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Showing 1 to 20 of 201 Records
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1980 (3) TMI 275 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the part of the learned Sessions Judge while granting bail to Durbeen Singh. The offence is mentioned as one punishable under Section 380 and 460 1. P. G. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge was under the impression that there was no offence of murder. That is why he did not take into consideration that fact. Therefore, indications are that the aforesaid order proceeds on the wrong basis. In my opinion, the case calls for reconsideration and if need be cancellation of bail under Sub-section (2) of Section 439 of the Code by the learned Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge shall reconsider after giving notice to Durbeen Singh as well as prosecution. The prosecution 'will also be at liberty to make application for cancellation of bail before this Court or the Sessions Judge. (11) I, Therefore, reject the present petition. A copy of this order be sent to the learned Sessions Judge pin-pointing observation of this Court as contained in the proceeding paragraph.
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1980 (3) TMI 274 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... grant of the loan itself. Such acknowledgments cannot ensure for these future dates and have to be construed as having been made on the date when they were executed. 36. In this view of the matter, the acknowledgment resulting from the drawing of the cheques, in the present case, must be held to have been made prior to at least June 23, 1973, when these cheques were seized by the I.T. Dept. Those acknowledgments, Therefore, do not save the limitation for the suit brought on October 29, 1976. 37. The plaintiff is, Therefore, entitled to relief only on the basis of 20 cheques, the payments of which fell due within three years of the institution of the suit. Their total amount comes to ₹ 53,500. The defendants shall pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date from which each of these cheques was encashable till realisation. This rate of interest is allowed under s. 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The plaintiff will also be entitled to proportionate costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 273 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Reference was made to Madan Lal Pun v. Sain Das Berry and Kamla Sont v. Rup Lal Mehra AIR 1969 NSC 186 on the one hand and T.B. Sarvate v. Nemichand 1966 MPLG 26 and Mattulal v. Radhe Lal on the other hand. We do not think it is necessary for the purpose of this case to enter into discussion of this question. Merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact it and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. It must, further be shown that there was a taint of such unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice, A concurrent finding, base on evidence, that the landlord did not bonafide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not in our view a finding which can be touched by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The appeal is therefore, allowed with costs. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the appellate Court is restored.
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1980 (3) TMI 272 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t that on the conclusion of hearing of this appeal in order to heal the wound caused by impaired dignity of the appellant as herein before mentioned, a suggestion was made to the Government to see if the present appellant could be accommodated in some way where he may not feel the humiliation which he claims he suffers. Mr. P. Parameswara Rao, learned counsel for the Government promised to discuss the matter with the Government and ultimately on March 7. 1980, the Central Government offered the post of Director and Head of the Department for a programme concerned with vision impairment and amelioration thereof. In that post the appellant would be the Head of the Department and would continue to be in supertime grade II. This offer did not appeal to the appellant and the matter was left at that. There is no substance in any of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant and, therefore, this appeal fails and it is dismissed with no order as to costs. V.D. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (3) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... continue his studies in the exigencies of the case and in the light of the observations we have made above. Dr. Naomi and Dr. Gopalakrishnan will be assigned a seat each in one or other two Medical Colleges by the Principal of the Medical College, Trivandrum who is the convener of the selection committee. 36. Finally, we make it clear once again that the only branch which has fallen for our examination is the degree course in Opthalmology. No other department or course is sought to be upset. The Court is not a bull in a china shop and we restrict the order we have made to the solitary department of Opthalmology and wish to leave undisturbed all the other studies in progress. 37. We must express our distress at being driven to patchwork solutions because of the academic crisis created by the State in working out its programme of selection and hope that time will not be lost in giving a fresh and fundamental look at the problem so that litigative history may not repeat itself.
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1980 (3) TMI 270 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion, but this is obviously not so. All notifications and laws previously in force are continued by Section 484(2) of the new Act, and in any case, the notification was issued under the Amendment Act, 1932 which is not at all affected by the repeal of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. (5) The petitioner then wanted the proceedings to be quashed on the ground that no case was made out. He said that in spite of several prosecution witnesses having been examined, no prima facie case had been made out. Learned counsel for the State urged that the prosecution evidence was not yet complete. It is unnecessary to deal with this point because no ground has been taken in the Writ Petition to the effect that the proceedings should be quashed because of the absence of a prima facie case against the petitioner. We cannot allow a ground to be taken which is not in the Writ petition. So, we make no observations on this question. In view of our conclusions, we dismiss this Writ Petition.
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1980 (3) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ave recorded a clear finding against the appellant so as to set aside the settlement in his favour on any of the grounds mentioned in Rule 211. But this does not vitiate its order, because such a ground is implicit in the finding by the Board that the money paid to the former lessee by the appellant to get possession of the shop did not come from bona fide sources. At the highest ail that can be said, is that if the High Court or this Court were in the position of the Board as an appellant authority it might have upheld the settlement in favour of the appellant who was an educated, unemployed youth belonging to the "more backward community". This however, as already observed, is not a ground for setting aside the Judgment of the Board in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction, particularly when the period of settlement is about to run out in a couple of months by March 31, 1980. 19. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 268 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... election, then it will be open the Central Government to make such a selection in such fair manner as it decides. But we further impose a time bound restriction upon the Central Government, since rights of parties are involved. We direct the Central Government, having heard the learned Attorney-General on this point, that the new policy, if any, shall be made within one month from now. The learned Attorney-General says that this is quite feasible. We should not be misunder stood to lay down the proposition that it is not open to the Central Government to make any policy, regarding any matter including the selection to the Directorate of Military Farms, at any time it likes, provided its acts justly and fairly. 6. We make it further clear that the Central Government will be free to act subject to the directions we have given above the untrammelled by the reasoning of the direction given above High Court. We dispose of the Writ Petition and the Civil Appeal on the above basis.
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1980 (3) TMI 267 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ply his mind to the facts disclosed and to the reasons given for filing the application late and then to give his decision. As the Lt. Governor had rejected the application on the preliminary ground of maintainability on erroneous view of law, his order clearly disclosed an error of law and learned Judge was Therefore right in setting aside the same and sending the matter back to Lt. Governor for reconsideration on merits. We, Therefore, must reject the contention that Section 5 of Limitation Act was not applicable to the case. We also hold that in any case Lt. Governor had inherent powers to entertain the application, if there were good reasons for it. But the Lt. Governor by holding that he had no power to do refused to exercise his jurisdiction vested in him and thus committed an error patent on the face of record and the learned Judge was right in quashing the said order. (11) As a result we find no merit in the appeal and we dismiss it but without any order as to costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 266 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... points had been decided against the parties in the present case, neither of them could have appealed therefrom. That judgment cannot, therefore, be said to operate as res judicata on any point or on any ground whatsoever in the present case. 6. No other point was raised before me and the findings on the other relevant issues entitling the plaintiff to decree, as recorded by the trial court being in his favour and not having been disturbed or touched by the lower appellate court, and not having been canvassed before me, the appeal must be allowed and the decree passed by the trial court restored. 7. In the result the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside. The decree of the trial court decreeing the suit for ejectment of the defendants from the house in suit and for recovery of ₹ 180/- up to the date of the suit and for pendente lite and future damages at the rate of ₹ 5/- per month is restored with costs throughout.
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1980 (3) TMI 265 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bility by doing something outside the meeting of the board of directors for which separate remuneration was paid to them. As stated earlier, the assessee had, before the Income-tax authorities, accepted that the remuneration paid by it to its directors for attending the meetings of the board was not inadequate. Accordingly, the annual remuneration paid by the company to its directors could not be linked with the responsibility undertaken by the members of the board either under the articles of association or other provisions of the Companies Act. So long as a particular remuneration is not linked or connected with any activity which is beneficial to the company, the payment of the same would be hit by section 40(c) of the Act. In the result, we answer the questions referred to us by the Tribunal in these references in the affirmative and in favour of the department. The Commissioner shall be entitled to one set of costs in these references, which are assessed at ₹ 200.
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1980 (3) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... out by this Court in the case referred to above. On this ground alone the appellant must fail. Dr. Chitale, however, suggested that out of 2.2 acres, possession of one acre may have been taken by the Government. Assuming that to be so, until the possession of the entire land acquired was taken by the Government, the acquisition could not be a complete acquisition so as to attract the operation of s. 7 of the amending Act. In this view of the matter, we are satisfied that the appellant has failed to prove that one of the essential conditions for application of s. 7 of the amending Act, which would cure the infirmities from which the acquisition proceedings suffer, has been fulfilled. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the land acquisition proceedings were void and no benefit accrued to the appellant from the amending Act. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no orders as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (3) TMI 263 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e the Proclamation has to govern the Cochin royal family subject to section 3 of the 1961 Act as amended by the 1978 Act which would fully apply to that family "notwithstanding anything contained" in the 1978 Act or any other law for the time being in force. Finality has thus been given to the provisions of that section which states that the partition is to be made among all the members entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace Fund under section 4 of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (30 of 1976)". Section 4 of the 1976 Act is thus made specifically applicable to the Cochin royal family by reason of the amendment of section 3 of the 19.61 Act by the 1978 Act; and if this be so, the crucial date for determining the number and identity of the members of the family entitled to a share of the Estate and the Palace Fund would be the 1st of December, 1976, i.e., the date on which the 1976 Act came into force. Petition partly allowed.
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1980 (3) TMI 262 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... period of six months from today. If there is any disputed question of fact to be decided by the Market Committee then it should be decided as quickly as possible leaving the person concerned to agitate the matter in a court of law, preferably in the High Court, within a short time thereafter. The High Court will proceed to decide the matter in the light of our Judgment. We do hope that services are being rendered and will continue to be rendered by the various Market Committees in the light of the Judgment of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri's case. If in regard to any particular Market Committee it is found that services are not being rendered or in future lapses are made then it will be open to the payers of fees to re-agitate the matter in the High court in the light of that judgment. 39. For the reasons stated above the appeals and writ petitions are partly allowed and partly dismissed in the manner indicated above. There will be no order as to costs in any of them.
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1980 (3) TMI 261 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is prima facie evacuee property before a notice is issued. On November 29, 1952 no evidence was found to support a declaration that the appellant was an intending evacuee. There is no material on record to suggest that on that very day the authority had before him any evidence to justify the initiation of a proceeding to declare the appellant an evacuee and his property as evacuee property. The notice under section 7 thus appears to have been issued without any basis. The Assistant Custodian General who found no merit in the revisional application preferred by the appellant overlooked these aspects of the case. We are therefore unable to agree with the High Court that the Assistant Custodian General's order did not suffer from any error. We allow this appeal and quash the notice issued to the appellant on March 11, 1954 and all subsequent proceedings based on it. The respondents have not appeared to contest the appeal; there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed .
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1980 (3) TMI 260 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e facts and circumstances enumerated in the petition established that the respondents were obstructing and interfering with the due course and administration of justice. It was not necessary that every allegation made should be followed then and there by the statement that the allegation established a Contempt of Court. We are satisfied that the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972, was an abuse of the process of the Court, calculated to obstruct the due course of a judicial proceeding and the administration of justice and was, therefore, a Criminal Contempt of Court. The respondents had expressed an unconditional apology to the Patna High Court, but we are convinced that the conduct of the respondents is so reprehensible as to warrant condemnation by the imposition of a sentence. We accordingly allow the appeal and sentence each of the respondents to pay a fine of ₹ 500/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks. Appeal allowed.
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1980 (3) TMI 259 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard. We have been taken through a few intricate legal submissions by counsel but we decline to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution especially where human misery is pitted against operational negligence. P.B.R. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (3) TMI 258 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y a criminal court under suspension unless exceptional circumstances suggesting a contrary course exist. After all a gesture of justice to courts of justice is the least that a government owes to the governed. We are confident that this inadvertence will be made good and the State of Maharashtra will disprove by deeds Henry Clay's famous censure "The arts of power and its minions are the same in all countries and in all ages. It marks its victim denounces it; and excites the public odium and the public hatred to conceal its own abuses and encroachments." The observations that we have made in the concluding portion of the order are of such moment, not merely to the State of Maharashtra but also to the other States in the country and to the Union of India, that we deem it necessary to direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Home Ministry in the Government of India for suitable sensitized measures to pre-empt recurrence of the error we have highlighted.
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1980 (3) TMI 257 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ing of legislative authority to the residuary entry. What is true in other jurisdictions is true in this branch of law also, namely, that one must have regard to the substance of the matter and not to the form or label. We may also mention that in so far as the Town Area Committees are concerned, Article 277 will not save the impugned tax since it was levied by the Town Area Committee in pursuance of the power conferred by clause (f) of section 14 of the Town Areas Act, which was introduced by a post- Constitution amendment. We accept the reasoning of Mr. Justice S. N. Dwivedi in The Notified Area Committee, (supra) by which the Special Bench expressed its disagreement with the view taken by the two learned Judges in R. R. Engineering Co (supra) in regard to the application of Article 277 on the basis that the residuary entry is attracted. For these reasons we uphold the validity of the tax on circumstances and property in both the appeals and dismiss the appeals with costs.
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1980 (3) TMI 256 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... there is any disputed question of fact to be decided by the Market Committee then it should be decided as quickly as possible leaving the person concerned to agitate the matter in a court of law, preferably in the High Court, within a short time thereafter. The High Court will proceed to decide the matter in the light of our Judgment. We do hope that services are being rendered and will continue to be rendered by the various Market Committees in the light of the Judgment of this Court in Kewal Krishan Puri’s case. If in regard to any particular Market Committee it is found that services are not being rendered or in future lapses are made then it will be open to the payers of fees to re-agitate the matter in the High Court in the light of that judgment. For the reasons stated above the appeals and writ petitions are partly allowed and partly dismissed in the manner indicated above. There will be no order as to costs in any of them. Appeals and petitions partly allowed.
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