|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 187 Records
-
1978 (8) TMI 245 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he person who has suffered injury. 11. In awarding compensation as cautioned by this Court in a decision reported in Palaniappa Gounder v. State of Tamil Nudu 1977CriLJ992 , the Court should not first consider what compensation ought to be awarded to the heirs of the deceased and then impose a fine which is higher than the compensation. It is the duty of the Court to take into account the nature of the crime, the injury suffered, the justness of the claim for compensation, the capacity of the accused to pay and order relevant circumstances in fixing the amount of fine or compensation. After consideration of all the facts of the case, we feel that in addition to the sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment, a fine of ₹ 3,500/- on each of the accused under Section 304(1) I.P.C. should be imposed. The fine will be paid as compensation to the widow of the deceased, Mewa Singh. In default of payment of fine, the accused will undergo further simple imprisonment for 6 months.
-
1978 (8) TMI 244 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... oked up story against them is taken care of (as held in Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India( 1978 2 S.C.R 861) to Which one of us Jaswant Singh, J.) was party by section 27 of the Cod of Crl. Procedure 1973 under which it is open to the Court of Session on committal o the case to it t(j discharge the accused if upon consideration of the record of the case and documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the parties it considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The respondents would therefore be at liberty to invoke the provisions of section 227 of the Code on the case being, committed to the Court of Session. As the learned counsel appearing for the respondents has given an undertaking that he will cause the attendance of the respondents before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Balangir, on September 18, 1978, the non-bailable warrants issued against the respondents shall not be executed till that date. S.R. Appeal allowed
-
1978 (8) TMI 243 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in the company of the deceased in the house of P.W. 1 as there is no evidence to that effect. Equally unsustainable is the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the evidence of the ballistic expert has established that the cartridge, Ex. 9, was fired from Ex. 8 and that the pistol belonged to the Appellant, Modan Singh. The High Court has also failed to consider the fact that the Appellant, Modan Singh, as well as the acquitted accused were both armed with pistols and it cannot, with certainty be said that the Appellant fired the pistol. We are satisfied on the perusal of the records that there is hardly any evidence to hold that the accused and the deceased were alone last seen left (together) on the night of the occurrence or that the cartridge was fired from the pistol by the Appellant. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the Appellant by the High Court and confirm the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court.
-
1978 (8) TMI 242 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... fused. 9. With regard to the question whether a dispute of this type, i.e., non-payment of price of goods is a referable dispute, the judgment of Shah, J. as he then was in the Supreme Court in the case just cited above is very Plain and states that the non-payment of price is not a dispute under or arising out of a contract. As I have said a dispute or difference requires the statement of a proposition and a denial thereof by the other side. As the existence of such a dispute or difference is not alleged or proved or even pointed out from any documentary material or contemporary dealings between the parties, I come to the conclusion that this suit cannot be stayed and I accordingly reject the application for stay with costs. 10. The Suit No. 655/76 may now be listed before the Deputy Registrar for receiving the written statement. Time for filing the same is extended to 15th September, 1978 which is also the date on which the matter will be listed. 11. Application dismissed.
-
1978 (8) TMI 241 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... P.C. and sentence him to undergo life imprisonment for these offences. The respondent Boota Singh is also convicted under section 364 read with section 34 and section 120-B I.P.C. and Section 394 read with section 31 and section 120-B I.P.C. and sentence him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years under each count. Boota Singh is also convicted under section 419 I.P.C. 471 read with section 465 I.P.C. and section 471 read with section 466 I.P.C. and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years, one year and four years respectively. All the sentences are to run concurrently. The respondent Boota Singh who is on bail shall surrender and serve out the remaining portion of the sentence. The appeal against Trilok Singh abates as he is dead. The appeal against Asa Singh will be taken on later after he surrenders. The appeal against Raghubir Singh is dismissed and the order of the High Court acquitting him is confirmed. Appeal allowed against respondent No.1
-
1978 (8) TMI 240 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... re the expiry of the 30 days, the appropriate Government has been given the power to declare in certain cases that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of 30 days. This declaration of course has to be made before the expiry of 30 days. In other words, the enforceability of the award may be postponed beyond thirty days under certain circumstances by the appropriate Government - No award, therefore, is enforceable before the expiry of 30 days and, therefore, no obligation is to be discharged before the expiry of the said period. There is no obligation at all on the employer to implement the award before the expiry of the 30 days from its publication and if he does not implement the award, it cannot be said that he has committed an offence under S. 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In my opinion, therefore, no offence could be committed by an employer within 30 days after the publication of the award if he does not implement within that time.
-
1978 (8) TMI 239 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... to prove any errors or infirmities in the physical determination of the contribution. Such a hearing, in tune with the ruling, of this Court in the Central Press case (1977) ILLJ 479 SC is fair and so we order that the assessment shall be reconsidered in the light of a de novo hearing to the appellants and the quantum of contribution affirmed or modified by fresh orders. 23. Before we formally wind up we think it apt to make a critical remark on the cumbersome definition in Section 2(9) of the Act which has promoted considerable argument. This reminds us of the well-known dictum of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen "that in drafting it is not enough to gain a degree of precision which a person reading in good faith can understand, but it is necessary to attain if possible to a degree of precision which a person reading in bad faith cannot misunderstand." Lux Gentium Lex-Then and Now 1799-1974 p. 7 24. Subject to this direction we dismiss the appeals with costs (one set).
-
1978 (8) TMI 238 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... dient to try the issue regarding bar under Section 66 (1) of the Code along with other issues and the suit is also likely to be disposed of within a short period. It appears from the facts placed before me at the time of argument that for deciding either the point whether the suit is barred under Section 66 (1) of the Code or the point whether the plaintiff's are entitled to claim partition as prayed more or less the very same facts and circumstances have to be considered according to the averments in the pleadings and it may be more convenient to decide both these points together. At any rate, however, I am not satisfied that in refusing to decide the issue regarding bar under Section 66 (1) of the Code as a preliminary issue the Court below has committed any error of jurisdiction which may justify interference of this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The application is, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances, there will be no order, as to costs.
-
1978 (8) TMI 237 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t and the High Court was right. The appeal is dismissed with costs. 8. Section 70 says that the State shall levy fine within six years from the date of the sentence. To levy is to realise or to collect. It is clear that what is meant is that within 6 years the State must commence proceedings for realisation, not complete it. It is beyond the State's power to complete the realisation proceedings, but it is within its power to initiate such proceedings. What is contemplated is that the State shall commence recovery proceedings. Once such steps are taken, the plea of limitation is out of bounds for the sentence. Section 70 has to be read in a common sense way and, therefore, when the provision speaks of levying fine it postulates that the fine is leviable other wise. If, however, on account of an order of a higher court, the fine has ceased to be leviable, thanks to the suspension of the levy of the fine. The period of limitation does not start to run under Section 70, IPC.
-
1978 (8) TMI 236 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 4) was due towards the hire-money from the debtor as on 7-8-1968 and that the amount of incidental charges remaining payable to the company's on 25-6-76 was ₹ 2,056.57. The company is, Therefore, entitled to recover from the respondents the sum of ₹ 9.5007- by way of hire-money interest thereon at 12 per cent per annum from 7-8-1968 to the date of application (which works out to ₹ 8,550.00 ), the sum of ₹ 2.056.57 due towards incidental charges and interest thereon amounting to ₹ 1.742.50 as stated in the petition. In all therefore. the applicant is entitled to recover from the respondents the sum of ₹ 21.850.00. (14) The last issue is regarding the relief to which the applicant is entitled. In view of my above discussion, I pass a claim order in favor of the applicant jointly and severally against the three respondents for the recovery of a sum of ₹ 21,850.00. (15) There will, however, be no order as to costs in the application.
-
1978 (8) TMI 235 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ding so that on return thence they turn a new leaf retaining the flavour of their self-sacrificing spirit to change 'the sorry scheme of things entire' but without blood-letting barbarities and boomeranging terrorism. Recreational opportunities and other factors which will improve, rather than injure must be brought into play when dealing with these prisoners. These observations in the direction of prison reforms are relevant for the whole jail system, still of Raj vintage, because conditions there leave much to be desired in the matter of humanism and correctionalism. We are aware that there is a hopeful awakening on the part of the Government at the Central and State levels towards hospitalisation effect as against 'zoological' impact. If our observations did catalyse this trend it were good. After all, the Constitutional culture of our country imposes this obligation, as we have briefly indicated. Prison justice is part of social justice. Appeal dismissed.
-
1978 (8) TMI 234 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nnings, and to inhibit the process of making Indians aliens in their own homeland. Swaraj is made of united stuff. We mandate the magistrate to release the petitioner on his own bond in a sum of ₹ 1,000/-. An After word We leave it to Parliament to consider whether in our socialist republic, with social justice as its hallmark, monetary superstition, not other relevant considerations like family ties, roots in the community, membership of stable organizations, should prevail for bail bonds to ensure that the 'bailee' does not flee justice. The best guarantee of presence in court is the reach of the law, not the money tag. A parting thought. If the indigents are not to be betrayed by the law including bail law re-writing of many processual laws is in urgent desideratum; and the judiciary will do well to remember that the geo-legal frontiers of the Central Codes cannot be disfigured by cartographic dissection in the name of language of province. Petition allowed.
-
1978 (8) TMI 233 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... get it delivered to the sentence and obtain written acknowledgment thereof from him. 3. Where the prisoner seeks to file an appeal or revision, every facility for exercise of that right shall be made available by the Jail Administration. 4. Where the prisoner is disabled from engaging a lawyer, on reasonable grounds such as indigence or incommunicado situation, the Court shall, if the circumstances of the case, the gravity of the sentence, and the ends of justice so requires assign competent counsel of for the prisoner's defence, provided the party does not object to that lawyer 5. The State which prosecuted the prisoner and set in motion the process which deprived him of his liberty shall pay to assigned counsel such sum s the court may equitably fix. 6. These benign prescriptions operate by force of Art. 21 strengthened by Art. 19(1)(d) read with sub-article (5) from the lowest to the highest court where deprivation of life and personal liberty is in substantial peril.
-
1978 (8) TMI 232 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... ued. After all access to justice is the basis of the legal system. In that view, where there is a doubt reasonable, of course, the benefit must go to him who says that the lesser court fee alone be paid. In this particular case there is hardly any difficulty in holding that the plaintiff in para. 14 of the plaint has clearly alleged that she is in joint possession and is seeking partition and separate possession of her half-share in the suit properties as heir or deceased Paramayee. Obviously, the court-fee that is payable is as she has claimed, namely under S. 37 (2) which corresponds to Art. 17 (B) of the Central Act, which is the predecessor legislation on the subject. We allow the appeal and send the case back to the trial Court and direct that court to proceed with the suit expeditiously. We make it clear that our decision on the question of court-fee does not have any implications on the merits, including the validity or otherwise of the Will. No costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1978 (8) TMI 231 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... and the film "New Delhi" do not make out a case infringement. The dissimilarities, in their opinion, are so material that it is not possible to say that the appellant's copyright has been infringed. This court is extremely reluctant to interfere with concurrent findings of fact reached by the courts below and for that reason I would allow the judgment under appeal to stand. In another, and perhaps a clearer case, it may be necessary for this court to interfere and remove the impression which may have gained ground that the copyright belonging to an author can be readily infringed by making immaterial changes, introducing insubstantial differences and enlarging the scope of the original theme so that a veil of apparent dissimilarity is thrown around the work now produced. The court will look strictly at not only blatant examples of copying but also at reprehensible attempts at colourable imitation. 67. The appeal is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
-
1978 (8) TMI 230 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ce 21. From the statement of Kapoora which is corroborated by documents (Exhs. Ka-2 and Ka-3) it is proved that for quite some time before the occurrence, the appellant who was a widower had been making amorous overtures to Kapoora and attempted several times to seduce her and to have sexual intercourse with her during the absence of the deceased from his house. 22. The above-mentioned pieces of circumstantial evidence leave no room for doubt in our mind that the appellant intentionally caused the death of the deceased in a brutal manner so that he should be free to make Kapoora yield to his sinister designs. Accordingly we see no ground to interfere with the conclusions arrived at, by the courts below regarding the guilt of the appellant. Keeping in view the manner in which and the motive with which the ghastly crime was committed, we are of opinion that the death penalty awarded to the appellant is well deserved. 23. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
-
1978 (8) TMI 229 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... it should bear a fixed court fee in the sum of 65 paise. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the application should bear ad valorem court fee. When dealing with a question of court fee, the perspective should be informed by the spirit of the magna carta and of equal access to justice which suggests that a heavy price tag on relief in Court should be regarded as unpalatable. In this view of the matter this appeal is allowed and the order made by the High Court as well as the orders made by the various District Judges except the District Judge, Broach, are set aside. On the question of costs, we looked at the specimen applications filed by the Corporation disclosing a clear lack of wisdom on the part of the Corporation in asking for a decree for certain amount which could not be granted under s. 31 (1). Therefore, there was a misconception on either side and the proper order should be that the parties shall bear their own costs. S.R. Appeal allowed.
-
1978 (8) TMI 228 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s are accordingly disposed of in the light of the observations made in the judgment. We share the concern and anxiety of our learned Brother Krishna Iyer, J. for reorientation of the outlook towards prisoners and the need to take early and effective steps for prison reforms. Jail Manuals are largely a hangover of the past, still retailing anachronistic provisions like whipping and the ban on the use of the Gandhi cap. Barbaric treatment of a prisoner from the point of view of his rehablitation and acceptance and retention in the mainstream of social life, becomes counterproductive in the long run. Justice Krishna Iyer has delivered an elaborate judgement which deals with the important issues raised before us at great length and with great care and concern. We have given a separate opinion, not because we differ with him on fundamentals, but because we thought it necessary to express our views on certain aspects of the questions canvassed before us. N.V.K Petitions dismissed.
-
1978 (8) TMI 227 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he Certifying officer under Sec. 5 o the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act. In regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor or in respect o which n regulations have been made by the Board, the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act shall continue to apply. In the present case the regulation made by the Board with regard to age o superannuation having been duly notified by the Government, the regulation shall have effect notwithstanding the fact hat it is a matter which could be the subject matter s) Standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act. The respondents were therefore, properly retired when they attained the age of is years. the appeal is, therefore, allowed. The Writ Petition field in the Light Court is dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the respondents as directed by this Court on 28-9- 1977. The costs are quantified at ₹ 3,500/-.. Appeal allowed.
-
1978 (8) TMI 226 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... or instance as, suits, appeals, revisions, review, proceedings in execution of a decree, etc. (See for instance Section 108 (3) which we have already quoted). We think in the circumstances that the pendency of the proceedings must be judged with special reference to the proceedings in relation to which the applicability of Section 125 arises. As the question here arises in execution proceedings, the point for consideration is, whether the execution proceedings were pending on the date of the commencement of the Act 35 of 1969. Admittedly they were not, as the execution petition E. P. 143 of 1971 was filed only on 10-8-1971 and delivery was taken on 18-8-1971. 10. It follows therefore that the proviso to Section 125 (1) is not attracted and that the lower appellate court was correct in directing a remand and an investigation in the light of the provisions of Section 125 of the Act. We see no ground to interfere with the judgment under appeal. We dismiss the appeal with costs.
........
|
