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Showing 1 to 20 of 102 Records
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1976 (10) TMI 162 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... discussion, we are of the opinion that the impugned notification has been validly issued by the Governor under Article 237 of the Constitution. After the issue of the notification the erstwhile Magistrates who are members of the U. P. Judicial Officers Service have become members of Judicial service as defined by Article 236(b) of the Constitution with the limitation that they are intended to fill the posts of Additional Sessions Judge only. Even though the U. P. Judicial Officers Service constitutes Judicial Service within the meaning of Article 236(b) of the Constitution, it is separate from the U. P. Civil Service (Judicial Branch). Since the members of the Judicial Officers Service form part of the Judicial Service of the State, the U. P. Higher Judicial Service Rules as notified by the notification dated March 21, 1975, are valid and they do not violate Article 233 or 236 of the Constitution. 21. In the result the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1976 (10) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hing in the case to excite the court’s suspicion and to accept the will as genuine on that premise is wholly ununderstandable. The High Court does not refer to a single circumstance out of the many that we have discussed and the operative part of the judgment just recites a few facts mechanically as if there could possibly be no answer to the validity of the will. The High Court has not referred in its judgment even in passing to the rule as to the burden of proof which applies to testamentary proceedings. If only it had taken the trouble of looking at the decision of this Court in Iyengar’s case, which is copiously extracted in the judgment of the Trial Court, it would have realized what its true duty was in the case. For these reasons we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court. The appellant will be entitled to recover from the respondents the costs of this Court and of the High Court. P.H.P. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (10) TMI 160 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sons held that the goods on which the burden of charge lay being available for the satisfaction of the liabilities, if any, under the agreement dated July 6, 1948, the defendants second set could not be held personally liable for payment of the decretal amount. The opinion expressed by the High Court is correct and we see no warrant or justification to interfere with the same. 34. In view of the foregoing, we have no hesitation in holding that as material alterations have been made by the plaintiff in the agreement dated July 6, 1948 (which is the basis of the suit) rendering it void and as the bar of Section 69 of the Partnership Act clearly applies to the case, the suit is clearly untenable and has to be dismissed. 35. In the result, Appeal No. 572 of 1974 is allowed and the suit out of which it arose is dismissed. Consequently, Appeal No. 416 of 1973 fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, parties are left to pay and bear their own costs of these appeals.
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1976 (10) TMI 159 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... under s. 7(1) read with S. 19 of the Act. Q.2 Whether the Collector & Assistant Supdt. of Stamps was right in impounding the copy of the instrument and ordering levy of duty and penalty under the provisions of Ss. 33 and 39 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958? Ans. In the negative. 5. In the result, the question referred to us are answered as under - 6. Reference answered accordingly. Parties will bear their own- costs. 7. Mr. Gandhi for the Company has made an oral application for certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133(l) of the Constitution. We are unable to certify that any substantial question of law of general importance which. in our opinion, requires to be decided by the Supreme Court arises in this case. Certificate is refused. We would also like to point out that question No. 2 which really matters from the point of view of the opponent Company has in fact been answered in favour of the opponent Company. 8. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (10) TMI 158 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... limitation on the above basis, it could hardly be maintained 'that the time limit had expired before the commencement of the new Act. We have already gone into the details of the computation, and there is, indeed, no dispute, that the last day for filing the execution petition in this case would not have arrived till 6-6-1975. 16. Sethuraman J. while dealing with this question, observed thus in his order on review dated 30-1-1975 -- "There is no provision in the new Act saying that the fresh start which the period of limitation had as a result of payment was affected by the new Act. There must be some clear language to affect any such vested right." We entirely agree with the observations of the learned Judge. 17. In the result, we hold that E.P. No. 34 of 1972 filed by the respondent decree-holder in this case is within time and not barred by limitation. This O. S. Appeal filed by the judgment-debtors is accordingly, dismissed with costs. 18. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (10) TMI 157 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ourt observed in State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhai "that the owners of the lands sought to be acquired for a company are entitled to an opportunity of being heard in an enquiry under Rule 4 of the Rules, and in an enquiry under Section 40 of the Act. In the absence of such an enquiry the acquisition proceedings are vitiated." The law laid down by the Supreme Court of India is binding on all courts. On the parity of reasoning of the case the State of Gujarat v. Chaturbhai we hold that the compliance of Rule 32 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Rules, 1956 has not been made in the case on hand. 40. The net result of the above discussion is that this appeal is accepted and the judgment of the learned single Judge dated July 23, 1974 is set aside. The writ petition No. 369 of 1974 is allowed. The impugned notification dated March 13. 1973 and all the proceedings taken thereafter are quashed. In the facts and circumstances of this case the parties will bear their own costs.
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1976 (10) TMI 156 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to construction being contemporaneo exposition. When the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes who is a principal executive authority charged with the duty of administering the Act and has the power under Section 12A of the Act to decide a disputed question as to whether or not any tax is payable in respect of a particular sale or purchase, puts a certain construction which is being acted upon for nearly a decade, there is no reason for us to depart from the construction placed by him. The Revenue must be consistent in its approach, if process of baking is the test then biscuits are undoubtedly cooked food. 6. The order of the Board does cot, in our opinion, give rise to a question of law because the answer to the question is self evident, vide Commissioner of Income tax Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir and Simla v. Chander Bhan Harbhajan Lal 1966 60ITR188(SC) . 7. These applications under Section 15(3A) of the Rajas than Sales Tax Act, 1954, are therefore, rejected.
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1976 (10) TMI 155 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... case that a statutory notification fixing prices has not the force of law is clearly erroneous. Further, the general observation made in that case that a notification cannot amount to law is also erroneous. It fails to notice the distinction between a statutory and a non-statutory notification. Mathuradas' case was rightly dissented from in State v. Gokulchand, AIR 1957 Madh Pra 145 and State v. Gopal Singh AIR 1956 Madh Bha 138 (FB). 11. The order of reference made in the instant case by the Division Bench does not formulate the questions, but it is implicit in it that we have to answer (a) whether notification No. G. S. R. 1512 issued under Section 7(1) of the Telegraph Wires Act amounts to law and should be taken judicial notice of under Section 57(1) of the Evidence Act; and (b) whether Mathuradas' case (AIR 1954 Nag 296) was wrongly decided. Our answer to both these questions is Yes. 12. The appeal shall now be placed before a Division Bench for final disposal.
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1976 (10) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... goods. The respondent in view of the trial court and the Division Bench of the High Court allowing the respondent to go on with the claim under section 70 of the Indian Contract Act became entitled to compensation for the goods accepted. The High Court found that the respondent had received a sum of ₹ 7,602-0-0 out of the claim of the claim under section 70 of the Indian contract Act and the respondent has been given a decree for ₹ 69,069-1-0 we order that the parties will pay and bear their own costs in this appeal. We specify the period of two months for payment of the aforesaid sums of money ₹ 76,671-1-0. The High Court gave a decree for the sum of ₹ 69,069-1-0. For the foregoing reasons there will be a decree for ₹ 69.0169-1-0. The High Court awarded half costs of the trial and full costs of the appeal. We do not wish to disturb those two orders for costs. In view of the fact that there was no proper case pleaded to support Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (10) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is close relations and did not even pay the sale price in cash. It is also significant that the shares of the other 'relations were insignificant. Moreover the. Company could not lead evidence to show that it was able to transact any substantial business whatsoever. We have therefore no reason to disagree with the trial court's finding that the Company was formed just to transfer the house to it in an effort to save it from attachment and sale for realisation of the income-tax arrears of defendant No. 3. The finding of the trial court on the issue is quite correct and the High Court committed a serious error of law in not examining this aspect of the matter at all even though it had a great bearing on the controversy. In the result, we are constrained to allow the appeals. The impugned judgment and decree of the High Court dated February 14. 1967 are set aside and the decree of the trial court is restored with costs throughout one hearing fee. V.P.S. Appeals allowed.
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1976 (10) TMI 151 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rly in error because we find from the judgment of the Second Additional District Judge, dated October 29, 1966, that the counsel for the respondents 1021 was given "ample opportunity" by the Municipal Commissioner to represent his case before him. He has also stated that the Assessment Officer paid due regard to all the relevant circumstances which had a bearing on the determination of the reasonable letting value of the building. Counsel for the respondents has in fact not found it worth his while to argue either that such a hearing was not given, or that all the relevant factors were not taken into consideration in determining the annual letting value of the premises. o p /o p In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court dated September 26, 1968, is Set aside. The appellants will however pay the costs of the respondents as stipulated in the order of this Court granting the special leave. o p /o p P.H.P. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1976 (10) TMI 150 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ;applications." These petitions and applications can be under any special Act as in the present case. The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case (supra) and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application failing within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act. For the foregoing reasons we accept the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. The appellant will pay costs to the respondent in accordance with order made at the time of granting special leave. Appeal allowed
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1976 (10) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n it show that it did not result in the production of a new commodi- ty at the port. It was only manganese ore of different grades which was unloaded at the port and gives the name of "Oriental Mixture" because the ingredients got mixed up automati- cally in transportation and satisfied certain specifications. No new commodity was produced in this process. Q. 6. Was the Tribunal right in holding that the Sales Tax Authorities had found as a fact that the goods consisting of oriental mixture were in the Madhya Pradesh State when the contracts in respect of these goods were made ? Ans. Yes. Before we part with the case we may observe that the questions could have been much more lucidly and simply and less culmsily stated. The appeals of the assessee company against the deci- sions of the Full Bench are dismissed. The appeals of the State of Maharashtra against the judgment of the Division Bench are allowed. Parties will hear their own costs, V.P.S. Appeals dismissed.
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1976 (10) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Ajodhya Prasad was entitled to the issue of the licenses for the seven shops?
Whether the State Government had the authority to direct the withholding and reauctioning of the licenses, and held, inter alia, that the State Government had no power to interfere with the auction held by the Collector after it had "become final in appeal and revision", and could not direct a reauction?
Held that:- The State Legislature was authorised to make a provision for public auction by reason of the power contained in Entry 8 List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and that there was "no fundamental right of citizens to carry on trade or to do business in liquor. "The State has the exclusive right and privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor" and that it has the "power to hold a public auction for the grant of such a right or privilege and to accept payment of a sum therefor." It was accordingly held that the right granted to the appellants by public auction and the licenses issued to them was "clearly an exclusive privilege within the meaning of section 22(1) of the Act" and that it has expressly been provided in section 29 that it would be permissible for the State Government to accept payment of a sum in "conSideration" of the exclusive privilege under section 22.
The High Court has taken the view that rule 103(1) of the Board’s Excise Rules regarding the manner of fixation and realization of the consideration for the grant of a license for the exclusive privilege of retail vend of country spirit was "incompetent and ultra vires the act." The High Court took that view under the mistaken impression that the State was not entitled to collect a tax "under the garb of a fee" and the "auction price for a license is not duty within the meaning of Entry 51 of List 11 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution." But, as has been shown, what was sought to be raised was consideration and not "fee". The use of the expression "fees" in the rule is therefore inaccurate, but that cannot detract from the real nature of the recovery. There can be no doubt therefore that the High Court erred in taking a contrary view. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (10) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
Whether entry 22 added by the Gujarat Government by notification dated March 27, 1967 to Part 1 of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 covers Mangalore pattern roofing tiles?
Held that:- The Explanation says that, for the purpose of entry 22, potteries industry ’includes’ manufacture of the. nine articles of pottery named therein. It seems to us that the word ’includes’ has been used here in the sense of ’means’, this is the only construction that the word can bear in the context. In that sense it is not a word of extension, but limitation; it is exhaustive of the meaning which must be given to potteries industry for the purpose of entry 22. It must therefore be held that the manufacture of Mangalore pattern roofing tiles is outside the purview of entry 22. Against assessee.
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1976 (10) TMI 146 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the urgency is of such a nature as to require elimination of the enquiry under section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The recital does not say at all that any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the enquiry under section 5A of the Act. It is certainly a case in which’ the recital was at least defective. The burden, therefore, rested upon the State to remove the defect, if possible, by evidence to show that some exceptional circumstances which necessitated the elimination of an enquiry under section 5A of the Act and that the mind of the Commissioner was applied to this essential question. It seems to us that the High Court correctly applied the provisions of section ’106 of the Evidence Act to place the burden upon the State to prove those special circumstances although it also; appears to us. that the High Court was not quite correct in stating its view in such a manner as to make it appear that some part of the initial burden of the petitioners under sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act had been displaced by the failure of the State, to discharge its duty under’ section 106 of the Act. The correct way of putting it would have been to say that the failure of the State to produce the evidence of facts especially’ within the knowledge of its officials, which rested upon it under section 106 of the Evidence Act, taken together with the attendant facts gnu circumstances, including the contents of recitals, had enabled the petitioners to discharge their burdens under sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act.
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1976 (10) TMI 145 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it was submitted that the depot did not file D forms for claiming exemption under the bona fide belief that its case did not fall within the definition of the word dealer and that it should now be allowed to file these forms before the Assessing Authority for claiming exemption. It is, however, not disputed before us that the petitioner has also filed appeals before the appellate authority. We have no doubt in our mind that the said authority will give due weight to the arguments advanced with regard to these two points because while exercising appellate jurisdiction it possesses all the powers of the original tribunal. After having found that the petitioner was a dealer within the meaning of the Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, we do not think it proper to interfere in a petition under article 226 of the Constitution, especially when the appellate authority is seized of the matter. These petitions are, therefore, dismissed, with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (10) TMI 144 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f 1975 should be held to be time-barred. In view of the decision in State of A.P. v. Sri Rama L.S. Rice Mill 1975 35 S.T.C. 601. , it is obvious that, in the instant case, the reopening would fall under section 14(4) because at the time when the matter was originally before the Sales Tax Officer, he had not considered whether the seat covers were accessories or not and that question was not agitated before him. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the decision of the Sales Tax Officer was wrong which needed revision or which can be revised under section 20 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act. The cases would therefore fairly and squarely fall under section 14(4) and, therefore, the bar of limitation under section 14(4-A) would clearly apply to Writ Petitions Nos. 4570 and 4659 of 1975 and they are, therefore, allowed with costs in each of the two cases. The other two matters, Writ Petitions Nos. 4689 and 4693 of 1975, are dismissed with costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1976 (10) TMI 143 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essee carries on such business, either in its old name or in some other name, the transferee or the lessee shall for all the purposes of this Act (except for liabilities under this Act already discharged by such dealer) be deemed to be and to have always been registered as if the registration certificate of such dealer had initially been granted to the transferee or the lessee and the transferee or the lessee shall on application to the Commissioner be entitled to have the registration certificate amended accordingly. The court held that the expression is transferred absolutely is of wide import and is broad enough to include absolute transfers by operation of law, including an absolute transfer on intestate succession. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in that case. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer both the questions in favour of the revenue and against the petitioners. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (10) TMI 142 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r, it appears that the relevant provisions of sections 57 and 41 of that Act are in pari materia with sections 26 and 14 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. The ratio of the abovesaid case is consequently equally attracted in the present one. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, have pointed out that the trial court has not clearly found whether the privilege was claimed expressly in regard to the record which had been only seized by the department. This is indeed so and therefore a clear determination whether the relevant record is the seized one, and not the one voluntarily produced before the authorities, is necessary. I would, accordingly, allow this revision petition and set aside the order under revision with the direction that the trial court should first determine whether the relevant record is a seized one. If it is so, then obviously the claim of privilege by the department would hardly be sustainable. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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