|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 118 Records
-
1975 (8) TMI 151 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... en deprived of the benefit to know of the execution of the will or of its contents. The wills are normally made in secrecy and it is only those very closely connected with its preparation execution etc. who would be repository of confidence of the testator and the evidence of Public Witness 1 and Public Witness 2, as indeed of the younger son, whose son is the principal beneficiary, leaves no manner of doubt that these three persons were aware of the will, two of whom had attested it. I do not see how this circumstance could in any event derogate from the genuineness or of the validity of the will. 65. As a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that the grant as well as the appointment of the guardian of the then minor with reference to the property were well merited. In the result, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. C.M. 627/71 fails while C.M. 27/71 is infructuous and are disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances, parties would bear their own costs.
-
1975 (8) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... deceased coming from his right. It was a main road 42 feet wide and if the appellant was reasonably alert and careful he would have seen the deceased coming from his right and trying to cross the road & in that event, he could have immediately applied the brake and brought the bus to a grinding halt. But it was the case of the defence that the appellant notice the deceased at all and it was only when the bus struck against the cycle of the deceased and knocked him down and an alarm was raised, that the appellant applied the brake and brought the bus to a stop. This was culpable negligence on the part of the appellant. We are, therefore, satisfied beyond doubt that the death of the deceased was caused on account of negligent driving of the bus by the appellant and the learned Magistrate, the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court were right in reaching that conclusion. 7. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The appellant will surrender to his bail.
-
1975 (8) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ompany and was produced before us. It contains the written representation of the appellant. We find no indication therein that a representative of the appellant was actually present before the Collector on May 9, 1961. The report of the Collector shows that he considered objections of a number of other parties who were present before him and sent his recommendations about the lands of those objections. As regards the lands upon which nothing had been built, the recommendation was that the objections of the objections be ignored. The appellant's land belonged to the last mentioned category. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no force in the contention that opportunity was not afforded to the appellant of being heard before the Collector made his report to the appropriate Government with his recommendations on the objections under Clause (2) of Section 5 A of the Act. 10. As a result of the above, both the appeals fall and are dismissed with costs One hearing fee.
-
1975 (8) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... lso, not just raised the amount of bribe from ₹ 40/- or ₹ 50 to ₹ 100/- or ₹ 200/- but taken out the entire bundle of currency notes with him and offered it to head Constable Ram Singh. The entire story sounds unnatural and we would hesitate considerably before founding a conviction upon it. 8. It appears that the trial Court and the High Court failed to notice the above circumstances which throw considerable doubt on the prosecution case against the appellant. We are not at all satisfied that the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution excludes reasonable doubt in regard to the guilt of the appellant. Since the prosecution case against the appellant cannot be said to be free from reasonable doubt, was must acquit the appellant of the offence charged against him. 9. We, accordingly, allow the appeal set aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and acquit the appellant of the offence under Section 165A of the Indian Penal Code.
-
1975 (8) TMI 146 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... this would be a desirable state of affairs. On the aforesaid considerations I hold that a judgment orally pronounced in open court may be always withdrawn, altered or modified before it is signed. That is so whether it is dictated in open court to prepared at home and delivered orally in court. 12. I am of opinion that inasmuch as I had not signed my judgment before the application was made for further hearing of the case, the application can be entertained. 13. By the application the Appellant prays that the appeal be treated as a revision petition and considered on that basis. It is not infrequent that the courts in their judicial discretion have adopted that course for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. I see no reason why I should depart from that practice. In the circumstances, el allow the application and direct that the present case which has been registered as an appeal, will now be treated as a revision petition. 14. List the case for further hearing.
-
1975 (8) TMI 145 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... quot; 20. In any event, in my opinion, Section 583 of the present Act does not confer any power upon the court to direct substitution in a proceeding initiated under Section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956. In directing substitution in such a proceeding the court makes the order which is beyond its jurisdiction and thus such an order is a " judgment " within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In my view, the question involved in the appeal is a jurisdictional question and the order under appeal is, therefore, appealable. The power under Section 543 of the Companies Act, 1956, is a statutory power and must be exercised within the four corners of the section. If the power is exercised in a manner which is not authorised by the section, the exercise of power becomes appealable. The above mentioned Supreme Court decisions overruled the cases noted at page 538 of Company Law by Sen and Sarkar. For all the reasons stated hereinabove, this appeal must succeed.
-
1975 (8) TMI 144 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t the time when the loan was contracted in this case. Information about i such factors will have a considerable bearing on the question whether the actual rate of interest contracted for by the; parties is excessive or not. Further, the respondent herein was a Bank which is subject to certain regulations and control by the Reserve Bank of India and the reference to 'interest at five per cent over Reserve Bank of India rate rising and falling' in Exhibit A-1 itself is a clear indication in this behalf. On the face of it, the rate of interest at 11 per cent per annum with half-yearly rests, provided for by the lower Court cannot be prima facie said to 'be excessive. As against this, the appellants had not placed any materials before the Court to show that such a provision for payment of interest was anyway excessive, requiring to be reduced by this Court. 6. Under these circumstances, there are no merits in the appeal and the same fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1975 (8) TMI 143 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... on as usual. After the resolution dt. 11th Decr., 1973 the committees with the respondents met several times and the winter session of the race was successfully completed with the commencement of summer session. The extraordinary general body meeting of the Company was held on 18th February 1974 which was presided over by defendant 2. The plaintiff was present in that meeting. He did not raise any objection to the continuance of the elected members. No one else also raised any such objection. It was only on 21st March, 1974 the plaintiff instituted the suit. This delay, if not acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff, is sufficient to deny him the interim relief. 14. In the view that I have taken, it is unnecessary to consider the appeal MFA. 500 of 1974 preferred by the plaintiff. 15. In the result, MFA. 654 of 1974 is allowed; the order impugned therein is set aside; consequently, MFA. 500 of 1974 fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances. I make no order as to costs.
-
1975 (8) TMI 142 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... observations of the High Court that "information furnished to this Court by the District Magistrate in his report dated 3-11-73 regarding the contents of the Police Report is grossly inaccurate and misleading" was unjustified. The substance of the other remarks in question is substantially the same, viz., that the issue of the impugned notice to the Advocate by the appellant was illegal and arbitrary and amounted to a gross abuse of the process of the Court. These remarks were an integral part of the reasoning of the High Court. They were not irrelevant or foreign to the matter in issue. They were inextricably intertwined with the findings and the order recorded by the High Court in that case. Excision of these remarks would emasculate the order of the High Court, robbing it of its very rationale. Judged by the aforesaid tests, no case for interference by this Court has been made out. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal, with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1975 (8) TMI 141 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... are not impressed by the nature of the evidence led by the prosecution. We cannot entirely ignore the fact that the signatures of Tambe are absent on all those documents on which they would have been present if Section 10(7) of the Act had been strictly complied with. We think that it is more likely, for the reasons already given by us, that Tambe was not there ll at all to witness the occurrence. If that be so, the evidence of the prosecuting Food Inspector, who said that Tambe was there, cannot be implicitly relied upon in this case. It is quite unsafe to base the appellant's conviction on such shaky foundations. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment and fine of ₹ 1,000/-, and in default, further rigorous imprisonment for two months, imposed upon the appellant. the appellant who is on bail need not surrender. His bail bonds are discharged. The fine, if realised. shall be refunded to him.
-
1975 (8) TMI 140 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t' in the M. P. Public Trust Act, 1951, ('public religious purpose' and 'public charitable purpose') is left open. When the present case is judged by the above tests, we have no doubt that Fosuram father of the petitioners, from whom they claim to have derived possession, was a lessee from year to year and his lease could be and was determined by notice (Ex. P-1) with effect from July 1, 1964 which called upon Fosuram to desist from cultivating the land from that date. Thus the lease ceased to be in force on July 1, 1964 within the meaning of Section 168 (4) of the Code and on the application of the Bhumiswami deity, Fosuram was liable to be ejected. This is what the Board of Revenue has held. There is no case for issuance of a writ to quash the order of the Board of Revenue The petition is dismissed. The petitioners shall pay ₹ 150 as costs to the first respondent. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners.
-
1975 (8) TMI 139 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... basis of the claim for overtime wages may be. 12. The disputes between this company and its workers quite often come to this Court. The case in Bombay Gas Co. v. Shridhar Bhau (supra) is one such. The other cases are found in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva 1964 3 S.C.R. 709 and Ramlanshan Jageshwar v. Bombay Gas Co. 1961 1 L.L.J. 38. If the workers are dissatisfied with any of the items in respect of which their claim has been rejected it is open to them to raise a fresh industrial dispute. The award has stood the test of time for 25 years, a very rare occurrence indeed these days. 13. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside with the result that the petitions of all the workers stand dismissed. The special leave granted in this case was subject to the conditions that the Appellant would pay the costs of the appeal to the Respondents in any event. The Appellant will therefore bear its own costs and pay the costs of the Respondents.
-
1975 (8) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o the State Governments in the circular would include reference to the Governments of the State or Maharashtra and the State of Gujarat. It should, therefore, be held that even in terms of the circular of the Central Government dated 11th May, 1957 the Gujarat Government was competent to make the rules which they had made in 1962. The argument on behalf of the petitioners therefore that no approval could have been, given in terms of s. 87 of the Bombay Reorganisation Act by a circular issued even in 1957 before that Act was passed has no force. The result is that the order of the Government of Gujarat State of 1962 laying down the G.D.C. & A. examination as a necessary qualification for promotion should be held to be valid. The appeal is therefore allowed and the judgment or the Gujarat High Court set aside. We, however, make it clear that no recovery shall be made from the respondents. In the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1975 (8) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n arrived at between the decree holder and the judgment debtor under which the decree holder had agreed to lift attachment of property except with regard to Plaza Talkies which was to continue. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court, that the Plaza Talkie was attached in execution of decree in suit No. 3B of 1952 on 4-5-1955 and that this attachment was in existence when the impugned lease was executed on 30-3-1956, are erroneous. On these findings, the lease of 1956 was certainly struck by the provisions of Section 64 Civil procedure Code also. Section 64, Civil Procedure Code, in fact, constitues an application of the doctrine of lis pendence in the circumstance specified there. For the reasons given above, we dismiss this appeal with costs. ORDER In view of our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1041 of 1968, delivered today, we think that these Special Leave Petitions (Civil) must be and are hereby dismissed. P.B.R.
-
1975 (8) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rule 10 notwithstanding that the period of limitation for impleading them had expired. o p /o p In Roshan Lal v. Kapur Chand the Court took the view that newly appointed trustees are not legal representatives of the trustees who had filed the suit and thereafter died during the pendency of the suit, that they can be added as parties under Order 22, rule 10 notwithstanding the fact that the period of limitation for an application to impleaded them under Order 22, rule 3 had elapsed. The Court said (at p. 384) o p /o p "Such an application is obviously not an application under O. 22, R. 3 Civil Procedure Code." o p /o p We also see no reason why the High Court should not have granted leave to the appellant to prosecute the appeal. o p /o p In the result we reverse the decree of the court below and direct the High Court to dispose of the appeal on merits. We allow the appeal but, in the circumstances, make no order as to costs. o p /o p V.P.S. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
-
1975 (8) TMI 135 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fore right in holding that the impugned order should be deemed to have been passed on April 24, 1956 when the Forest Department came to know of the order and "the right of appeal granted to the Department should be determined on that very basis." Counsel for the appellant sought to argue that the appellate authority was wrong in finding that the respondents had no notice of the order passed by the Forest Settlement Officer. We cannot permit the appellant to question the findings of fact in this appeal. As regards the order passed by the State Government on the revision petition filed by the appellant, it appears that though the appellant referred to the said order in the writ petition there is no prayer in the petition for setting aside or quashing that order. As the validity of this order was not questioned before the High Court, the appellant cannot be allowed to raise the question at this stage. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1975 (8) TMI 134 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tement like Exhibit P-45, the Investigating Officer would have sent it along with his report. The Inquiry Officer says that the Investigating officer recorded the statement of the respondent. The Tribunal has not relied on ’B’ Report or Investigation Report. The respondent never demanded ’B’ Report and Investigation Report. The A respondent was interested before the Tribunal to displace Exhibit P-45 by doubting its genuineness. The Tribunal found that Exhibit P-45 was genuine and was a statement made and signed by the respondent in the presence of the Investigating Officer. It does not appear that the Tribunal based its finding only on Exhibit P-45. o p /o p For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and re-assessing the evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. o p /o p V.P.S Appeal allowed. o p /o p
-
1975 (8) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... any candidate, or in relation to the candidature, or withdrawal of any candidate, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election. Apart from the other requirements it is of the essence of the matter that the impugned statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of a candidate which is alleged to have been published should be false. Unless the said statement of act is shown to be false, its publication would not constitute corrupt practice as defined in clause (4) of Section 123 of the Act. When there is complete absence of any material on the record to show that the impugned statement of fact no occasion would plainly arise for remanding the case to the High Court to enable the appellant to produce in evidence the photostat copy in question with a view to show that the original of that had been written by the respondent. 9. There is no merit in the appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed with costs.
-
1975 (8) TMI 132 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ate authority that his genuine need for the forms is greater than sanctioned by the Sales-tax Officer and also that the forms previously issued to him had been properly accounted for, the Appellate Authority can give him the necessary relief. It is not open to this Court to entertain and decide such disputes. In the circumstances we are of the opinion that the proper course for the petitioner is to approach the Appellate Authority. We make it clear that in the meantime, if the petitioner bona fide utilises the forms already issued to him and if he genuinely needs more forms, he can make a demand from the Sales-tax Officer and we have no reason to believe that the Sales-tax Officer will not issue more forms. 4. At the end the learned counsel make an attempt to challenge sub-rule (4) of Rule 85. No such ground has been taken in the writ petition and, as such, we are not inclined to permit him to raise this ground. 5. With these observations the petition fails and is dismissed.
-
1975 (8) TMI 131 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ppellant on his own or for some person other. than Gupta. We have already held that the appellant was a mere labourer who was not concerned with the installation work at the site or with the giving of the power connection to the complainant. In view of the categorical position taken by the prosecution in evidence, it does not now lie in their month to may that the appellant must have received the money for himself or for some other person; much less can it be said that the appellant has abused his official position or has used any illegal means in acting as an innocent carrier for Gupta. Thus, the essential ingredient of the offence under s. 5(1) (d) was lacking in this case. We are therefore of the opinion that on the facts of this case, the prosecution had failed to bring home the charges to the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly we allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant and acquit him of the charges levelled against him. Appeal allowed.
........
|
