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1979 (6) TMI 135 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se included a document or two which had been marked on the respondent's side as well. The appellate Court had also gone in to the relevant oral evidence on the subject. On a consideration of the entire evidence, the appellate Court concluded; "Therefore, the theory of the defendant that the defendant is a tenant of the entire premises has got to be rejected". This conclusion based as it is on the evidence on record, cannot be regarded as erroneous in point of law. It has not been, and it cannot be, urged that the appellate Court's finding is perverse or is otherwise vitiated by any legal flaws in reasoning. 15. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside. The appellants will have a decree for permanent injunction as prayed for by them against the respondent. The cross-objections filed by the respondent is dismissed. I make no order as to costs, both in the second appeal and in the cross-objections.
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1979 (6) TMI 134 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essional statements recorded on December 13, 14, 1977 were voluntary statements or were statements which were obtained from the detenu under duress or whether the subsequent retraction of those statements by the detenu on December 22, 1977 was in the nature of an afterthought, were primarily for the detaining authority to consider before deciding to issue the impugned detention order but since admittedly the aforesaid vital facts which would have influenced the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other were neither placed before nor considered by the detaining authority it must be held that there was non-application of mind to the most material and vitial facts vitiating the requisite satisfaction of the detaining authority thereby rendering the impugned detention order invalid and illegal. 15. In the result and for the reasons stated, the rule is made absolute. The order of detention is quashed, with a direction that the detenu R. Sathyadass be released forthwith.
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1979 (6) TMI 133 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ove the view taken by Alagiriswami, J., in Writ Petition Nos. 2397 to 2399 of 1976 and Ismail, J., in Writ Petition No. 642 of 1969, and hold that the decision in Lakshmi Venkatesan (minor) v. Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition W.P. No. 1418 of 1972--(1978) 91 L.W. 1, is not good law. 20. The reference will stand answered accordingly. We direct the papers to be placed before the learned Chief Justice for the writ petition being posted before a single Judge for disposal after considering the other grounds set out by the petitioners for quashing the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. This petition coming on for hearing on this day, before the Honourable Mr. Justice V. Kamaswami, pursuant to the order of the full Bench, dated 22nd June, 1979, the Court made the following Order --(4th September, 1979). 21. In view of the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 3469 of 1976, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1979 (6) TMI 132 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... hat the duty in respect of the said yarn should have been recovered at the rate of ₹ 10 per Kg. inasmuch as that was the rate applicable to the variety of yarn in question, on the date of payment, as per Government of India’s Notification No. 85/77, dated 9-5-1977. He has further pleaded that the observation made by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, M.O.D. III, New Delhi to the effect that since the subject yarn was seized on 5-11-1976, the rate of duty applicable in respect thereof would be the rate prevailing prior to 5-11-1976 is not correct and is contrary to the provisions of Rule 9A(5) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The plea put fourth by the appellant is correct as according to the said Rule, the rate of duty applicable to excisable goods in such cases shall be the rate in force on the date on which the duty is paid. I accordingly accept the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, M.O.D. III, New Delhi.
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1979 (6) TMI 131 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... As pointed out earlier, Bhide s case(6) turned on the finding that the contract was for training out ballast and not merely for stacking the ballast. Therefore, it is sufficient to state that Bhide s case(6) does not govern cases as the present one, where the contract is only for stacking ballast. 7.. In the light of the above discussion our conclusion is that the contract for supply by stacking of ballast at specified points entered into by the petitioner with the railway department was only a contract of sale and not a contract for work. 8.. In the result, our answer to the question, referred for our opinion, is as follows A contract under which an assessee agrees to supply jelly (ballast) to the purchaser with the condition that the jelly (ballast) would be stacked in a particular manner before delivering, would not amount to a contract for work or a composite contract for sale of goods and for work, but only amounts to a contract of sale. Reference answered accordingly.
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1979 (6) TMI 130 - KERALA HIGH COURT
A Firm, Agricultural Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... to us the decision of a Division Bench of of this court in Commr. of Agrl. I T. v. K. S. Narayanan Tratan Namboodiripad 1967 64 ITR 57 holding that janmikaran is not income under the Agrl. I.T. Act. Neither the decision nor the principle has direct application here. Counsel also placed reliance on the ruling of a Division Bench of this court in S. A. Ramaraj v. Commr. of Agrl. I. T. 1969 71 ITR 108 and on the decision of the Madras High Court in State of Madras v. Moulvie Estate 1968 70 ITR 138. In the light of the categorical pronouncement of the Supreme Court in CIT v. R. M. Chidambaram Pillai 1977 106 ITR 292, we are unable to derive any assistance from these decisions. In the result, we answer the questions referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be communicated to the Tribunal, as required by law.
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1979 (6) TMI 129 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Transfer ... ... ... ... ..... he sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset or the extinguishment of any rights therein or the compulsory acquisition thereof under any law. As held in CIT v. Janab N. Hyath Batcha Sahib 1969 72 ITR 528 (Mad), there is no sale in a case like this. There is no exchange either. Nor is there any relinquishment of the asset or any extinguishment of any rights therein. In a partnership, a partner does not completely divest himself of his rights in the property, which is a partnership asset so as to result in relinquishment. He has a community of interest in the assets of the firm and, therefore, these expressions, viz., relinquishment of the asset or the extinguishment of any rights therein cannot apply. It will consequently follow that there is no transfer as contemplated by s. 2(47) attracting the liability under s. 45 also. Following these decisions, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (6) TMI 128 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... s nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain and proceed with the suit. Mr. Vakil has brought to my notice the order made by this court in Company Application No. 166 of 1978 granting to the plaintiff on 4th August, 1978, leave to proceed with the suit as against the company. Therefore, not only the suit as against defendant No. 2 can proceed but it can also proceed as against defendant No. 1. In the result, I find that the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from no infirmity. The civil revision application, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged with costs. In this civil revision application, defendant No. 2 has also prayed for transfer of the suit from the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad to this court. I cannot decide this plea in a revision application. Defendant No. 2 will be at liberty to make an appropriate application to this court for the purpose if he thinks fit to do so.
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1979 (6) TMI 119 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... alternative but to admit the petition for winding up. Mr. Chinoy has lastly urged that the petitioners have filed this petition mala fide with the intention of capturing the boat-yard of the company. In support of his contention he has urged that the petitioners knew that the debts were not presently payable. There is no substance in this argument either. There are 24 boats which are lying unfinished with no prospects of their completion. Under such circumstances, it is disingenuous on the part of the company to urge that the petitioners should wait till after the completion of the contracts when they fully knew that there are no prospects of completing the contracts. The petition is accordingly admitted. The petition should be advertised in the Indian Express, Bombay Samachar and the Maharashtra Government Gazette. Hearing of the petition is fixed for August 22, 1979. Mr. Doctor states that the petitioners will not advertise the petition for a period of one week from today.
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1979 (6) TMI 118 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... the shares of the transferor-company. I have not examined this aspect of the matter in any detail because admittedly inclusion or exclusion of these figures make only a marginal difference to the valuation of shares. In my view, there is nothing contrary to public interest in the scheme of amalgamation which is presented before me. The official liquidator has made a report under the provisions of section 394(1) of the Companies Act, which goes to show that the affairs of the transferor-company have not been conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of its members or public interest. Under the circumstances, there will be an order in terms of prayers ( a), (b), (c), (d ), (f), (g), (h ) and (i). In prayer (h) the time fixed for delivering a copy of the order will be 30 days from the date of the sealing of the order. Registrar to consolidate the files immediately thereafter. Petitioners to pay the costs of the Regional Director of the Company Law Board fixed at Rs. 300.
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1979 (6) TMI 103 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... renovation charges and without claiming any abatement, duty was paid on such amount also. In price list dated 1-4-1997 appellant proposed refund of the rebate collected earlier and claimed abatement in respect of the same from the assessable value. 4. emsp In the Order-in-Appeal No. E/1514/89-A, we examined the various circulars issued by the appellant and held that in the previous year appellant raised money for the purpose of modernisation and renovation on the understanding that the same will be repaid the next year and will not carry any interest and it was only a scheme for raising loan to meet specified contingencies and to be repaid in due course. Accordingly, it was held that the rebate was not one in the nature of discount but in the nature of loan repayment and, therefore, deduction would not be admissible. For the same reasons, we hold that deduction claimed in this case in respect of rebate also would not be admissible. 5. emsp The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1979 (6) TMI 102 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... purchased jointly by all the ten persons. The mere fact that by a stroke of fortune that one of the tickets secured the prize would not mean that the members associated together by carrying on a commercial activity to produce income. As observed earlier, the other ingredients necessary to constitute an AOP like common management, common activity to produce income etc., are utterly lacking in this case. As stated above, for the mere reason that one of the tickets which was jointly owned by all the ten persons secured the prize all the ten persons became the owners of the prize money in equal shares. The authorisation given to the bank to collect the prize money and to credit the same equally to the ten persons also confirm the position that there was only joint ownership of the winning ticket and there was no AOP carrying on any activity to produce income as alleged by Revenue. For the foregoing reason, we uphold the order of the AAC. 9. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (6) TMI 101 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... to the facts of this case. On a careful consideration of the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case. We are satisfied that the delay in filing the returns of wealth for the years under appeal by the assessee was not without reasonable cause. We therefore, uphold the orders of the AAC cancelling the penalties. 6. The learned counsel for the assessee pointed out that in any event the quantum of penalties levied for the asst. yrs. 1967-68 and 1968-69 was in excess of the quantum authorised by law as was in force during the time when the returns were due. His submission is correct. As per the law then in force, the wealth-tax penalties should have been levied at the rate of 2 per cent of the tax for every month of default and not exceeding in the aggregate 50 per cent of the tax. However, we have by this order upheld the order of the AAC cancelling the penalties on the ground that there was reasonable cause for the delay. 7. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1979 (6) TMI 98 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... ell or dispose of the said property during her life time then the said property is to be divided among the three sons and their heirs equally in three shares. . If the lady had given this property to the assessee during her life time, it could perhaps be said that it was a different case. Since the assessee got this property only after the death of his mother, in terms of the settlement deed, it is clear that the character of being ancestral got revived as a result of the direction in the settlement deed and the income from these properties could be assessed only in the hands of the assessee s HUF and not in his individual hands. In the light of the above discussion, I hold that the AAC was right in directing the exclusion of the income from the properties devolved on the assessee consequent to the death of his mother from the individual assessment of his assessee. I, accordingly, confirm his order. 8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection is allowed.
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1979 (6) TMI 97 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... from out of the joint family property to his wife. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the mere fact that the donor happened to be the manager of the joint family and that the gift was part of the joint family property would not make the gift a gift by the Hindu joint family. In the instant case, the gift was made by the Karta who is also the husband of the donee of half the amount of capital standing in the capital account in the firm M/s Peerless Theatres, May,uram. The gift was made by the Karta as a husband to his wife, though the gift made was out of the joint family property. No other decision in support of the stand of the Revenue was brought to our notice. Respectfully following the rulings of the High Courts referred to above, we hold that the assessee is entitled to exemption in respect of the gift made to the wife under s. 5(1)(viii) of the G.T. Act. We accordingly uphold the order of the AAC. 7. In the result, the appeal of the Revenue fails and is dismissed.
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1979 (6) TMI 94 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... Even under the English Act there is no judicial decisions which prohibits or is against the same inclusion. Green s Estate Duty only speaks of a practice in certain cases, whereas Diamond s Death duty not only does not refer to the practice but in fact suggests a liberal approach only. Even from the point of equity we do not see how when a person who seeks to give a gift wants to enjoy the fruits thereof by retaining the property with himself should be given not a single advantage, namely allowance of gift-tax on the estate duty claim but a double advantage. Double addition is one thing but to allow double deduction is altogether a different thing. Unless specific provisions of the statute permits the same there is no justification for the same. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the disallowance of the debt of Rs. 10,000 referable to the gifted amount is justified. The Asstt. Controller s order is restored. The departmental appeal is allowed.
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1979 (6) TMI 92 - ITAT MADRAS-C
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... ... ..... rom his service this obligation has left solely to the assessee himself and for fulfilling this obligation he had depend on his former office. That being the case, the assessee s explanation that he had to wait for the particulars of his leave salary from the Pay and Accounts Officer and had also trace out his income tax file which misplaced by the Accountant of his former office cannot be considered as an after thought because there is nothing to show that the assessees had wantonly chosen to disregard his statutory obligation and wanted to take advantage by postponing the tax payments. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that there is nothing to attribute conscious neglect or disregard on the part of the assessee in filling the returns belatedly. Having regard to the above and applying the ratio of the decision of the madras High Court in V.L. Dutt s case (1) I cancel the penalties for both the assessment years. 6. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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1979 (6) TMI 90 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... he order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, dt. 30th March, 1976, is not final. Before the Magistrate, the assessee had categorically stated that he has nothing to do with the articles seized and that further the Magistrate has observed that the assessee has not claimed the goods as his and, therefore, he is not entitled to get the return of the goods seized. The revenue has not brought on record any material to show that the plea of the assessee that he is not the owner of the seized goods is false. On a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, as discussed above, we hold that the case of the Revenue that the assessee is the owner of the gold ornaments and the semi-precious stones seized by the Central Excise authorities is unfounded and except bare suspicion, there is no material to support it. Consequently, the provisions of s. 69A would not apply to this case. We, therefore, delete the addition made. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (6) TMI 89 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... and an authority like the Tribunal acting anywhere in the country has to respect the law laid down by the High Court, though of a different state so long as there is no contrary decision of any other High Court on that question. In the instant case, the Madras High Court in the case reported in 110 ITR 256 has held that r. 19A(3) of the IT Rules has to be ignored. A special Bench (Bombay)of the Tribunal comprising five Members, viz., S/Shri T.D. Sugla, Vice President, B.B. Palekar, A. Krishnamurthy, T.A. Upponi and P.G.K. Warrior in the case of M/s. Amar Dye-Chem. Ltd. Bombay vs. ITO Com, Cir. II (3), Bombay, for asst. yr. 1970-71 in ITA No.3643/Bom/1974-75,dt.1st Dec.,1977,has held that r. 19A(3) has to be ignored in the computation of capital for the purpose of relief under s. 80J. Respectfully following the above ruling of the Madras High Court and other High Courts referred to above, we uphold the order of the AAC. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and stands dismissed.
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1979 (6) TMI 88 - ITAT MADRAS-A
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... ... ..... ITR 715, the Madras High Court held at page 720 that even if the extinction of the old firm and the constitution of the new firm took place simultaneously, in law it must be presumed that the retirement of the partners of the old firm preceded the constitution of the new firm, for, unless the old firm ceased to exist a new firm could not come into being. In that case, 4 out of 5 partners retire from the firm, the remaining partner took over the rights and liabilities of the firm and later on the same day a new firm was formed by taking in three new partners. On those facts the Hon ble High Court made the above observation. But the principle laid down would apply to this case where on the death of the partner Shri Sivanesan on 12th June, 1976 there was an automatic dissolution of the firm and the new firm came into existence only on 14th June, 1976. For the forgoing reasons, we uphold the order of the AAC. 8. In the result, the appeal of the Revenue fails and stands dismissed.
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