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Showing 1 to 20 of 150 Records
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1976 (4) TMI 234 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ith the aid of Section 34, Penal Code. Secondly, although in the charge only Section 161, read with Section 34, Penal Code was mentioned, the language of the charge, could leave the appellant in no doubt that in addition to the vicarious charge under Section 161, read with Section 34. he was being charged with the commission of an offence under Section 161, simpliciter also. This was manifest from the words "You Accused 2 directly accepted from Shri Ghan shamsinh Champublia Zala Rupees 500/-...." All the material circumstances appearing in evidence constituting an offence under Section 161, Penal Code simpliciter were put to him during his examination. This objection was not raised in any of the courts below at any stage. No prejudice has therefore, been caused to the appellant by this technical defect in the charge. In any case this irregularity stood cured under Section 537. Criminal Procedure Code. 27. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 233 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e larger interest of justice, be upset. Such is not the case here and we are of the opinion that it is desirable that in such matters, a practice which has been evolved after due consideration by the Court should be adhered to. 16. In the result we answer the two questions referred to us as follows Question No. 1 Where the appellate Court passes an order allowing proportionate costs between two contesting parties in an appeal which succeeds partly; court fees are to be taxed according to the slab system on the claim actually allowed in the appeal. Question No. 2 In a similar case, advocate's fees, either single or double, are to be taxed as per the table of fees on the entire claim in the appeal and the amount so taxed has to be apportioned between the parties on the basis of the percentage of success in the appeal. The matter will now go back to the Division Bench for passing necessary orders in the light of the observations made in this judgment. 17. Answer accordingly.
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1976 (4) TMI 232 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a writ of mandamus. 8. In K.P. Krishnana's case (supra) the issues in dispute related to a claim of classification for specified employees and additional bonus and the sole ground on which the Government refused to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 12(5) of the Act was that the employees had adopted go-slow tactics during the relevant year. The facts were that the company had nevertheless voluntarily paid three months' bonus for that year and the report of the Conciliation Officer was in favour of the employees this Court held that the Government acted on irrelevant considerations and issued a writ of mandamus. 9. In the present case, the fact is that the Government found that the appellant was not a workman within the definition of workman in the Act, and, therefore, it was not a fit case for reference for adjudication. 10. The High Court lightly rejected the application. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.
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1976 (4) TMI 231 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... osed to be acquired. The company at such an enquiry has to show that the company made negotiations with the owners of the land. The owners of the land are, therefore, entitled to be heard at such an enquiry for the purpose of proving or disproving the reasonable efforts of the company to get such land by negotiation. The contention on behalf of the State that the owners of the land will get an opportunity when an enquiry is made under Section 5-A of the Act is equally unsound. Section 17 of the Act provides that the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply, and if it does so direct a declaration may be made under Section 6 at any time after the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. Therefore, the enquiry under Section 5A may not be held. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the question is answered in the affirmative and the appeals are dismissed. The parties are left to bear and pay their own costs in these appeals.
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1976 (4) TMI 230 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion payable for the Life time of the writ-applicant. The High Court therefore manifestly erred inasmuch as it directed the State to pay pension at the rate of ₹ 500/- per month, even to heirs of the deceased in their own right. This patent error which was perhaps due to inadvertence could and should have been suo motu corrected by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction even after the expiry of the ordinary period of limitation, if any prescribed for a review application. 11. For the foregoing reasons we partly allow the appeal, and modify the order of the High Court limiting the amount payable thereunder to the respondents herein, to arrears of pension due to the deceased at the rate of ₹ 500/- per month, for the period from August 1, 1953 to the date of the death of the pensioner, Sardar Shermia Bapumia, which admittedly took place on January 1, 1964. In the circumstances of the case, we will leave the parties to pay and bear their own costs.
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1976 (4) TMI 229 - HIGH COURT PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... the concerned locality simultaneously and in case it is not possible to give notice of the substance in the concerned locality simultaneously, then at least it has to be done immediately after the publication of the notification in the official Gazette and it would be for the State to show that whatever time was taken to give notice of the substance in the concerned locality was the minimum possible time taken for this purpose. 13. Adverting to the facts of this case, I find that publication of the substance in the concerned locality was made as late as on the 29th day after the publication in the official Gazette. That being so, the impugned notifications cannot legally be sustained. Accordingly, I allow this petition, quash the impugned notifications, Annexures P-1 and P-2, issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively. 14. However, in the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. Bhupinder Singh Dhillon, J. I agree. Ajit Singh Bains, J. I also agree.
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1976 (4) TMI 228 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was not a member of the family. The decided cases show the concept of the family itself is such that it could include two Mahammadan brothers as well. To say that a Muslim brother is not a member of the family and to further say that since the brother (now tenant) was found to be living in the demised premises it was a case of his brother tenant not living in that demised premises attracting section 14(l)(d) is, it seems to me, to argue in a circuity. That is the reason why I have noticed the only two points that arise for decision in this case are those under section 14(l)(e) and (b) but not (d). (29) In the result no ground has been made out for eviction either under section 14(l)(e) or (b). Each of these raises a substantial question of law warranting interference with the decree of eviction passed by the Controller, confirmed by the Tribunal. In the circumstances the decrees of courts below are reversed and the application for eviction is dismissed with costs throughout.
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1976 (4) TMI 227 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... found a legal claim. Reciprocal rights and obligations arising out of contract do not depend for their enforceability upon whether a contracting party finds it prudent to abide by the terms of the contract. 20. What has been extracted above applied aptly and with greater force to the cases before us; for, here the vends were operated by the licensees for the full period of the license year ending March 31, 1969. Having exploited the licences for the entire period without discharging the full burden of the fees payable for the same period, the appellants are seeking to avoid contractual obligations voluntarily incurred and to work the licences on terms as they find convenient. 21. In there circumstances, the High Court rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in their favour. 22. The appeals fail and are dismissed with costs, excepting CA. 2504 to C.A. 2508 of 1969 in which the parties will pay and bear their own costs.
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1976 (4) TMI 226 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lectric Works Ltd.'s case 1971 2SCR397 (supra). We respectfully dissent from the view taken by the Allahabad High Court. We have no hesitation in rejecting the contention that the plaintiff is entitled to relaxation of the rule of limitation by reason of any hardship or special circumstances of the case. In our opinion, there can be no obviation of the bar of limitation on the ground of general suspension of limitation or right of action. 14. In the result, both the First Appeals are dismissed. The Judgment and decree of the trial Court are confirmed. There will be no order as to costs in both the appeals. 15. As the plaintiff is unsuccessful on a technical plea of limitation, we think, that the proper order to be made is that the court fees payable on the appeal should be borne by the Corporation. Accordingly, the court-fees payable on appeal should be recovered from the Corporation, and a certificate should be issued to the Collector accordingly. 16. Appeals dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 225 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... connecting amounts from the occupants of the premises in Katra Baryan and appropriating the same to themselves. He apprehended that the appellants might at any time, in case any portion of the premises fall vacant, transfer the possession to another person and create complications. In order to prevent further appropriation of the amounts due from the occupants of the building in Katra Baryan and to safeguard against the parting with the possession of any portion of the premises which may fall vacant, the learned Company Judge was justified in appointing the provisional liquidator. No case has been made out before us for interfering with the order under appeal in Compare Appeal No. 26 of 1975. (19) Both the appeals are dismissed without there being any order as to costs. C.M. No. 348 of 1976 in Company Appeal No. 26 of 1975, preferred under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code by the respondents for vacation of the stay order is not pressed and the same is also dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 224 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed any expert or special skill. The question was a simple one whether he had taken money from Gottwald in discharge of his official duties. Having appreciated all the facts and circumstances of the case we have come to the conclusion that no principle of natural justice was violated in not making available to the appellant the services of Shri Bhalla or any other railway officer stationed in India for the conduct of his defence. In the entire background of this case we find a passage occurring at page 803 in the Judgment of Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls in the case of R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Mughal quite apposite to be quoted. The passage runs thus "The rules of natural justice must not be stretched too far. Only too often the people who have done wrong seek to invoke 'the rules of natural justice' so as to avoid the consequences." In the result we find no merit in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 223 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... we find any merit in the contention that an order directing the re-arrest and detention of an accused- respondent who had been acquitted by the High Court of a capital offence, in any way, offends Article 21 or any other fundamental right guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. Such an order is made by this Court in the exercise of its plenary jurisdiction conferred by Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that such an order deprives the accused-respondent of his liberty in a manner otherwise than in accordance with procedure established by law. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with a discussion of the rulings cited by Mr. Garg. Suffice it to say that the facts of those cases were entirely different and they have no bearing on the point in issue before us. For all the foregoing reasons, we answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment in the affirmative and dispose of the references accordingly.
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1976 (4) TMI 222 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uld be presumed to be a valid reference, does not apply to these cases. The words "or is otherwise invalid" in clause (c) of section 30 are wide enough to cover all forms of invalidity including invalidity of the reference. We do not find any reason why the general and unqualified language of clause (c) should not include an award on an invalid reference which is a nullity. The cases cited at the Bar show that all the High Courts with only one or two exceptions have taken this view. We hold therefore that the awards challenged in these appeals are nullities and have been rightly set aside by the High Court. In the view we have taken that is not necessary to consider the other question, whether Brig. Bhandari who made the awards was the officer answering the description on Director of Farms, General Headquarters, Simla, to whom the court had referred the disputes. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 221 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... matter because it was not lodged by an eye-witness but by Ibotan Singh who was 73 years old. The Judicial Commissioner has tried to explain the discrepancy regarding the place of the incident also. There can be no doubt however that, for reasons stated by us, it could not be said that the finding reached by the Sessions Judge was unreasonable, so as to require interference in appeal. It may be that the Judicial Commissioner has found it possible to arrive at a different conclusion on the basis of the material on the record. It may also be that the evidence was sufficient to create some suspicion about the complicity of the appellant in the crime. But, as has been held by this Court in Mathai Methews v. State of Maharashtra that could not justify a reversal of the finding of acquittal which was based on a proper appreciation of the evidence on the record. 13. The appeal is therefore allowed and appellant Akoijam Ranbir Singh is acquitted. He shall be set at liberty forthwith.
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1976 (4) TMI 220 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at Abdul Hussain's case was decided by this Court on September 20, 1967, that is, about four and half months after the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Sabuddin's case (supra), Consequently, the Bench did not have the advantage of the guidance furnished by Abdul Hussain's case. In the light of the construction put by us on the expression "specially empowered" as used in s. 2(c) of the Act, we hold that by virtue of the State Government Notification dated July 22, 1958, the Judicial Magistrate First Class Rajkot has the jurisdiction to try the offences under the Act. Accordingly, we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court. The cases will now go back to the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajkot for further proceedings in accordance with law. The cases, being very old, it is directed that they be disposed of on top- priority basis, with utmost expedition, if possible, within three months from today. Appeals allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 219 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cy is not the highest state of legal bliss. Law must grow, it cannot afford to be static and theretore Judges ought to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents. Precedents, as observed by Lord Macmillan, should be "stepping stones and not halting places".(2) But, Justice Cardozo's caution should not go unheeded that the weekly change in the composition of the court ought not to be accompanied by changes in its rulings. The language of the Regulations called for no review of established precedents. Nor indeed is there any fear of unfairness if only 2 members decided the cases of students accused of adopting unfair practices in the examinations. In such cases it is so much better that the law is certain. In the result we allow the appeals, set aside the decision of the majority and uphold that of the minority Judge. The writ petitions filed by the respondents will consequently stand dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 218 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t to its notice by one of the objectors without including the information in the representation made by the objector. The right of the representer as such is no doubt limited, for, he has no right to insist that any representation made otherwise than under s. 57(4) should be considered in the manner prescribed under s. 57(5). But that does not in any way debar the authority under s. 47(1) of the Act from taking the information into account for deciding to whom the permit should be given in the interests of the public." The decision of the Assam High Court (AIR 1959 Assam 183) brought to our notice by Shri Phadke does not really consider the issue from the position we have delineated and turns on approach which is not quite correct. Our conclusion therefore is that s. 15 is intra vires and, further that the said rule merely makes patent what is otherwise latent in the statutory provisions. The appeal accordingly, fails and is dismissed with costs. P.B.R Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (4) TMI 217 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t, and (b) for sale to dealers who in their turn sold the goods to consumers within the municipal area irrespective of whether such consumers bought them for use in the area or outside it, but it was "not liable to octroi in respect of goods which it brought into the local area and which were re- exported." The law on the subject matter of the present controversy has thus been laid down quite clearly in the Burmah Shell's case (supra) and the present case squarely falls to be governed by it. We are also in agreement with that interpretation of the law. It may be mentioned that the learned counsel have not been able to advance any new argument justifying a reconsideration of the decision. The appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the respondents are directed to examine and determine the claims of the appellant in accordance with the above decision. The appellant will be entitled to costs from the respondents. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 216 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an appeal was not taken, could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order. Accordingly, the circumstance that the remanding judgment of the High Court was not appealed against, assuming that an appeal lay therefrom, cannot preclude the appellant from challenging the correctness of the view taken by the High Court in that judgment. In view of our decision that the contention raised by the respondents is barred by res judicata, it must be held that the High Court was in error in allowing the respondents' appeal and accepting his contention. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the District Court. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. We would like to state by way of clarification that our judgment will not affect the respondents' right to the flow of water through the appellant's land for agricultural purposes from 15th Meenam to 15th Vrischigam every year. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (4) TMI 215 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tion 15 for mis conduct that the procedure laid down therein for an enquiry etc. becomes applicable." The decision of the House of Lords in Mc Clelland's case on which strong reliance is placed by Mr. Garg is not at all helpful to the appellant. In the case, the dismissal of the plaintiff was on the ground of redundancy of the staff which was not one of the grounds specified in the terms and conditions of service. In the present case, no such difficulty could arise as the terms and conditions of service specified in the contract of employment entered into between the appellant and the University under section 34 of the Act contained an express provision for termination of his services by six month's notice on either side. Thus all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant having failed, the appeal cannot succeed and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear and pay their own costs of the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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