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Showing 1 to 20 of 144 Records
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1978 (1) TMI 180 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... order to the Tribunal constituted under Section 11 of the Act within three months from the date of communication to him of the order. For the applicability of this provision of the Act, two conditions must co-exist. These are (1) that the employee should be an employee of a recognised private school and (2) that he should be visited with either of the three major penalties of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. As the School was neither a recognised private school on the relevant date nor was the impugned order one of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank but was an order simpliciter of termination of service, the aforesaid appeal filed by respondent No. 2 to the Tribunal constituted under Section 11 of the Act was manifestly incompetent and the order passed therein by the Tribunal was clearly without jurisdiction. 9. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal and quash the order of the Tribunal. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no-order as to costs.
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1978 (1) TMI 179 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rial court. 13. I find that a Division Bench of the madras High court in V. R. Nathan v. Mac Laboratories(P.) Ltd., AIR 1975 Mad 189 allowed the amendment which was ask for the first time during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court against the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit. The court held "in view of the imperative language of the proviso which requires that the Court shall grant the amendment ... ... ... ... ... the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of right, to have the amendments made and the only discretion left for the Court is about the terms, if any, on which he may be Permitted to amend." All the pleas opposing the amendment on the ground that it was very much belated and was lacking In bona fides etc. were held to be futile In view of the Proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 40 of the Specific Relief Act. 14. The result is that the appeal is dismissed. The parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs. 15. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (1) TMI 178 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... plaintiff may come with a case for establishment of his title and in that connection it may be necessary for him to prove that the entries in the record-of-rights are erroneous. If in such suits it is held that Section 57B would apply, leading to the recording of orders of abatement of the suits, we are afraid, there would be no forum or process of law to establish title to land or property, Such cannot be the intention of the legislature. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the trial courts in the respective suits have illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction in holding erroneously that the suits have abated under Section 57B of the Act. 11. In the result, the impugned orders are set aside and the trial courts are directed to dispose of the respective suits in accordance with law. Both these Rules are made absolute. There will, however, be no order for costs in either of them. Let the records be sent down as early as possible. D.C. Chakravorti, J. 12. I agree.
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1978 (1) TMI 177 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uctions from the Government. 4. The present case is fully covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jan Saran, Kailash Chander . 1973 2 SCC 96, wherein the order declining the prayer under section 34 of the Act was upheld because of the application submitted to seek adjournment to file the written statement. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, sought to distinguish this case on the ground that in the present case no application has been filed to seek the adjournment. I am, however, unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant, because an oral request for adjournment is as good as a writ ten request. If a written request seeking adjournment to file written statement amounts to taking steps in the proceeding I find no reason why an oral request to same effect would not amount to taking such a step. 5. This appeal has, therefore, no merit and is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs. 6. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (1) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... based on the return. It has to be seen that the ground that was urged by the respondent was that the returns were non-est which was accepted by the High Court. We do not think we will be justified in these appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution to permit the State to contend that it can proceed on the basis that the returns were valid, especially when the plea before the High Court was that the returns were invalid. This Court has repeatedly held that the exercise of power under Article 136 is discretionary, (vide Trivedi v. Nagrashra (1962)IILLJ236SC ). In State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Ors. 1976 3SCR565 this Court held that ever though there may be substance in the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant the Court taking the totality of the circumstances may decline to interfere in an appeal filed by special leave of the Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. 10. In the result the appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1978 (1) TMI 175 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this court even at the stage of the issue of a notice and before the actual proceedings are taken. It is always open to the petitioner to put forward his objections and convince the second respondent who issued the notice under Section 147 of the I.T. Act that there is no room for making a revised assessment as proposed by him and that he, having decided earlier the status, cannot change his opinion and make a revised assessment on the estate of Kumaraswami Mudaliar in the status of an HUF. 5. We have to, therefore, hold that this writ petition is premature. Further, the matter involves investigation of facts. The proper thing for the petitioner is to go before the second respondent and put forward his objections and if ultimately any adverse orders are passed against him by the second respondent, he can challenge that order in appropriate proceedings. 6. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed without going into the merits of the case. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (1) TMI 174 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... before the delivery of judgment Shri B. N. Kirpal for the petitioner, drew my attention to the second relief claimed by the petitioner, viz. quashing the orders of transfer of the petitioner contained in the office order dated 22-2-1977 and 31-3-1977. Shri Budhiraja says that this point was not argued, but Shri Kirpal maintains that it was the very first argument he had made. However, the matter is only consequential on the decision which has already been arrived at. In view of the decision arrived at above, respondents 1 and 2 may consider in the light of what they have stated in paragraphs 16 and 17 of their reply dated 2-5-1977, namely, that the transfer of the petitioner was due to the fact that he was the junior most along with K.C. Choudhry. Since, as a result of the above decision he would not be the junior most ,but will take his place between Shri Bhatnagar and Shri Goel, respondents 1 and 2 may consider if the orders of transfer of the petitioner should be revised.
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1978 (1) TMI 173 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nces we are of the opinion that the apology tendered by them is not an act of contrition, instead they have used it as a weapon to escape the consequences of the present proceedings. In the circumstances, we do not consider it proper to accept the apology tendered. 24. We are therefore of the opinion that R. R. Upadhya and S. N. Tewari both are guilty of willful disobedience of the orders of this Court and they are further guilty of making reckless allegations against an officer of this Court which has a tendency of lowering down the prestige of this Court. We, therefore, hold that the contemners are guilty of contempt of this Court for which they deserve punishment. 25. Both the contemners are therefore sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 1000/-(Rupees one thousand) each payable within six weeks from today, or in default, to undergo one month's simple imprisonment. The contemners shall also pay costs of these proceedings to S. P. Agarwal which we assess at ₹ 300/-.
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1978 (1) TMI 172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt Act, but subject to the provisions that the vesting in management and the possession of the respective parties will be preserved undisturbed". are uncalled for as they are, based on a misconstruction of the interim order passed by this Court. For the reasons given above the appeal is allowed, the order of the, High Court is set aside and the sale held by the Official Liquidator in pursuance of the order of the Company Judge is annulled. In case, the concerned respondents have deposited the purchase money in Court they would be entitled to refund of the same according to law as the sale made under the orders of the Company Judge has been held by us to be invalid and void. The decision of this appeal would not govern the order of three lots of items of movable property which had been sold earlier and which do not form the subject matter of the, present appeal. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs, S. R. Appeal allowed..
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1978 (1) TMI 171 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tting above silhourted, we are of the view, that subject to certain safeguards, the petitioners are eligible to be enlarged on bail. The endemic pathology of factious scrimmage and blood-shed should be preempted by suitable safeguards, even if we are inclined to bail out the petitioners. So, we direct that the petitioners be released on their own recognisances in a sum of ₹ 5,000/each, with one surety for each in a like sum, subject to two conditions, viz., firstly, that the petitioners shall not enter Bharaiyam village which is alleged to be the hot-bed of Plan clashes according to the prosecution and secondly, the petitioners shall report at the Tandiawan Police Station (District Hardor) once every week. We direct the Sub-Inspector of Police station concerned to see that both the conditions are observed. In 'the event 'of breach of either condition, the prosecution will be at liberty to move this Court for cancellation of the bail hereby granted. Bail granted
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1978 (1) TMI 170 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and paying the balance in instalments. It cannot therefore be said that the impugned provision violates article 14 of the Constitution on that account. There is also justification for treating an auction-purchaser at a court sale differently from a bona fide alienee of the auction purchaser who derived his rights before the date of publication of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Bill 1968, in the State Gazette. Such an alienee of the auction- purchaser could not possibly have been aware of the hazards of purchasing the property of an indebted agriculturist at the time of the purchase, and it is futile to contend that if the Legislature has protected his interest by an express provision in sub-section (6) of section 20, it has thereby made a hostile discrimination against the auction-purchasers as a class. There is thus no force in the arguments which have been advanced on behalf of the appellants and the appeals are dismissed with costs. P. B. R. Appeals dismissed-
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1978 (1) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... one or other of the higher officers of the Bank in or around Calcutta on a salary of not less than ₹ 250/. The driver-respondent will be given intimation by registered notice about this offer of absorption. And, if he does not report within one month of the receipt of such notice, this part of the assurance will lapse. 7. We record these observations and assurances while we allow the appeal. Dr. Anand Prakash draws our attention to the fact that ₹ 1,000/-has been already paid under an order of this Court on an earlier occasion by way of costs to the workman. We fix the total costs payable to the workman at ₹ 2,000/- and although the decision has gone adverse to him, since the earlier order of this Court is that costs will be paid to the workman irrespective of the result, the balance of ₹ 1,000/- will also be made goods by the management. This amount will be payable within six weeks when the workman calls on the Bank's regional office at Calcutta.
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1978 (1) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... its part- ners. But even if it has been dissolved, the effect of- dissolution is not to render the firm non-existent. It continues to exist for all purposes necessary for its winding up. One of these is of course the recovery of moneys due to it by suit or otherwise". We think that the amendment sought does not alter the cause of action. It only brings out correctly the capacity of the plaintiff suing. It does not change the identity of the plaintiff who remains the same. The result is that we allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the High Court and the Trial Court. We allow the amendment application and send back the case to the Trial Court. We direct that the Trial Court will now permit the defendant to file such further objections, if any, as the defendant may wish to file within 14 days of the receipt of the record by the Trial Court. It will then proceed to decide the case in accordance with law. Costs to abide the results of the litigation. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (1) TMI 166 - COLLECTOR, CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... in Form R.T. 12 and the gate passes regularly. It should have been possible for the Central Excise Officers below to verify the correctness or otherwise of the discount allowed before the verification of the prices. This point gains importance in view of the time-bar issue because the period for which the demand has been raised is from 1-10-1975 to 30-9-1976 and the Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice was issued on 30-3-1977. The payment of duty, if short levied at all, was thus made thorugh inadvertence or error on the part of the Central Excise Officers concerned, who did not verify the postion of disocunt before approval of the price lsits. Major part of the demand from 1-10-1975 to 29-3-1976 will, therefore, be time-barred. In view of the above position confirmation of part of demand under Rule 10A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 is not correct on facts and in law. 2. Considering the above discussions, I set aside the order of the Asstt. Collector and accept the appeal.
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1978 (1) TMI 165 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... it of Rupees one lakh. There is another view of the matter i.e. in so far as the assessments on clearances of a value up till Rs. two lakhs can be said to have been finalised only after this limit of Rs. two lakhs was reached and not earlier. The appellants submitted the refund claim on 5-4-1977, which was in time according to the above view of the matter. The second ground, on account of which the Assistant Collector has rejected the refund claim is that exemption provided for under Notification No. 97/70-CE, dated 1-5-1970 is restricted by the second proviso to Notification No. 14/76-CE, dated 23-1-1976. I observe that this is not valid reason because the appellants are not a new licencee and because hey did not hold a licence in Form L. 4 for less than 12 months immediately preceding the month in which they made the application for simplified procedure. 2. In the above view of the matter, I set aside the order of the Assistant Collector and sanction the refund claim.
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1978 (1) TMI 164 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... owever, at the time of personal hearing, the appellants submitted that the petition filed by them in the High Court has been withdrawn and requested that this appeal should not be treated as sub-judice and a decision may be taken. 2. I have considered the submissions made by the appellants in their appeal petition as well as at the time of personal hearing before me. I find that the process of cutting and polishing of rough diamonds cannot be included within the scope of the term “manufacture” as defined under Section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. There is no change either in character or the constitution of the diamonds after the process of cutting and polishing is carried out. These diamonds after cutting and polishing cannot, therefore, fall under the purview of Item 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. The order of the Assistant Collector is set aside and the appeal is allowed. Consequential relief if any shall be granted to the appellants.
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1978 (1) TMI 163 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n order is not to be passed mechanically. Admittedly no opportunity of showing cause against the proposal to extend the period of time was afforded to the petitioner. He was simply informed that the Collector was satisfied that there was sufficient cause and on that the period was extended. This action of the Collector in extending the period was illegal. 4. Under section 110(2) the period can be extended upto a maximum limit to six months only. That period of six months expired on 12th March, 1976. Now the Collector cannot, even if he wishes to adopt a proper procedure for extending the period to time, validly do so. The only alternative left to the Collector is now to return the seized goods to the petitioner. 5. In these circumstances the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 12th September, 1975 is quashed. The respondents are directed to forthwith return the seized goods to the petitioner. The petitioner will be entitled to the costs.
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1978 (1) TMI 162 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng the fund and, if their claim is established, they are given refund of the excess realizations under Sections 5 and 8 of the Act. It seems that the excess realization as defined by Section 2(b) of this act does not cover cases of excise duty only which may have been charged or kept by the producer or paid over to the Excise Department. But that is neither here nor there. That is a fund which is meant to reimburse the actual consumers the amount that they may have paid in addition to the lawful charges. If the amount now in question lying in deposit with the Excise Department is directed to be paid over by them to the Fund, the best possible means of achieving the result that the money may ultimately go to the consumers, can possibly be achieved. 11. The petition is accordingly allowed in part. The respondents are directed to forthwith pay the sum of ₹ 19,491.84 to the Controller Levy Sugar Price Equalization Fund. The parties may, however, bear their own costs.
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1978 (1) TMI 161 - SUPREME COURT
Whether public interest will or will not be served by a particular order to be passed under a valid law subject, as it always is, to judicial supervision - Held that:- Petitioner is not entitled to any of the fundamental rights enumerated-in Article 19 of the Constitution and that the Passport Act complies with the requirements of Art. 21 of the Constitution and is in accordance with the procedure established by law. I construe section 10(3)(c) as providing a right to the holder of the passport to be heard before the passport authority and that any order passed under section 10(3) is subject to a limited judicial scrutiny by the, High Court and the Supreme Court.
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1978 (1) TMI 160 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... irectly against the order of provisional assessment dated 21st November, 1972. The High Court refused to interfere with the decision of the taxing authorities at that stage. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while rejecting the writ petition, observed as under We also think that for the same reason we could not interfere under article 32 with the decision of the Commercial Tax Officer. Indeed, no fundamental right is shown to be affected by a mere determination of the question indicated above. There is no absence of jurisdiction of the taxing authorities who had the power to decide the question either rightly or wrongly. On a parity of reasoning, it can be safely said that no fundamental right of the petitioner is involved in this case and this writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of not availing the alternative remedy available to the petitioner under the statute. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.
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