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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 64 Records
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1976 (6) TMI 72 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ears to have some force, it is not necessary, in our opinion, for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition to decide as to whether or not the Government is estopped from saying so. We have already held that there was no dispute before the Collector as to the persons to whom the compensation money is payable. In the absence of such a dispute the Collector could have no jurisdiction to make a reference to the District Judge. The respondents are bound to pay the compensation money to the petitioner in terms of the award made by respondent No. 1. 16. In the result this petition is allowed and the Rule is made absolute. The reference made by the Collector to the District Judge under Section 30 of the Act (Annexure A/18) is hereby quashed and we direct the respondents to pay the compensation money in terms of the award made by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case we however leave the parties to bear their own costs. K.M. Lahiri, J. I agree.
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1976 (6) TMI 71 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... d that this is into a proper case where the provisions of section 154 of the Act can be invoked because when two reasonable views are possible the power under that section cannot be invoked. In taking that view the Tribunal was right because if a Hindu Undivided Family through its manager is a partner in the firm then for the purposes of the Income-tax Act, the income received will be of the H.U.F. while if any co-parcener including the manager has advanced a personal loan that will be his personal income. Interest paid in respect of the personal loan cannot be treated as interest paid to the H.U.F. which is a partner through the manager and therefore it is doubtful whether section 40(b) can be made applicable to interest paid in respect of the amount advanced by the manager in his personal and individual capacity. Thus the Tribunal was right in taking the view that powers of rectification under section 154 cannot be exercised. Accordingly, the Rule is discharged with costs.
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1976 (6) TMI 70 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o determine the nature of the petition and deferred the question of appropriation of that deposit towards the court-fee. That being the plain position available on record and upon clear construction of the nature of the petition, it indeed follows that the deposit made on behalf of each of the petitioners should be appropriated towards the court-fee payable by each the petitioners had he filed independent petition. 9. This by itself is enough to negative whatever was submitted on behalf of the petitioners with regard to the appropriation of the court-fee or further seeking election at this stage to restrict the petition to one out of the two. 10. In the result, we direct that the deposit taken from each petitioner in these petitions should be appropriated towards court-fee on the basis that each petitioner had filed his petition and the document represents independent petitions jointed together. 11. Copy of this order may also be sent to Bombay Office. 12. Order accordingly.
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1976 (6) TMI 69 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h the tractor, is fixed by the Government from time to time and the said two accessories fitted by the petitioners to their tractors at the option of the purchasers are exempt from excise duty. The said contention of the learned counsel for the respondents therefore cannot be accepted. 26. In my view, therefore, on the aforementioned admitted facts and other circumstances of this case the said impugned orders both of the Assistant Collector and the Collector of Central Excise cannot be sustained. 27. In the view that I am taking, it is not necessary to consider the other contentions of the petitioners. 28. The result, therefore, is that the petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c) including therein the order dated 6-2-1973. Respondents to pay to the petitioners the costs of the petition. 29. Petitioners not to revoke bank guarantee which was given at the time of interim order for a period of six weeks from today.
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1976 (6) TMI 68 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the officer concerned was not debarred from reviewing the order because the original order which was sought to be reviewed was the order passed pursuant to direction of the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. But the order actually passed contains an error of law by non-application of the correct principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and the order also does not indicate the detailed reasons for coming to the conclusions he has done. For the aforesaid reasons, I set aside the order dated 24th June, 1974, passed under section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act read with section 20(4) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, and direct the officer concerned to pass a fresh review order in accordance with law after giving the parties reasonable opportunity and in accordance with the principles indicated above. With the aforesaid directions the rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Order set aside and case remanded.
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1976 (6) TMI 67 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts judgment, the amount of tax, if any, due from the dealer in respect of such period and all subsequent periods and the prescribed authority may direct that the dealer shall pay, by way of penalty, in addition to the amount of tax so assessed, a sum not exceeding one and a half times the amount, provided that no proceeding for such assessment shall be initiated except before the expiry of eight years from the expiry of the period to which it relates. It is thus apparent that there is no invalidity in the notice issued to the petitioners nor any has been pointed out to us. 9.. The result is that there is no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. But, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Apart from deciding the legal questions, I shall not be deemed to have decided any question involving the liability of the petitioners, if any, which properly falls for decision by the sales tax authorities. ALI AHMAD, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1976 (6) TMI 66 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ew to capturing the market. Plastic, as already stated, is a pliable commodity and with admixtures is available for manufacture of different goods. Polythene bags appear to be a commodity of that type. Essentially, therefore, polythene material comes under the broad head of plastic and, when the description of goods in the notification is goods made of similar substance , the words are wide enough to take similar products. In our view, therefore, polythene came within the notification and, accordingly, would be exigible to the higher rate of tax. 5.. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Member, Sales Tax Tribunal, was not justified in directing assessment of tax on the turnover of polythene goods at the rate of five per cent instead of seven per cent. It would be appropriate that we make no direction for costs in the facts and circumstances of the case. DAS, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1976 (6) TMI 65 - ITAT PATNA-B
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... ... ..... ned. However, the Tribunal while deciding in favour of the assessee held that the appeal was maintainable also in the matter concerning the status of the assessee and this point was not agitated before their Lordships of the Patna High Court. Thus in view of this ruling and following the decision of this Tribunal, we hold that when the Income-Tax Officer assessed the assessee in the status of U.R.F., the assessee has a right of appeal as the assessee under s. 246 of the said Act can file appeal relating to the status taken by him. The assessee has asserted that the status should be taken as registered firm and not as unregistered firm. Hence, we hold that the appeal is maintainable. 15. In view of our discussions above, we hold that the assessee is entitled to be treated as registered firm. We direct the Income-tax Officer to allow continuation of registration of the assessee and assess the assessee in the status of a registered firm. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (6) TMI 62 - ITAT PATNA-A
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... ... ..... it does not follow that the receipt constituted the assessee rsquo s taxable income. Findings given in the assessment proceedings for determining or computing the tax are not conclusive though they may be good evidence. Before penalty can be imposed the entirety of the circumstances must reasonable point to the conclusion that the disputed amount represented income and that the assessee had consciously concealed the particulars of his income or had furnished inaccurate particulars. Three deposits had appeared on different dates in the bank a/c of the assessee. The assessee had explained that these had come out of his past savings and also from out of the rental income derived by the mother. It was for the Revenue to establish from cogent materials that the amounts in dispute were the income of the assessee. We find that there was no material on record for such a conclusion. We accordingly have to uphold the action of the AAC and the Departmental appeal is therefore dismissed.
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1976 (6) TMI 60 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... assessee rsquo s case fails. The addition of Rs. 16,400 for the asst. yr. 1974-75 is upheld. 5. For the first two assessment years however, there is force in the assessee rsquo s contention that there was no mistake apparent from the record which could be rectified under s. 35. Even before us the point has been argued at length. Whether the loans have to be allowed as liability in the circumstances obtaining or not has to be decided only after an elaborate discussion of the point both involving questions of fact and law. As argument active question, therefore, this comes to. It is settled law that things which should be decided after an elaborate argument or much discussion cannot be said to be errors apparent from record. For the first two assessment years, therefore, we hold that there was no justification for passing order under s. 35 of the Act. These orders are cancelled. 6. WTA Nos. 555 and 556 (Mds) of 1974-75 are allowed and WTA No. 557 (Mds) of 1974-75 is dismissed.
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1976 (6) TMI 58 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... bit of electrical goods under entry 41 of the 1st Schedule r/w s.3(2). 9. Another type of argument advanced is that when the disposed good are discarded goods, they lose the character of electrical goods and that they tend to be sales of scrap only when sold. Disposal of such scarp would not also in any way give scope for the type of treatment adopted by the authorities to bring to assessment Rs.3,300 at 9 per cent. We however do not find sufficient documentary supports to show that the sellers condemned the goods and sold them as scrap. We however find, on the basis of other available details and materials, that the entire turnover under dispute is assessable at multi-point rates under s.3(1) 10. Resultantly we uphold the liability to assessment on the turnover of Rs. 65,000 under dispute before us. We treat the turnover as liable to assessment under s.3(1) and allow the claim of the appellant so far as to second count is concerned. Resultantly the appeal is allowed in part.
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1976 (6) TMI 57 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... ssessment. (iii) We have considered in paras 12 to 14 the details pertaining to the suppressions and the related addition. The possible features of sales returns, apportionment possibility to circulation sales, scope for mergers etc. sufficiently merit confirmation of the quantum adopted by the first appellate authority. There are no fresh materials or incriminating data or materials to merit out interference in this regard. (iv) We have detailed the position in regard to penalty in para 15 above. We have further reduced the quantum of penalty in consideration of the extenuating feature involved and presented before us. There are no materials or facts to merit our interference in this regard also. (v) In the result we do not find scope for our interference on behalf of the Revenue and accordingly dismiss the enhancement petition presented by the State Representative. 17. Resultantly the appeal is allowed in part. The enhancement petition presented under s. 36(3) is dismissed.
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1976 (6) TMI 56 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... pression is found. Under these circumstances there is jurisdiction to levy penalty. We also find that the systematic non-accounting of numerous transactions clearly shows wilfulness on appellant rsquo s part. Hence, penalty is justified even on merits. However, penalty at 100 per cent had been confirmed. Considering that all the four assessments are the results of a single inspection and that there is no record of past misconduct, the penalty at 50 per cent as is usually considered reasonable in such other cases is adequate. In this view of the matter the appellant is eligible for a relief of Rs. 48.50 for asst. yrs. 1970-71 Rs. 182.50 for 1971-72, Rs. 195.00 for 1972-73 and Rs. 254.00 for 1973-74. 6. In the result the appeals are partly allowed. The revisions for the first three years and the assessment for the last year in respect of the quantum are confirmed, both on law and on merits. Penalties levied are however reduced to the extent mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
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1976 (6) TMI 55 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... not merely accidental or bad accounting. Wilfulness is implicit wherever there is systematic under-statement of taxable sales. In the circumstances we have no doubt that there is case for levy of penalty. We however find that the tax as a result of revision alone should be the basis of levy of penalty and not the entire addition to the book turnover. The addition which we have sustained for asst. yr. 1967-68 is Rs. 49,125.47 and tax thereon on Rs. 12,261.44 at 2-1/2 per cent is Rs. 306.54, on Rs. 36,864.03 at 3 per cent is Rs. 1,05.92 adding upto Rs. 1,412.46. For asst. yr. 1969-70 the addition sustained is Rs. 30,603.08 at 3 per cent tax thereon is Rs. 918.09. In our view, penalty at 5 per cent thereon will be reasonable. Hence penalty (rounded off to nearest rupees) for assessment year will be Rs. 706 for 1967-68 and Rs. 459 for 1969-70. Hence reduction in penalty will be Rs. 3319 for 1967-68 and Rs. 3,370 for asst. yr. 1970. 9. In the result the appeals are partly allowed.
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1976 (6) TMI 52 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... the decision in 29 STC 219, it ultimately gave scope to view that the publication before us can be treated only as lsquo books rsquo . (v) Thus the factual position derived by us is also confirmed by the above cited legal supports. 13. When considered in the light of the various approaches outlined in the preceding paragraphs we feel that the publication under dispute has to be treated as a book entitled for exemption within the scope of G.O. 976 Revenue dt. 28th March, 1969 amended by G.O. 4725 Revenue dt. 30th Oct., 1961. 14. The claim of wages for Rs. 72,646.96 is presented to relate to the printing of the publication under dispute. The state Representative on verification referred us to correspondences and confirmed such a position. Even if the resultant product is considered, it falls within the lsquo Booklet rsquo lsquo Burmah Shell Map of Greater Bombay rsquo which is eligible for exemption. 16. In result the appellants succeeded in their claim. The appeal is allowed.
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1976 (6) TMI 49 - ITAT JABALPUR
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... ... ..... lected to continue as full-fledged partners sharing both in profits and losses and have accepted all the assets and liabilities of the partnership with retrospective effect from 19th Oct., 1972 (Diwali 1971) and thus a change in the constitution of the partnership has taken place, whereby it has become necessary to execute a fresh deed of partnership. In view of such a declaration in the partnership deed, cl. 2 of the partnership deed has almost got no effect. As a matter of fact, the ITO as well as the AAC have become too hypertechnical in refusing registration to the assessee firm on the ground that the firm commenced w.e.f. 2nd Oct., 1972. This is not a defect which could be fatal to the grant of registration to the assessee firm. Upon a proper construction of the partnership deed, therefore, the registration cannot be refused to the assessee firm. We accordingly, for reasons recorded above, grant registration to the assessee firm. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (6) TMI 48 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
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... ... ..... arriage and maintenance expenses of the deceased rsquo s daughters have to be first ascertained and to be excluded. In other words, the marriage and maintenance expenses of the unmarried daughters have to be deducted from the family properties and only after such a deduction, the properties have to be divided or partitioned between the father and his sons. That is how 1/3rd shares of the deceased has to be worked out for the purpose of the Estate Duty. We are here concerned only with the marriage expenses of the unmarried daughters and those expenses have to be deducted from the joint family properties before the share of the deceased when the notional partition is determined. The contention of the accountable person regarding the deductability of Rs. 30,000 is accepted in the manner that we have indicated above. The Assistant Controller is directed or modify the assessment accordingly. No other point has been argued before us. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
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1976 (6) TMI 47 - ITAT HYDERABAD-B
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... ... ..... riate construction of r. 1(xi)(a). What that sub-r. 1(ix)(a) says is the exclusion of reserve as required under s. 17(1) of the Banking Regulation Act. If we read the provisions of s. 17(1) read with the statutory directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India, the amount required to be created as reserve under s. 17(1) would be the amount that the banks are obliged to created as reserve in accordance with the directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India. In other words, it is not the minimum that is mentioned in s. 17(1), but more than the minimum that the banks are obliged to create as reserve. Whatever the banks were required to created as reserve in accordance with the provisions of s. 17(1) coupled with the directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India would be the amount required to be excluded under r. 1(xi)(a) of the Surtax Rules. 9. In the result, we set aside the consolidated order of the CIT and restore the orders of the ITO. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
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1976 (6) TMI 46 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
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... ... ..... ssessment made for the two asst. yrs. 1966-67 and 1967-68. 12. The addition is made on the ground that the lsquo BOI rsquo received interest. In the view that we have taken that there is no lsquo BOI rsquo the interest income cannot be included. That should be separately assessed in the hands of the individuals. Before coming to a close it is necessary to refer to an order of the Bench to which one of us is a party i.e., ITA No. 1628 (Hyd) 73-74 dt. 29th Dec., 1975. We may straighway point out that the facts of that case are totally different. There, there was a division of the business carried on by the family as such in which the minors have the interest. In such circumstances following the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High court in the case of Deccan Wines and General Stores the Tribunal held that there was a lsquo BOI rsquo . That decision therefore does not apply to the fact of this case. 13. In the result, all the assessments are cancelled and the appeals are allowed.
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1976 (6) TMI 45 - ITAT HYDERABAD-A
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... ... ..... e contentions raised on behalf of the revenue. Therefore, respectfully following the decision of the Madras High Court we have to hold that the ITO cannot modify to original assessment merely on the ground that what he did in the original assessment was contrary to law as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Pongal Vithal Nayak rsquo s case 69 ITR 47. We may also repeat that the assessment once made is final and cannot be disturbed except by methods provided by law. The assessment made by ITO having become final in all respects the ITO cannot touch it unless he comes within the four concerns of law. In this case we have found that the action of the ITO is beyond jurisdiction and he cannot reopen the issues which are already closed inasmuch as admittedly the action that it sought to be taken is beyond the period prescribed for reopening the assessment as per s. 147(b). 7. In the result, the assessment is cancelled and the original assessment is restored. Appeal is allowed.
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