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Showing 1 to 20 of 135 Records
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1976 (8) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or the sake of argument that the last order of the Government was a direction to transfer the entirety of funds including those relating to the property of the evacuee, Abdul Ghani Jan Muhammad, without keeping back what was required for paying the registered claims of Rabia Bai, then the same would be contrary to the intendment of Clause(b) of Section 14(l) to the extent of Rabia Bai's claim. 42. We are of opinion that in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Appellate Bench of the High Court was right in directing the Custodian to refund a sum of Rs. 2,40,000/- to the respondent, Rabia Bai, in payment of her claim and in further directing the Central Government to place at the disposal of the Custodian, appellant herein, the said sum for the purpose of refund. The time for refund is further extended by 3 months from today, if the same has not already been done. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. The appellant shall pay the costs of the respondents in this Court.
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1976 (8) TMI 184 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uit properties should be deemed to be and held as the properties of Ramaswami Iyengar, in which the plaintiff did not acquire a right by birth, no such accounting can be directed, as it is not possible. 17. As regards the wills and settlement deeds, no question has been raised before us. There was no argument before us that they were not executed when T.S. Ramaswami Iyengar was in a sound and disposing state of mind. We are not, therefore, referring to this and we accept the finding of the Court below that the wills have been executed validly by Ramaswami Iyengar, when he was in a sound state of mind. 18. In the result, we hold that the suit properties are not joint family properties and that Ramaswami Iyengar had the requisite authority and competence to settle or will away the same, as he did under Exhibits B-1 to B-10 and that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for partition and separate possession as claimed by him. 19. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 183 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the appearance of the accused persons before the transferee Magistrate. The bail bond executed by the accused persons in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate shows that the accused persons bound themselves to. attend the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate or such other Magistrate, before whom the case might be pending. Therefore, the accused persons were bound to appear before the learned Munsif Magistrate on the date fixed for their attendance. As they did not appear before the Munsif Magistrate on the date fixed the learned Munsif Magistrate cancelled their bail bond and issued non-bailable warrant of arrest against them to enforce their appearance. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussions I do not find any illegality in the order of the sub-divisional Magistrate, dated 25-5-1973 or in the order of the Munsif Magistrate, dated 23-6-1973. There is no merit in any of these two applications. Both the applications are therefore, dismissed. Udai Sinha, J. 14 I agree.
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1976 (8) TMI 182 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , as in an appeal presented by the accused or his pleader, the Court does decide the appeal. It is indeed, a very serious thing to say that Sections 421, 435 or 439 give the Court a discretion not to decide the appeal or revision brought before it and I, for one, am not prepared to countenance and much less encourage such an idea. In my judgment a summary dismissal of an appeal or revision does involve an adjudication by the High Court just as a dismissal after a full hearing; does. 6. It cannot, therefore, be said that the order dated 11-5-1976 is not a final order. Even a summary dismissal at the admission stage of a revision case after due hearing of the petitioner or his counsel is as much a dismissal after full hearing and the order having been pronounced and signed by the Judge, the same cannot be altered or reviewed in view of the express prohibition contained, in Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This revision therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed.
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1976 (8) TMI 181 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the instant case is a bond for the following reasons -- (1) It is an instrument by which the Bengal Paper Mills Co. Ltd., has obliged itself to pay the sum of ₹ 15,00,000/- in three equal annual instalments of ₹ 5,00,000/- each on May 31, 1991, May 31, 1992 and May 31, 1993; (2) It is not payable to order or bearer; and (3) It is not an agreement because the enforcement of this document does not involve quantification of damages by Court. (4) In default the obligation under the Agreement can be enforced independent of any damages. 48. For all the reasons aforesaid, we are of the opinion with reference to Question No. 2 that the Collector in the instant case was justified in assessing the duty of ₹ 18,000.10 P. on the document under reference under Article 15 of Schedule 1-A to the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Our answers to the other two questions do not arise. There will be no order as to costs. Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. 49. I agree. S.K. Datta, J. 50. I agree.
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1976 (8) TMI 180 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... has become final. It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding. In view of the High Court judgment dated December 18, 1964, the Tribunal while passing the order dated September 12, 1967, disposing of the revision petition filed by the appellant, could not reopen the questions of fact which had been decided by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. The High Court, in our opinion, was right in holding in the judgment under appeal that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Assistant Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner and the Tribunal cannot be set aside in the writ petition. The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (8) TMI 179 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dified. In the present case, the factory area was not comprised within the area of any local, authority and there were in force no pre-existing appointments etc. within its area immediately before the appointed day-Nothing could, therefore, be continued under Clause (ix) after the inclusion of the said area within the limits of the first respondent-Municipality. In our opinion therefore, the argument based on Clause (ix) is totally misconceived and it most be rejected. 22. On the foregoing discussion, it would follow that the impugned direction No. I contained in the order at Annexure 'F' must be held to be invalid and ultra vires and the under of the second respondent, in so far as it seeks to extend and bring into force the taxes, etc. imposed by the first respondent-Municipality in its area immediately before the appointed day to the factory area of the petitioner, must be quashed. A Writ will issue accordingly. Rule is made absolute in terms aforesaid, with costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 178 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been under a compromise acquired for a Co-operative Housing Society at higher price. These are not allegations of mala fide whatever of the State Government The urgent Co-operative Housing Societies schemes might have justified acquisition for that public purpose being given a priority but the present lands from these Petitioners am required for the purpose of the town planning scheme and, therefore the whole contention of mala fide is thoroughly misconceived. The same is true of the grievance of non publication of the draft scheme which has; belie completely met with by showing how the draft scheme had been properly Pub shed. Therefore. no additional ground exists even in Mr. Amin's petition. 17. In the result all these petitions fail and, therefore, they have to be dismissed. These petitions are, therefore, dismissed with costs. For the aforesaid reasons the interim relief granted in each case is vacated and the rule is discharged in each case. 18. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (8) TMI 177 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ory would come within the statutory description, "persons employed in work connected with the factory." But the construction workers who put up the additional constructions have no similar nexus with the factory work as such. This is because they are birds of passage, and the moment they complete the constructions they are out of the picture. Indeed, it is only after the construction workers finish their job, that the completed building begins to assume any reality or relevance to the day-today working of the factory. In this view, therefore, there is no occasion for the issue of any directions, to the District Judge for instituting further injury This part of Venkataraman, J.'s order, is accordingly set aside. Subject to this modification of the learned Judge's order in C.M.A. Nos. 260 and 261 of 1968, all the three Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the appellant- Corporation are hereby dismissed. But, in the circumstances, we make no orders as to costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 176 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not arise at all at this stage. 8. If the application under Section 5 be rejected the order rejecting the application cannot be a decree. And the order rejecting the memoraundum of appeal is merely an incidental order. 9. Our answer therefore to the question referred to us is that an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal following the rejection of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal is not a decree but an order against which an application in revision under Section 115 of the Code may lie but no appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code can be preferred. 10. In the premises aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 11. We are told that the appellants have also made an application under Section 115 of the Code read with Section 5. They would be at liberty to proceed with the said application if so advised. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. 12. I agree. Salil Kumar Datta, J. 13. I agree.
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1976 (8) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t the provisions for the obtaining of a licence or lease would still be applicable to it. In S. Lai and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India and others (supra) the High Court noticed the decision in State of Orissa v. Union of India (supra) but it cannot be urged with any justification that the view expressed in it was followed by the Patna High Court. On the other hand the Patna High Court followed the view which was taken by the Gujarat High Court in the judgment which is the subject matter of the present appeals and held that the State Government has the,, power "to reserve certain areas. for exploitation by itself. or by a statutory corporation or for a company in a public sector." The controversy in that case was. however, examined with reference to the provisions of article 298 of the Constitution. The two cases cited by Mr. Sen cannot thus be of any avail to the appellants. For the, foregoing reasons there is no merit in these appeals and they are dismissed with costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 174 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... imposed by the second proviso to Article 31A(1) on legislative power. The argument overlooks certain obvious answers firstly, that limits on legislative powers, imposed by Part III of the Constitution, do have the direct result of protecting individual rights; and, secondly, that no part of the second proviso to Article 31(1) of the Constitution was, as already pointed out above, infringed by the impugned provisions; and, thirdly, even if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that rights conferred on individuals by the 2nd proviso to Article 31(1), were infringed in any way, provisions of Article 31B of the Constitution are enough to repel an attack based upon such an alleged infringement. Both Articles 31A(1) and 31B are intended to operate as protections against consequences of what could otherwise be breaches of the Constitution. 20. Consequently, we have to and do dismiss these appeals. But, in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... given and it appears that he was represented by two eminent advocates-Sri V. T. Rangaswami Iyenger and Sri R. Krishnamoorthy Iyer-in the trial court who knew both these languages and who would not have allowed the interest of the appellant to be jeopardised even to the smallest extent. In our opinion, the irregularity has not resulted in any injustice and the provisions of s. 537, Criminal Procedure Code are applicable to ,cure the defect. Lastly, it was submitted that the 6 items of allged cheatin- were combined together in one charge and the conviction of the appellant is therefore illegal. There is no merit in this argument because the lower courts have found that all the six items of cheating were part and parcel of one transaction and the trial of the appellant on a single charge was therefore permissible under s. 239, Criminal Procedure Code. For the reasons expressed we hold that the decision of the High Court should be affirmed, and this. appeal should be dismissed.
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1976 (8) TMI 172 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... usiness went into liquidation and claims were filed by the Official Liquidator against the prized subscribers for the recovery of the balance amounts due from them under the respective chit fund accounts. The respondents contended inter alia that they were entitled to a set-off to the extent of the sums paid by them to the concerned Companies under other chit fund accounts or by way of fixed deposits. This contention was upheld by the learned Judge and it was held that the respondents were liable to pay only the balances remaining after giving credit to the sums in respect of which set-off was pleaded. This decision fully supports the conclusions that we have reached in these cases and with respect we are in complete agreement with the reasoning contained therein, 12. The cases will now go back to the learned single Judge for disposal on the merits in the light of the legal position as explained above. We do not make any order as to costs in respect of the hearing before us.
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1976 (8) TMI 171 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... imum requirements will not render the scheme null and void so as to entitle a party to challenge it under Article 226 or in any Court after it becomes a part of the Act under Section 51 (3). 26. For the above reasons, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Rule discharged. When the petitioner, without any right after this finally sanctioned scheme under which all his rights are extinguished, remains in occupation all these years only because of our stay order, we cannot further continue the relief any longer as requested by Mr. K. S. Nanavati and the interim relief is, therefore, forthwith vacated. 27. Mr. K. S. Nanavati has made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution. We are unable to certify that any substantial question of law of general importance which, in our opinion, requires to be decided by the Supreme Court, arises in this petition. Oral application rejected. 28. Petition dismissed.
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1976 (8) TMI 170 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ave to defend. I think petitioner should, be directed to deposit ₹ 2500 in each suit within four weeks from today and on condition being satisfied the experts decree made in each suit would be set aside and petitioner should be given an opportunity to appear and cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses and to lead his own evidence in the matter. 18. Accordingly, these three revision applications are allowed and experts decree made in Civil Suits Nos. 1942, 2161 and 1941 all of 1972 are set aside and Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 68,67 and 69 all of 1975 respectively are allowed setting aside the order made by the learned Judge rejecting them. Petitioner is permitted to appear in the suits on a condition that he deposits ₹ 2500 in each suit within four weeks, and each suit should be tried de now from the stage of recording evidence, meaning thereby the plaintiff's evidence should also be recorded afresh. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 169 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ld and had the right to do on the 4th December (Sunday), he had also the right to do it on the reopening of the Court, i.e. on the 5th December. In that view, it cannot be said that the plaintiff did not comply with the order of the Court. The dismissal of the suit was, therefore, erroneous and illegal. It would be merely a matter of technicality whether we set aside the order in exercise of appellate jurisdiction or in exercise of revisional jurisdiction suo motu. The error is obvious enough and the sooner it is corrected the better, in the interest of justice. In the result, this appeal is allowed, The order of the trial Court dated December 5, 1966, whereby it dismissed the suit, is set aside. The case shall now go back to the trial Court for proceeding with the suit according to law, as if the suit had not been dismissed on December 5, 1966. In the circumstances, of the case, we direct that the parties shall bear their own costs incurred from December 5, 1966 till today.
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1976 (8) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... im. That explains why he did not urge the contention which he is now urging as an argument of last resort. 17. Counsel for the appellant attempted to draw some sustenance from the provisions of Section 221 of the Contract Act in support of the claim for the value of improvements but that section has nothing to do with the case. It gives to the agent a lien over the principal's property which is received by the agent, until the amount due to the agent as commission, disbursements and services in respect of the property has been paid or accounted for to him. The amounts said to have been spent by the appellant for improving the property, without any reference whatsoever to the respondent cannot be recovered under Section 221 of the Contract Act, as it does not fall within its terms. 18. In the result, the unspeaking order of dismissal passed by the Bombay High Court can seek its justification in the reasons given by us above. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1976 (8) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 3-5-1972 summoning the accused which must also be treated to be a nullity and destitute of any legal effect. The High Court has not at all considered this important aspect of the matter which alone was sufficient to put an end to these proceedings. It was suggested by Mr. D. Goburdhan that the application given by him for recalling the order of dismissal of the complaint would amount to a fresh complaint. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention because there was no fresh complaint and it is now well settled that a second complaint can lie only on fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a special case is made out. This has been held by this Court in Pramatha Nath Taluqdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar(1). For these reasons therefore, the appeal is allowed. The Order of the High Court maintaining the order of the Magistrate dated 3-5-1972 is set aside and the order of the Magistrate dated 3-5-1972 summoning the appellant is hereby quashed. M.R. Appeal allowed.
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1976 (8) TMI 166 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... extent of 3 acres leaving to the Tribunal to identify that portion of land. 11. This Court is reluctant to interfere with a finding of fact made by the Land Tribunal. But,, where the order of the Tribunal violates the essential principles of rules of natural justice or it exceeds its jurisdiction or commits a serious error in the exercise of its jurisdiction or if the order is perverse in the sense that there is a conscious violation of the pleadings or law, such an order cannot be allowed to stand uncorrected. Therefore, we have no hesitation in allowing this appeal and quash the entire proceedings before the Tribunal commencing with the notice issued under Section 48-A(2) of the Act, and ending with the final order. The Tribunal is at liberty to issue a proper notice in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment. 12. The, appellant is entitled to his costs which shall be paid by the Land Tribunal 2nd respondent. Advocate's fee R-s. 250/-. 13. Appeal allowed.
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