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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 88 Records
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1977 (9) TMI 127 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 594). Such a procedure was adopted in the cases of Grepe v. Loam and Bulteel v. Grepe (1887) 37 Ch. 168 and Lord Kinnard v. Field (1905) 2 Ch. 306. Such being the position and as in our view an exceptional case has been made out for grant of injunction as prayed for, we grant the injunction prayed for and we direct that all the eleven Respondents to this application or any one of them, their servants and agents are restrained from initiating any suit or proceeding in any Court on a prayer for stay of further proceedings in Money Suit Nos. 10, 18, 11, 13, 19 and 28 of 1974 and 2 and 11 of 1975 pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Chinsurah, without the leave of this Court first had and obtained. 24. The Rule is accordingly made absolute on terms set out hereinbefore with costs. The hearing fee being assessed at 20 Gms. 25. Let the operation of the order be stayed until a week after the Puja holidays as prayed for by the Respondents. A.P. Bhattacharya, J. 26. I agree.
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1977 (9) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... amily to maintain. The circumstances and the social milieu do not militate against the petitioner being granted bail at this stage. At the same time any possibility of the abscondence or evasion or other abuse can be taken care of by a direction that the petitioner will report himself before the notice station at Baren once every fortnight. This petitioner will be released on bail on his entering into a bond of his own and one surety for ₹ 5,000/- to the satisfaction of the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Baren. While the system- of pecuniary bail has a tradition behind it, the time has come for rethinking on the subject. It may well be that in most cases not monetary suretyship but undertaking by relations of the petitioner or organi- sation to which he belongs may be better and more socially relevant. Even so, in this case we stick to the practice and direct the furnishing of one surety for ₹ 5,000/-. Application for intervention allowed. Bail granted.
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1977 (9) TMI 125 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... een the debtor and the third party and the creditor is thereby enabled to give to the third party all the rights that he has against the debtor or to ensure that the original contract between the debtor and the creditor does not disable the creditor from transferring the right to enforce the creditor's right under the contract to a third party. "That is to say, to ensure that the contract is assignable. (19) For the above reasons, the appeal is dismissed. While we do feel that the respondents 3 to 5 have acted contrary to the contract between them and the bank, namely, the power of attorney, we also take note of the fact that the bank has not made any claim against Respondents 3 to 5. The bank should have done so if it suspected that the Respondents 3 to 5 have played foul. It may also be that the concerned officers of the Government have not acted above board. In these circumstances, we order that the costs of this appeal should be borne by the parties as incurred.
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1977 (9) TMI 124 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en dishonestly withdrawn from his account against a cheque issued by the bank without his knowledge and consent by some unknown person purporting to copy his signature which according to him was forgery and he has stated that there was conspiracy of fraud and forgery and criminal misappropriation by some designing persons. In view of the facts and circumstances as stated above, I answer issue Nos. 1 and 2 in the negative. I answer issue No. 3 in the positive. I answer issue No. 4 in the positive. As the plaintiff did not lead any evidence whatsoever, I answer issue No. 5 in the negative. I answer issue No. 6 in the negative. I accept the evidence given by Mr. Nath as also Shukla on behalf of the bank and I hold that the bank has not been guilty of negligence in encashing the said cheque for ₹ 13,701 and in view of my finding of the issues as stated above, I hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as claimed in the plaint and I dismiss the suit with costs.
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1977 (9) TMI 123 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ength and having read the petition and the several affidavits as also the documents accompanying them, I am inclined to agree with Mr. Patnaik for the Company that there is a bona fide dispute regarding the payability of the sum of money said to be due to the Creditor and until the debt is established, it cannot be said that the Company has neglected to pay the debt. 7. There was some amount of dispute as to whether the statutory notice of demand had been issued, but since that aspect has been contentious and without receiving evidence it may be difficult to come to a finding, I have not entered into it. 8. I am satisfied on the materials placed before me to which cursory reference has been made above that this is not an application which should be entertained. I would accordingly recall the order of publication and direct that the petition for winding up by the Creditor do stand dismissed. I am not inclined at this stage to make any direction for costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1977 (9) TMI 122 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the purchase money which is still to be paid by the plaintiff- respondent to the defendant-appellant. Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act governs the matter. It is only if the plaintiff- respondent had been given the possession of the property that he would have been required to pay interest on the unpaid amount of the purchase money. Since possession has not been delivered to him by the appellant-defendant, the interest was not payable by the respondent to the appellant. No other ground to support the payment of interest by the respondent to the appellant is available. There was no term for payment of interest in the agreement for the purchase of the property. Nor has notice of demand of interest been given to make interest payable under the Interest Act. The cross-objection is, therefore, allowed with costs and the judgment of the trial Court is modified by the deletion of the direction for the payment of interest by the respondent to the appellant there from.
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1977 (9) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he C.P.C. (Mulla as well as A.I.R.) concur in this view, footnoting the flow of pan-Indian case-law. The law in this branch, though based on Anglo-American thought, has a legitimacy when viewed as contempt of the court's authority. Once amends are made by later leave being obtained, the gravamen is gone and the suit can proceed. The pity is that sometimes even such points are expanded into important questions calculated to protract Indian litigation already suffering from unhealthy longevity. A pragmatic view, not theoretical perfection, is the corrective. The leave should have been given. We allow the appeal-in the hope that such an objection may not become a dilatory chapter in other litigations. We grant leave to the appellant to prosecute his suit against the Receiver-respondent. The parties will bear their respective costs in this avoidable adventure, but the respondent will be free to urge all his other contentions to meet the plaintiff's claim. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (9) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he court omitting or delaying to prepare the decree without any further action by a party. 39. Even otherwise, in the entire circumstances of the case disclosing sheer indifference, perhaps, negligence, on the part of the Advocate, Shri Bharatinder Singh and no laches, whatever, on the part of the appellant, we would have been inclined to condone the delay of 12 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 40. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside. We will, however, make no order as to costs, particularly in view of the fact that counsel appearing for both sides expressed that there would be a sincere endeavour by the parties to settle the matter when the records reach the High Court. We are sure that with the good offices of counsel the High Court will be able to take up the appeal at an early date, if possible, to record a final' settlement of the dispute between the parties. With this hope we part with the records.
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1977 (9) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ever, that there was no direction in the order which was only by way of ’request" and suggestion. We are, however, unable to accept this submission as correct. o p /o p Any "request" of the Government to a subordinate authority is tantamount to a positive direction or order and it will be difficult for the subordinate authority to disregard the same. o p /o p Normally we would have remanded the revision petition to be disposed of by the Government in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment but since the period of the arrack licences will expire on 30th September, 1977, no useful purpose would be served by a remand. It will however, be open to the Government to notify its policy with regard to the settlement of arrack shops in future in such appropriate manner as it may deem fit. o p /o p This judgment will govern both the appeals. Both the appeals are allowed, but there will be no. order as to costs,. o p /o p S. R. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1977 (9) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... onvicted for the offence under section 302 and sentenced to life imprisonment, he surrendered before presenting his petition for special leave to appeal to this Court. Since then, the appellant has been in jail and the total period he has spent in jail so far is about four and a half years. The appeal is of 1974 ;and it is not likely to come up for hearing for at least another two years since. this Court is at present hearing appeals preferred in the year 1972.The very fact that this Court has granted to the appellant specialleave to appeal against his conviction shows that, in the opinion of thisCourt, he has prima facie a good, case to consider and in the circumstances it would be highly unjust to detain him in jail any longer during the bearing of the appeal. We, therefore, direct that the appellant be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patiala. The appellant will report at the nearest police station once in a fortnight. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (9) TMI 116 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ts between the parties depends on whether the parties intended to create a tenancy, and the intention has to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the case. It is possible to find on the facts of a given case that payments made by a transferee in possession were really not in terms of the contract but independent of it, and this might justify an inference of tenancy in his favour. The question is ultimately one of fact. In the present case the High Court has found in agreement with the courts below that the "payment of rent by the appellant to the plaintiff respondent who accepted the same did not create any tenancy in favour of the appellant inasmuch as the said payments were made in part performance of the said contract of lease contained in the compromise petition". We cannot go behind this finding of fact on which the appeal turns. The appellant’s plea of tenancy cannot therefore be accepted. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1977 (9) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at is done once, if it be allowed, may be done again and in a lesser crisis and less serious circumstances. And thus judicial power may be eroded. Such an erosion is contrtry to the clear intention of the Constitution. In their Lordships' view the Acts were ultra wires and invalid." I am conscious of the fact that I am not dealing with the vires, nor could I do so, of the provisions of the Constitution contained in Article 222. But I have extracted the above passage with the purpose of laying stress on the words "what is done once, if it be allowed, maybe done again and in a lesser crisis and less serious circumstances" .if the Constitution allows it, let it be done. We cannot prevent it. But if such a situation is possible to be restrained by the rules of construction and interpretation of the various articles of the Constitution we shall be failing in our duty if we do not do so in the larger interest of our country and the preservation of the democracy.
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1977 (9) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... possible for it to, do so in.... face of the impediment created by the mandamus issued by the High Court, we would allow the appeal' in so far as the current year is concerned and leave it open to the Government to grant the fishery rights to the appellant in conformity with the aforesaid policy and procedure in case the latter fulfills the conditions laid down therein. In the event of the Government settling the Jalkar with the appellant or any other Fisherman Society in accordance with the policy and procedure laid down in the aforesaid circular letter, it shall, on the basis of section 70 of the Contract Act refund to respondent No. 1 proportionate amount of the Jamma deposited by him for the year 1977-78 after going into the accounts which he was bound to, maintain under order passed by this Court on May 6, 1977 for the period commencing from May 1, 1977 to August 30', 1977. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.. Appeal., allowed.
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1977 (9) TMI 113 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... o the market is brought into existence. However, in this case no such process or manufacture is involved in the operation carried out by the appellants and as such the paper cut to sizes and then re-rolled cannot be called as converted paper in the context in which the term “converted paper” has been mentioned in the Central Excise Tariff under Item No. 17(2). Since there is no manufacture taking place attracting duty under Tariff Item 17(2), there is no question of taking out a licence under the Central Excise Law under the said Tariff Item, namely, Item 17. Since no new product is brought into existence in the operation carried out by the appellants, there is also no question of any further levy of duty under Item 17 of the Central Excise Tariff on the paper cut and re-rolled by the appellants. 6. In view of what has been stated above, I set aside the order of the Assistant Collector and allow the appeal. Consequential relief shall be granted to the appellants.
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1977 (9) TMI 112 - COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nd parcel of the Hall and inseparable from the Hall under the Delhi Cinematograph rules and should not be treated as furniture. These cannot be moved outside the Hall without dismantling and since they are one legged unit they cannot be utilised for any other purpose without further fabrication. In view of the above I set aside the order of the Assistant Collector treating the Cinema Chairs as steel furniture falling under Item 40 and accept the appeal. Consequential relief, if any, may be allowed.
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1977 (9) TMI 111 - COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... nature not involving issue of fresh licence under the provisions of Rule 178(3). The appellants have, therefore, argued that the order passed by the Assistant Collector for payment of duty at higher rate in terms of the first proviso to Notification No. 41/65 for the period from 30-5-1976 to 10-10-1976 is illegal and unjustified. 2. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the appellants. Notification No. 41/65, date 28-2-1965 as amended provides that no payment at higher rate shall be required in respect of any such amendment if, it does not involve reduction or increase in the number of power looms. In the present case, the amendment covers the change of ownership by addition of partners without any reduction or addition in the number of powerlooms, There is, therefore, no ground for recovery of duty at higher rate. The order of the Assistant Collector is, therefore, set aside and the appeal allowed. Consequential relief shall be granted to the appellants.
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1977 (9) TMI 110 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he respondents (who have no right to it), to the petitioner who also have no right to it. 44. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, in my view, as the petitioner did not claim that money at any stage and the duty has already been paid and credited to the Government, at this stage, the petitioner cannot claim for any refund. 45. In the result, this Rule is made absolute in part. The order of assessment for the months of April, 1971 to September, 1973 and demand of ₹ 46277.92 are quashed. The petitioner’s claim for refund of ₹ 47,711.66 is rejected. This order, however, shall not prevent the Central Excise Authorities to make a fresh assessment with respect to the aforesaid periods in the light of the observations made ereinabove after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard and in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Let the operation of the order be stayed till two weeks after the long vacation.
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1977 (9) TMI 109 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . Clause (3) of Article 226 of the Constitution lays down that existence of an alternative remedy will be a complete bar to the entertaining of a writ petition. The learned Standing Counsel invited our attention to Section 128 of the Customs Act which provided for an appeal against every decision or order passed under the act. In view of the provision contained in Section 128 of the Customs Act, the petitioner had an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the order which it impugnes by the present writ petition. 4. Since the petitioner had an alternative remedy under Section 128 of the Customs Act, this writ petition could not have been presented, after the commencement of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act. Consequently, in view of the provisions contained in Section 58 (2) of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, this petition must fail. 5. The petition, accordingly, fails and is hereby dismissed. No order however, is made as to costs.
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1977 (9) TMI 108 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rods. This I say because it is not said that paragraph 2 of form B was also amended. Paragraph 2 of the form as prescribed says that this certificate is valid up to ...... Admittedly, the exemption certificate was granted in the year 1969 and it was to remain valid up to 5th January, 1974. Even if the authorities had jurisdiction to extend the life of the certificate beyond what was mentioned in paragraph 2, it was not so done. The result is that the certificate in spite of amendment of item No. 5 of the particulars remained valid only up to 5th January, 1974. The petitioner, therefore, under this exemption certificate was not entitled to any benefit under the notification beyond 5th January, 1974. I do not, therefore, see any illegality in the orders as contained in annexures 2, 3 and 4 to the writ application. 6.. The result, therefore, is that the application has no merit and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100. LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (9) TMI 107 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... relief under article 227 of the Constitution on the ground that it has an alternative remedy against the final order making reassessment. Next it is contended that disputed questions of fact cannot be decided in a revision petition, and that the petitioner has to submit its explanation and representations in answer to the impugned notice and thereafter the respondent should investigate the facts and decide the matter. I do not think in the circumstances of the present case, it can be said that the question of jurisdiction raised by the petitioner involves any further investigation into the facts. On the other hand, on the facts admitted and which do not require any further proof or investigation, it is found that the impugned notice by the respondent is beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the relevant rule and, therefore, it is devoid of jurisdiction. In the result, the revision petition is allowed with costs and the impugned notice is set aside. Petition allowed.
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