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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 153 Records
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1978 (9) TMI 201 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... acquire the character of Government money and the Government could not claim any right, title and interest therein. No reason has been given by the disciplinary authority in accordance with the provisions contained in rule 10(12) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971 as to the higher punishment sought to be inflicted on the petitioner. The fact that the witness who was examined by the respondents without informing the petitioner and without affording the petitioner any opportunity to cross-examine him vitiated the enquiry proceeding. The disciplinary authority proceeded with a biased mind as will be evident from the second show cause notice and in fact the petitioner was not given any opportunity to challenge the findings of the enquiring authority. The second show cause notice also is, therefore, bad and cannot be sustained. For all the above reasons the petitioner succeeds. The rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (9) TMI 200 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... words "the performance of any services" in the relevant provision of law it can no more he said that all contracts for the performance of any services undertaken by tin Government still come within the mischief of Section 9-A The language of Section 9-A is clear and this Court cannot construe the section in a different manner by straining the same. The remedy to set right incongruity, it any, lies with the Legislature. 20. For the aforesaid reasons the contracts entered into by the 1st respondent with the State Government to sell toddy and arrack do not come within the mischief of Section 9-A as they are neither to, supply of goods to the Government nor for the execution of any works undertaken by the Government, and consequently the 1st respondent does not suffer from any disqualification for being chosen as a Member of the Legislative Assembly- 21. In the result, the election petition is dismissed with costs. Advocates fee ₹ 10000/-. 22. Petition dismissed.
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1978 (9) TMI 199 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es so, he must follow the procedure laid down for warrant cases and he cannot, whilst proceeding with the two cases together, treat them separately. If he wishes to do that, he must deal with them separately from the inception." 9. In view of these authorities, it would seem to me that once the learned trial Magistrate had started this case as a warrant case, it was not correct for him on 6-9-1975 to dismiss the case for want of prosecution merely because the complainant and his advocate were absent. The said order passed by the learned Magistrate is not a legal order and will have to be set aside. 10. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The order passed by the trial Magistrate on 6-9-1975 dismissing the complaint for want of prosecution is set aside and the case is sent back to the trial Court for hearing from the stage at which it was dismissed and for disposing it of according to law. The parties shall appear before the learned trial Magistrate on 9th October 1978.
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1978 (9) TMI 198 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... der under appeal, directing the Magistrate to take de novo proceedings against the accused was not barred by the provisions of Section 403, (of the Code of 1898), the earlier proceedings taken by the Magistrate being no trial at all and the order passed therein being neither a valid "discharge" of the accused nor their acquittal as contemplated by Section 405(1). The Magistrate's order (to use the words of Mudholkar J. in Mohd. Safi v. State of West Bengal 1966CriLJ75 was merely "an order putting a stop to these proceedings" since the proceedings, ended with that order. The other contentions of the appellant, have been stated only to be rejected. 35. For all the reasons aforesaid, we have no hesitation in upholding the High Court's order under appeal, and in dismissing the appeal. 36. Since the case is very old, the Magistrate shall proceed with the case with utmost despatch, if feasible, by holding day to day hearings within six months from today.
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1978 (9) TMI 197 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d is not shown to be tainted with illegality or immorality or avyavaharik. Therefore, the suit property was liable to be sold at court auction for two reasons, one that the debt was joint family debt for the benefit of the joint family estate and, therefore, all segments of the joint family property were liable for the discharge of the debt, and secondly, under the doctrine of pious obligation of the sons to pay the father's debt. In the present proceedings no attempt was made to establish that the debt was tainted with illegality or immorality. Therefore, the sale is valid and the purchaser acquired a full and complete title to the property. The sale is not void. Part of the property is acquired and the compensation is taken by the plaintiffs subject to the orders of the Court. Accordingly, both these appeals are allowed and the plaintiffs' suit is dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case, with no order as to costs throughout. N.V.K. Appeals allowed.
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1978 (9) TMI 196 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lengthy judicial process may, as here, be obviated if, by a tripartite arrangement an agreement within the scope of s. 34 of the Bonus Act is reached. The ruling of this court in State of U.P. & Anr. v. Basti Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (Supra) supports the synthesis we have evolved. The only difference is that there is now Mo reference of a bonus dispute under S. 3 (e) of the U.P. Act. Instead, the same dispute will-where no agreement or settlement stands in the way, as it does here-on application, be referred for adjudication under the Bonus Act read with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The analysis shows the absence of basic inconsistency and presence f intelligent method in the U.P. and the Central provisions. We hold. after this long tour, that the goal of social justice and public peace, essential to good Government is best reached by reading together and not apart. The High Court's order is upheld and the appeal dismissed, of course, with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (9) TMI 195 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... in cash instead of in bonds. Having regard to the eighteen year period which has elapsed since the date of taking over of the Company this would have the effect on the Company losing even the interest of 3% per annum for this period. When this was pointed out to Shri Sen he agreed that if we considered that Section 9(2) was severable from the rest of the Act he would not ask us to strike down Section 9(2) as ultra vires. We will leave it at that. We should not however be understood as having decided that Section 9(2) offends Article 31(2) of the Constitution. Shri Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the State of West Bengal, argued that the earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution operated as res judicata. In the view that we have taken on the main question it is unnecessary to consider this argument except to say that there does not appear to be any substance in it. In the result the Writ Petition is dismissed with costs.
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1978 (9) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... saddle the condition that till the loss is totally wiped out the Managing Director and the Directors shall not charge any fee for the services rendered as Director, no dividend shall be paid to equity shareholders, and the Managing Director shall not be paid any overriding commission, if there be any, on the turnover of the company since this will account for the pragmatic approach of common sacrifice in the interest of the industry. We indicate the implications of Article 43A in this area of law but do not impose it here for want of fuller facts. 19. The Award shall stand accordingly modified to the effect that the retrenched workmen who are now reinstated shall be paid 75% of the back wages after deducting the amount paid to them as wages when recalled for work since the date of retrenchment and adjustment of the retrenchment compensation towards the amount found due and payable. The appellant shall pay the costs of the respondents as directed while granting special leave.
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1978 (9) TMI 193 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ble for us to assume that she would not be able to lead any evidence in support of these allegations. It is no doubt true that in a criminal case the burden of proving the charge rests on the complainant and an accused person is entitled to have the benefit of doubt, but these principles are quite well known and we have no doubt in our minds that the learned trial Magistrate will keep them in view while trying the complaint. In the circumstances, we find no force in the petition and dismiss the same. 15. Before parting with the case, we might observe that in view of the status of the parties we tried our best to bring about a compromise between them but failed. Even then we do hope that on some future date this ugly litigation will come to an end and the two spouses would once again decide to live together. Impelled by that hope we direct that the learned trial Magistrate shall grant the petitioners exemption from appearing in person in Court as long as it is felt necessary.
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1978 (9) TMI 192 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e to a band, and to a substantial extent also pays it because he desires to see that is a good and elaborate and expensively produced show." The facts of the case in the London Casino's case (supra) is similar to the facts of our case. In the case before us, a minimum is fixed and we have no doubt, a part of which is a payment for admission to the entertainment. Other decisions referred to were Attorney General v. Mcleod 1918 1 K.B. 13, Attorney General v. Swam 1922 1 K.B. 682, Attorney General Arts Theatre of London Ltd. 1933 1 B. 439 and Attorney General v. Southport Corporation 1933 All E.R. 971. We feel it is unnecessary to burden our judgment with the various decisions referred to in detail by the High Court for they are not applicable as the Act with which we are dealing is wider in its scope and application. In the circumstances we confirm the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court and its direction regarding levy of the tax and dismiss the appeal.
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1978 (9) TMI 191 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to the wall, on a cavalier no' to his application for renewal. Fair consideration of his claim has been denied to the appellant; his huge investment has gone to waste because of non-renewal. We see no relevant ground justifying the order; there is breach of natural justice; there is importation of non- materials; there is unawareness of the fact that a fundamental right is involved and that a costly coach is condemned to non-use. The basic reason for quashing the order of refusal is the untenable reason assigned to support the order. We allow the appeal, set aside the refusal of renewal and having regard to the 'long delay and absence of disqualifications direct the State Transport Authority to reconsider the grant or renewal within two weeks of receipt of this order. We repeat for emphasis that ordinarily this Court is loath to reinvestigate questions relating to motor vehicle permits; but every rule has an exception even as every case has a martyr. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (9) TMI 190 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er of the dealer's family the dealer must be an entity which has a family. This can only be in the case of natural persons. It can have no application to other juristic entities. So far as a firm is concerned, although under the general law it does not have a juristic entity, apart from the partners constituting it, the Sales Tax Act recognises a firm as an assessable body and treats it as such, for section 2(c) in its inclusive part mentions a firm specifically. It is obvious that a firm is incapable of having any family, as it is not a natural person. This being so, the notice of the date of hearing of the revision could not have been served on the son of one of the partners of the firm. Service made in this manner was not valid service, and did not comply with the requirements of rule 77. 6. The question referred is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at ₹ 200/-,
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1978 (9) TMI 189 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay on the ground that he was not aware; but the recorded tenure-holder cannot force such an objector to have his rights determined in the ceiling proceedings, so that after adjudication of rights of such a claimant his ceiling area and the surplus land may be re-determined. 56. This undoubtedly appears to be an anomalous position, which, in our opinion, requires legislative intervention. We would commend such a situation for consideration of the Government so that such anomalous situations are not permitted to arise. 57. Coming back to the instant case, the only question of law arising in the writ petition being whether ceiling proceedings are liable to be stayed during the pendency of consolidation proceedings, the same is answered in the negative. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Yashoda Nandan and K.N. Singh, JJ. We concur with Hon'ble the Chief Justice and have nothing to add.
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1978 (9) TMI 188 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rcumstances with costs, one set. 16. For the reasons given in Writ Petitions No. 1135 to 1155 and 1759 to 1949 of 1977, Writ Petitions No. 1544-1758, 1952-1991, 1993-2199, 2216-2220, 2274-2325 of 1977, 592-607, 849-862, 1898-1908/78, 1597-1606/78, 955-956/77, 1222/77, 4-176 & 2359/78, 967-1128/77, 314-591, 901-950, 1870-1887, 2240-2294, 2367-2390, 3063-3081/78, 1223-1526/77, 177-313, 871-900, 2319-2358/78, 2326-2430/77, 1807-1869, 1239-1312, 1584-1592, 1737-1759, 2296-2311, 2312-2318, 2392-2472, 2937-2951, 3380-3464, 609-821, 979-1237, 1543-1583, 1956-2111, 2810-2936, 2986-2998, 2953-2968/78, 2472A-2472B/78, 823, 3514-3574, 824-826, 975, 1617-1627, 1628-1725, 1915-1942/78, 2366, 2610, 3088, 3576, 1313-1542, 2112-2203, 3131-3340, 1760-1806/78, 2231-2234, 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2475, 2476, 2975-2985/78, 3465, 3466-3513/78, 3622-3641/78, 3766, 3801 & 3786-3788/78 are dismissed but without any order as to costs. These are the reasons for our orders pronounced on 5-5-1978.
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1978 (9) TMI 187 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d. So, in my view, the conditions precedent for exercising powers under Section 3 of the Act have not been fulfilled with respect to the impugned items referred to in Schedule 'C' to the notification inasmuch as the matters are neither "definite" nor of any "public importance". In view of my above findings, it is not necessary for me in this case to deal in details the point of mala fide raised by the petitioner in the instant case. That point is left undecided. 75. In the result, this Rule is made absolute. The impugned items i. e. 2, 4, 9, 11, 12 and 13 to Schedule 'C' to the notification are quashed. 76. Let a Writ of Prohibition be issued, prohibiting the Commission of Inquiry to inquire into those items. 77. I, however, make it clear that besides those items which have been quashed, the Commission shall be at liberty to proceed to inquire other matters in the notification in accordance with law. 78. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (9) TMI 186 - SIKKIM HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which would admittedly and undisputedly take effect as a result of extension of another law on the same subject under Clause (n), would also come within the expression "repealed" in Clause (n) and that being so, the repeal will have to be regarded as quite valid and in order even according to the contention of Mr. Chaudhury according to which the power to repeal is to be found only in Clause. (k) and (1) and not in Clause (n). 20. My conclusion, therefore, is that the Arms Act, 1959, has been validly extended to Sikkim even though the corresponding Sikkim law, being the Sikkim Arms Rules, 1962, has not been repealed at any time before such extension and enforcement. My conclusion further is that the Sikkim Arms Rules, 1962, have automatically stood overborne or overthrown and impliedly repealed by the extension and enforcement of the Arms Act. 1959, under Clause (n) of Article 371-F of the Constitution. 21. The appeal accordingly fails and is, therefore, dismissed.
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1978 (9) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s of the Act. We have been informed that the appellant has filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, Kerala under Section 61(a) of the Kerala University Act. 1974. We refrain from making any observation with regard to that appeal. We wish to say that the validity of Sections 60(7), 61 and 65 was not in question before us, and so we express no opinion in regard thereto. 61. The result, therefore, is that the appeals fail and are dismissed. The judgment of the High Court setting aside the two orders of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Kerala dated October 19, 1970, is upheld though on a different ground, namely, the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33(1) and (4) had no power to entertain the appeals from the impugned orders of dismissal or suspension of the appellant. The costs shall be borne by the parties throughout as incurred. 62. We are thankful to Sri M.K. Ramamurthi, who appeared as an amicus curiae for the appellant, for the able assistance he has rendered.
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1978 (9) TMI 184 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he ban is removed by it. It merely saves the law enacted after coming into force of the said Article. We, therefore, must reject the argument of Mr. Ramamurthi with reference to Article 31C of the Constitution. 41. In the result all the petitions are allowed and it is declared that Section 25-O of the Act as a whole and Section 25-R in so far as it relates to the awarding of punishment for infraction of the provisions of Section 25-O are constitutionally bad and invalid for violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Consequently, the impugned orders passed under Sub-section (2) of Section 25-O in all the cases are held to be void and the respondents are restrained from enforcing them. We must, however, make it clear that since the orders fall on the ground of the constitutional invalidity of the law under which they have been made, we have not thought it fit to express any view in regard to their merits otherwise. We make no order as to costs in any of the petitions.
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1978 (9) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ould justify the High Court to interfere under Art. 227. Before concluding the judgment, we may point out that Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is no longer in force having been replaced by the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). Under the new Section, 146(1), if the Magistrate is unable to satisfy himself as to which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof. Art. 227 has also been since amended by 42nd Amendment further restricting the powers of the High Court to interfere under Art. 227. The question thus dealt with by us can no longer arise after the coming into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 2 of 1974). In the result the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside and that of the Magistrate is restored. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (9) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ad given prior consent to the publication of the cartoon Ex. P. S. Thus, the petitioner has miserably failed to prove the allegation made by him in paragraphs S and 11 of the petition which alone have been pressed before us. We have also come to the conclusion that the presumption under section 7 of the Press Act is not available to the appellant and the learned Judge was wrong in relying on the same. The result is that the appeal is allowed with costs. The judgment of the High Court setting aside the election of the appellant and unseating him is quashed as also the order of the High Court disquali- fying the appellant from contesting the election for a period of sixyears. The election petition filed by the petitioner before the High Court is dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 865 of 1978 FAZAL ALI, J.-In view of our decision in the case of Haji C. H. Mohammed Koya v. T. K. S. M. A. Muthukoya (Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1978), the appeal is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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