecution is upon police report. After the delay is condoned by the Court on its being satisfied by the process referred to above, then alone it would register the case and proceed with the same in accordance with law. Before condoning the delay, although I do not find any provision of giving of notice to the accused person in Chapter XXXVI of the Code, but natural justice demands that the accused persons must be heard before passing an order in that regard as such an order is bound to affect a valuable right which accrues to the accused and which cannot be allowed to be taken away lightly. As such, they have to be heard when an application under Section 473 of the Code is moved by the prosecution before cognizance is taken. For the reasons stated above, the petitions succeed and are allowed. The proceedings in all the aforementioned cases are hereby quashed and the matter is remitted back to the trial Court with the directions as indicated above.
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1975 (7) TMI 163 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... k to the STAT to hear the case afresh, consider relevant factors bearing upon 'public interest' as highlighted in s.47 of the Motor Vehicles Act and dispose of the appeal before it in accordance with law, guided by the decisions of this Court and untrammeled by any observations made either by the Single Judge or by the Division Bench. Currently, the respondent is plying his bus on the route and we direct that the status quo be maintained and he will continue to operate on the route until the appeal is disposed of by the STAT. Of course, the RTA passed its orders as early as 1966 November and is it thinks that public interest demands the need for an extra bus to ply on the route to cope with the traffic, it will be open to the RTA to grant a permit, pending disposal of the appeal, to the present appellant. The fluctuating fortunes of the combatants for the permit have been such that it is appropriate to direct both parties to bear their costs throughout. Case remanded.
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1975 (7) TMI 162 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f exports also increased the Government was justified in withdrawing the normal cash assistance to offset losses as also the incentive cash assistance for increase of exports. This contention also, Therefore, fails. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioners have stated that an administrative practice by the Government in respect of some other exports has been that whenever a scheme subsidising exports is withdrawn before running its full period, the Government consider the representation of the exporters for some ex gratia compensation. It is open to the petitioners to make such representation to the Government and if the analogy is applicable, the Government should be able to deal with the petitioners in the same way as they have dealt with the exporters of other commodities who were deprived of cash assistance before the expiry of the period of the schemes. 25. For the above reasons. The writ petitions are dismissed but without any order as to costs. 26. Petitions dismissed.
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1975 (7) TMI 161 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the position then the order dated 17th April, 1964 which prohibited export of 'all goods', in my opinion, was beyond the authority given by Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. As such the show cause notice based on the alleged violation of the said order, in my opinion, is without jurisdiction. In the premises, on this ground I would hold that the notice was issued without jurisdiction and, therefore, the respondents had no authority to issue the show cause notice dated the 5th October, 1967. 12. The notice dated 5th October, 1967 is therefore, quashed and appropriate- writ in the nature of certiorari do issue and the respondents are restrained from proceeding under the said notice and a writ in the nature of mandamus do issue. The Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. 13. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. 14. There will be a stay of operation of this order for a period of six weeks.
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1975 (7) TMI 160 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1971 Punj 353 appear to me to have been rather widely worded as in the earlier Calcutta case and do not appear to me with respect to represent the true legal position. The other decision referred to above by and large support the view that I have taken of the matter. 12. I have, Therefore, no hesitation in holding that by virtue of the protest recorded by the Petitioners in their applications seeking payment, the Petitioners had specifically reserved their right to seek enhancement and had not waived their right notwithstanding the unqualified language in which the receipt was executed. 13. In the result, the Petitions succeed, the impugned orders are quashed and I direct that the Land Acquisition Collector will deal with the applications of the Petitioners under Section 18(1) of the Act in accordance with law after notice to the Petitioners. 14. The Petitioners would also have their costs. Counsel's fee in each petition is fixed at ₹ 350/ - 15. Petitions allowed.
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1975 (7) TMI 159 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Income Tax Department before any controversy arose about the ownership of the said insurance policies. Therefore, it is not necessary to discuss whether the deceased Mahanth had private sources of income or not. Even if he had, the insurance policies were held by him as the assets of the Math and it was not open to him to transfer or alienate the same for the benefit of his wife. The ownership of the Math remained unaffected by the nomination made by the deceased Mahanth after he ceased to be the Mahanth. The policies in question could not be disposed of by the Mahanth except for a legal necessity or benefit of the estate in his lifetime and he could not make the said assets the subject-matter of a will for the benefit of his wife. 20. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decree passed by the courts below is set aside. The plaintiff's suit shall stand decreed against the defendant-respondents. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their costs throughout.
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1975 (7) TMI 158 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... re than certain specified charges. 20. We are, therefore, of the view that the Board was not entitled to enhance the charges in derogation of the stipulations as to charges contained in the agreements with the appellant and the notification dated 28th November 1969 fixing tariffs for extra high tension consumers was not enforceable against the appellant. We accordingly issue a writ quashing and setting aside the notification dated 28th November 1969 in so far as it seeks to make the tariffs specified in it applicable to the appellant and declare that the Board is not entitled to claim from the appellant anything more than the charges specified in the agreements. We also issue a writ restraining the Board from enforcing the notification dated 28th November, 1969 against the appellant or claiming from the appellant anything more than the charges specified in the agreements. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The 1st respondent will pay the costs of the appeal to the appellant.
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1975 (7) TMI 157 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it is the common case of the parties that the bank is no longer in possession of the pledged goods and the same are, Therefore, not available for redemption by the plaintiff. In the circumstances it is unnecessary to determine if there is a claim, which could form, subject-matter of a set off or a counter-claim or as to the quantification in respect thereof. In the view that I have taken of the issues, these questions do not survive. Issues NOS. 11, 12 & 13 29. None of these issues were seriously pressed before me either in the written arguments or in the oral submissions in Court In the view that I have taken of the issues, none of them issues, really survives, The bank bas made a plea for special costs but I do not we any ground, to award any special, costs to the bank in the circumstances of the case. Issue NO. 14 30. In the mutt, the suit fails and is thereby dismissed but, in the circumstances, leaving the parties to bear their respective costs. 31. Suit dismissed.
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1975 (7) TMI 156 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ange Regulation Act, 1947. In this case no evidence was adduced to show that the said procedural formality had been observed. Therefore, there was violation of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 19-D of the Act also. (3)In the result the petitioner succeeds and the rule is made absolute. I direct that the said authorisation on the 13th May, 1968, be quashed. The respondents are directed to return the documents seized as a result of the said illegal search. But this will not authorise the petitioner to claim the return of the documents which have been exhibited or made exhibits in any adjudication proceedings. Apart from the said documents all other documents seized as a result of the said search should be returned. The Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. Let write in the nature of certiorari and mandamus issue accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Operation of this order is stayed for six weeks.
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1975 (7) TMI 155 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w will fall with It as forming part of the same integrated legislative policy and on the ground that the Legislature would not have excluded alcohol from the U. P. Sales Tax Act of 1948 if it had known that it could not validly tax It in the form it has done under the Taxation Act of 1939. 47 (b). In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The U. P. Ordinances Nos. 9 and 14 of 1974 and U. P. Act No. 12 of 1974 and Chapter III of the U. P. Taxation and Land Revenue Laws Act of 1975 in so far as they refer to alcohol are quashed. Sections 21 (2) and 22 of the aforesaid Act No. 8 of 1975 as also the notification dated 29th April, 1974, issued under Section 4 of U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, in so far as they relate to alcohol are quashed. The respondents are directed to forthwith refund to the petitioner company the amounts if any paid or recovered from it in pursuance of the unconstitutional provisions mentioned above, less 12i per cent of the sale price.
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1975 (7) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n view, however, of the contradictory affidavits given by Mr. S. K. D. Mathur, it is difficult to determine whether Mr. S. K. D. Mathur or Mr. R. C. Arora passed the order of detention and as to who among them was satisfied regarding the grounds of detention. This is also a very serious infirmity from which the order of detention suffers and as a result of which the order has to be set aside. There appears to us to be a clear violation of the provisions of s. 3 of the Act in this case. Lastly we may mention that although the petitioner has pleaded he question of mala fides in the instant case, it is not necessary for us to decide the same in the view we take in this case, and that is why it was not seriously pressed by Mr. Asoke Sen ill the course of his arguments before us. For the reasons given above, we allow the petition and quash the order of detention passed against the petitioner on November 8, 1974 and direct the petitioner to be released forthwith. Petition allowed.
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1975 (7) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... had not been agitated in the courts below. But we may in passing notice that in view of section 108(p) of the T.P. Act since the lessee must not, without the lessor's consent, erect on the property any permanent structure, except for agricultural purposes, the State Legislature has by amending the Act by Act No. 29 of 1969 inserted section 10A conferring a right upon a thika tenant to erect a pucca structure for a residential purpose with the previous permission of the Controller. We are, however, not required to consider such a question in this appeal. Mr. Chowdhary also relied upon a contemporaneous letter written by the landlord to the tenant on June 1, 1956, which was found by the courts below to contain interpolation by the tenant with regard to the according of permission to construct structures on the land. We however, do not think that this would have any bearing on our. interpretation of section 2(5) . In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1975 (7) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... issing Writ Petition No. 527 of 1971 filed by the appellant against the Orissa State Electricity Board (herein after referred to as the Board). Writ Petition No. 527 of 1971 challenged the validity of the same press note dated February 1, 1971, which also formed the subject-matter of challenge in Writ Petition No. 605 of 1971 leading to Civil Appeal No. 1653 of 1974. The facts giving rise to the Writ Petition No. 527 of 1971 are identical with those of Writ Petition No. 605 of 1971 barring only the difference that whereas the appellant in Writ Petition No. 605 of 1971 carried on the business of manufacture of board and paper, the appellant in Writ Petition No. 527 of 1971 carried on the business of running a textile mill and while the agreement between the appellant and the State of Orissa for supply of electricity in Writ Petition No. 605 of 1971 was dated December 8, 1960, the agreement in Writ petition No. 527. We, therefore, dismiss, the appeal with no order as to costs.
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1975 (7) TMI 151 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cannot interfere. The result is that the appeal will have to be allowed and the award of the Labour Court set aside. It, however, appears that the respondent had attained the age of 60 on 11-6-73 and even if he had been in service he would have re tired on that date. Under an interim order made by this Court on 29-4-1969 the respondent has been paid ₹ 200/- per month as part of the remuneration payable to him till the hearing and final disposal of the appeal and such payment has been made upto-date. Even if the respondent had succeeded in this appeal he would not have been entitled to any payment after 11-6-73. In view of this appeal being allowed and the award of the Labour Court being set aside the respondent will have to repay the money he had received in, pursuance of the order of this Court. The appellant has agreed that it would not take any steps to recover from the respondent the payments already made to him. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (7) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 4,50,000/-, the liquidator will make appropriate orders for payment of appropriate amount to the decree holder. We make it clear that after payment by the liquidator to the decree-holder whatever amount will remain due to the decree-holder, it will be open to the decree-holder to take up execution against the Government for the amount due by the Co-operative Society on the ground that the Government has taken over entire assets and liabilities of the Co-operative Society subject, of course, to such contentions as the Government may have. The appeals filed by the State are dismissed. The decree-holder will be entitled to costs in these appeals to be paid by the State. The liquidator will retain costs out of the assets in his hands. The amount of ₹ 90/- which has been withdrawn by the decree-holder will now be refunded to the liquidator. There will be one set of costs for the decree holders. There will be similarly one set of costs for the liquidator. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (7) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... icult to say that the matters in these disputes with which we are concerned did not touch the business of the society. In that sense the lack of jurisdiction of the first respondent was not patent. But there were two decisions of this court in Malabar Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Kozhikode v. State of Kerala, 1963 Ker LT 705 and Kerala State Handloom Weavers' Co-operative Society Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 1964 Ker LJ 175 which could have been relied on by the appellant, if he had been diligent. If he was aware of these decisions and still had not taken the point his position is worse. The decision in Kaloor Vadak-kummury Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Assistant Registrar, Mukundapuram, 1973 Ker LT 523 was no doubt rendered only a few days before Exts. P-1 and P-2 awards were passed. But we are not satisfied that considering all aspects this is a case in which we should interfere. 11. We dismiss this appeal and direct the parties to bear their respective costs.
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1975 (7) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t's discretion to make a fresh reference to the Industrial Tribunal on the dispute is not fettered. We would, however, like to make it clear that the Government has sample discretion to make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal under s. 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act if it so thinks fit. This Court in Western India Match Company Ltd. v. Western India Match Co. Workers Union and others(1) clearly held that even if a reference was refused by the Government that will not debar the Government from making a reference at a later time if it is satisfied that in the changed circumstances a reference is necessary. For the reasons given above, we allow the appeal, quash the order of the High Court dated April 9, 1973 and as a consequence of this we also set aside the order of the Government dated February 6, 1973 for making a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, however we make no order as to costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (7) TMI 147 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... necessary that misconstruction cannot be detected afterwards in view of new developments coming to light. The party accordingly detected that in the past they had misconstrued the law relating to assessment and the Voltas’ judgment enlightened them about it. But refund arising out of misconstruction is subject to time-limit laid down in the Central Excise Rules. From this angle there was misconstruction of law on the part of the party and refund will be admissible subject to compliance with Rule 11 read with Rule 173J of Central Excise Rules, 1944. For this purpose what is relevant or material is the date of payment and not the date of assessment in RT-12. The Law of Contract has no application in a claim for refund of Central Excise duty. 5. In this consideration in exercise of the powers under Section 36 (2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, the Government of India modifies the order of the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, as stated above.
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1975 (7) TMI 146 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 0. Hence the petitioner is entitled to succeed in O.P. No. 1290 of 1975. The respondents will levy excise duty on items manufactured by the petitioner taking into account the manufacturing cost and the manufacturer’s profit and that would be determined in accordance with what been said in the judgment. 11. The connected petition O.P. No. 1524 of 1973, if for refund of amounts wrongly collected as excise duty in the past. Of course, no ?? was obtained from the department by the Petitioner in the light of the view taken by it. But in the light of what I have said about the liability to pay excise duty, the question calls for a fresh approach. Since I am directing the authorities to look into the matter of the liability of the petitioner that should apply equally well to the prayer for refund also. That also will be gone into afresh in the light of what has been said in this judgment. The petitioner are allowed as indicated. Parties are directed to suffer costs.
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