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Showing 1 to 20 of 115 Records
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1975 (9) TMI 196 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and had a possible motive to see the accused removed permanently from the way of their immoral activity. 56. It is pertinent to mention here that the evidence of defence witnesses particularly that of D. Ws. 3 and 5, was not successfully impeached in cross-examination. The High Court has not touched their evidence at all. If the defence evidence were to be believed, at the material time, the appellant was in police uniform patrolling the Railway platform and he was not wearing the pants from the pocket of which the tainted currency notes are alleged to have been recovered. According to the appellant these pants were hanging on a peg in his room. Therefore, the possibility of the tainted notes having been implanted by Dal Chand, who appears to us a person with wit more and scruples less than the ordinary, cannot be ruled out 57. For the foregoing reasons we would allow this appeal, accord the benefit of doubt to the appellant and acquit him of the charges leveled against him.
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1975 (9) TMI 195 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... able ground of grudge against the deceased and his father. 42. Further it is wrong to say that Baljeet never absconded. Contrary to what Baljeet has said in his examination under Section 342. Cr.P.C. the Investigating Officer, P.W. 7, testified that Baljeet was found hiding in a chhappar in the village from where he was arrested. This account of Baljeet's arrest was not challenged in cross-examination. To be an 'absconder' in the eye of law, it is not necessary that a person should have run away from his home, it is sufficient if he hides himself to evade the process of law, even if the hiding place be his own home. We therefore, do not find any ground to distinguish the case of Baljeet from that of Sita Ram and to treat him differently. 43. All said and done, no good reason has been shown why we should disturb the concurrent findings of the courts below against the appellants. 44. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and maintain the convictions of the appellants.
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1975 (9) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d even if there were not eligible Assistant Executive Engineers who could be promoted to fill in two vacancies belonging to their quota, one vacancy is to be filled up by promotion of an Assistant Engineer, if he was eligible. Similarly, if two vacancies belonging to the quota of Assistant Executive Engineers are to be filled by Assistant Engineers for want of availability of eligible Assistant Executive Engineers the appointment of Assistant Engineers to fill in those two vacancies would be irregular because they would have to be pushed down to later years when their appointment could be regularised as a result of absorption in their lawful quota for those years. 40. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the respondents Nos. 2 to 24 were entitled to the vacancies within their quota which had not been filled up and they are senior to the appellants. We affirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeals. Parties will pay and bear their own costs in these appeals.
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1975 (9) TMI 193 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and in view of the nomination made by the late Srinivasa Rao in this behalf, the second respondent nominee was absolutely entitled to receive the commission from the first respondent herein in her own right. I may also point out that the learned counsel for the appellant did not contend that the notification issued by the Government of India was itself in any way illegal. Therefore, my conclusion on the second point is that the second respondent is entitled to receive the money in her own right and that the first respondent is justified in paying it to the second respondent and stating that it would continue to pay the money to her alone. 14. In view of this conclusion of mine on the second point it is unnecessary to consider points 3 and 4 enumerated by me above. 15. Under these circumstances, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Having regard to the question of law considered by me for the first time in this appeal, I do not make any order as to costs. 16. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (9) TMI 192 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibunal to consider whether there was any reasonable cause which prevented the assessee from filing the return in time. Question Nos. 1 and 2 which have been raised in view of the provision of law as it stood before the amendment made in Section 271(1)(i) by the Direct Taxes (Amendment) Act, 1974 need not be answered. We, therefore, answer question No. 3 as under "The assessee-firm would incur a liability provided there is no reasonable cause which prevented it from filing the return in time." 4. The Tribunal shall have to examine this aspect of the question by itself or by remanding it to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, if so advised, and then decided the question of liability in view of what we have stated in this judgment. Having regard to the fact that position of law has been altered by the amendment retrospectively with effect from 1-4-1962 in the matter of penalty under Section 271(1)(a) read with Section 271(1)(i), there should be no order as to costs.
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1975 (9) TMI 191 - HIGH COURT ORISSA
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... ... ..... trator said that the award had become final in the year 1963. In fact it was not final. The award clearly laid down the principles and directed the Land Acquisition Officer to compute the compensation. It is only after the compensation was calculated that the petitioners could know the amount to which they were entitled. It was the duty of the arbitrator when complaint was made to him to see whether the calculation made was correct or not. He retained jurisdiction to determine correct calculation. 7. In the result, the writ application is allowed with costs. Hearing fee of ₹ 200/- (two hundred). The petitioners would be granted compensation on 15544 maunds at the rate of ₹ 7.27 per maund which comes to ₹ 1,13,004.88. Any amount already paid would be deducted from this as directed by the Arbitrator. Petitioners would be entitled to 15 per cent solatium on the aforesaid amount and interest at 6 per cent. as directed by the Arbitrator. S.K. Ray, J. 8. I agree.
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1975 (9) TMI 190 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng limitation and not to create a different substantive period of limitation, the latter depends upon the appropriate Article of the Limitation Act which applies to the suit In this case, the mortgage document was registered and the personal covenant was contained in the registered deed. Therefore, Article 116, which gives a period of six years, applies. Thus, the fresh period of limitation will be six years and it has to be Counted from the date of acknowledgement, namely, 31-8-40. In this view, there is no merit in the plea of limitation either. This is obviously a case where the revisional Court had missed a fact apparent upon the record and, therefore, thought it fit, in the exercise of its discretion to review its judgment. Justice has thereby been furthered rather than frustrated. We are not here concerned with an endorsement on the deed as constituting a cause of action. 5. We dismiss the appeal but, in the special circumstances, the parties will beat their own costs.
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1975 (9) TMI 189 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed Chief Justice as the second Special Bench constituted of myself, S.K. Mukherjee and A.K. Basu, JJ. could not 'hear the matter owing to personal ground of Mukherjea, J. Thus it cannot be said that the appellant was negligent in not keeping itself informed about the position of the appeal from the respondent's Solicitor. ( 6. ) We have failed to find out that the Corporation of Calcutta has acted mala fide in making the present application. Further, it cannot be said that the appellant is guilty of any culpable negligence in not presenting this petition earlier. ( 7. ) For all the reasons stated above in the extraordinary facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that there is sufficient cause for the appellant for not taking steps earlier and that there should be an order in terms of prayers (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6). The petitioner shall pay the costs of this application to the respondent. ( 8. ) Certified for two Counsel. I agree with the order.
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1975 (9) TMI 188 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... v. Pan American Airways Inc., 1968 3 W.L.R. 714, 732 and indeed it is no secret that courts constantly give their own shape to enactments. We feel that when economic legislation in the implementation of Part IV of the Constitution strikes new ground and takes liberties with old jurisprudence, there looms an interpretation problem of some dimensions which Indian jurists will have to tackle. The genre of agrarian reform laws, with special constitutional status, as it were, warrants interpretative skills which will stifle evasive attempts, specially by way of gifts and bequests and suspect transfers. Here ss. 10-A, 19-A and 19B, inter alia, strike at these tactics. Our conclusion, in conformity with the principles of statutory construction we have projected, is that the gifts in both the appeals fail in the face of s. 19B. It follows that the appeals have to be allowed, which we hereby do without hesitation, without costs how ever to either party at any stage. Appeals allowed.
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1975 (9) TMI 187 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o officers under the rule-making control of the Government of Andhra Pradesh" was merely a reference to the rules and not to the pay schedules. This was further made clear by the first proviso of Rule 19(1) which reads as follows "Provided that except with regard to salaries, allowances, leave and pensions, the Chief Justice shall exercise the powers vested in the Governor under any of the aforesaid rules;" For the reasons stated above we do not find it possible to sustain the judgment of the High Court in law. We, however, trust and hope that the Government will give their second thought to the matter and see whether it is possible in the State of Andhra Pradesh to obliterate the distinction in the matter of pay scales etc. between the High Court and the Secretariat Staff. There does not seem to be any good and justifiable reason for maintaining the distinction. In the result the appeal is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. V.M.K. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (9) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... roach made by the High Court but we do not agree with the amount quantified by it. If we add interest at the rate of 6 per annum as prayed for in the plaint on the amount of ₹ 15,000/-,the interest calculated at this rate for 35 years from 1940 to 1975 would come to ₹ 31500/-. Thus the total amount payable to the plaintiffs comes to ₹ 46,500/- . We, therefore, allow the appeal in part and modify the decree of the High Court to the extent that there will be a decree for a sum of ₹ 46,500/- in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants which represents their share of the movable properties of which they were deprived of. The plaintiffs would be entitled to future interest at the rate of 6 per annum till payment. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. This course, in our opinion, safeguards the interests of the minors to give them their just due and to protect them from a protracted and fruitless litigation. Appeal partly allowed.
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1975 (9) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hin r. 14 of the Rules of 1968 where they have been removed from service without complying with the last part of r. 14 of the Rules of 1968 as indicated above. In none of the cases has the disciplinary authority either considered the circumstances or heard the delinquent employees on the limited point as to the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed if at all. On the other hand in all these cases the disciplinary authority has proceeded to pass the order of removal from service straightaway on the basis of the conviction of the delinquent employees by the criminal courts. For the reasons given above the High Courts of Kerala and Rajasthan were, in the Circumstances, fully justified in quashing the orders of the disciplinary authorities removing the respondents from service. The appeals therefore fail and are accordingly dismissed but in view of somewhat unsettled position of law on the question involved we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (9) TMI 184 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt additional assurance to the circumstantial evidence pointing to his guilt. But the fact that the prosecution has failed to lead such evidence has this effect only, that the other evidence bearing on the guilt of the accused has to be very closely examined. In this case the learned Judges of the High Court have very carefully examined the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution and come to the conclusion that the circumstances proved beyond any doubt that the appellant was responsible for the murder that night. It may be that he was aided by Hoshiara but that was a matter on which the court was not called upon to finally pronounce its opinion. If the conclusion was right, there is no doubt that the appellant deserved the only sentence that under the law could be imposed upon him apart from the extreme penalty which the High Court in this case did not think fit to impose. 7. In our opinion, no ground has been made out for interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1975 (9) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... State to give possession of any land either to its erstwhile proprietor or to one who has been in long possession rightly of wrongly. We do not make any observation in that behalf but point out that prima facie section 4(f) and (g) and rule 7-H attract the jurisdiction of the State and its revenue 13 authorities. The policy of the Act includes the State taking over and managing lands not saved by sections 5, 6 and 7 and are not found to be in possession of the proprietor so that the eventual distribution to the landless and the like may be worked out smoothly. The appeal is dismissed in substantial measure except to the extent of the relief by way of mesne profits and possession in regard to a few items mentioned in paragraph 27 of the contestants' written statement The parties will bear their costs throughout in the peculiar circumstances of the case. This judgment will not affect the rights, if any. either party may seek or has secured from the State. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (9) TMI 182 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld not have been made. Such an evidence is visualised by the counter illustration referred to above but that is a circumstance which a Court is entitled to consider before raising a presumption. Once the presumption is raised, the manner of rebuttal need not be limited to the instance given in the counter illustration. The only possible evidence that could have been given by the tenant in such a case would be to deny the tender on oath and that is exactly what the tenant has done in the present case. This evidence could not be rejected out of hand merely because it was made by a party to the proceedings or because any better negative evidence could have been given by the tenant. (13) In the result, the appeal succeeds. The order of the Rent Control Tribunal is set aside and that of the Addl. Rent Controller is restored with the result that the petition for eviction would stand dismissed. The tenant would have his costs both in this Court and before the Rent Control Tribunal.
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1975 (9) TMI 181 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... this circumstance. What has to be established is mala fide exercise of power by the State Government-the acquiring authority-although the beneficiary of the acquisition is eventually the Municipality. There is no scintilla of evidence suggestive of malus animus in Government. At this state Shri Deshpande complained that actually the Municipal Committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony, apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the s. 5(3) declaration. There is no merit in the appeal which is dismissed without costs.
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1975 (9) TMI 180 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eals and dismiss them, leaving parties to bear their respective costs throughout. C.As. 1456-1458/69 These appeals raise an interesting question of law bearing on compensation payable to landholders whose lands are vested in tenants and this turns on the connotation of 'similar land' in s. 18(2) of the Act in the context of averaging the price for ten years before the filing of the - application for purchase. The primary fact which projects this point Of law is as to whether the purchased land is irrigated or non-irrigated for purposes of valuation. We are relieved from the need to investigate the implications of the issue because the factual foundation about the nature of the land in question was never put in issue nor considered in the High Court. Thus the appellants have missed the bus and we cannot hear them on a question raised de novo and demanding enquiry into facts not raised at the next-below level. We dismiss these appeals, without costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1975 (9) TMI 179 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... notice that the Public Analyst, Mr. Sudama Roy whose report is in question-is no longer in the service of the Cor poration and is not residing at Delhi. It is obvious that it will not be possible to procure Mr. Roy's attendance in court without an amount of delay and inconvenience which will be unreasonable in the circumstances of the case and will cause undue hardship to the respondent who has had more than his normal share of the mental suffering. harassment and expense which go together with protracted criminal proceedings, extending in the present case over 81 months. No useful purpose will therefore be served by remanding the case for a fresh decision. Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, we do not think it proper to disturb the acquittal of the respondent. Subject to the clarification of the points of law and the reversal of the view taken by the High Court as to the meaning and scope of s. 2(i)(f), the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1975 (9) TMI 178 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eport, or, in any event, the final decision of the Government contained in the impugned notification. It must be remembered that the procedure followed in this case was the one provided in section 5(1) (a) in which case it was not mandatory for the Government to take the opinion of the Advisory Board. After all, the recommendations made by the Board even on consideration of the report of the Sub-committee along with that of the Committee was the advice of the Board. The Government did accept it but accepted it after some modification. In such a situation we do not think that the notification dated 31-7- 1965 deserves invalidation. It follows as a corollary that the proceedings started pursuant to the notification cannot also be quashed. In the result we allow this appeal, set aside. the judgment and order of the High Court and dismiss the connected writ application filed by respondent No. 1. Since he has not appeared there will be no order as to costs. V.P.S. Appeal allowed.
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1975 (9) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... als. We are not interested in what happened to those appeals. We further direct that while re-assessing for the period aforesaid i.e. 1964/65, the officer will have due regard to the materials placed before him, if any, although it will be open to him, for good reasons, if any, to accept or reject the materials, including the accounts that may be placed before him. In case, the conditions for a best-judgment assessment are present, he will make it not on speculative or fanciful grounds but on reasonable guess since the best-judgment assessment does not negate the exercise of judgment on the part of the officer. We make it clear that whatever the observations of the High Court, the point driven home was only that a tax officer, who makes a best-judgment assessment, should make an intelligent well-grounded estimate rather than launch upon pure surmises. With these observations and subject to the above directions, these appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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