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Showing 1 to 20 of 98 Records
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1978 (5) TMI 131 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rivy Council, the declaration was that the removal of the Managing agents was ultra virus of the Articles and was Therefore invalid. However, in both cases the impugned removal had actually taken place. In the present case, that stage has not been reached and, Therefore, this matter is premature and the grant of injunction would not be right. (11) In my view, as stated above, the holding of a meeting is only the first stage in the matter and the result of such a meeting is quite different from restraining the removal of the Managing Director. If a meeting is held and action taken at that meeting to remove the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director, then only can it be said that the action is either wrongful or contrary to contract which would led to damages or it can be said that such action is ultra virus leading to the Court's decision that the removal is nonest. Before such removal actually takes place, there is no occasion for the grant of an interim injunction.
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1978 (5) TMI 130 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... horter. 5. It was then claimed by Mr. Nigam that no decree could have been passed against either of the defendants Nos. 2 and 3, but he was unable to justify the reasoning adopted by the trial court, namely, on the ground that there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendants Nos. 2 and 3. In Zawar Hasan v. Rakhaldas Banerji it has been held by a learned single Judge of this Court that the right to, recover damages for use and occupation does not arise out of anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act but it is a right under the general law for the recovery by the owner of damages from a person who has used the property. There is no question of any privity of contract in such a case. It is the own case of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 that they were in possession of the property. They have accordingly been rightly held to 'be liable to pay damages decreed by the lower appellate court. 6. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1978 (5) TMI 129 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l 103) (FB). The circumstances in which this Court refused to exercise discretion in that case were entirely different and the case cannot be a proper guide in the matter of exercise of discretion in the case of the present nature. In the circumstances of the present case I feel that refusal to exercise my discretion would not he a sound exercise of judicial discretion in view of the fact that the decree passed by the court below is a nullity and its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings as laid down by the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (AIR 1954 SC 340). 10. I accordingly allow the revision, set aside the decree of the courts below and direct that the record be sent to the court of Munsif. Moradabad, who shall re-register the suit at its original number and try it afresh in accordance with law. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout.
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1978 (5) TMI 128 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... uction of slag cement is a new business is not correct. It is a regular part of the activity of the assessee as a manufacturer of cement and, in fact, in the accounting year relevant for the assessment year 1967-68, the assessee had already produced 1,152 tones of slag cement. Thus, this was a business which was already in existence and the samples of the slag cement were sent to Germany only for testing. This was done in the ordinary course of the assessee’s existing business and the lower authorities were wrong in holding that the expenditure related to a part of the business which had not yet gone into production. After verifying the facts of the case we are satisfied that the submission made on behalf of the assessee in correct. Accordingly, we delete this disallowance of ₹ 1,314. 29. The other contentions raised in the grounds of appeal were not pressed before us, at the time of hearing of the appeal. 30. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed, as above.
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1978 (5) TMI 127 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , that does not mean that the Court's discretion to condone delay in filing an appeal is inconsistent either with the nature of right or the scheme of the special law, so that applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is 'necessarily excluded.' It only means that the Court has to keep this end in view while exercising its power. We are unable to hold that the express exclusion contemplated by Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, has been made in this manner. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to appeals filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is not excluded since there is no such exclusion as contemplated by Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the question whether delay in filing such an appeal should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is one of fact in each case, to be decided on the facts and in the circumstances thereof.
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1978 (5) TMI 126 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ther. Old texts, one of the principal sources of Hindu law and the commentaries thereon, and over a century the Courts with very few exceptions have recognised hereditary office of Shebait as immovable property, and it has all along been treated as immovable property almost uniformly. While examining the nature and character of an office as envisaged by Hindu law it would be correct to accept and designate it in the same manner as has been done by the Hindu law text writers and accepted by courts over a long period. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the hereditary office of Shebait which would be enjoyed by the person by turn would be immovable property. The gift of such immovable property must of course be by registered instrument. Exhibit 1 being not registered, the High Court was justified in excluding it from evidence. On this conclusion the plaintiff's suit has been rightly dismissed. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (5) TMI 125 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... S.C.R. 755, Workmen of Messrs Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. v.Management & Ors. (1973) 3 S.C.R. 587 and Cooper Engineering Limited v. Shri P. P. Mundhe (1976) 1 S.C.R. 361. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and, uphold the impugned action of the appellant's management. In view of the Court's order dated September 19, 1977, the appellant shall pay costs quantified at ₹ 1.500/- (One thousand and five hundred) to respondent No. 2. This Judgment should not, however, stand in the way of respondent No. 2 being paid ₹ 15,000/- by the appellant which, in view of 1008 former's unfortunate position, the appellant's learned counsel was good enough on our suggestion to agree to pay her as an ex-gratia payment. This amount of ₹ 15,0001- shall be in addition to the amount of ₹ 1,500- which the appellant is required to pay to respondent No. 2 by way of costs.
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1978 (5) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oss of ₹ 7,000/- caused to the Respondent, by the act of K. D. Shukla, while the latter was acting as an agent of the plaintiff and not within the scope of his employment with the Bank. Nor could the fact that false and fictitious entries to cover up his fraud, were made by K. D. Shukla in the Pass Book of the respondent and in the Ledger Account of Bhagwati Prasad & Sons, make the embezzlement committed by Shukla an act committed in the course of his employment with the Bank. The findings of the High Court with regard to the remaining, items are not seriously disputed before us. In view of all that has been said above, we allow the defendant's appeal and dismiss the plaintiff's claim with regard to ₹ 11,000/(consisting of the items of ₹ 4000/- plus ₹ 7000/-) and interest thereon. The decretal amount granted by the High Court shall stand reduced by ₹ 11,000/-, and interest thereon. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (5) TMI 123 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... challenged as it was not clear under which provision fresh leases were granted to others. It was held by the Supreme Court "Hence at the very threshold, the power of the Collector to proceed under the Act is challenged. It is true that the Act does not give power to the Collector to adjudicate on questions of right and title where these properly and really arise. Nevertheless, the Collector when proceeding to take steps under the Act must determine the source and extent of his power and jurisdiction where these are questioned, so as to decide whether the Act relied upon by a party before him could be applied at all." (8) The result is that this petition is allowed. The order of the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge are quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to its cost. It shall be however, open to the prescribed authority to take proceedings in respect of land in dispute after proper inquiry and service of statement in G.I.H. Form 3 on the petitioner.
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1978 (5) TMI 122 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... isions reported in Concrete Spun Pipe Works v. Sales Tax Officer, Sector 5 Kanpur and Laximi Narain Gauri Shanker and another v. State of U. P. and another reported in 24 S. T. C. 48 and 77. It is not necessary to deal with this decision in detail. As a Division Bench of this court in Narain Chemical Industries v. Sales Tax Officer Moradabad, 1970-U. P. T. C. 605, distinguished these decisions and applying the principle laid down by the Supreme Court held that mistake in applying the correct rate of tax by the Assessing Authority at the time of assessment could be rectified under section 22 of the Act. We respectfully agree with the ratio of this decision. 3. In the circumstances we answer the first question referred to us in affirmative against the assessee and in favour of the Department. Our answer to the second question is that the pumping set sold by the assessee were liable to tax as machinery. 4. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1978 (5) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which, bears almost identical resemblance to the relevant statutory provisions in the cases mentioned above, would perhaps attract a similar conclusion in regard to its construction. At the lowest, there is good ground for saying that a contention that a marriage solemnised in violation of the main', provision of Section 15 is a nullity cannot be summarily rejected. The question which arises before us in this case does not directly involve the construction of the main provision of Section 15 and, therefore, I refrain from expressing any opinion on the validity of such a marriage. The appeals are allowed, the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Special Appeals Nos. 374 to 379 of 1967 as well as of the learned single Judge in Writ Petitions Nos. 4083 to 4088 of 1966 are set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant in this Court in one set. S. R. Appeals allowed.
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1978 (5) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e workmen was justified or not justified. We would, however, like to observe that it may be open to the workmen to raise an industrial dispute demanding half day's extra wages on account of their being asked to work on Sundays on the basis of the Roster off system. Even though the system may not be unjustified, yet it may be possible for the workmen to press and justify their demand of extra half day's wages. Giving them one day's full wages when, per chance, they are asked to work on their off day may not be a compensation fit to be equated with the said demand. This is not a matter on which we are called upon to express any opinion as to whether such a demand would be justified or not or whether it should be acceeded to. But what we want to emphasize here is that the relief granted by the Tribunal was beyond the scope of the reference. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss this appeal but in the circumstances make no order as to costs. S.R. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (5) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ancellation of respondent's bail to that period. We hope and trust that no unfair advantage will be taken of our order by stalling the proceedings or, by asking for a stay on some pretext or the other. If that is done, the arms of law shall be long enough. Out of abundant caution, we reserve liberty to the State to apply to the High Court, if necessary, but only if strictly necessary. We are hopeful that the State too will take our order in its true spirit. In the result, we allow the appeal partly, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated April 1 1, cancel the respondents bail for a period of one month from to-day and direct that he be. taken into custody. Respondent will, in the normal course, be entitled to be released on fresh bail on the expiry of the aforesaid period. The learned Sessions Judge will be at liberty to fix the amount and conditions of bail. The order of anticipatory bail will stand modified to the extent indicated herein. Appeal allowed in part.
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1978 (5) TMI 118 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not effective or adequate to redress the injury complained of in the negative. 14. The Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mill's case AIR 1977 SC 2086 affirmed the High Court's decision that there was no error apparent on the face of the record as question whether tyre cord fabric could be described as a fabric or merely cord pretending to pass off as a textile fabric was a technical question of which two views could be possible and it required careful consideration of the technical process of manufacturing. As indicated by us there is no dispute on facts. We have proceeded on the facts found by the sales tax authorities. The decision thus in Delhi Cloth and General Mill's case AIR 1977 SC 2086 is not helpful. 15. The result is that this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Sales Tax Officer is quashed. The notices for assessment years 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77 are also quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to one set of costs.
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1978 (5) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
Detenu release orders - Held that:- Appeal allowed. Questions whether the confessional statements recorded on December 13 and 14, 1977 were voluntary statements or were statements which were obtained from the detenu under duress or whether the subsequent retraction of those statements by the detenu on December 22, 1977 was in the nature of an after thought, were primarily for the detaining authority to consider before deciding to issue the impugned detention order but since admittedly the aforesaid vital facts which would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other were neither placed before nor considered by the detaining authority it must be held that there was non application of mind to the most material and vital facts vitiating the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority thereby rendering the impugned detention order invalid and illegal. For these reasons we set aside the impugned detention order.
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1978 (5) TMI 116 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... spect of retail sales. From the statement of the case it appears that the practice adopted by the assessee was that in respect of very petty sales he did not issue separate cash memos, but at the end of the day passed a consolidated cash memo for all the petty sales. From this no adverse inference against the veracity of the accounts maintained by the assessee could be drawn. Apparently the assessee adopted this procedure in order to tally the sales of the whole day with his books of account. The passing of a consolidated cash memo for all the petty sales of the day could not help the assessee in avoiding there petty sales from tax. We are hence satisfied that rejection of the account books of the assessee was based on no reasonable ground. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to his costs which are assessed at Rs. 200 one set. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (5) TMI 115 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n decided to share the bonanza with its own suppliers. On the facts, it is clear that the sale consideration receivable by the assessee from the corporation did not either in fact or in law appreciate in value so that it can be said that this amount constituted part of the sale consideration. It is well-settled that a receipt in the course of business will not necessarily or automatically be a receipt arising from business. The receipt of the amount in question may be said to be a receipt in the course of business of the assessee but it will not be arising from business in the sense of falling within the purview of the definition of the term turnover . In other words, since it was not part of the sale consideration, it could not be liable to sales tax. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (5) TMI 114 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the assessee had purchased the goods on behalf of the ex-U.P. principals and despatched them to Jaipur. Vegetable oil is taxable either at the point of manufacture or at the point of import under Notification No. ST-3391/X-1012-1962 dated 1st July, 1962. There is no evidence on record to show that tax was paid in respect of the vegetable oil sold by the assessee at the point of manufacture. There is also no evidence on record that Messrs. Mool Chand Raghubir Saran, from whom the assessee had purchased the goods for ex-U.P. principals, had paid tax on this commodity. This being so, as the assessee sold the goods after importing the goods from Jaipur, the impugned turnover was liable to tax in the hands of the assessee as an importer. In view of these conclusions, we answer the question in the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1978 (5) TMI 113 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nature to that of a thali. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that they do fall within the purview of the entry bartan as used in the aforesaid notification. Tin calendars have nothing to do with bartan. Tin calendars are completely different than utensils. They are neither used nor are capable of being used as such. They are articles of presentation or used for knowing the dates, etc. They are outside the purview of the word wares . We are also not satisfied that the tin signboards in question can possibly answer the description of bartan. They too are outside the purview of the word wares . We, therefore, answer the question by holding that tin trays are wares within the meaning of Notification No. ST-2104/X-902(16)-52 dated 21st May, 1963, while tin calendars are not. We are also of the opinion that tin signboards also do not fall within the purview of the entry wares . In view of the divided success, the parties shall bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1978 (5) TMI 112 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . What was observed by the Supreme Court was that the term accessories was used in the schedule to describe goods which may have been manufactured for use as an aid or addition. A sense in which the word accessory is used was given in Webster s New International Dictionary. This was relied on by the court. It was pointed out that accessories are not necessarily confined to particular machines for which they serve as aids. Even with this ruling of the Supreme Court, at the utmost we may be able to hold that stay-wires can be regarded as accessories . But we still are unable to hold that they are accessories to electrical goods , as we cannot regard the electric posts as such. 6. In view of the facts noticed, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Tribunal does not disclose any error of law or any omission to consider and decide any question of law. We affirm the judgment of the Tribunal and dismiss the tax revision cases with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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