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Showing 1 to 20 of 132 Records
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1978 (12) TMI 195 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e High Court at the time of admission, then a petition even by the party who has been unsuccessful before the Sessions Judge can be received, entertained and finally disposed of. The label given to the case is immaterial, it the satisfaction of the Court whether the case warrants the exercise of its power under S. 482 which is important. Therefore, such matters must be carefully scrutinised even at the admission stage. That is our answer to the first question. 16. Now that, we have answered both the questions referred to us, we direct these matters, which are In the S, R. stage. to be posted before the regular Court to decide whether they are fit cases to be entertained under S. 482 Cr , P. C. The Court will entertain them and issue notice to the other side and the public prosecutor only if it is prima facie satisfied that there has been abuse of the process of the court or that the High Court's interference is necessary in the interests of justice. 17. Order accordingly.
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1978 (12) TMI 194 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... out 10 days and it would not be in the fitness of things if they are sent to jail after a lapse of such a long time. It would suffice the ends of justice if, in addition to the sentence already undergone, sentence of fine is imposed on him. 13. All the four revision applications are dismissed subject to the modification that the revisionists' conviction under Section 135(b) of the Customs Act is maintained but their sentence is reduced to the period already undergone and to a fine of Rs. 500/- to each revisionist which the learned Counsel for the revisionists concedes will not amount to enhancement of sentence. In default of payment of fine each revisionist will undergo six months' R.I. Fine will be paid within two months from the date of receipt of the record by the trial court failing which the revisionists will surrender themselves in court or be taken into custody to serve out the alternative punishment. This judgment will also govern the other criminal revisions.
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1978 (12) TMI 193 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... upon the, Civil Court to refer the issue to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act and the civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide or deal with the same. That issue arises in the suit from which the present appeal arises and both the trial Court and the High Court were in error in clutching at a jurisdiction which did not vest in them and, therefore, on this ground alone this appeal will succeed. 21. Accordingly this appeal is allowed and the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit, affirmed by the High Court, is set aside and the suit is remanded to the trial Court to proceed further according to law in the light of the observations made in this judgment. Costs would abide the final outcome of the suit in the trial Court. 22. As the case is very old one, the trial Court and the competent authority to which a reference would be made pursuant to the direction in this judgment, should give top priority to the matter and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible.
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1978 (12) TMI 192 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as accepted by the appellant-firm and a binding agreement came into existence and what is more that a binding agreement was executed by the parties in the prescribed Form 'C'. Further the conduct on the part of the appellant-firm in referring the dispute to arbitration and filing an appeal against the arbitrator's award under the relevant Rules clearly shows that the parties, particularly the appellant-firm, treated the agreement dated May 4, 1955 as one under the Act and the U.P. Sugarcane and purchase Order, 1954. We are, therefore, of the view that the authorities below were right in coming to the conclusion that the said additional supply of two lac maunds of sugarcane by respondent No.4 to the appellant-firm was the supply of "bonded sugarcane" and, therefore, the appellant-firm was not entitled to the benefit of the Cane Commissioner's Notification dated June 1, 1955. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (12) TMI 191 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o be recovered. The Collector recorded an order (Ex. R-2) dated July 21, 1964, in which he clearly stated that he had gone through the case and that the Tehsildar should immediately recover the entire amount of the cess due from the appellant forthwith. He further directed that the "entire amount of the cane cess due from the B.S.I." should be recovered and monthly progress report sent to him. This shows that the Collector did apply his mind to the matter, and made an express order for the recovery of the total amount of the cess admitted by the appellant. It seems that the Naib-Tehsildar increased the amount beyond what had been admitted by the appellant and directed by the Collector, but the High Court rightly confined the recovery to ₹ 5,44,835.69 which was admitted by the appellant to be due from it on account of cess for the two seasons. There is thus no force in the argument of Mr. Desai to the contrary. 14. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 190 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... situation there is no getting out of the conclusion that the said offence must be regarded as one committed in relation to those proceedings. This requirement of clause (b) aforementioned is also therefore fully satisfied. 15. For the reasons stated, I hold that the complaint against Trivedi is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceeding in Court and that in taking cognizance of it the SDJM acted in contravention of the bar contained in the said clause (b), as there was no complaint in writing either of the SDJM or of a superior Court. In the result, therefore, I accept the appeal and, setting aside the order of the High Court, quash the proceedings taken by the SDJM against Trivedi. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the proceedings taken by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate against the appellant, Kamlapati Trivedi, are quashed. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (12) TMI 189 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... recision prescribed by the customer, it would not be commercially expedient for the manufacturer to carry out his manufacturing activity in the larger sense of the term as is explained by the Supreme Court in J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd.'s case 1965 16 STC 563 (SC). It is this test which is to be applied and unless the facts are gathered, placed and correlated so as to justify the conclusion that the activity of putting machinery in the crates so as to transport them to the site without disturbing their precision it would not be possible to answer the question which has been referred to us. In the circumstances, therefore, we decline to answer the question and leave it to the Tribunal to adjust its judgment accordingly under section 69(4) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, after applying the test in view of the evidence that may be placed by the rival parties. 5. The result is that we decline to answer the question referred to us with no order as to costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 188 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y come into operation. But in this case, as already pointed out, what is done is no more than reiterating the effect of section 6(1) of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Garg, the learned counsel, submitted that by amending procedure drastically and giving it retrospective effect a new offence may be created retrospectively. It was contended that by shifting the burden of proof as provided for in section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, a new offence is created. It is unnecessary for us to consider the larger question as to whether in certain circumstances giving retrospective effect to the procedure may amount to creation of an offence retrospectively. In the present case the old procedure is revived and no new procedure is given retrospective effect. The procedure given effect to is not of such a nature as to result in creation of a new offence. In the result all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant fail and these appeals are dismissed.
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1978 (12) TMI 187 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Adhiniyam, the State Government having by U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services Rules, 1966, constituted the Centralised Palika Services, the appellant Mohd. Rashid Ahmad, who was performing the duties and functions of the post of Executive Engineer under s. 577(ee), was entitled to be considered, if found suitable, for absorption under s.112A(2). Admittedly, the appellant was not heard in the matter of his final absorption. It is also not in dispute that the procedure laid down in the U.P. Palika (Centralised) Services Rules, 1966, was not followed. If the appellant was at all found fit for absorption, it was for the State Government next to decide the suitable post on which he could be absorbed. The method of recruitment provided by r. 20 had to be followed. Evidently, this has not been done. In view of the fore-going reasons, Civil Appeal No. 1724 of 1969 succeeds and is allowed, while Civil Appeal No. 1732 of 1971 fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e or novel improvement, nor did it involve any inventive step, having regard to what was publicly known or used at the date of the patent. The grant of the patent in question was therefore, invalid and was liable to be revoked on the grounds mentioned in Clauses (d) and (e) of Section 26(1) of the Act. Before parting with this judgment, we will like to dispose of another argument of Mr. Mehta. The argument is that since the Courts below have concurrently held that the invention had utility, the patent should be sustained. We are unable to accept this contention. As pointed out already, the crucial test of the validity of a patent is whether it in voices novelty and an 'inventive step' ? That test goes against the patentee. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the judgment of the Appellate Bench is set aside and that of the trial Court restored. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs throughout. M.R. Appeals allowed.
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1978 (12) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... from the date of vesting (i. e. July 1, 1952). 32. An application, dated March 14, 1969, (C.M.P. No. 1437 of 1969) has also been made in this Court by the appellant for taking additional grounds. This application has been stoutly opposed by Shri R.K. Garg, counsel for the respondent. It is submitted that this is not a pure question of law, but one depending on evidence. No extract from the revenue records to show that Bhumidhari rights were granted not to the idol or the Temple as a juristic person, but to the appellant personally. 33. It appears to us that this plea cannot be entertained at this belated stage. It is not even faintly adumbrated in the written statement of the defendant, nor was it agitated at any stage before the Courts below. It is not a pure question of law. We, therefore, decline to go into it. 34. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decree of the High Court and dismiss this appeal. In the circum stances of the case, we make no Order as to costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 184 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at they were invalid. Those provisions are not relevant for purposes of the present case, but I cannot help extracting the following note of caution struck by their Lordships,- what is done once, if it be allowed, may be done again and in a lesser crisis and less serious circumstances; and thus judicial power may be eroded. An attempt like the one made in the present Bill to usurp an important judicial power and vest it in the executive, is a serious inroad on the independence of the judiciary and is fraught with serious consequences. It has therefore necessarily to be put down at the very inception for it may otherwise give rise to a prospect too gruesome to envisage and too dangerous to be allowed to have the sanction of law. 176. My answer to the question referred by the President will therefore be that apart from the three defects pointed out by my Lord the Chief Justice, Clauses 5 and 7 of the Bill are constitutionally invalid, and I would report my opinion accordingly.
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1978 (12) TMI 183 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... hat necessitated the extension of the period of shipment in this case cannot be considered incompatible with bona fide commercial practice. The extension of the period of shipment, and that was the only amendment in the original terms of the Letter of Credit, necessitated as it was in an abnormal situation, cannot be taken as altering the contractual obligations of any fundamental manner. In these circumstances, the Board is of the view that it will be unreasonable to construe this as a case of fresh contract entered into after the issue of the Public Notice No. 78/77 or to beat the importation in question as not having been pursuant to the firm commitment to which was entered into prior to the issue of the said Public Notice. Board accordingly allows the appeal and directs that the ITC licence No. 2793665, dated 21-6-1977 produced by the appellants, if otherwise in order, be accepted to cover the import in question and the fine imposed on the appellants be remitted in full.
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1978 (12) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
Detention orders - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. If the detenu wanted any more particulars such as the name of the intelligence officer or other information, he could have well asked for the particulars before making his representation. That he never did. It was not as if any privilege had been claimed by the Government in respect of the intelligence reports. In fact, we find that the intelligence reports were produced before the learned Judges of the High Court at the hearing of the Writ Petition there. There was no complaint before us that the detenu or his Counsel wanted to peruse the reports and were denied the opportunity of doing so. We do not think that the detenu could be said to have been denied a reasonable opportunity of making a representation merely because particulars which he neyer desired in respect of a ground which was not vague were not furnished to him. We are unable to see any force in any of the submissions advanced on behalf of the detenu.
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1978 (12) TMI 181 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the explanation, reduction to the extent of one per cent of the sale price of the goods so despatched was required to be made from the amount of drawback, set-off or refund, as the case may be, due to the assessee. The Bombay High Court held that such reduction could be made only from the drawback, set-off or refund due to a dealer in respect of tax paid on the purchases of goods used in the manufacture of goods so despatched. The said decision, therefore, buttresses the view which we are inclined to take. In accordance with the aforesaid view, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) Not pressed. Question No. (2) Not pressed. Question No. (3) In the negative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. (4) In the negative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The State of Gujarat shall pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered accordingly. Here italicised.
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1978 (12) TMI 180 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d show that the assessing authority assessed the turnover relating to the sale of leather cases of radios at 3 per cent treating the same as general goods. This would clearly show that there was no suppression on the part of the assessee. Otherwise, it would not have been so evident to the Deputy Commissioner from the perusal of the assessment file. We have no hesitation to hold that the Tribunal erred in thinking that the assessee had suppressed the nature of the leather cases which he had sold. Consequently, the extended period of six years, which the Tribunal applied, was not available. The result is that the reopening of the assessment for the year 1971-72 was barred by limitation. This does not apply to the later year 1972-73. In the result, T.R.C. No. 80 of 1977 is allowed and T.R.C. No. 81 of 1977 is dismissed. Since the parties have succeeded and failed in one case each, we direct them to bear their own costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each case. Ordered accordingly.
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1978 (12) TMI 179 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ters are not machinery simpliciter, since we have held that they are not water supply fittings , they would come under the category of general goods . Once they are outside the ambit of item 102, it is immaterial both for the revenue as well as for the assessee whether water-meters are treated as machinery or as general goods, since both of them are liable to tax only at the rate of 4 per cent. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that water-meters do not come within the ambit of water supply fittings and, consequently, within the ambit of item 102 of the First Schedule. Whether they are machinery or general goods, tax only at the rate of 4 per cent is exigible on them. We, therefore, agree with the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and dismiss the tax revision case preferred by the revenue. Since we are told that there is no decided case of this Court on this aspect of the matter, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (12) TMI 178 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 26th November, 1970. Since the authorities themselves demanded and collected the amount in the manner aforesaid and since the relevant period had long ago expired, it appears to us to be positively unreasonable to insist on the petitioner to pay the amount of Rs. 1,18,467 once again and then immediately thereafter claim refund of the amount. As we have said, that is the true legal position. But, in view of the lapse of so much time and the fact that the departmental authorities themselves collected the amount in the manner in which it was paid in view of G.O. No. 1094, we direct that the amount of Rs. 1,18,467 be adjusted by the respondent towards the demand made for the Central sales tax due from the petitioner for the assessment year 1974-75. We also direct that this amount be adjusted accordingly and that they shall not collect any amount in this behalf. The writ petition is accordingly allowed, There will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1978 (12) TMI 177 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... considered the issue so plain and beyond challenge as to brush aside all arguments against its retrospectivity rather summarily. If retrospectivity beyond a decade was held in that case as free of any constitutional vice, I am unable to see how merely on the point of time it can be otherwise in the present case as well. Equally it may be recalled that in the Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills case 1979 43 S.T.C. 158. retrospectivity given to the definition of dealer for a period of nearly 18 years by the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, has been upheld. I do not think that any sea change would necessarily arise if the period of retrospectivity herein is a little longer than that in the earlier case. This contention also must meet the same fate as the earlier one. 9.. For the reasons aforesaid, I am unable to find any merit in this writ petition, which is hereby dismissed. Parties will, however, be left to bear their own costs. MITAL, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (12) TMI 176 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uting such an assessee for the commission of a criminal offence. Last of all, it was argued that the observations made by the Assessing Authority indicate that the assessee did not conceal anything in the quarterly returns filed by it and its only fault is that the figures mentioned in the returns were incorrectly totalled up. It is argued that for such, a minor lapse a penalty of Rs. 2,25,000 should not have been imposed on it. The contention raised is not wholly without substance but this is a matter which could more properly have been agitated before the appellate and the revisional authorities especially in view of the amendment of article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner may, if so advised, avail of the statutory remedies to seek redress of its grievance on this point. For the reasons mentioned above, I find no force in this petition which is hereby dismissed. C.W.P. Nos. 3211 and 3216 of 1977 also stand disposed of by this judgment. Petitions dismissed.
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