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Showing 1 to 20 of 132 Records
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1977 (3) TMI 184 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... isurely proceeding with the cases by the police unmindful of its effect on the valuable personal liberty of a citizen. (16) Now coming to the present applications, I find that the petitioners were arrested on 14-9-1976 and when the investigation was still continuing, an incomplete report or 'incomplete challan' was filed before the Magistrate on 12-11-1976. As the investigation had not been completed within sixty days and the 'police report' had not been filed within this period, the petitioners arc entitled to the grant of bail by virtue of proviso(a) of section 167(2) of the Code. (17) For the reasons stated above, I grant both the applications and order that the petitioners be released on bail on their furnishing sureties in the sum of Rs. 5000.00 each and executing bonds for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi. (18) Criminal Misc. (Main) 99 and Criminal Misc. (Main) 111 of 1977 are disposed of in the above terms.
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1977 (3) TMI 183 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... isurely proceeding with the cases by the police unmindful of its effect on the valuable personal liberty of a citizen. (16) Now coming to the present applications, I find that the petitioners were arrested on 14-9-1976 and when the investigation was still continuing, an incomplete report or 'incomplete challan' was filed before the Magistrate on 12-11-1976. As the investigation had not been completed within sixty days and the 'police report' had not been filed within this period, the petitioners are entitled to the grant of bail by virtue of proviso(a) of section 167(2) of the Code. (17) For the reasons stated above, I grant both the applications and order that the petitioners be released on bail on their furnishing sureties in the sum of Rs. 5000.00 each and executing bonds for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi. (18) Criminal Misc. (Main) 99 and Criminal Misc. (Main) 111 of 1977 are disposed of in the above terms.
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1977 (3) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... linquent at the time of termination for service (26) an relented in the matter of final termination by simply telling him off from service without inflicting any of the punishments. This lies within the power of the employer and it is not for us to say that the States should have punished him in a particular manner. Therefore, while confirming the order passed by the State and setting aside the decree of the courts below we hold that the consequences of a simple termination must follow. We, therefore, direct while allowing the appeal, that the State shall pay the respondent all that is due to him under the industrial law as an employment when his services are terminated without penal consequences apart from the salary for the period or he has worked after the recent reinstatement. Counsel for the appellants has agreed that this direction will be carried out as the State is bound to. With these observations, we allow the appeal but the parties will bear their costs throughout.
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1977 (3) TMI 181 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fact that the officers have acted in the manner indicated above due to misapprehension of the correct legal position and in good faith without any motive to defeat or defy the order of the Court, we are not inclined to take a serious view of the matter, more so when they realised the mistake, they have tendered an unqualified apology. This tendering of the unqualified apology itself indicates that they acted bona fide and had no intention to disobey the order passed by this Court. Further, the petitioners themselves have given an undertaking that they will not take any benefit nor will enforce the stay order till the application for vacation of stay is finally decided. In view of this, in our opinion, in the present cases no further action is called for and we expect that the observations made in this case will have a desired effect. 23. With these observations, therefore, the rules are discharged. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (3) TMI 180 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t and breaches of the Company, judicial moderation is necessary in the administration of Section 633 of the Act so as to ensure that such categories of Directors are not subjected to the harassment of legal proceedings for breaches and defaults of a Company, which may at times be rather protracted. It would be proper in such cases to relieve such directors of consequences of the defaults and the breaches unless they are directly involved in the acts or omission complained of or have otherwise not acted honestly or reasonably or have financial involvement in the company. (6) Having regard, Therefore, to the fact that the petitioner has been a Director of the Company, as indeed of a number of other Companies, by virtue of being a solicitor and did not participate in the management of the Company and had no financial involvement in it, I would relieve the petitioner of the liability arising out of breaches and defaults on the basis of which the petitioner apprehends proceedings.
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1977 (3) TMI 179 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lso entertained a reasonable belief that the petitioners have absconded or concealed themselves. Besides, these petitions having been filed invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this court under S. 397 of the Cr.P.C., which is a discretionary one, we are not bound to entertain the revisions merely on the ground that the court acting under S. 82 has proceeded on the basis of the satisfaction of the State Government under S. 7(1) without an independent enquiry. We have already held that there are materials from which on could entertain a reasonable belief that the petitioners have absconded or concealed themselves with a view to avoid or evade the orders of detention. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the Court below acting under S. 82 did not conduct an independent enquiry before entertaining a reasonable belief, the orders of proclamation challenged in these revisions need not be interfered with. 26. The result is the petitions are dismissed. 27. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (3) TMI 178 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , no prejudice has been suffered by the appellant, on a fair reading of the Central Government's order. The breach is admitted. The plea is one for excuse, and the discretion has been exercised. It is not within the normal province of the Court to demolish dictionary exercise of power in the absence of special vitiating features. There are none here. We conclude by dismissing the appeal. However, we fell that the consequences are serious especially in the context of the comparatively less serious breaches. It is but appropriate therefore that even though we affirm the orders of the State Government, the Central Government and the High Court, we leave it open to the appellant to move the State Government for a re-consideration of the case if it so chooses. We keep the door ajar although it is within the discretion of the state Government to close it against reconsideration. 10. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their costs of the appeal in this Court.
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1977 (3) TMI 177 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d be right to say that notwithstanding their not availing of the aforementioned opportunity at the trial stage, he can complain at the hearing of the appeal of the failure of justice occasioned by the said omission and ask for the quashing of the conviction. The witness having been cross-examined at length in the trial court and the counsel not laying a foundation for assailing the veracity of the witnesses account of material fact, it cannot be maintained with justification that there was wrongful exclusion of evidence vitiating the conviction. The accused cannot, therefore, have a stantial grievance on that score. This does not however, preclude the court to exercise the power. Without giving an unfair advantage to one of the rival sides, Under Section 165 Evidence Act and Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to arrive at a just decision of the case see Jamatraj v. State of Maharashtra 1968CriLJ231 . 10. Let the reference be returned with answers given in the above.
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1977 (3) TMI 176 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n to the relevant provisions of law. In that view of the matter, in our opinion., the notice in question cannot be condemned as being vague or laconic. In this connection learned advocate for the appellants relied on the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Charandas v. Asst. Collector of Customs AIR1968Cal28 , Whether a notice is vague or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the facts and circumstances of this case we are unable to accept the position that the notice is vague. Reliance was placed also on the said decision and on the aforesaid paragraph to contend that the impugned notice indicated a closed mind. Reading the notice in its entirety we are unable to accept the position that the notice indicated closed or pre-determined mind. 7. For the aforesaid reasons the contentions urged in support of this appeal fail and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. M.M. Dutt, J. 8. I agree.
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1977 (3) TMI 175 - ANDHRA PARDESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rt. 226. We cannot accede to this contention. The Industrial Disputes Act has provided a clear remedy for adjudication of the disputes by Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals, once a dispute is raised and the same has been referred to them. If, in any particular case, the Government acts arbitrarily or contrary to law in refusing to refer a dispute to the Tribunal or Labour Court then such a refusal may be a ground for filing a writ petition. But one cannot postulate that the Government may not refer a dispute to the appropriate forum created by the statute and then entertain a writ petition. Therefore we cannot accept this contention. 67. Now having expressed our opinions on the different questions raised, we do not propose to go into the merits of each case posted before us. We direct that these matters shall be posted before the appropriate Division Bench or learned Single Judge for their disposal in the light of principles we have laid down above. 68. Order accordingly.
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1977 (3) TMI 174 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ocioeconomic justice, we must mould the reliefs as to be effective. That is what we must do and, therefore, this cloud or doubt about our power must stand dispelled by the discussion herein and we must grant the appropriate relief. 51. Accordingly this writ petition is granted by quashing the order of the Labour Court dated June 11, 1975 and directing that the petitioner be reinstated immediately with full back wages to be paid within a period of four weeks from to-day. Respondents to pay the costs of the petitioner quantified at ₹ 500. 52. At this stage Mr. K. S. Nanavati made an oral request for issuance of a certificate under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution. All throughout we have followed and examined and applied the decisions of the Supreme Court. There is no substantial question of law of any general public importance which, in our opinion, ought to be decided by the Supreme Court in this case and, therefore, the request is rejected and the certificate is refused.
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1977 (3) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o investigate into the complaint. It must, however, be clearly understood that the police are under an obligation to investigate into complaints filed by the University, whenever law casts upon them that obligation. The Special Leave Petition filed before us states in Paragraph 18 that after the judgment of the High Court it has become impossible for the University to maintain law and order in its campus as the police have been obdurately refusing to accept any complaint lodged by the University against ex-students and outsiders who enter the campus at any time of the day and night, and stay in the hostels without the necessary permission. It is the bounden duty of the police to record the complaints lodged by the University and to inquire into them in accordance with law. If any cognizable offence is disclosed, the police cannot refuse to act on the complaint lodged by the University for the reason merely that the orders issued by the University are not binding on outsiders.
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1977 (3) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... isprudence. An afterword. 26. The possibility of the power of government to issue orders to vacate being used discriminatorily should be carefully avoided. If exceptions are made in the case of big officers, naturally the middling and the lesser minions of government may have a grievance. It may perhaps be proper if government, when allotting good premises for high officers who make from their own houses large returns by way of rentals, makes them pay into government coffers some equitable part of the gain so made, giving consideration to circumstances like loans, investments and the like This, again, is a matter falling within the province of the sense of justice of the Administration. But we mention it only to save the legislation from the aspersion of invidiousness in the exercise of the power. 27 In the view we have already taken, it follows that the appeal must be dismissed and we hereby do so; but the parties, in the circumstances, will bear their own costs throughout.
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1977 (3) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Municipal Committee to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jabalpur, who by an order dated July 14, 1948 modified the decision of the Committee by asking them to charge octroi duty on an amount which was less by 121/4 instead of 61/4 than the retail price of the goods. Plaintiffs succeeded to an extent though the Sub Divisional Officer upheld the assessment of double duty. Having exhausted their remedies under the Act and having been benefited by the appellate decision, though partly, plaintiffs turned to the civil Court to claim the refund. That is impermissible in view of the provision contained in Section 84(3) of the Act. 26. In the result. Civil Appeal No. 1923 of 1972 filed by the plaintiffs fails and is dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 1924 of 1972 filed by the defendants succeeds and is allowed with the result that the plaintiffs' suit will stand dismissed. Considering that the defendants revised the assessment after a lapse of time, parties will bear their costs throughout.
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1977 (3) TMI 169 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... principle of "might and ought" embodied in Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Civil P. C. 7. As the matter was, to some extent argued before us, we may merely notice that after some vacillation of judicial opinion, the Supreme Court in Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam (AIR 1965 SC 1150) and Gulabchand Chhota-lal Parikh v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1965 SC 1153), has accepted the position that the principle of "might and ought" would have application in writ proceedings. (See the discussion in Seervai's Constitutional Law of India, Second Edition, Vol. II, p. 828). We need not for the purpose of this case examine the same. 8. In view of our conclusion that the present application under Section 80-B is barred by res Judicata by reason of the prior order in O. A. 881 of 1971, there is no need to consider the second question set out in the opening paragraph of this judgment. We express no opinion on it. We dismiss this revision petition with costs.
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1977 (3) TMI 168 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of law could give. Similarly it could well be said that the Umpire in this case can give such relief as the court of law could give and if the court of law is prohibited by Order 2 of the Code to entertain the dispute now sought to be raised I see no reason why the Umpire should not be, This is not saying that all disputes under an arbitration agreement must be disposed of by cne award. The circumstances under which there can be more than one award under one arbitration agreement need not be considered here. I am also not concerned here with any subsequent disputes arising out of the agreement. In the view I have taken on the question whether the present disputes are covered by the claim it is not necessary for me to rest my decision on this point. In the aforesaid view of the matter it must be held that the present dispute cannot be referred to the Umpire. 8. In the premises, this application fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1977 (3) TMI 167 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... those works which are recognised by the Act. This means that the composer alone has copyright in a musical work. The singer has none. This disentitlement of the musician or group of musical artists to copyright is un-Indian, because the major attraction which lends monetary value to a musical performance is not the music maker, so much as the musician. Perhaps, both deserve to be recognised by the copyright law. I make this observation only because act in one sense, depends on the ethos and the aesthetic best of a people; and while universal protection of intellectual and aesthetic property of creators of 'works' is an international obligation, each country in its law must protect such rights wherever originality is contributed. So viewed, apart from the music composer, the singer must be conferred a right. Of course, law-making is the province of Parliament but the Court must communicate to the lawmaker such infirmities as exist in the law extant. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (3) TMI 166 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... damages. We, accordingly, hold that the appellant is not entitled to any damages. For the reasons stated, this appeal is allowed to this extent that the judgment and decree passed by the court below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit for possession over the property in dispute is decreed. The claim for damages is, however, disallowed. The appellant shall get proportionate costs of this suit and the courts below. ( 16. ) An oral request was made by Sri G. N. Verma in view of O. 45 R. 2, C. P. C., as amended by U. P. Civil Laws Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1976, for a Certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court against this decision. We have heard Sri Verma and we are not satisfied that the question of law involved in this case is of such general importance as meriting decision by the Supreme Court, as we have decided the question involved in this case on the basis of the Supreme Court decision itself. The prayer for leave is, accordingly, refused. Order accordingly.
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1977 (3) TMI 165 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r clauses of the insurance policy. The policy also provides for insurance of risks which are not covered under section 95 of the Act by stipulating payment of extra premium. These clauses would themselves indicate that what was intended to be covered under clause 1 and 1 (a) is the risk required to be covered under section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act. On a construction of the insurance policy we accept the plea of the insurance company that the policy had insured the owner only to the extent of ₹ 15,000 regarding the injury to the passenger. In the result we hold that the liability of the insurance company is restricted to ₹ 15,000. There shah be a decree in favour of the claimants appellants to the extent of ₹ 27,500 against' the respondents out of which the liability of the insurance company will be restricted to ₹ 15,000. The appeal is allowed with the costs of the appellant which will be paid by the respondents in equal share. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (3) TMI 164 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of all persons who are enitled to a share in the property of the deceased as it existed at the moment of his death. Since Mula's property stood freed from the encumbrance of the gift at the moment of his death, respondent as the adopted son would be entitled to the possession of the gifted property. (8) Another facet of the same question can be seen in Chand Singh v. Ind Kaur.( (1974) 1 P.L.R. 226.) A learned Single JUdge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held therein that though a suit to contest, under the customary law, an alienation of immovable property may not lie after the coming into force of the Amending Act of 1973, a declaratory decree already obtained by a reversioner would continue to be operative as the Amending Act does not render such a decree a nullity. (9) There is thus no substance in the contention raised by the appellants and their appeal must fail. Appellants 1 to 12 shall pay the respondent's 'costs of the appeal. S.R. Appeal dismissed.
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