|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 200 Records
-
1979 (1) TMI 250 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... er visited the school during night. In these circumstances, as Pancham's duty started at night it cannot be said that this witness or for that matter any other witness was competent to depose that Pancham chowkidar was not working in the school during night. 16. In these circumstances, therefore, we are unable to accept the prosecution case that the appellant had drawn Rs. 500/- and misappropriated the same and made false entries in the accounts. The detailed contingent bill does mention the name of Pancham Chowidar as an employee of the school and a sum of Rs. 500/- was due towards his salary which was drawn by the appellant in this bill. For these reasons, therefore we are of the opinion that the charge against the appellant has not been substantiated. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set a side the convictions and sentences passed on the appellant and acquit him of the charges framed against him. The appellant who is on bail will now be discharged from his bail bonds.
-
1979 (1) TMI 249 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... uestion No. 2 that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the company was entitled to the relief under section 80G of the Act and, therefore, the question is to be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by saying that having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case the assessee-company is entitled to the relief under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 10. In the result, in Income-tax Reference No. 238 of 1975 Question No. 1 is answered in the negative, that is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. 2 was not pressed in view of our answer to Question No. 1. In Income-tax Reference No. 239 of 1975 Question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative, that is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. 2 is also answered in the affirmative, that is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 11. In both these references, the CIT shall pay the costs to the assessee.
-
1979 (1) TMI 248 - ITAT JAIPUR
... ...
... ... ..... ame of the allotted for a period of 2 years. In short, whatever may be penal provision in the Act the possession and use is not disturbed as far as the buyer is concerned". In another case ITA Nos. 15242, 15243, the Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal hel back "the expression" owned by the assessee has not been defined, but all the same, that expression must be understood not simply as departmental representative jute ownership, but also as departmental representative facto ownership." It further held that "A person in whose name registration certificate stand cannot be held to be the only owner." The seam view was taken by the Cochine Bench of the Tribunal in ITA No. 99 of 80-81. In that case also the vehicle registered in the name of another person was used by eh assessee and the Tribunal allowed depreciation. Following these decisions we hold that he assessee was entitled to depreciation on the truck. 5. In the result, the appeal succeeds in part.
-
1979 (1) TMI 247 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 39; salary as provided far by Clause 10 of the agreement. 8. We would like to add that even if the appellant could be held to be entitled to a declaration that she continued to be in the service of respondent 1, this is not a proper case in which such a declaration should be granted to her. The appellant's claim according to her counsel would amount to over ₹ 2 lakhs. The appellant has admitted in her evidence that she did not make any attempt to mitigate the damages by trying to obtain an alternative employment during the last 20 years. The difficulty of obtaining employment is an argument which cannot be permitted to a person who, on her own showing, has made no effort to obtain any employment. 9. In the result we affirm the judgment of the High Court except with the modification that in addition to the sum awarded to the appellant by the High Court she would be entitled to a further sum equivalent to three months' salary. 10. There will be no order to costs.
-
1979 (1) TMI 246 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d the rule enunciated by this Court in M/s. Jain Sudh Vanaspati Ltd. and another v. Union of India and another, C.W. 802 of 1977 and the Supreme Court in M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Private Ltd. v. The State of U.P. and others. Civil Appeal No. 1597 of 1972 we issue a mandamus to the respondents to issue necessary export licenses to the petitioners to export teak in sawn sizes. against firm contracts entered into by them in which advance payment has been received prior to June 5, 1978 on the petitioners submitting fresh applications, proof of firm contracts, proof of advance payment received and identification of the source of procurement of the teak in sawn sizes sought to be exported. The petitioners' may put in the fresh applications within a week from today and the licenses should be issued within 10 days of the receipt of the applications. (31) The petitioners will also be entitled to their costs in each case. Counsel's fee ₹ 1600/- in each case.
-
1979 (1) TMI 245 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the bye-laws". It was further observed that a dispute referred to the Registrar can even be transferred for disposal to a person who may have been invested with powers in that behalf, or may be referred for disposal to an arbitrator. But neither the Registrar nor his nominee will be competent to grant the relief requiring a change in the service conditions of the employees, under Section 62 of the Andhra Act. Such a relief could be granted only by the Industrial Tribunal which under the Industrial Disputes Act, has the jurisdiction even to vary contracts of service between an employer and employees. This reasoning is applicable mutatis mutandis to the instant case. 43. For all the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. In token of our gratitude for the valuable assistance rendered to us by Shri Rama Reddy as amicus curiae, we direct that an honorarium of ₹ 1500/- be paid to him, which shall be taxed as costs awarded against the appellant.
-
1979 (1) TMI 244 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e issued by this Court if there was any delay the same should be condoned. It was further urged on behalf of the respondent that the petitioner had notice of the filing of the award and it was not necessary to have separate notice from the Court. Reliance in this connection was placed on the decision in the case of Nilkantha v. Kashinath, 1962 2SCR551 , State v. L. M. Das AIR 1976 Cal 403, Parasramka Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 1970 2SCR136 . I am inclined to think that this application in view of the facts narrated above is barred by limitation. But in the view I have taken on the other aspect of the matter it is not necessary for me to rest my decision on this aspect of the matter, so it is not necessary to discuss this question in detail. 18. In the aforesaid view of the matter the application therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed. The other applications also fail and are dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs in any of these applications.
-
1979 (1) TMI 243 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he appellant. This unfortunately is a situation of her own making. The Courts can only act where there is any infringement of a right but not merely on equitable considerations. We wish to mention that the counsel appearing for the Chandigarh Administration very fairly suggested that if the Government of Haryana were to forward the name of an officer immediately senior to the appellant in the cadre of Head-Mistresses, who may be holding a post in the pay scale of ₹ 350-900 for appointment on deputation in an equivalent post, such officer could be absorbed by the Chandigarh Administration in the pay scale of ₹ 350-900. That being so, the appellant could still be saved from the predicament of being posted as a Head-Mistress in the pay scale of ₹ 300-500 on her reversion to her parent State. This is, however, a matter for the Haryana Government to decide. 41. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (1) TMI 242 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
... ...
... ... ..... bble" company, but I do not propose to make any reference to them. These cases are (1) In re Haven Gold Mining Company, (1881) 20 Ch. D. 151, and (2) In re Thomas Edward Brinsmead & Sons, (1896) 1 Ch. D. 45. ( 12. ) I think to dub the respondent -company as a bubble company is totally unjustified and uncalled for. This ground was not even alleged in the petition and seems to have been taken in desperation. To sum up, I have come to the conclusion that both the grounds taken under section 433(e) read with section 434(1)(a) and section 433(f) are not well founded and the petition presented ostensibly for winding -up order is really to exercise pressure and deserves to be refused admission. It is proper to clarify that any observation made in this petition is only a prima facie view in the context of the provisions relating to a winding -up of a company and it will not affect the pending proceedings between the parties. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with costs.
-
1979 (1) TMI 241 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ala Court amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court. We do not think that the prosecution acted with any oblique motive. In the charge-sheet filed in the Delhi Court, it was expressly mentioned that Mehra was already facing trial in the Ambala Court and he was, therefore, not being sent for trial. In the application made to the Ambala Court under Section 494 Criminal Procedure Code, it was expressly mentioned that a case had been filed in the Delhi Court against Mehra and others and, therefore, it was not necessary to prosecute Mehra in the Ambala Court. The Court granted its permission for the withdrawal of the case. Though the investigating agency would have done better if it had informed the Ambala Magistrate and sought his formal permission for the second investigation, we are satisfied that the investigating agency did not act out of any malice. We are also satisfied that there has been no illegality. Both the appeals are, therefore, dismissed. Appeals dismissed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 240 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... a resolution for voluntary winding up. But, such is not the case here. 22. Be that as it may, in the instant case, no inspectors had been appointed under Sections 235 or 237 of the Act and no parallel investigation by the Central Government or its authorities under the Act into the affairs of the Company was continuing. Nor was it a case where the High Court thought that for a proper and effectual adjudication of the petition pending before it, it was necessary to get the matter investigated through the agency of the Central Government. 23. In the circumstances, of the case, therefore, the High Court should not have stayed the proceedings on the petition for winding up filed before it by Moolchand Gupta but should have dispose it of on merits. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the case is sent back to the High Court for disposal of the appellant's petition in accordance with the law. Costs to abide the result.
-
1979 (1) TMI 239 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f time or to prove that the curse Lord Curzon spelt out still haunts the wheels of administration. The appeal is allowed; so also the writ petition-in the manner and to the extent we have directed. The parties will bear their costs. The decisional guidelines herein given will, we dare say, so help dispose of the many Writ Petitions pending in the High Court. The journey to the Supreme Court is not always necessitous for final justice. ORDER While there is agreement that thirty seats more have to be added as has been indicated in the judgment making the total number of seats allocable to the students of the Calicut University to 166, there is some dispute regarding the number of seats available for the students belonging to the Kerala University. We have mentioned in the judgment that it is 317. It is open to the State Government or to the concerned Universities to bring it to the notice of the court in case there is any clarification necessary. Appeal & Petition allowed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 238 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hosen to examine two witnesses but for reasons best known to it did not produce the note which formed the subject matter of the Resolution of the Sanctioning Authority-Exh. P-16. It is well settled that in a criminal case this Court or for that matter any court should not ordinarily direct fresh evidence to fill up a lacuna delibrately left by the prosecution. The liberty of the subject was put in jeopardy and it cannot be allowed to put in jeopardy again at the instance of the prosecution which failed to avail of the opportunity afforded to it. For these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the present prosecution was launched without any valid sanction and, therefore, the cognizance taken by the Special Judge was completely without jurisdiction. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and convictions and sentences passed on the appellant are quashed. The appellant will now be discharged from his bail bonds. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 237 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ve brushed aside this legal lacuna without making any real attempt to analyses the effect of the provisions of section 53 and 54. The High Court observed that these two sections were wholly irrelavant. With due respect, we are unable to approve of such a cryptic approach to a legal question which is of far reaching consequences. It was, however, suggested that the word "place" would not include the car, but the definition of the word "place" under the Act clearly includes vehicle which would include a car. Thus the ground on which the argument of the petitioner has been rejected by the High Court cannot be sustained by us. We are satisfied that there has been a direct non- compliance of the provisions of section 54 which renders the search completely without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant is set aside and he is acquitted of the charges framed against him. Appeal allowed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 236 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... appellants before the Supreme Court. We are unable to accept the contention for the case referred to is one wherein an opportunity was not provided to a person before the passport was impounded. It has no application to an appeal as in the present case the appellant is properly heard in a trial and is also heard by the appellate court. We feel that Maneka Gandhi's case has no application to the facts of the present case. In the result we reject all the contentions put forward by the learned counsel and hold that the impugned Rule is within the rule making power of the Supreme Court and answer the reference accordingly. ORDER In the light of the majority judgment, we uphold the vires of Order XXI Rule 15(1)(c) of the Supreme Court Rules and also S. 384 of the Criminal Procedure Code but hold that in their application both the provisions shall be governed by the criteria laid down in the majority Judgment. In the appeal, above mentioned, we direct notice to the respondent.
-
1979 (1) TMI 235 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... be conducive to the ends of justice to send the appellant back to jail. In these circumstances, therefore, while upholding the convictions of the appellant, we would reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period already served. In lieu of the sentence remitted we impose a fine of ₹ 15,000/ under each count, total being ₹ 30,000/ , in default six months rigorous imprisonment on each count. The appellant is allowed to pay ₹ 10,000/- with a month from today and the balance of the amount to be paid within six months from today. With this modification, the appeal is dismissed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 234 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... appears to have enhanced the sentence to one year. In view of our finding that section 27 (a) (i) have no application to this case, the charge on this count against the appellant must fail and the appellant must be acquitted of this charge. So far as section 28 is concerned the maximum punishment which can be imposed is only one year. The appellant is a young man and comes from a respectable family and had made a very candid confession before the Court in pleading guilty. In these circumstances, we therefore do not think that any deterrent sentence is called for. We would, therefore, uphold the conviction of the appellant under section 28 but give the sentence till the rising of the Court which he has already undergone. The appellant will now be released forthwith. The sentence of a fine of ₹ 200 will be maintained under section 28 and not under section 27 (a) (i). The fine if not paid shall be paid within a month from today. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part.
-
1979 (1) TMI 233 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ary check and review. Therefore, we do not find that there is any excessive delegation of power in this behalf. However in actual exercise of its power, if the central Government acts capriciously or arbitrarily in any given case, it is open to the aggrieved person to call that action in question. However, merely because the Central Government may exercise the power capriciously or arbitrarily in some cases, it cannot be said that the power which is implicit in S. 9(3) of the Act has been delegated to the Central Government in excessive form. The last contention raised by Mr. Patel also fails and is rejected. 25. Except that 1970 notification is ultra vires Section 9(3), all the contentions which Mr. Patel has raised fail. In the result, the petition is partly allowed and it is declared that the 1970 notification is void and unenforceable at law. Rule is made absolute to the above extent with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. 26. Petition partly allowed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 232 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tion of sales only and has no application to a sale held by a Receiver. In this view the objection raised by the learned counsel for the defendant has to be rejected. ORDER When the Judgment was delivered in Court on 16th January, 1979, allowing the appeal to the extent that there will be a decree for partition and separate possession of one-fourth share each of plaintiffs 2 and 3, the parties expressed their desire to agree amongst themselves and divide the properties finally and report a settlement to that effect and prayed that the Court may be pleased to pass a decree in terms of the compromise. Leave was granted to the parties to enter into a compromise and report the matter to the Court for the passing of the decree in terms of the compromise. Accordingly the parties have entered into a compromise and have filed the compromise memo along with plans for passing of the final decree. Accordingly we direct that a decree be passed in terms of the compromise. Appeal allowed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 231 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... regards counsel's contention that the user of the disputed passage should be regarded as by way an easement of a right of way granted to the appellants" and other tenants by the second respondent, it must be stated that no such plea or case was made out by the appellants in any of the Courts below.Moreover, there is no material on record from which such a grant of easement of all the tenants could be inferred. On the contrary from the fact that the disputed passage in question was being used in common by the previous owner (second respondent) as also by all the tenants of the building clearly suggests that what was granted by the second respondents to the appellants and all other tenants was a bare licence to use the passage with a view to have access to their respective tenements,without any interest being created in their favour over such common passage.The contention raised is, therefore, devoid of any substance. 7. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
........
|
