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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 160 Records
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1979 (8) TMI 223 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... udgment of the appellate court is of reversal, the appellate court should consider all the relevant and material evidence on record and thereafter give reasons for the said decision. (2) Where the judgment of the appellate court is of affirmance it is not necessary that every piece of evidence is considered once again but there must be sufficient discussion to show that the court has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellate court should further state the reasons why it finds itself in agreement with the prescribed authority. 12. In view of the above, I agree with the submission made by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. The judgment of the District Judge is no judgment in the eye of law. 13. In the circumstances, I allow the petition, quash the judgment of the appellate court dated 29th April 1977 and remand the case for decision afresh in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 222 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... people to violence , What words did he employ , What, then, is the connection between these grounds and acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order There is no answer to be gleaned from the grounds recited in paragraphs three and four which must therefore, be held to be both irrelevant and vague. In paragraph five it is said that the detenu instigated educated unemployed youth to go on a hunger strike. A hunger strike, in our country, is a well known form of peaceful protest but it is difficult to connect it with public disorder. We consider this ground also to be vague and irrelevant. The allegation that the detenu made derogatory remarks about Shri Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, Chief Minister of Kashmir, and compared him with General Zia of Pakistan appears to us, again, to be entirely irrelevant. I do not think it is necessary to refer to all the grounds in any further detail as that has been done by my brother Shinghal,J. N. K. A. Petition allowed.
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1979 (8) TMI 221 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dquo;Bata Shoe Company Private Ltd.” was a mere misdescription and should be allowed to be corrected by way of amendment. In such a case no question of limitation arises. No prejudice also can it cause to the defendant. 19. Strictly this is not a case coming under S. 23(3) of the Companies Act for that section contemplates a change of the name during the pendency of a proceeding. Here the change in name did not take place while the suit, namely Money Suit No. 20 of 1976 was pending. The change took place prior to the institution of the suit by the company by its former name. Since the change in the name did not affect the identity or entity of the company itself, we hold that it was merely a case of error in the description of the company when it sued by its former name. In that view of the matter we find no grounds to interfere with the order allowing the prayer for amendment. The revisional application accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. The rule is discharged.
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1979 (8) TMI 220 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Judge initially came to the conclusion that an application under Order 21, Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was not maintainable in view of the unreported decision of this Court. Therefore this is a fit case where the matter should be remitted back to the trial Court for deciding the question on merits afresh in accordance with law after giving a reasonable opportunity to both the sides to put forward their respective cases. In the result therefore, the rule is made absolute. The order passed by the Small Cause Court, Bombay dated 19th Nov. 1976 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Small Cause Court, Bombay for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law after giving a reasonable opportunity to both the sides to put forward their cases. As the matter is long,, pending, the trial Court is directed to decide the same as expeditiously as possible. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. 11. Rule made absolute.
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1979 (8) TMI 219 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... Police Act. Unlike section 3 of the Act, that section does not go to the extent of penalising the accused where he is proved to "have been in possession" of that property. It is true that the gravamen of the offence under section 3 of the Act is the "possession" of the property, but it need not necessarily be a subsisting possession, and it is sufficient if the accused was proved to "have be in possession" of that property at any point of time. In the view we have taken, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court dated November 30, 1972, is set aside, and the trial court is directed to frame a charge under section 3 of the Act against accused 1, 2, 5 and the absconding accused in addition to the charge under sections 379/34 and 461/34 I.P.C. The accused are directed to appear in the trial court on September 3, 1979. The trial of the case has been considerably delayed and it should now proceed with expedition. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (8) TMI 218 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ders would be subject to the same infirmity. From the evidence on record it appears nobody really knows the actual value of the 37 items of the jewellery. It may be well worth more than ₹ 20.25 crores. 66. We must, therefore, uphold the judgment of the High Court setting aside the alleged sale of 37 items of jewellery belonging to H.E.H. the Nizam's Jewellery Trust, effected by the Board of Trustees in favour of the appellants and other successful tenderers for ₹ 14.43 crores, but set aside its order accepting the bid of the eighth respondent, Peter Jansin Fernandez, for purchase of the jewellery for ₹ 20.25 crores, and direct a re-auction on the terms specified separately. 67. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. The appellants, in all these appeals, excepting Civil Appeal No. 1269 of 19-78, shall bear their own costs and pay one set of cost to the respondents as they have substantially failed. The two special leave applications are also dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 217 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... there was fraud the court could not assist the party in fraud even if both sides were involved in the fraud. He invoked the doctrine of In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis. We are not inclined to examine these contentions but leave it open to the executing court to go into such pleas as are permissible at the execution stage. Beyond that he has no jurisdiction but within that he has a duty to decide. On these findings we dismiss the appeal but direct the Controller to go into the question of the validity of the sanction and such other objections as may be available in the light of our observations recorded above. The first point raised is untenable and we should have directed costs while dismissing the appeal. The second point raised is of great public moment and the appellant has broadly succeeded on that question. The result is that the community has benefited by our declaration of the law and the parties must, therefore bear their respective costs throughout.
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1979 (8) TMI 216 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... andlord had acquired a right to institute a proceeding for the eviction of the tenants that could not be taken away by the amendment which was not given a retrospective operation either by express words or by necessary implication. We are unable to agree. It has been held ever since Abbet v. Minister of Land (1895) AC 425 that a mere right to take advantage of the provisions of an Act is not an accrued right. Abbot's case (supra) was followed by this Court in a number of cases Sakharam v. Manikchand Mothichand Shah and Anr. Hungerford Investment Trust Limited v. Haridas Mundhra and Ors. Lalji Raja & Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram . In the present the application for possession was made long after the amendment came into force; even the right to institute a proceeding does not appear to have accrued before the amendment because the notice terminating the tenancy was also issued after the proviso was amended. There is no substance in the appeal which is dismissed with costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 215 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t has been argued by the learned Standing Counsel that the Supreme Court has not gone to the length of saying that the entries in favour of other persons apart from these in whose favour entry was made should also be produced by the Department. The passage where the Supreme Court has laid down has been quoted above. From that it is clear that the Department has to produce the person on whose evidence it relies for coming to the conclusion that the assessee has made purchase or sale and has suppressed the turnover. As there was no evidence in the case which could establish that 65 maunds of oil was the suppressed turnover of the assessee the Additional Judge Revision did not commit any error in accepting the turnover disclosed in the account books. 5. In the result the revision fails and is dismissed. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which is assessed at ₹ 200/- one set only. The fee of the Standing Counsel is also assessed at ₹ 100/- in both revisions.
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1979 (8) TMI 214 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... k-charged employees are bound by the settlement dated June 28, 1977 effected between them and the management in the conciliation proceedings and since they are also bound by and have accepted benefits under the consent award dated May 15, 1974, they are not entitled to any rights apart from those flowing from the A aforesaid settlement and the Award. Special Leave Petition No. 1246 of 1979 which is filed to challenge the Award and C.M.P. No. 2077 of 1979 which is filed for condonation of the delay of over four and half years caused in filing the S.L.P. shall have to be dismissed We would like to say that in regard to the work-charged employees, it is high time that the Government framed specific rules to govern their employment so as to dispel all doubts and confusion. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that all the Writ Petitions, the Special Leave Petition and the C.M.P. for condonation of delay are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 213 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ion to the scheme. It was only in October, 1963 that they moved this Court challenging the scheme but the writ petition which they filed was withdrawn and in December, 1963 they filed a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed in limine as stated earlier. That the appellants did not question the validity of the scheme framed in 1964 until October, 1968 has already been stated. They did not also implead in their writ petition in High Court, the other landholders who were likely to be affected in case this scheme was disturbed. For these reasons, we think that the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine. The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as at costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 212 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... technical ground. On merits, a second enquiry could be held. It was rightly held. The order of reinstatement does not bring about any distinction in that regard. The Government had to pass that order because the earlier order of reversion had been quashed by the High Court. Without reinstating the appellant, it would have been difficult perhaps unlawful, to start a fresh enquiry against the appellant. The observations of this Court in the last paragraph of the judgment in State of Assam & Anr. v. J. N. Roy Biswas are not applicable to the facts of the present case and do not help the appellant at all. The reduced amount paid to the appellant for the period of suspension was affirmed by making it a part of the order of reversion itself. That being so, the second point urged by the counsel is also, of no substance. For the reasons, stated above, we dismiss this appeal but since the, appellant has already retired from service, we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 211 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt was right in its view that no notice to quit was necessary under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in order to enable the landlady-respondent to get an order of eviction against the tenant-appellant. But we were told by learned counsel for the appellant that he had some more points to urge before the High Court to challenge the order of eviction. We do not find from the judgment of the High Court that the appellant was prevented from supporting the orders of the courts below in his favour by urging any other point. No point of substance could be indicated before us which was worth consideration after a clear and definite finding by the Appellate Court that the respondent required the premises bona fide for a personal necessity. We do not think it advisable to delay the proceeding any further and send back the case to the High Court on this account. We accordingly dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
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1979 (8) TMI 210 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rs after the redemption in 1918, of the last mortgage by the redeeming co-mortgagor. This being the situation, the non-redeeming mortgagor's suit for his share of the property on payment of his proportionate share of the mortgage money would be barred irrespective of whether the limitation is governed by the provisions of Limitation Regulation corresponding to Article 132 or 144 or any other Article of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Therefore, as at present advised, we do not feel the necessity of laying down the law with regard to this aspect of the case. Since the limitation started running in 1913 or 1918, the suit was time-barred from every point of view. For all the fore-going reasons, we uphold the finding of the High Court that the plaintiff's claim in regard to suit items 31 to 40, 42 and 44 was time barred and dismiss the appeal. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties are left to pay and bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 209 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uthorities as well. Since nothing has turned out in positive, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking for appropriate relief . 2. Heard the learned Government Pleader as well. W.P.(C)No.13075 OF 2013 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the only relief pressed before this Court is for issuance of a direction to the first respondent to consider and finalise Ext.P8 within a reasonable time. 4. In view of the limited extent of relief sought for, this Court does not find it necessary to issue notice to the 4th respondent for the time being. The first respondent is directed to consider and finalise Ext.P8 at the earliest, at any rate, within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the 4th respondent. The petitioner shall produce a copy of the judgment along with a copy of the writ petition before the first respondent for further steps. The writ petition is disposed of.
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1979 (8) TMI 208 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... weaver; the woven cloth is made into wearing apparel by the tailor." At each of these stages distinct utilities are produced and what is produced is at the next stage consumed. It is usual, and correct to speak of raw cotton being consumed in ginning. Applying this test the conclusion is irresistible that when uncrushed salt is crushed in the factory it is commercially a different article and the uncrushed salt must be held to have been consumed. The word "use" is of wider import than "consumption". It cannot be denied that the uncrushed salt has been used and by the user a new product crushed salt has come into existence. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case we are satisfied that octroi is leviable on the uncrushed salt which is brought-to the octroi area and crushed as the activity would amount to both consumption and use of the uncrushed salt. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 207 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... me sort of a "shabait", and vests in the mutt as a juristic person. This has been sufficiently borne out in the definition of "math" in clause 10 of section 6 of the Madras Act of 1951. A mutt has therefore a laudable object and it is in the interest of all concerned that such endowments should be properly administered. As there are mutts in the other areas of the Karnataka State (besides the South Kanara district) it is necessary that the State Government should examine whether the contribution provided for by the Madras Act of 1951 is really necessary and advantageous for the proper administration of the religious and charitable institutions and endowments in the State as a whole and if not, whether it is an inequality, and its continued applicability to the South Kanara district can be justified with reference to article 14 of the Constitution. I agree with the Chief Justice that this may be done "say, within a year or so." Appeals dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 206 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt, the respondents have wrongful and illegally deprived the petitioners of their rights and the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs claimed in this petition. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (b) of paragraph 23 of the petition. Mr. Taraporewala states that the respondents have refused to grant import licence even for the subsequent period for which the contract was subsisting and though the petitioners have not filed a separate petition challenging that order, still the petitioners should be given relief in that connection. As the petitioners have not even amended the petition claiming additional relief, I would not be justified in granting that relief but I have no doubt that the respondents would grant necessary reliefs to the petitioners in view of this judgment. The respondents shall pay the costs of this petition. The respondents shall grant the import licences within a period of eight weeks from today.
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1979 (8) TMI 205 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has been proved beyond reasonable doubt so as to invoke the provisions of section 98B(1) of the Act and to draw the presumption envisaged by section 99 of the Act. It will be allowing the prosecution to take advantage of the weakness of the defence if the opposite parties’ submissions are accepted. Hence the contention put forward by the opposite parties nos. 1 and 2 cannot be sustained. 10. We, therefore, hold that the prosecution has failed to establish by clear and cogent evidence that the primary gold in question was in possession, control or custody of the accused petitioner. He, therefore, cannot be found guilty of the charge under section 85(i)(ii) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. 11. The Rule is, therefore, made absolute. The conviction and sentences of imprisonment imposed upon the accused petitioner be hereby set aside and he is acquitted. The fine, if already paid, shall be refunded. 12. Let the petitioner be discharged from his bail bond.
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1979 (8) TMI 204 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the giving of fire-arms by a person holding a licence for repairing and dealing in fire- arms for repairs to mechanic who holds no such licence, but does the repair job at his workshop at a place different from the factory or place of business of the licence holder, amounts to "delivery of those arms into the possession of another person" within the contemplation of Section 29(b) of the Arms Act, 1959?
Held that:- There is nothing in those materials to show that before handing over those fire- arms to Mrityunjoy Dutta for repairs, the respondents had done anything to ascertain that Mrityunjoy Dutta was legally authorised to retain those arms even for the limited purpose of repairing them. Thus, prima facie the materials before the Magistrate showed that the respondents had delivered the fire-arms in question into the possession of Mrityunjoy Dutta, without previously ascertaining that he was legally authorised to have the same in his possession, and as such, the respondents appeared to have committed and offence under Section 29(b) of the Act. Further, by allowing the fire-arms to be removed to a place other than the places of their business or factory specified in Column 3 of their licences in Form IX, the respondents appear to have contravened condition 1(c) of their licence - Appeal allowed and set aside the orders of the Courts below whereby respondents 1 to 4, herein, were discharged.
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