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Showing 1 to 20 of 146 Records
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1979 (3) TMI 218 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ough there cannot be any doubt that he witnessed the occurrence his subsequent conduct does not inspire such confidence as to place implicit reliance on his evidence. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that P.W. 3 was not a reliable witness. 10. In our view the two dying declarations Exhibits P-1 and P-6 may be relied upon without any reservation and the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 5 may also be safely accepted. We have considered the reasons given by the High Court for acquitting the first accused and we find them wholly unsatisfactory. In the light of the principled set out by us earlier we think that the interests of justice demand that we should interfere with the order of acquittal in the present case. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge of Tirunelveli against the respondent (first accused) on the charge under Section 302 Indian Penal Code.
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1979 (3) TMI 217 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a proper application of its mind that a sentence of imprisonment alone is called for in a particular situation Thus, the sentence of imprisonment is an exception while sentence of fine is the rule. 7. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we do not find any special reason why the appellants should be sent to jail by sentencing them to imprisonment. Furthermore, respondent No. 1 before us despite service, has not appeared to support the sentence given by the High Court. Having regard to these circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the present case, squarely falls in the first part of Section 12(3) and a sentence of fine alone should have been given by the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal to this extent that the sentence of imprisonment passed by the High Court is set aside and instead the appellants are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- each. In case of default, 15 days simple imprisonment. Four weeks time to pay the fine.
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1979 (3) TMI 216 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t be assumed. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis". 26. In my opinion, the petitioners have not discharged the burden of showing that the classification in the present legislation does not rest upon a reasonable basis. 27. While parting I would like to make certain observations. More than 22 years have passed since the passing of this law. As stated above, this law was intended to be a tranquilliser and by a quick acting process the legislature thought that the object will be achieved quickly. It is only unfortunate that the sharp edges of this law have been made blunt and the quick acting procedure set at naught by lethargic and slow moving powerful bureaucracy. At the time of hearing a chart showing progress of consolidation proceedings in several districts of the State was shown to us by the learned Advocate General, but that shows a dismal picture necessitating vigorous steps in the matter.
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1979 (3) TMI 215 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... its administrative side must be having records from which these particulars can be easily gathered. We also direct the State of Bihar to furnish to us within three weeks from today particulars as to the number of cases where first information report have been lodged and the cases are pending investigation by the police in each sub-division of the State as on 31st December, 1978 and where such cases have been pending investigation for more than six months, the State of Bihar will furnish broadly the reasons why there has been such delay in the investigative process. The writ petition will now come up for hearing and final disposal on 4th April, 1979. We have already issued notice to the Supreme Court Bar Association to appear and make its submissions on the issue arising in the writ petition since they are of great importance. We hope and trust that the Supreme Court Bar Association will respond to the notice and appear to assist the Court at the hearing of the writ petition.
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1979 (3) TMI 214 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and must fail. It is, however, needless for us to go into the question as to whether Rule 16 is repugnant of Section 22 of the Act as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in view of the decision arrived at by us. 15. Sri K. Pratap Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that should our judgment be against him on the main contention, then the Tribunal should be directed to give the petitioner a notice before actually seeking to reopen, as the Tribunal has failed to do so and, without giving any notice and opportunity, has reopened the case, which on the face of it is violative of the principles of natural justice. We see sufficient force in this submission and we direct the 1st respondent (Land Reforms Tribunal, Mahabubabad) to give a notice to the petitioner before seeking to reopen the case and proceed according to law. With these observations, we dismiss the Writ Petition No costs, Advocate's fee ₹ 200/- 16. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 213 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a bottling licence. This apart, the licence clause is ineffective, as Section 28 and Section 29 and the duty Notifications issued under the Act clearly indicate that duty is to be charged only at point of issue and the rate fixed with reference to the destination. 5. It is, thus, clear that the impugned levy cannot be sustained in all these petitions. In Special Appeal No. 79 of 1978 the matter has been remanded to the Excise Commissioner for considering the claim of the petitioner for being exonerated from payment of excise duty. However, on the view taken by us that excise duty is not payable on bottling wastage, no useful purpose would be served by asking the Commissioner to reconsider the matter. 6. The petitions and the special appeal are allowed, and the impugned demand of excise duty on bottling wastage is quashed and the respondents are restrained from realising or adjusting the impugned demand of excise duty on bottling wastage. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1979 (3) TMI 212 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it is extremely difficult to hold that the original of the letter Ext. B was posted by the defendant or received by the plaintiff. As that fact is not established, the reciial in Ext. B that "If we do not hear anything from you contrary to what we stated, we take it that you have accepted our condition of jurisdiction" is of no avail or effect. 9. On the above considerations I agree with the finding of the court below that there was no contract between the parties ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court at Keonjhar for the institution of the suit in question. As the petitioner now does not challenge the finding of the court below that the cause of action for the suit arose in Barbil within the jurisdiction of Keonjhar civil court, the court below has jurisdiction to try the suit. So this civil revision, challenging the jurisdiction of the court below to try the suit in question, has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee ₹ 100/-.
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1979 (3) TMI 211 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... delay. The workman in this case has not stated anything to explain the delay in making the application (under) Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code for its acceptance after condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. I accordingly propose to give the workman an opportunity to explain the delay he made in making the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code. 22. The Rule thus succeeds and is made absolute. The impugned order is set aside, without any order as to costs in the circumstances. The records are sent back to the learned Commissioner who will afford an opportunity to the workman to explain the delay by a supplementary affidavit in making the application for restoration, which if filed will be considered in accordance with law after affording like opportunity in rebuttal to the company. If the workman fails to take any steps as indicated above within such time as may be granted by the learned Commissioner, his application for restoration will be dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urt that not only the compensation should be enhanced but in reply to the submissions of the counsel for the State in their appeal they contended that no case was made out for reducing the compensation. Both the appeals were heard together and not, one after the other. Therefore, the legal representatives of the deceased Y. Prakhakar Reddy were all throughout before the Court, of course in one capacity, viz., as legal representatives of deceased appellant, but not so described as legal representatives of the deceased respondent. That cannot make any difference. Therefore, the appeal has not abated. 44. On merits, I agree with my learned brother P.N. Singhal, J. that the compensation as awarded by the High Court represents the market value of the land on the date of the Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and no case is made out for interfering with the same. Accordingly, I agree with the final order that the appeal be dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1979 (3) TMI 209 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . Our conclusion regarding the non-heritability of this right rests solely on our understanding of Section 40 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act as it stood before it was amended in 1956, in relation to the right under Section 37. Nothing that we have said should be understood as indicating that any other right of a tenant or this very right after the 1956 amendment is not heritable. Shri Karkhanis argued that having regard to the position that obtained both under the Bombay Tenancy Act and under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act after the 1956 amendment, we should so interpret Section 40 as to make the right under Section 37 heritable. We are unable to do so in view of the language of Section 40 before it was amended in 1956. In the result we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order regarding costs. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 208 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 1908, and all other laws dealing with limitation, special or local are saved and are to be read into the Limitation Act, 1963. We, therefore, arrive at the conclusion that the body of provisions in the Portuguese Civil Code dealing with the subject of Limitation of suits etc. and in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu only is "local law" within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. As stated earlier these provisions have to be read into the Limitation Act, 1963, as if the Schedule to the Limitation Act is amended mutatis mutandis. No question of repugnancy arises. We agree with the Judicial Commissioner that the provisions of the Portuguese Civil Code relating to Limitation continue to be in force in the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. We do not think that it is necessary to consider the other submissions of the learned Counsel for the respondents. In the result both the appeals are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 207 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and direct recruits to Service would be on probation. But the latter part of rule 8 (a) comprehends Inspectors being promoted on officiating basis. Unless there is a temporary addition to the strength of the cadre such officiating appointment by promotion would not make the promotee a member of the service in view of Rule 3. In order to avoid any injustice to such promotees the Government may make an order to treat officiating service to count towards probation. In the absence of such order the officiating service would not count towards probation and such appointment would not make the promotee a member of the service. In that event his case would not be covered by the proviso to rule 8(a). Therefore, the contention cannot be accepted. The High Court was, therefore, right in concluding that the quota rule would operate at both the stages. Accordingly both these appeals fail and are dismissed but in the circumstances of the case with no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 206 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ,145, 146 and 147 is the case of raid at the Pulpally Wireless Station for which these accused persons are liable to conviction under Section 149/455, I.P.C. and are sentenced to 7 years' rigorous Imprisonment. The result is that all the appellants excepting accused Nos. 5, 7, 16, 128, 135, 145, 146 and 147 are acquitted of all the charges framed against them and the appeals of these accused are accordingly allowed. The appellants mentioned above are also acquitted of all other charges excepting the charge for which they have been convicted, under Section 149/455, Indian Penal Code. We have altered the convictions of these appellants because the accused were charged with much more serious offences like Sections 395, 302 (sic) even with respect to Pulpally Wireless Station which have been altered to minor offences under Section 149/455, Indian Penal Code under which they are sentenced to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. Thus all the appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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1979 (3) TMI 205 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd the respondent came handy. Some charges were framed none of which could costitute misconduct in law. Some charges were mere surmises. Substance of the allegations was that he was not a very efficient officer and lacked the quality of leadership and was deficient in the faculty of decision making. These deficiencies in capacity would not constitute misconduct. If the respondent were a young man and was to continue in the post for a long period, such an inquiry may be made whether he should be retained in the responsible post. He may or may not be retained but to retain him in service beyond the period of his normal retirement with a view to punishing him was wholly unjustified. The High Court was, therefore, right in coming to the conclusion that the respondent was no longer in service on the date on which an order removing him from service was made and, therefore, the order was illegal and void. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 204 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tability who may be assigned a higher place. The Selection Committee will review the list for 1973 in accordance with these directions. The Union Public Service Commission will thereafter be consulted in accordance with the regulations. The Select List as finally approved by the Commission will form the Select List of the members of the State Civil Service. We may indicate that the Writ Petition filed by the appellant and his appeal to this Court cannot be considered to have become infructuous on the ground that the Union Public Service Commission has already approved of the Select List. The learned Single Judge of the High Court had stayed the final publication of the list by his order dated September 24, 1973 and had directed by his order dated February 11, 1974 in C.M. 994 of 1974 that the publication of the Select List will be subject to the result of the Writ Petition. With these modification, the appeal is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 203 - SUPREME COURT
Interpretation of "shall be liable to confiscation" occurring in Section 63(1) read with sub- section (1) of Section 64, two alternatives, namely, to confiscate the car, or, in lieu of confiscation, to impose a fine at the option of its owner.
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1979 (3) TMI 202 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e a certificate can be granted. It means that it is not sufficient if the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance but in addition to it the High Court should be of the opinion that such question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Further, the word need’ suggests that there has to be a necessity for a decision by the Supreme Court on the question, and such a necessity can be said to exist when, for instance, two views are possible regarding the question and High Court takes one of the said views. Such a necessity can also be said to exist when a different view has been expressed by another High Court’. 34. The above observations are binding upon us. Therefore, we reject the prayer in all the appeals for certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution. 35. Let operation of our judgment, delivered today, be stayed for ten weeks from date, as prayed for. 36. Let certified copy of our judgment be granted expeditiously.
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1979 (3) TMI 201 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the prosecution case proved against accused Nos. 1 to 13 who were convicted of various offences covered by different counts of the charge and were sentenced in consequence to imprisonment?
Held that:- In taking the view of the matter that it did, the High Court, for all practical purposes, presumed the accused to be guilty unless they succeeded in establishing their innocence, which was not a correct approach to the appreciation of evidence. It was for the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the contraband articles were in the conscious possession of accused Nos. 1 to 11 and that they had received the currency notes in question as claimed by the prosecution, neither of these matters was a matter of assumption, although of course the same could be inferred from circumstances which, in our opinion, have not been shown to exist. We do not regard the defence as a bundle of assertions which could not possibly be true within the domain of reason. There is nothing inherently improbable in the currency notes having been found in one or more of the packages which are said to have been lying unaccounted for in the Customs House, nor can we agree that the averment about residents of Varor having deposited the said packages in response to a warning issued to them earlier borders on the absurd even though it may not be very probable.
Thus as contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 leave the prosecution with no material such as may suffice, apart from documents exhibits 31 and 46 to be incriminatory of any of the accused. Accordingly we accept all the appeals, reverse the impugned judgment, set aside the conviction recorded against and the sentences imposed upon the appellants (being accused Nos. 1 to 11 and 13) and acquit them of the charge in its entirety.
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1979 (3) TMI 200 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ared in all the three cases were flats and not bars. He should have looked into the specifications given in the Gate Passes as well as in the R.G.1 Register before arriving at the conclusion in regard to the classification of the goods. In view of the foregoing observations, I set aside the demand raised by the Superintendent (Gold) in all the above three cases, subject to the satisfaction that specification of the all goods cleared by the appellants conformed strictly to the specification of bars as given above and further that the goods in question had been made from ingots, cut or broken but not rolled so as to qualify for exemption granted under Government of India’s Notification No. 206/63 dated 30.11 1963. As for the penalty of ₹ 25/- in the case at Serial No. l, the same is upheld as the appellants had been found guilty of violation of submitting the RT-12 returns for January, 1974 in time. The penalty imposed in the other two cases is however, set aside.
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1979 (3) TMI 199 - BEFORE THE APPELLATE COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... I also observe that the unit in question cannot also be termed as an evaporative type of cooler since according to I.S.I. Specification No. IS 3315-1974, Filter Pad is an essential part in an evaporative type of cooler, which unit manufactured by the appellant does not have any filter Pads as it works only on the simple principle of cooling air through water sprayed by an air washer by means of a blower. In view of the above discussions, the order passed by the Superintendent is not correct in law as well as on facts, I, therefore, accept the appeal and set aside the order of the Superintendent.
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