|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 168 Records
-
1979 (10) TMI 235 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... if this affidavit of valuation along with Annexures 'A' and 'B' is attached to the probate. Mr. Bhagat again relies upon the said judgment of the Punjab High Court in support of this contention. It appears that the affidavit of valuation is filed under the Court-fees Act and there is no provision under the Indian Succession Act to incorporate the affidavit of valuation or the details of the assets of the deceased in the Probate itself or by means of Annexures to the probate. Under Section 273 of the Indian Succession Act the probate has effect over all the property and estate, moveable or immovable, of the deceased. In view of these provisions I hold that it is also not necessary to attach with the probate the affidavit of valuation accompanying the application for the grant of Probate. The Probate be corrected in the light of this order and delivered to the petitioner who would comply with provisions of Sections 317 and 318 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
-
1979 (10) TMI 234 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the Sessions Court. We think that so far as arguments on the question of sentence is concerned, there is great substance in the same Although this was a case of double murder, the appellants had been acquitted on 10-1073 and it will not be proper or expedients, to impose the extreme penalty of death on the respondents, as was done by the trial Court. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Sessions Judge, with the modification that the respondents Hawaldar, Ziledar Ram Singh are convicted under Section 302/34 IPC for the murder of Amrit Sri and Lajja Ram and Hakim Singh for the murder of Tale Singh and each of them are sentenced to imprisonment for life. The other conviction and sentences imposed by the trial Court on these appellants are restored and maintained and the order of the High Court is set aside. The respondents 2 to 4 who are on ball will now surrender and serve out the remaining portion of the sentence.
-
1979 (10) TMI 233 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... as to adopt a hands-off policy. The 'B' wing members complain that they have really suffered by being denied what is due to them on account of length of service all these years after 1970. The boot is in the other leg, they lament. Probably, the injustice of the past, when suddenly set right by the equity of the present, puts on a molested mien and the beneficiaries of the statutes quo cry for help against injustice to them. The law, as an instrument of social justice, takes a longer look to neutralise the sins of history. Be that as it may, judicial power cannot rush in where even administrative feats fear to tread. We see the force of the petitioners grievance and realise that an alternative policy may well be fabricated. That is matter for the State and not for the court. We hold that the impugned G.O. cannot be voided as violative of Articles 14 and 16, and, therefore, dismiss the petitions. The parties will bear their respective costs. N.V.K. Petitions dismissed.
-
1979 (10) TMI 232 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ing out a miserable existence from small daily sales and many of them are ignorant about the provisions of the law and are moreover at the mercy of the wholesalers and manufacturers, such a provision does not afford any real protection to the small tradesmen and there may be cases where they may have to go to jail for the sins of the wholesalers and manufacturers entailing untold hardship on their family. We would, therefore, strongly urge upon the Food Inspection Department not to remain content with paying homage to anti-adulteration law by catching small tradesmen but direct the full fury of their investigative machinery against the wholesalers and manufacturers who are in a large majority of cases really responsible for adulteration of the food stuff which is being sold by the small retailers. Then only would the true purpose of the Prevention of Food Adulteration law be fulfilled and the great gap between expectation and fulfillment in respect of welfare laws be bridged.
-
1979 (10) TMI 231 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... und by the rule of promissory estoppel ? In our view, this second condition of the petitioners having, changed their position by acting upon the representation would arise for consideration only when the representation was capable of being acted upon. It was certainly capable of being acted upon when the Export Policy remains unchanged. But it was not capable of being acted upon if the Export Policy is changed. The potentiality of the change always existed. It makes no difference, Therefore, that the contracts were concluded before the change in the Export Policy. Since the liability to change of policy existed prior to the contracts, the contracts themselves would be subject to the liability of the change of policy. They were not such, Therefore, as would amount to the change of position by the sellers enabling them to enforce the representation of the Government against it. (47) For the above reasons, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed without any order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 230 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... this would become a precedent for others to violate the patent. The balance of convenience would Therefore be to injunct the defendants. The plaintiff has made inventions and Therefore if the patent is allowed to be violated by defendants the plaintiff is likely to suffer injury. 14. I am of the opinion that it is a fit case to restrain the defendants from infringing the plaintiff's patent. I, therefore, confirm the ex parte injunction dated 13th June, 1979 and restrain the defendants from infringing the plaintiff's patent No. 138571 dated 26th November, 1973 pertaining to 'TITA NIUM SUBSTRATE INSOLUBLE ANODE ASSEMBLY FOR DIAPHRAGM TYPE Chloral kali CELLS" till the decision of the suit. The plaintiff's application (I. A. No. 1915 of 1979) is. therefore, allowed. The application (I. A. No. 1953 of 1979) of the defendants for vacation of the stay is dismissed. The defendants shall pay costs of these proceedings to the plaintiff. Counsel fee ₹ 300/-.
-
1979 (10) TMI 229 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is is one of those cases where I ought to order an inquiry into profits. (52) At the fag end of the case before me the defendants made an application (CM 962 of 1979) for additional evidence. I do not think there is any ground to allow the application as none of the conditions of 0.41 rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure is satisfied. The application, is accordingly dismissed. (53) For these reasons the appeal is dismissed. Cross-objections are allowed to this extent that it is held that the defendants-appellants, in addition to infringement of registered trade mark, are also guilty of the tort of passing-off. Cross-objections are dismissed in so far as the claim for accounts of profits is concerned. The decree for injunction passed by the trial court is affirmed. The defendants are ordered to deliver up the offending boxes, wrappers, letters heads for destruction. The defendants shall pay the costs of the suit and the appeal. On the cross objections I make no order as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 228 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he learned single Judge as regards the liability of this respondent. 13. In L. P. A. No. 28 of 1976 prefer red on behalf of the claimants to seek enhancement of the compensation Mr. Maharaja Bakhsh Singh could advance no argument worth the name to challenge the considered view of the learned single Judge. We therefore, affirm the findings with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded. On a minor point, however, appellants are entitled to succeed. It was contended that the view in this Court is now settled that interest on the compensation awarded should be allowed normally from the date of application unless there are reasons to hold to the contrary. Agreeing with this we modify the judgment of the learned single Judge to this effect that the appellants in this appeal would be entitled to the t of interest from the date on which the claim petition was presented. 14. In both the appeals, the parties shall bear their own costs. G. C. MITAL, J. I agree. 15. Appeal allowed.
-
1979 (10) TMI 227 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ht of the tenant at all but has merely simplified the procedure for eviction of the tenant in cases falling within the ambit of Sections 14A and 14(1)(e) of the Act as discussed in the judgment. In these circumstances, therefore, any challenge by the tenant to the constitutionality of the Act must necessarily fail and hence Section 25B is constitutionally valid. 24. For these reasons, therefore, all the contentions raised by the appellant fail and the appeal is dismissed. But In the peculiar circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Time till 31-5-1980 is given to the tenant to hand over peaceful and vacant possession to the landlord on filing an undertaking to this Court within a month accompanied by an affidavit that he would do so on the date fixed and shall not induct any other person on the premises. The tenant will, during this period, continue to pay the compensation for wrongful use of the premises equivalent to the amount of the rent and arrears.
-
1979 (10) TMI 226 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d authorities and the assessees so that an absent owner may not be unduly harassed nor proceedings delayed by reason of his absence and not for limiting to the occupier alone the liability to pay the cess. In fact subsection (2) of section 7 which is in the following terms would indicate that the liability of the owner of the concerned factory is not excluded "7. (1)........................ (2) If the occupier fails to furnish in due time the return referred to in section 6 or furnishes a return which in the opinion of the prescribed authority is incorrect or defective, the prescribed authority shall assess the amount payable by him in such manner as may be prescribed and the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply as if such assessment has been made on the basis of a return furnished by the owner...." Both the submissions made by Mr. Patel are therefore repelled. 9. In the result all the five appeals fail and are dismissed with costs, one set. Appeals dismissed.
-
1979 (10) TMI 225 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... findings of the trial court and of the Division Bench on issues relating to the claim of the plaintiff to get possession of the property from defendants Nos. 2 to 10 on the ground that they were not statutory tenants i.e. issues Nos. 4 and 6 and to leave the questions involved in them open reserving liberty to the parties to agitate them in appropriate proceedings. In view of our finding on issue No. 3, we hold that the decree passed by the trial court and the appellate court are unsustainable. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decrees passed by the trial court and by the Division Bench of the High Court and dispose of the suit as having abated on June 10, 1964. The findings on issues Nos. 4 and 6 are set aside without expressing any opinion on them reserving liberty to the parties to agitate the question in appropriate proceedings. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
-
1979 (10) TMI 224 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sion as required by law and provided it an opportunity of either filing a written objection or appearing personally before respondent no. 2 in case it disputed its liability as also to show as to why legal steps be not taken against it for recovery of the dues. Such commission as might be due from the petitioner under Section 18 of U. P. Act No. XXIV of 1953 as amended up-to-date may be recovered only after following the procedure in accordance with Section 17 (4) of that Act was held by a Division Bench of this Court in Mokha Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1977 UPTC 624. There is nothing in the petition disclosing that any such steps have been taken. Under the circumstances, on the material before us the petitioner is entitled at this stage to no relief in respect of the commission claimed to be due against it. 15. For the reasons given, we find no merit in this petition, which we accordingly dismiss with costs to the respondents. Interim order, if any, is hereby vacated.
-
1979 (10) TMI 223 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... three years the matter has come up before us. In these circumstances, therefore, the ends of justice do not require that the respondents should be sent back to jail. Mr. Ganpule pointed out that so far as respondent No. 1 Sada Nand was concerned he had a previous conviction to his credit and so he deserves a jail sentence. As the previous conviction was 7 years old and today it will be about 15 years old, we do not think that we should take these facts into consideration while imposing the sentence on the respondent. For the reasons, therefore, we would allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and convict the respondents under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentence the respondents to fine of ₹ 2,000/- each, in default 6 months' R.I. 7. In view of the undertaking given by the counsel for the respondents that they will be careful in future we do not choose to pass the consequential order under Section 16(1)(d).
-
1979 (10) TMI 222 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... exists in regard to the basis of a claim for payment of gratuity, no proceedings will lie under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appeal is allowed, and the order dated April 30, 1975 of the Labour Court, Jullundur is quashed. Having regard to the terms on which special leave was granted by this Court to the appellant, the appellant shall pay to the employee respondents their costs of this appeal. At this stage we put to the learned Solicitor-General, who appeared for the State whether in the special circumstances it was not fair that the entire amount be paid by the appellant to the employees without driving them to a separate proceeding. He has fairly stated that the appellant is willing to do so and the sole object of this litigation was to have the law clarified. We, therefore, direct the appellant to pay to the employee respondents within one month from today the amounts that may be due to them, if they have not already been paid. P.B.R. Appeal allowed
-
1979 (10) TMI 221 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... no merit and was rejected. It was on the basis of these endorsements in the file that the averments quoted above were made by Mr. Khambra in his counter-affidavit. It is thus very clear to us that the representation could be said to have been considered by the Chief Secretary at the highest but he did not take the decision to reject the same himself and for that purpose the papers were submitted to the Administrator who ultimately rejected the same. There is no affidavit filed by the Chief Secretary before us taking that he had rejected the representation. The representation was, therefore, not rejected by the detaining authority and as such the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(5), as interpreted by this Court, cannot be said to have been strictly observed or complied with. The continued detention of the detenu was clearly illegal and deserves to be quashed and we accordingly quash the same and direct that the detenu be released forthwith. 4. No orders as to costs.
-
1979 (10) TMI 220 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... two questions formulated, the answer is self- evident. The individual liability of the sales manager is distinct and separate from the corporate liability of the manufacturer. In case of a 'company prosecution', the company along with its agent, that is, the person nominated under s.17 (2) as well as the sales manager can both be prosecuted under s.7 (i) read with s.16 (1) (a). Notwithstanding the nomination of a person responsible under s. 17(2), there can also be prosecution of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company under s. 17(4). But in such a case it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the offence has been committed 'with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of such person'. The result, therefore, is that the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate is set aside and he is directed to issue summons to the respondents and proceed with the trial according to law. V.D.K. Appeal allowed.
-
1979 (10) TMI 219 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nd belief as derived from official record". The land belonging to the respondents Nos. 1 to 21 was selected by a body described as the Site Selection Board. There was also a New Mandi Control Board. The deponent of the counter affidavit was not a member of either Board. He was not a participant in the deliberations which are said to have led to the selection of the land belonging to the said respondents. Whether or not the deliberations were effected by the influence or pressure of the respondent No. 22 is a matter to which the officials or members selecting the land could alone be privy. In the absence of any denial of the allegations made by the respondents Nos. 1 to 21 in the writ petition by a person having personal and direct knowledge in the matter, and having regard to the entire history of the case, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the averments in the writ petition alleging mala fides must be accepted. The petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
1979 (10) TMI 218 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... erious social offence which must be visited with exemplary punishment, it will be rather harsh to pass a sentence of imprisonment in the facts and circumstances of this case. Under s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, as in force at the material time, the Court had the discretion for special and adequate reasons under proviso to sub s. (1) not to pass a sentence of imprisonment. In the instant case, the respondent is a man aged 75 years. The offence was committed on August 1, 1968 i.e., more than eleven years ago. The order of acquittal was based on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Dhanraj’s case. The samples were taken from sealed tins. These are all mitigating circumstances. We accordingly refrain from passing a substantive sentence of imprisonment and instead sentence the respondent to the period already undergone and to pay a fine of ₹ 2000/- or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. Appeal allowed.
-
1979 (10) TMI 217 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he function of deciding whether the ingredients are established is primarily and essentially its own function, and it cannot abdicate that function in favour of another, no matter how august and qualified be the statutory authority. The order of the High Court rejecting the petition being erroneous it is set aside, and the High Court is directed to dispose of the petition on the merits within two weeks from today. In case the petition is dismissed on the merits by the High Court, it will direct the Court below to proceed with the trial expeditiously and to bring to an early close the case pending before it. ORDER OF THE COURT We direct the High Court to dispose of the petition on the merits as soon as may be, not later than one month from today. In case, the petition is dismissed on the merits, by the High Court, it will direct the Court below to proceed with the trial as soon as possible and to bring to an early close the case pending before it. Appeal allowed and remitted.
-
1979 (10) TMI 216 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he Gold Control Administrator having issued the permit to possess primary gold after the Collector’s order, the Administrator cannot review his own order by exercising revisional powers. The argument is misconceived. The Administrator under the Gold Control Rules performs several functions of administrative character and issuing of the permit to possess primary gold is one of them. In exercise of the said administrative power, the office of the Administrator issued the said permit to the appellant. The issuing of the permit as administrative Act operates on entirely a different field and relates to the separate function of the Administrator under the rules. While exercising the revisional powers, the Administrator is exercising a quasi-judicial function. The contention, therefore, fails. 13. In the result we do not find any reason or justification to interfere with the decision of the learned single Judge. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.
........
|
