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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 97 Records
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1979 (5) TMI 159 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tages relating to direct recruitment and recruitment by promotion specified in column 2 of the Schedule shall not be applicable and the minimum qualifications and the period of production shall be the following, namely- Qualifications.... It is common ground between the parties that the posts comprised in the cadre of Assistant Engineers constituted by the Recruitment Rules have yet to be filled in for the first time. The proviso extracted above therefore will apply fully to the utilization of those vacancies as stated above. It goes without saying that all questions of seniority shall be decided in accordance with the Seniority Rules and that the Recruitment Rules, as amended from time to time, shall be fully implemented as from the date of their enforcement, i.e., 1st of March, 1958. 7. In the result we accept the appeals set aside the judgment of the High Court and decide the dispute between the parties in accordance with the observations made in paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof.
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1979 (5) TMI 157 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ubscribe to what has been observed by the Madras High Court in Narayanaswamy v. Krishnamurthi. I.L.R. (1958) Mad. 513. I would say that the Calcutta High Court in Sarafatulla Sarkar v. Surja Kumar Mondal and the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Uttam Singh v. S. Kirpal Singh appear to have come a more accurate conclusion. 43. Samrath must, therefore, succeed in his appeal. That being so, Marotrao must fail in his. Samrath having been duly elected to the Office of Councillor, Marotrao cannot claim the same office for himself. 44. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 2406 of 1977 is allowed and Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1978 is dismissed. The judgment of the Bombay High Court is set aside and the election petition filed by Marotrao is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their costs. ORDER By majority 45. Civil Appeal No. 2406 of 1977 is allowed. Civil Appeal No. 356/78 is dismissed unanimously. There will be no order as to costs in each of the appeals.
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1979 (5) TMI 156 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e to be followed by a Special Judge he would be a Magistrate empowered to try such a person within the meaning of Rule 3. Relying on this decision the learned Judge held that the same ratio would govern the facts of the present case. The learned Judge was in error in applying the decision of this Court relating to Rule 3 which is framed under Section 549 to Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. The Magistrate contemplated under Rule 3 is a Magistrate who is empowered to inquire with a view to committal which cannot apply to a special judge. 10. In the result on consideration of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act and the Cr.P.C. we have no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that a Special Judge would be a Magistrate empowered to try a case under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. The Special Judge will proceed to exercise the powers that are conferred upon a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court set aside.
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1979 (5) TMI 155 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t is not possible to say that the result of the election has been materially effected by that irregularity. 14. In the appeal filed by Bahekar, the contention raised for him is that on a proper and complete recount of the votes cast for the respective candidates it is he who should be declared duly elected. We are not satisfied that the grounds raised have any substance, and we see no force in his appeal. 15. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 1936 (NCE) of 1978 is allowed and Civil Appeal No. 2387 (NCE) of 1978 is dismissed. The order of the High Court declaring the election of the appellant void and declaring the fifth respondent duly elected is set aside. The election petition is dismissed. The appellant is entitled to his costs throughout against the second and the fifth respondents in the election petition as Well as in the appeal filed by him. The remaining respondents will bear their own costs in that appeal. All the parties will bear their own costs in the other appeal.
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1979 (5) TMI 154 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Section 468, Cr. P. C. which was accrued in their favor, instead of depriving them of the same. ........ ....... . . .............. ................. . I do not feel any justification for condensation of delay in the present case." (11) We agree with Mr. Mehta that after sustaining the accused's objection of limitation the Magistrate should not have proceeded to acquit the accused. Acquittal of an accused after the charge is framed has to be the result of appreciation of evidence since it has to be based on a 'finding of not guilty'. Indeed, in the application dated April 20, 1977 made by the accused, it was prayed that "proceedings against all the accused may be dropped," In these circumstances the proper order should have been to stop further proceedings, direct the file to be consigned to the Record Room, and discharge the sureties. (12) In the light of the circumstances discussed above, we find no merit in the present appeal which is dismissed.
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1979 (5) TMI 153 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n so far as it is alleged that the detenu was found not to be a foreign national. It was further asserted that as a matter of fact various representations of the petitioner seeking Indian citizenship have bean considered and rejected by the authorities. As the petitioner made some assertion about his status it was countered on behalf of the respondents but there is nothing to show that apart from the relevant considerations, the allegation that the petitioner is a foreign national according to the belief of the customs authorities or the, detaining authority has at all influenced the mind of the detaining authority or that this aspect has stealthily crept into the decision of the detaining authority directing detention of the detenu. Therefore, the contention must be negatived. 17. As there is no merit in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of the detenu this petition fails and is dismissed but this being a petition for habeas corpus there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (5) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... about the transfer causing extraordinary increase in expenses of litigation and inconvenience to them, are much too exaggerated. Rather, the balance of convenience is in favour of the Seoni suit being transferred to the Madras High Court which is a superior forum than the District Court, Seoni. 22. As regards the second submission of Mr. Bal, we make it clear that the transfer of the Seoni suit to Madras will be without prejudice to the objection raised by the second respondent, herein, as to the Madras High Court's jurisdiction to try the suit, already instituted there by the petitioner. 23. Mr. Bal's argument founded on Section 10 of the CPC does not arise in this transfer petition, and we express no opinion on it. 24. For the foregoing reasons we allow this petition and transfer suit No. IB of 1972 filed by the second respondent herein in the Court of the District Judge, Seoni, Madhya Pradesh, to the file of the High Court of judicature at Madras (Original Side).
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1979 (5) TMI 151 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r necessary for the individual, is not bona fide visa-vis the community. Therefore, we allow the appeal in the light of the interpretation we have adopted, restore the tribunal's holding and rule that if any transfer defeats the provisions of the Act by reducing the extent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling available from any person such transaction bona fide or not, is void in the matter of computation of the permissible area and the surplus area. May be, that the transaction may be good for other purposes or may not be. The Authorised officer is within his power if he ignores it as void for purposes of s. 22, s. 7 and other ceiling- related provisions. The detailed discussion of the High Court on many other aspects of the Act do not affect the core of the matter and cannot deflect us from the conclusion we have arrived at. The appeals are allowed but in the light of the earlier direction of the Court the State will pay the costs of the respondent. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 150 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s addressed to an entity which did not exist, the whole proceedings stand vitiated in law. The defect in the notice was fatal to the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sales-tax Officer. 5 The notice having thus been held to be vitiated in law, on the basis of which the Sales-tax Officer could not have assumed jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Act/it is not necessary for me to answer the other points raised by the assessee dealer in the revision before me. 6. For the considerations in the above, the defect in the notice issued by the Sales-tax Officer on 23rd March, 1974 was fatal to the continuance of the proceedings' under Section 21 of the Sales Tax Act. The order of the Judge (Revisions) deserves to be quashed and I direct so. 7. The revision is accordingly allowed. In the circumstances, costs shall be borne by the parties. 8. Let a copy of the judgment be sent to the Judge (Revision) under Section 11 (8) of the Act for taking steps in conformity with the judgment.
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1979 (5) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eration in this Court. The appeals fail and are dismissed. C. A. No. 2584 of 1977 Smt. Varghese Marium and another vs. The Taluk Land Board and others The evidentiary value of the purchase certificate came up for consideration in this case in the High Court. In view of our decision on point No. 2, the appeal is allowed and the case is sent back to the High Court for fresh disposal in this respect according to law. C. A. No. 2586 of 1977 P. M. Kuruvilla vs. The State of Kerala and others In view of our decision on point No. 2, the appeal is allowed and the case is sent back to the High Court for fresh disposal according to the law in so far as the question of exclusion of 23.57 acres of land in Trikhadambe village is concerned. In the result C. A. Nos. 869/79, 876/79, 877/79, 878/79, 879/79, 224/78, 895/79, 2564/77 and 2586/77 are allowed to the extent mentioned above. All the other appeals fail and are dismissed. The parties are left to pay and bear their own costs. N. K. A.
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1979 (5) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... declaration that he had also been shot by the appellants, but the High Court felt that he might have been caught between the cross-fire which subsequently ensued after the three had fallen. These were nothing but intentional, coldblooded and brutal murders. In my view, the High Court was justified in confirming the death sentences passed under s. 368(a) of the Code, being satisfied that there were "special reasons" within the meaning of s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973, I would say that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the award of death sentence to the two appellants was neither 'erroneous in principle' nor was 'arbitrary or excessive', or 'indicative of an improper exercise of discretion'. nor my part, I have no sympathy for these trigger-happy gentlemen and the sentence imposed on them is well-merited. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal leaving the appellants to Executive clemency. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ettlement Commission will certainly take due note of the gravity of economic offences on the wealth of the nation which the Wanchoo Committee had emphasised and will exercise its 15 power of immunisation against criminal prosecutions by using its power only sparingly and in deserving cases; otherwise such orders may be come vulnerable if properly challenged. Thus, a holistic perspective in the correct statutory setting makes the conclusion irresistible that the appeal must be allowed, that the Settlement Commission should be inhibited from proceeding with the application of the assessee and the appeals by the assessee before the I.T.A.T. must be revived and disposed of expeditiously. The departmental appeals, having been admitted by the C.I.T. himself to be very weak and frivolous, should not be revived as it will be only a waste of public time and public money. The appeals are allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their costs. Appeals allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 146 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of an order of detention challenged - Held that:- It is amply clear from the record that the representation of the petitioner was not considered by the 1st respondent before he confirmed the order of detention. The 1st respondent thus failed to comply with the constitutional obligation imposed upon him under clause (5) of E: Art. 22. The subsequent consideration and rejection of the representation could not cure the invalidity of the order of confirmation. The detention of the petitioner must, therefore, be held to be illegal and void. These were the reasons for which we made our order dated 11th April, 1979 quashing and setting aside the detention of the petitioner and directing that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 145 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ility of the Limitation Act in this case. There can, however, not be any dispute that the Limitation Act would apply to quasi-judicial proceedings also and that if the mistake of Law is established by pronouncement of a judgment by the Supreme Court, this Act shall have to be applied. In this case it appears that the mistake of Law was discovered by pronouncement of a judgment by the Supreme Court and hence Limitation Act shall apply to this case also. Since the Assistant Collector has not gone into the details of the admissibility of the various amounts of refund as well as the period of limitation with reference to the discovery of the mistake after due diligence, I cannot pass any orders on these two points. However, the refunds shall be sanctioned if otherwise admissible after the Assistant Collector has satisfied himself that the amounts are admissible and that the mistake of Law could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence. The appeal is partially allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 144 - SUPREME COURT
What are the constitutional obligations on the State when it takes action in exercise of its statutory or executive power?
Is the State entitled to deal with its property in and manner it likes or award a contract to any person it chooses without any constitutional limitations upon it?
What are the parameters of its statutory or executive power in the matter of awarding a contract or dealing with its property?
Held that:- The corporations acting as instrumentality or agency of Government would obviously be subject to the same limitations in the field of constitutional and administrative law as Government itself, though in the eye of the law, they would be distinct and independent legal entities. If Government acting through its officers is subject to certain constitutional and public law limitations, it must follow a fortiori that Government acting through the instrumentality or agency of corporations should equally be subject to the same limitations. But the question is how to determine whether a corporation is acting as instrumentality or agency of Government. It is a question not entirely free from difficulty.
It is not possible to formulate an all-inclusive or exhaustive test which would adequately answer this question 'there is no cut and dried formula, which would provide the correct division of corporations into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of Government and those which are not.
It may, therefore, be possible to say that where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregegnated with governmental character. But where financial assistance is not so extensive, it may not by itself, without anything more render the corporation an instrumentality or agency of government, for there are many private institutions which are in receipt of financial assistance from the State and merely on that account, they cannot be classified as State agencies. Equally a mere finding of some control by the State would not be determinative of the question "since a State has considerable measure of control under its police power over all types of business operations". But 'a finding of State financial support plus an unusual degree of control over the management and policies might lead one to characteristic an operation as State action"
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1979 (5) TMI 143 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the article continues to remain the same, it has to be taxed as that commodity alone . After an exhaustive consideration it was held that the sale of ice-cream is exempt from assessment to sales tax. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken therein. The entry has to be interpreted in the manner in which it is understood in common parlance. Ice-cream as everybody knows is a milk product. If in the process of preparation some essence, flavour or gum is mixed it does not cease to be a milk product . Consequently ice-cream is exempt from assessment by virtue of the notification dated 16th February, 1965, issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers under section 4 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. 5.. For the reasons stated in the above, the revision is allowed. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Judge (Revisions) to take steps in conformity with this decision. The revisionist shall get Rs. 100 (one hundred) as costs from the department. Petition allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 142 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion. It would thus appear that the State Government is empowered by issue of notification to fix a higher rate of tax in respect of specified items. This is what has been done by the notification. In respect of bamboo, sales tax has been fixed at 7 per cent. I do not see how it can be said to be beyond the power of the State Government. What has been done is clearly and explicitly authorised by section 6(2) of the Act. It is not in dispute that if sales tax is leviable, cess tax is also leviable. 22.. A number of other decisions were also cited at the Bar. I have not specifically dealt with them as they were decisions on propositions, which are not in dispute, or have no relevancy to the facts and circumstances of the case, in view of my decision on the contentions urged in the course of argument. 23.. I am, therefore, of the view that this application has no merit and must, therefore, be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 500. S.P. SINHA, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (5) TMI 141 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ct. 13.. The revenue had for 12 years exempted the packing material used by the assessee in substantial compliance of the requirements of section 5(2)(a)(ii). The deletion from the registration certificate is done on the erroneous interpretation and application of the decisions of the Supreme Court quoted above and some decisions of the High Courts. Even otherwise, as pointed out by the learned single Judge, the opportunity to show cause given to the assessee was a sham opportunity and was not opportunity in the eyes of law. 14.. For the reasons stated above, we quash order No. ST/M-36/75/533 dated 16th January, 1975, passed by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Ward No. 36, New Delhi. We further direct the Assistant Sales Tax Officer to restore the following items, namely (1) nails, (2) packing material, (3) strips, and (4) packing cases, in the registration certificate of the writ petitioner, M/s. Palam Potteries. The parties will bear their respective costs. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (5) TMI 140 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... entertained by the appellate authority. In such a situation, when the appeal came up for final disposal on 17th November, 1975, it could not be disposed of on merits and had to be dismissed. So far as the necessity for the assessee obtaining extension of time from the appellate authority as regards five per cent required to be deposited under the waiver order, it was obviously necessary for him to do so as the time fixed by the order had run out. The only other course open to the assessee to remedy the defect in the appeal was to deposit the entire tax, i.e., 20 per cent of the assessed tax before the limitation for the appeal expired on 25th May, 1975. The assessee, however, as we have seen, did not deposit twenty per cent of the disputed tax when the appeal came up for hearing. The appeal, as such, was rightly dismissed. The revision is, however, dismissed. A copy of this order will be sent to the revising authority. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (5) TMI 139 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the Union Carbide (India) Ltd. directly outside the State and bills were also raised directly on such customers. This letter has not been found to be incorrect or untrue. It is also a matter of record that the Union Carbide (India) Ltd. has been assessed to Central sales tax for such inter-State sales. The same transactions cannot be treated as two separate inter-State sales. For the reasons above, the dealer succeeds in this application. We answer question No. 1958 9 S.T.C. 353 (S.C.). in the negative and in favour of the dealer. We hold that the relationship between the Union Carbide (India) Ltd. and the dealer was not one of vendor and vendee and answer question No. (2) accordingly. It is not necessary for us to define the precise relationship between the parties. Question No. (3) is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The reference is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. BANERJI, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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