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Showing 1 to 20 of 154 Records
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1976 (11) TMI 217 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ease and the other for the recovery of possession of the premises. There may be suits for recovery of Immovable property between co-sharers, or mortgagor and motgagee, or the true owner and the trespasser and so on. It would be academic to discuss the applicability of the provisions of Rules 2 and 4 of Order II, Code of Civil Procedure to these types of cases, and in fact it would be beyond the scope of the reference made to this Full Bench, I have, therefore, not referred to the catena of cases cited at the Bar and to the different views held by the various High Courts of the country expressed in those cases for the simple reason that most of those cases do not relate to a suit for recovery of immovable property by a landlord against the tenant 60. For the reasons stated above, my answer to the question referred to this Full Bench is in the affirmative. Prem Prakash Tiwari, J. 61. I agree with brother Misra. The question referred to this Bench is answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (11) TMI 216 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ary Committee for further inquiry to enable them to examine some other witnesses, if the material on record is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the respondent. We may add that the inconvenience and the trouble experienced by the respondent till now would be sufficient punishment to make him more conscious of his duties and obligations to the articled clerks during the period of training for not evincing sufficient caution, care and interest. Taking into account his past record and the other circumstances, we do not think this to be a fit case for us to exercise our power under Section 21(6)(d) of the Act, as such power should be exercised only in furtherance of real and substantial justice but not to fill up the lacuna in the evidence at a belated stage. 28. For all the reasons stated, our answer to the question is in the negative and in favour of the respondent-chartered accountant. We, therefore, direct the complaint to be dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 215 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ly directed against her. As is obvious, she could have no opportunity to challenge it after the making of the final order, and such a belated challenge would have been purposeless for it would have given her no relief. So insofar as the appellant is concerned, the order of the Magistrate could not be said to be an interlocutory order and the revisional courts erred in raising the bar of Sub-section (2) of Section 397 against it. 9. We have gone through Dhola v. State and The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand 1967 1 SCR 310 cited by Mr. Vohra. Dhola's case related to the grant of bail, and Gokal Chand's case related to a right of appeal under Section 38(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act against an order made inter partes. They cannot, therefore avail the respondent in this case. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned orders of the High Court dated April 22, 1975 and of the Metropolitan Magistrate dated August 8, 1974 are set aside.
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1976 (11) TMI 214 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on over it, but there is no evidence to establish that he dishonestly misappropriated the receipt book or converted it to his own use or dishonestly used or disposed of the receipt book. It is quite possible that the appellant might have lost or mislaid the receipt book and hence he might have been unable to return it to the superior authorities. What the section requires is something much more than mere failure or omission to return the receipt book. The prosecution has to go further and show that the appellant dishonestly misappropriated or converted the receipt book to his own use or dishonestly used or disposed of it. That, we are afraid, the prosecution has not been able to do in the present case. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant was wrongly convicted under Section 409. 3. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and acquit him of the offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code.
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1976 (11) TMI 213 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tituted by law cannot act in such a manner as to set aside the Civil Court's judgment and decree. In this view, the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer erred in ignoring the civil Court's judgment and decree. The question as to the rights of parties and also the question as to the jurisdiction of the civil Court will all have to be argued when the appeal is heard by the appellate Judge. The order of the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer, when the decree of the civil Court is in operation, cannot be sustained. 7. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed and the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer are set aside. After the decision of the civil Court in the appeal, the Revenue Divisional Officer will proceed according to law. Respondents 1 to 3 before us i.e., the appellants in the civil appeal would be at liberty to raise all legal contentions that are open to them in law. No costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 212 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rement on the part of the purchaser to take reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make the transfer. The requirements of the provision in the Specific Relief Act are only twofold, viz., (1) that the transferee has paid money in good faith and (2) he should have done so without notice of the original contract. In my opinion, the statement which the defendant No. 4 made in the witness-box clearly established these ingredients and nothing was done on behalf of the plaintiff to show that the defendant No. 4 had any prior notice of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff or that the said defendant did not act in good faith. In this situation, I do not think that the judgment of the lower appellate court can be said to be bad in law even though reference to Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act was misconceived and the said court should have relied on Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. 5. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 211 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... crutinize how far the perfunctoriness of the Public Analyst has affected the substance of his conclusions. It is not enough to give a few mechanical data. It is more pertinent to help the court with something more of the process by which the conclusion has been arrived at. We need not probe the matter further, notwithstanding the decisions reported in two English cases (cited before us)(1) because the plea of 'guilty' silences the accused. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, although we leave it to the State Government, having regard to the fact that the trade is petty, that the adulteration has not been shown to be by any noxious substance and that the harm done has not been of any magnitude, to consider whether it should exercise the power of clemency to remit the sentence by three months so that it may be in tune with the provisions of the Act as recently amended. These observations notwithstanding, as aforesaid, the appeal stands dismissed. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... word 'appurtenances' includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way, of common . . .but it does not include lands in addition to that .granted'. (Words and Phrase, supra). 33. In short, the touchstone of 'appurtenance' is dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. Obviously, the hat, bazar or mela is not an appurtenance to the building. The law thus leads to the clear conclusion that even if the buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a hat or mela, the land is not appurtenant to the principal subject granted by Section 9, viz., buildings. 34. This conclusion is inevitable, although the contrary argument may be ingenious. What the High Court has granted, viz., 5 yards of surrounding space, is sound in law although based on guess-work in fact. The appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 209 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rly good prima-facie case is made out for interference with the internal affairs of educational institutions. 13. We presume that the plaintiff-respondent has been working as a result of the injunction granted to him. We, however, see no justification for continuing the injunction. We, therefore, allow this appeal to the extent that we withdraw the injunction. This means that the parties are left free to adjust their differences. If, upon the strength of any facts subsequent to the institution of the suit now before us, the plaintiff has acquitted any new rights which have been infringed he is free to seek relief. We make this observation as it was stated on his behalf that he claims some rights on the strength of subsequent facts too. As those are not before us, we can say nothing about them. 14. The result is that we allow this appeal and set aside the decree and order of the High Court and restore those of the Trial Court. The parties will bear their own costs throughout.
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1976 (11) TMI 208 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the grant of an interim injunction. 11. In Meckdlec Engineers and Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment Corporation C.A. No. 508 of 1976 decided on 1.11.1976 also we found very recently that, as in the case before us now, a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court had overlooked the principles governing interference under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code laid down by this Court in Baldevdas Shivlal and Anr. v. Fdmistan Distributors (India)(P) Ltd. and Ors. D.L.P. Housing and Conslmction Co. Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi v. Samp Singh and Ors. The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronaulica Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad and Anr. v. Ajit Prasad Tarwy, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Balanagar, Hyderabad. We direct the attention of the learned Judges concerned to the law declared by this Court. 12. We allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court and restore that of the Appellate Court. The parties will bear their own costs In this Court.
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1976 (11) TMI 207 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the view adopted by my learned brother Jaswant Singh. I am unable to accept an interpretation of the relevant provision prescribing limitation which would confine the accrual of a cause of action only to cases of direct proof of death, on a particular date. Such a view implies that suits based on a presumption of death are devoid a cause of action which could support a suit by a reversioner. I do not think that the provision we have to interpret was meant to define or restrict a right of suit or a cause of action in this fashion at all. The object of a "statute of repose" is only to extinguish rights of the indolent but not to demolish the causes of action of those who have not been shewn lacking in vigilance in any way whatsoever. Consequently, I would allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and decrees of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore those of the learned Single Judge and leave parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeals dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 206 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... der under any of these sections of the Code in respect of such offences could be passed. For these reasons, therefore, we think that the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the instant case, as also in its Division Bench decisions in Criminal Revision No. 285/74 (State v. Shantilal & Others) and Criminal Revision No. 286/74 (State v. Manoharlal & Ors) mentioned in the order under appeal, was wrong in law, and therefore these deci- sions are hereby overruled. I, therefore, concur with the judgment proposed by my brother Bhagwati, J., and accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dismissing the application of the petitioner in limine and direct the High Court to re-admit the petition and decide the same on merits in the light of the observations made by us. The parties are di- rected to appear before the High Court which shall hear the petition and dispose it of. Until the decision of the High Court on merits, the appellant will continue on bail.
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1976 (11) TMI 205 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ave been sufficient to disprove the allegations, had sufficient and convincing evidence been led to prove them. The High Court also failed to consider that the appellant had examined some of the persons who, according to the witnesses for the second respondent, accompanied the appellant whom the offending documents were distributed, and they have denied the allegation. In any case we have found that the evidence led in support of the allegation of corrupt practice is neither sufficient nor convincing. Not only the oral evidence led on behalf of the second respondent lacks assurrance from any "unlying circumstances" or "unispeachable documents", the evidence suffers from serious infirmities which make it quite unsafe to rely on. On such evidence it is impossible to hold that the allegation of corrupt practice has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the appeal must be allowed and the election petition dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 204 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... igatory. The application and the order of Deshpande, J. did not dispense with that procedure. (20) Counsel referred me to a decision of Prakash Narain, J. in Munshi Lal v. Delhi Administration, (C.W. No. 433-D of 1961 decided on December 10, 1970) (2). That was a case under s. 48 of the Act. There Mr. Dharam Vira, the then Chief Commissioner made an G order under s. 48 releasing the petitioner's land. His successor Mr. Vishwanathan decided not to release the land. The learned judge held that an order having once been made under s. 48 of the Act and communicated to the petitioner it was not open to the successive Chief Commissioner to revise or reverse that decision and to revive the acquisition proceedings. That case in my opinion has nothing to do with the point involved in the present writ petition the decision of which turns on the validity of the cancellation of the notification under s. 6 of the Act. (21) For these reasons I would allow the writ petition with costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 203 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... dence for such application more time is spent which could have been utilised to dispose of the suit itself. ( 5. ) In the result, the rule is made absolute, but the restoration will be on the following terms -- "The petitioner will pay to the respondent the costs of the Miscellaneous Application, of the Misc. Appeal and of this revision petition as well as the costs thrown away on 29th June, 1974, quantified in the aggregate at ₹ 350/-, before the date of effective hearing of the suit. Such payment of costs will be condition-precedent to the petitioner being allowed to further appear in the suit." The petitioner through his Advocate also undertakes that he will file the Vakalatnama of some Advocate in the Khed Court on or before 15th November, 1976. I further direct the Khed Court to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and in any case on or before 15th January, 1977. Records and proceedings and the writ be sent down forthwith. Rule made absolute.
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1976 (11) TMI 202 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e mean time a number of other appointments were also made to Indian Administrative Service by promotion from the State Civil Service, some of the officers received promotions to higher posts in that service and may even have retired. Those who continued to serve could justifiably think that as there was no challenge to their appointments within the period prescribed for a suit, they could look forward to further promotion and higher terminal benefits on retirement. The High Court therefore erred in rejecting the argument that the writ petition should be dismissed because of the inordinate and unexplained delay even though it was "strenously" urged for its consideration on behalf of the Government of India. 7. In the view we have taken, we do not think it necessary to examine the controversy on the merits. The appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment dated April 11, 1975 is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. There will however be no order as to the costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 201 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lf of the revision petitioners (the heirs of the said Joseph and those who took under the settlement deed dated 15.6.1957) that levy under the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order, 1966, has been collected from each of the shares under the deed of 1957, that land tax has been imposed on each of the shares separately and agricultural income-tax collected on the income of the properties of each of the sharers". We do not think it is necessary to go into any other question. The High Court was of opinion that some facts had still to be ascertained when the case goes back to the Land Board for proceeding on the footing determined by the High Court. We think that we should make it clear that matters to. be still determined could not, in view of our finding, involve determination of any question of adverse possession of the claimants, the children of M.T. Joseph. For the reasons given above, we dismiss these appeals. We make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 200 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . must necessarily fall. The conviction under s. 447 I.P.C. as also that under ss. 324/34 and 323/34 I.P.C. cannot be interfered with in view of the evidence of assault made by the appellants on the witnesses Ram Khelawan, Manohar, Sarabjit, Mewa Lal, Satrohan with their respective weapons. Having regard to the fact that the appellants made a concerted attack either with a Biroo or lathis respectively on the aforesaid prosecution witnesses they had undoubtedly a common intention to cause simple hurt to these witnesses. For these reasons, therefore, we would affirm the convictions and sentences passed on the appellant Ram Sajiwan but allow the appeal of the other appellants viz. Ram Rattan and Ram Samujh to this extent that their convictions and sentences under ss. 326/34 I.P.C. are set aside, but their convictions and sentences under ss. 324/34, 323/34 and 447 I.P.C. will stand. If the appellants have already served out their sentences they may be released. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 199 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ection will be determined by such deemed date of selection. No employee has any right to have a vacancy in the higher post filled as soon as the vacancy occurs. Government has the right to keep the vacancy unfilled as long as it chooses. In the present case, such a position does not arise because of the controversy between two groups of officers for these years. The seniority list which is the basis for the field of choice for promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner was approved by this Court on 16 April, 1974. Promotions to the post of Assistant Commissioners are on the basis of the selection list prepared by the Committee and are to be made prospectively and not retrospectively. For the foregoing reasons the judgments and orders appealed against are set aside. The selection list made by the Departmental Promotion Committee forming the subject matter of these appeals is held to be correct, lawful and valid. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. Appeals allowed.
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1976 (11) TMI 198 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. o p /o p Besides, the period of settlement has since expired and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd respondent are negotiating another settlement with further improvements. o p /o p These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. o p /o p That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. o p /o p The said settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. o p /o p B.P.R. Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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