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Showing 1 to 20 of 64 Records
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1977 (5) TMI 90 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... irections to prevent such consequences. In the present case, we find no reason, for which the relief to the petitioner should be refused, specially when the Board was asking for something which it had no power to demand under the law creating it or under the 1910 Act, Clause VI of which was made applicable to it by Section 26 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 14. We may note that the Board, by its letter dated February 18, 1972, has directed the units under its control not to charge cost of the transformer from a consumer if the transformer was stolen in 1971 or preceding year but it was not physically replaced by Executive Engineer in 1971 or preceding years. In view of these modified instructions it is all the more necessary that the Board be directed in the present case to continue to perform its obligations by replacement of the stolen transformer. 15. For the discussion in the foregoing we see, therefore, no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs.
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1977 (5) TMI 89 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... etition until the question of the state of mind of the third respondent has been determined and the problem of proper representation has been dealt with. The order clearly excludes all proceedings on the petition except the question as to the state of the mind of the third respondent. 15. In the result, I would defer the decision of the question as to the maintainability of the petition till the composite enquiry envisaged by the afore said order has been held and the question as to the true state of mind of the third respondent has been decided. In case the respondents are keen to have a decision on the question of maintainability of the petition before a decision on the merits with regard to the state of the mind of the third respondent the respondents would have the option to have the preliminary enquiry de-linked from the enquiry on the merits. 16. Let the matter be listed for further consideration to enable the respondents to exercise their option. 17. Order accordingly.
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1977 (5) TMI 88 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed in opinion. If the third Judge expresses his opinion on any other point or finally decides the case as a whole, the latter part of his opinion (be it styled as 'order' or 'judgment') has to be ignored as without jurisdiction. After the third Judge has recorded his opinion; the case must be laid before the Division Bench for deciding the point or points which were referred to the third Judge according to the method provided by Clause 26 of the Letters Patent and it is at this stage that a Division Bench will finally decide the case before it. It is not the requirement of law that the case must be laid before the same Division Bench which first heard it, after it is returned by the third Judge. When one of the Judges constituting the Division Bench which first heard the case, has retired or is not otherwise available, the Chief Justice can constitute another Division Bench to decide the case according to the method provided by Clause 26 of the Letters Patent.
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1977 (5) TMI 87 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n of the legal requirements. The petitioners cannot be debarred by any rule of estoppel from demanding refund of the excess duty paid erroneously under Item 72A. The Revisional authority has rightly refused to apply the principle of estoppel against the petitioners and to that extent has expressly disagreed with the Customs Appellate Authority. Since an excess amount of duty has been paid, the petitioners are entitled to get refund of the same. As it is not feasible for us to make mathematical computation to work out the actual amount of duty paid in excess, we would direct the Collector of Customs, respondent No. 4, to ascertain the amount of duty paid in excess on the basis that the petitioner company is liable to duty under Item 72 (18) I.C.T. and give a refund of the excess amount so determined by him. The petitioners shall be entitled to costs which is assessed at ₹ 200. The writ application is, accordingly, allowed with costs. Prafulla Kishore Mohanti, J. I agree.
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1977 (5) TMI 86 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in Clause (ii) of the preceding proviso which has distributed to its shareholders during the previous year dividends in excess of 6 per cent. of its paid-up capital, not being dividends payable at a fixed rate......" 19. The expression used is a "a company which has distributed to its shareholders......dividends". The words " has distributed" cannot mean "has declared". Further, the aforesaid expression is unambiguous and it connotes the idea that, after the declaration of dividends, the company has actually or constructively distributed the dividends to its shareholders. 20. Though ₹ 1,05,000 was declared as dividends, ₹ 47,000 was only distributed by the company. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that ₹ 47,000 and not ₹ 1,05,000 was distributed as dividends. We accordingly return our answer in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 21. There will be no order as to costs. R.N. Pyne, J. 22. I agree.
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1977 (5) TMI 84 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it the jurisdiction of the. Judicial Commissioner in the sense counsel wants us to accept. We therefore hold that the Judicial Commissioner's confirmation of the death sentence is not without jurisdiction. Undeterred by the fact that the murder is gruesome counsel has pleaded that at least on the question of sentence leave should be granted because his client is a young man and the sentence of death has been haunting him agonisingly for around six years. May be that such a long spell of torment may be one circumstance in giving the lesser sentence. Even so, we have to be guided by the rulings of this Court which have not gone to the extent of holding that based on this circumstance alone, without other supplementing factors or in the face of surrounding beastly circumstances of the crime, judicial clemency can attenuate the sentence. Possibly, Presidential power is wider but judicial power is embanked. We refuse special leave and dismiss the petition. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (5) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court of Gujarat. We confirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal. Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1974 and Civil Appeal No. 285 of 1974 are cross appeals. Both of these appeals arise out of Special Civil Application No. 1418 of 1971 which was field by the promotees in the High Court of Gujarat. Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1974 is filed by the promotees in this Court challenging the decision of the Gujarat High Court to the extent to which they failed. Civil Appeal No. 285 of 1974 is filed by the direct recruits challenging the aforesaid decision to the extent to which the High Court allowed the reliefs claimed by the promotees. We allow Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1974 partly and dismiss Civil Appeal No. 285 of 1974. The reasons in support of the conclusions to which we have come in these appeals will be given later. The extent to which the appeals are allowed or dismissed will become clear from those reasons. There will be no order as to costs in any of the appeals."
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1977 (5) TMI 82 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... connection I further observe that to he distinguished at strips, the nature of mill through which they have been rolled is important. Strips/plates are a product of plate/strip Mill. There is no evidence to show that the subject products have been made out of a strip Mill. According to the l.S.I. definition given in ISI-5-113, the narrow strips should be in straight length or in coil form and the Dy. Collector’s order in holding the subject goods in question within the category of the narrow strips is not correct. These should be either trimmed or with sheared edges, which is not the case with the subject goods of the appellants and hence this cannot falls under the definition of “strips”. In view of the discussions I hold that the subject goods cannot be classified as “strips” as ordered by the Dy. Collector. The Dy. Collector’s order has therefore, to be set aside and I order accordingly. Consequential relief is allowed to the appellants
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1977 (5) TMI 81 - SUPREME COURT
Constitutional validity of Orissa Legislature enacted the Orissa Taxation (on Goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, 7 of 1959 challenged
Held that:- If any appeal challenging. an order of assessment is filed beyond the period of limitation and the authority is satisfied that the appeal could not be filed within limitation for the reason that the Acts of 1959 and 1962 were held to be unconstitutional, the delay in filing the appeal would be condoned. We are equally confident that if any appeal filed for challenging an order of assessment was withdrawn or not pursued for the reason that the two Acts were held unconstitutional, the authority concerned would pass appropriate orders reviving the appeal. We are happy to note the assurance of the learned Advocate-General of the State of Orissa that the State will not oppose in such cases the condonation of delay or the revival of appeals. For these reasons we dismiss the appeals.
The points raised in these appeals undoubtedly involve the determination of questions as to the constitutional validity of a State law but they are so utterly devoid of substance that Mr. Asoke Sen and Mr. Gokhale who appear for the appellants could say nothing in support of their contentions beyond barely stating them
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1977 (5) TMI 80 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nover. We do not find any substance in this contention. In our opinion, sub-clause (ii) of clause (s) of section 2 will equally be covered by sub-section (2) of section 4 and we are not prepared to confine the operation of sub-clause (ii) of clause (s) of section 2 to sub-section (1) of section 4 only, as, in our view, there is no justification for putting a narrow interpretation on the aforesaid subclause (ii), as suggested by Dr. Tewari, looking to the plain language of subsection (2) of section 4 of the Act. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that a registered dealer who sells the goods to another registered dealer and the first registered dealer is exempt from payment of sales tax cannot make the sales effected by the second dealer subject to the liability of payment of sales tax and, in our view, that is the answer to the question of law referred to us and we answer accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (5) TMI 79 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iew of the foregoing discussion, we find ourselves unable to hold that the Government of Andhra Pradesh by holding auction of forest produce carried on business in the sale of that class of goods. As such, the respondents could not be made liable to pay the sales tax. It must be held that the transactions under the contracts were not sales exigible to sales tax. Question No. (5) Is the petitioner entitled to any relief against the threatened action? 9.. These applications must succeed. We accordingly hold that the demand for reimbursement of sales tax raised by opposite party No. 2 is not at all tenable as no sales tax is payable on the transactions. We direct that a writ shall issue quashing the letter of demand and prohibiting the opposite parties from enforcing the demand in any manner. The petitioner shall have its costs of the applications. One set of hearing fee of rupees two hundred and fifty is allowed for both the applications. DAS, J.-I agree. Applications allowed.
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1977 (5) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been made without giving an opportunity to the appellant to produce materials for quantifying the correct tax. It is not disputed by the respondents that the demand of tax was made on best judgment basis without reference to the appellant s records. Therefore, while upholding the levy of tax, we have to direct the respondents to quantify the tax after giving an opportunity to the appellant to produce its records and other materials and after verification of such records produced by the appellant. The appellant, therefore, is given two months time from this date for producing the necessary documents before the respondents to enable them to quantify the taxable turnover and the tax due thereon. If the appellant fails to produce the documents and other necessary materials within the time set out above, the demand in question will stand. Subject to the above modification, the decision of the lower courts is affirmed and the second appeal is dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (5) TMI 77 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mmissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Indian Cable Co. Ltd.(1) But that case does not support the contention that the question whether the goods continued to be movables after the execution of the contract is immaterial to the determination of the question whether the transaction is a works contract pure and simple or is also a contract for sale of goods. 7.. It is true that the question whether title in the goods passed as movables has to be determined, in a case where the contract has been reduced to writing, on the basis of the terms of the contract itself, but it cannot be gainsaid that, where the terms of the contract are ambiguous and the ambiguity is a latent ambiguity, recourse can be had to the surrounding circumstances to interpret and ascertain the terms of the contract. 8.. For the aforesaid reasons, I would answer the question in the affirmative and against the dealer in both the cases. Hearing fee Rs. 200. SINGH, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (5) TMI 76 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unt of aggregate sales to registered dealers. 16.. To sum up, I hold that the Tribunal as well as the Member, Board of Revenue, and the taxing authorities in the appellate orders as well as in the assessment orders have committed an error of law in holding that the provisions contained under rule 18 were mandatory. Those provisions, as held by me, are mere directory. The petitioners could have on that ground claimed deduction from the gross turnover on account of aggregate sales to the registered dealers and there was no bar on them, but, in view of the findings by this court in Budhram Kashiram v. State of Bihar 1970 26 S.T.C. 505 1970 B.L.J.R. 135., they are not entitled to claim now such deduction. 17.. In the result, question No. (1) and earlier part of question No. (2) are answered in favour of the assessee, but the latter part of question No. (2) is answered against the assessee. BIRENDRA PRASAD SINHA, J.-I agree with the order proposed. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (5) TMI 75 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ney by the assessee has resulted from transactions liable to sales tax and not from other sources. The burden of proving this, as pointed out earlier, is not on the assessee but on the department. 4.. In the present case, there is no evidence whatever to connect the sum of Rs. 14,000 with a business transaction that is liable to sales tax. The Sales Tax Officer and the appellate authorities were, in our view, not justified in coming to the conclusion that the assessee had derived this amount from sale transactions which are liable to sales tax. Their conclusions are not supported by any evidence whatsoever and are, therefore, unsustainable in law. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the addition of Rs. 93,333 to the turnover in foodgrains in the assessee s business for the relevant assessment year is incorrect. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal under revision is set aside and the tax revision case is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1977 (5) TMI 74 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver 1967 20 S.T.C. 453 (S.C.). It cannot for a moment be pretended that there can be no attempt to evade the tax due under the Act before the liability to pay the tax has arisen. A scheme or device to evade the tax may start operating long before the actual liability to pay the tax arises. As soon as the scheme or device is set in motion there is an attempt to evade the tax due under the Act and it will not be necessary to wait till the liability to pay the tax actually arises. If an attempt to evade tax is discovered earlier, the liability to be subjected to penalty is straightaway attracted. In our view, there is no repugnancy between the provision for levy of penalty under section 14-B(7) when an attempt to evade the tax is discovered and the general scheme of the Act which provides for the levy of tax at the point of first sale within the State. The writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (5) TMI 73 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y section 14-B were not in the public interest and were unreasonable. It was said that carriers like the petitioners were subjected to needless and harassing restrictions although they were not dealers and neither sold nor purchased any taxable goods. The same argument was advanced with regard to rules 56-A, 56-B and 56-C of the Punjab General Sales Tax Rules. It was also said that these Rules went beyond the rule-making power of the Government. There is no substance in any of the submissions. Section 14-B and rules 56-A, 56-B and 56-C are designed to prevent the evasion of tax and they are certainly in the public interest. All that the carriers are expected to do is to maintain proper accounts and documents and produce them for inspection when necessary. We are unable to see any unreasonable restriction. We are also unable to see in what manner the rule-making authority has gone beyond its authority. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (5) TMI 72 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n section 10(d) of the Act, which is the relevant provision. Therefore, the answer to questions Nos. (1) and (2) must necessarily be in the affirmative. Learned counsel for the petitioner would hardly raise any cogent argument regarding the issue covered by question No. (3). The very statute itself provides that penalty has to be imposed by the authority who granted to him the certificate of registration or in any case is competent to grant the same. In the present case, there does not appear to be any manner of doubt that the Assessing Authority (Sales Tax) of the Union Territory of Chandigarh was the authority which had issued the certificate of registration to the petitioner. Consequently, question No. (3) has also to be answered in the affirmative. In the light of the aforementioned discussion, all the three questions are answered as above in favour of the revenue and against the petitioner. The parties will, however, bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (5) TMI 71 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Balance sheet - Default in filing copies of ... ... ... ... ..... the balance-sheet and profit and loss account have been laid before it will not arise. Therefore, the condition precedent or the essential prerequisite of the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account being laid before the general meeting of the company not being fulfilled, the requirement of section 134 cannot be complied with. The above observations fully support the view I have taken. Since the petition of complaint does not disclose that the prerequisite conditions, as pointed out above, had been fulfilled for the furnishing of the copies to the Registrar, it must be held that the complaint does not indicate that the provision of sub-section (1) of section 220 of the Act has been contravened by the petitioners for which they may be punished under sub-section (3) of that section read with section 162(1) of the Act. As such, the proceeding against them must be quashed. Accordingly, the application is allowed and the proceedings against the petitioners is hereby quashed.
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1977 (5) TMI 70 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... deter me at all from exercising jurisdiction. What is there to run away from it. Therefore, again with respect, I find no complicated or complex questions raised in this petition. There are some questions of law. But without any arrogance I must say that the High Court would be better suited to decide these questions. Taking the other view, these petitioners who are fighting from 1975 will have to go to the city civil court, then come by way of appeal. It is merely adding to the hierarchy of litigation and when charge is being levelled that litigation in our country is protracted, one need not add argument in favour of it by resorting to the suggestion made on behalf of the respondents. Therefore, examining the matter from all possible angles, the preliminary objection must be overruled and the petition must be set down for final hearing. Costs of this hearing should be taken into consideration while determining the costs which would finally abide the outcome of the petition.
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