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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 103 Records
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1980 (5) TMI 120 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing that revisional jurisdiction is invoked, we are not prepared to hold that Sessions Judge's order refusing anticipatory bail is an interlocutory order. 14. A learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chhajju Ram Godara v. State of Haryana 1978 Cri LJ 608 held that normally the Court of Session should first be approached under Section 438 before approaching the High Court, though a party would be entitled to make out an adequate case for not approaching the Court of Session, We have perused this judgment. With all respects to the learned Judge we cannot agree with his view. No such restriction has been placed by law nor we would like to place any such restriction. 15. Our answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench are that persons can apply for revision or anticipatory bail to the High Court direct without first invoking the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge. 16. The matters may now be placed before a single Judge for deciding the petitions.
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1980 (5) TMI 119 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fice and goes to check up the matter at his sweet-will it cannot be said that he learnt of the mistake only on 13-10-1976 when he went to the Registry, as in the present case. 33. So far as the Registry is concerned, it has immediately pointed out the defect and there is no affidavit of the learned counsel to show that he did not learn of the mistake earlier. There is no explanation whatsoever for this either before the learned Additional District Judge or before this Court detailing the cause of delay right from the date the petition was ordered to be returned i.e 7-9-1976 till 13-10-1976 when the petition was actually taken back. 34. For the aforesaid reasons, I am satisfied that the learned Additional District Judge was right in dismissing the application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay in entertaining the appeal. 35. The result is that the revision petition fails and is dismissed. 36. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1980 (5) TMI 118 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... religious purpose or both, for which a ceiling limit is' prescribed Under Section 14O(1), or a person holding any land in trust or in pursuance of any other endowment, creating a legal obligation exclusively for a purpose which is charitable or religious, or both, requires land, as distinct from the income of such land, for the due performance of its obligation, it may having regard to all the circumstances of the case, increase the ceiling area for such corporation or institution or person to such extent as it may deem fit. The legislature has therefore, provided adequate safeguards Under Section 14O(3) to soften the rigour of the Act in relation to religious and charitable trusts. 63. The challenge to the validity of Chapter II B of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 introduced by the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 must, therefore, fail. 64. In the result, the petitions must fail and are dismissed with costs, quantified at ₹ 5,000 in one set.
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1980 (5) TMI 117 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... construction that where a clause is ambiguous a construction which will make it valid is to be preferred to one which will make it void. 63. The restraint may not be greater than necessary to protect the employer, nor unduly harsh and oppressive to the employee. I would, therefore, for my part, even if the word 'leave' contained in Clause 10 of the agreement is susceptible of another construction as being operative on termination, however, accomplished of the service e.g. by dismissal without notice, would, having regard to the provisions of Section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872, try to preserve the covenant in Clause 10 by giving to it a restrictive meaning, as implying volition i.e. where the employee resigns or voluntarily leaves the services. The restriction being too wide, and violative of Section 27 of the Contract Act, must be subjected to a narrower construction. 64. In the result, the appeal must fail and is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 116 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to their respective possession in the usual course. Those are only contrivances for creating complications and delay if possible and all these indicate that this is a fit case where the Court must stamp down dishonesty, corruption and commercial immorality by all means and do so promptly as far as possible. The conduct of the applicant has already clearly shown that they have enough resources for carry on litigations to the last stage up to the supreme Court from every possible order which they allege to be against them. That only indicates that the intention of the applicant to present this application is not at all bonafide but wholly malafide and for making unjust gain at the cost of others and impede administration of companies in winding up; if possible. ( 36. ) Therefore , I am satisfied that no grounds whatsoever have been made for any kind of stay of winding up being granted either limited or unlimited. In the result the present application is dismissed with costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 115 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pinion, under . 159 of the IT Act, 1961 penalty proceedings for a default committed by deceased can be started or continued against the legal representatives. 20. In view of this clear legislative provision, it is not possible to contend that penalty proceedings under s. 271 of the IT Act could not be taken against the legal representatives of the deceased assessee who had furnished inaccurate particulars in the return filed by him. The case of Smt Yawarnnissa Begum vs. WTO (supra) relied upon by the petitioner, relate to penalty impasable under the provisions of the WT Act which Act does not contain a provision similar to that contained in s. 159 of the IT Act. The ratio decidendi of the said decision, is, therefore, not applicable to the present case. 21. As all the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner for impugning the validity of the assessment and the penalty orders have been found to be void on merit, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e of winning fireclay so long as, and to the extent that, they do not carry on any coal mining operation or engage in winning or mining coal. In these writ petitions there will be no order as to costs. We have already indicated how, though the petitioners holding composite leases were permitted to carry on mining operations for the purpose of winning fireclay, they, according to their own showing, cannot win or mine fireclay without doing a coal mining operation or without engaging in winning or mining coal. It is self-evident that in attempting to win fireclay, they will have to act at their own peril since they will run the risk of being prosecuted under, Section 30(2) of the Coal Mines' (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. Petition Nos. III, 178, 220, 221, 257, 352, 600 and 1130-1134 partly allowed. Petition Nos. 150, 151, 180, 205-210, 226, 270-271, 346, 355, 403, 396-398, 599, 541, 543, 626, 635-639, 661, 687-692, 758/77 and 154, 571-574, 603, 605, 610 and 611/77 dismissed.
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1980 (5) TMI 113 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aid is ₹ 500 and the income therefrom may well be ₹ 5 a month, too ludicrous to mention as maintenance. The amount earlier awarded is the minimum. 20. Before we bid farewell to Fazlunbi it is necessary to mention that Chief Justice Baharul Islam, in an elaborate judgment (Jiauddin Ahmad v. Anwara Begum, Criminal Revision No. 199 of 1977, decided on March 31, 1978) replete with quotes from the Holy Quoran, has exposed the error of early English authors and judges who dealt with talaq in Muslim Law as good even if pronounced at whim or in tantrum, and argued against the die hard view of Batchelor, J. (Sarabai v. Rabiabai, ILR 30 Bom 537) that this view "is good in law, though bad in theology". Maybe, when the point directly arises, the question will have to be considered by this Court, but enough unto the day the evil thereof and we do not express our opinion on this question as it does not call for a decision in the present case. 21. We allow the appeal.
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1980 (5) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution since it does not provide any legislative guidelines as to when life should be permitted to be extinguished by imposition of death sentence. 211. I would therefore strike down Section 302 as unconstitutional and void in so far as it provides for imposition of death penalty as an alternative to imprisonment for life. I shall give my reasons for this view on the day on which the Court reopens after the summer vacation. ORDER 212. In accordance with the majority opinion the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 302 of the Penal Code in so far as it provides for the death sentence as also the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973 fails and is rejected. 213. The Writ Petitions and other connected matters may now be placed for hearing, in the usual course, before the Division Bench for consideration of the individual cases on merits, in the light of the principles enunciated in the majority judgment.
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1980 (5) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as the relative merits of the petitioner on one hand and the 2nd respondents on the other were concerned, the 2nd respondents were definitely superior and it cannot be said that the State acted unreasonably or contrary to public interest in preferring the 2nd respondents and permitting them to put up a factory within the State and awarding them tapping contract in respect of these blazes for the purpose of the factory. It may be pointed that the petitioners in writ petition No. 482 of 1979 had not even got their registration renewed for the year 1979-80 and hence no tapping contract could possibly be given to them. We must, accordingly, reject the third ground of challenge urged on behalf of the petitions. We are, therefore, of the view that there is no substance in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and it was for this reason that by an order dated 15-2-1980, we dismissed both these writ petitions with no order as to costs. S.R. Petitions dismissed.
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1980 (5) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... one year. The record shows no improvement but persistent deterioration in his efficiency. It was by reason of such record for several years that the impugned decision was taken. Further, the impuged action came to be suggested by Shri Palande, Industries Commissioner and Director of Industries on an overall consideration the Respondent's record and not by Shri Shinde and ultimately the State Government took the decision to retire the respondent under Rule 8. It is difficult to shift the mala fides, if any of Shri Shinde and describe them to the Industries Commissioner against whom the respondent has no grievance whatever. This challenge, therefore, fails. 9. Since no other ground was urged the appeal must be allowed, Accordingly, we allow to appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and dismiss the respondent's writ petition. As regards costs, they will abide by the order made by this Court on 18th October, 1979 at the time of granting special leave.
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1980 (5) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . Kishori Lal Goswami, Madhu Sudhun Kunda v. Pramode Nath Roy and Nihal Chand v. Azmat Ali Khan and concluded that the nature or the right that vested in the Municipality as regards public streets there is no disposal by the Indian Legislature of any land or hereditament vested in the Government. What is vested in the Municipality under S. 116(g) is the street qua street and if the Municipality put the street to any other user than that for which it was intended, the State as its owner, is entitled to intervene and maintain an action and to get any person in illegal occupation evicted. We accept the contention of Mr. Dixit, learned counsel for the State of U.P. that the State is the owner and in the circumstances of the case entitled to maintain action for eviction of the respondent. The view taken by the High Court is erroneous. The result is that the appeal by the State is allowed with costs and there will be decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for. Appeal allowed.
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1980 (5) TMI 108 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s. 100 is accepted and there is no other provision in the Act for voiding election, the election petitioners would be without a remedy. It would mean that even though one can indulge into forgery-what is tampering of ballot papers, if not forgery,-and get away with it. In order to ensure the purity of election it is better to so construe s. 100 as to embrace within its fold, as has been done by the Constitution Bench, all conceivable infirmities which may be urged for voiding an election. Therefore, the contention of the appellant must be negatived. Having examined all the contentions of the appellant with care that an election appeal deserved, I find no merit in any of them and accordingly this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Hearing fee in one set. Interim relief, if any, granted during the pendency of the appeal is hereby vacated. GUPTA, J. I agree with the order made by my learned brother Desai, J. and the essential reasoning in support of it. Appeal dismissed.
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1980 (5) TMI 107 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at liability was not available to be passed on under the indemnity clause to Damani. We have given enough reasons to hold why this recondite liability apprehended by the STC should not weigh against equity which includes us to release Damani from the indemnity obligation. 30. We bold, confined to the facts and circumstances of this case, that Clause 9(a) which creates the indemnity clause shall not be enforced by the STC against Damani even if the unlikely event of the former being made liable by the foreign buyer takes place. Subject to this direction, we allow the appeal but make it dear that in the view we have taken, a final pronouncement on the other issues has become otiose. The Writ Petition pending in the Bombay High Court must necessarily and in keeping with the final direction we have issued now. 31. Each party will, by their voluntary gesture, pay a sun of ₹ 2,000/- each to the Legal Aid Society (Supreme Court) but otherwise will bear their respective costs.
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1980 (5) TMI 106 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... id judgment. The Andhra Pradesh High Court have pointed out that the notification does not mention that the rebate will be granted on excess production upto 7.5% etc. Apparently the confusion has arisen in this case because of the procedure adopted for grant of rebate under the notification. As per the procedure in force the rebate that is admissible on the quantity of excess production is given in advance by way of credit in the petitioners personal Ledger Account i.e., the credit is given even before the sugar is cleared. But the notification has to be read independently of the procedure and as stated above the wording of the notification in this case is quite clear and the various percentages specified therein have relation only to the average production inasmuch as the total excess production is known only at the end of the season, whereas relief becomes due as soon as the clearance of excess Production starts. The four revision applications are accordingly rejected.
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1980 (5) TMI 105 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... vehicles for which they included an additional charge in the price realised. Government observed that the fact of sales at the factory gate is confined by purchase made relied by purchasers from Haldia and Basirhat who took delivery of the goods in their own vehicles and paid the price as declared in the price list without having to pay an extra price which was recovered when the applicants delivered the goods at the buyers’ premises. The Appellate Collector’s point that such sales were stray and therefore deserves to be ignored is not acceptable unless it could be proved that the sales made at the factory gate were not at arms’ length. Government accordingly hold that wherever sales at arms’ length are made at the factory gate that sale price available at the factory gate should form the basis of assessment, whatever be the quantum of such sales. 3. Government of India, therefore, set aside the order-in-appeal and allow the revision application.
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1980 (5) TMI 104 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... apse or omission and (c) above has no merit or force, in terms of text of 84.66 or Project Import Regulations. Appeal is allowed. Provisional assessment already made shall be revised once more as an interim measure, provisionally. Goods of value ₹ 1,69,605/- assessed at 60 15% shall be provisionally reassessed at 40% under 84.66 and consequentially interim refund pending finalisation shall be granted to Appellants. Other goods combined with above said goods, in the second item of the bill of entry are not the subject of this appeal, and their assessment is not affected by this order. 6. Having written all this, when I was about to issue order as above, the original B/E has come to me. On its perusal I find that there is nothing in it to indicate that it is a provisional assessment. Appellants claim dated 17- 11-1979 is in any case well within 6 months, and therefore the above order prevails, irrespective of whether the original assessment was provisional.
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1980 (5) TMI 103 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... e price and consequently the quantity, amounted to entering into a fresh agreement much after 3-4-1978 and the petitioner’s company elected to amend the original L/C instead of opening a fresh one in terms of the new agreement. This was apparently with a view to circumvent the restrictions envisaged in para 209 of AM-79 Policy for pecuniary benefit. 3. Thus, the Government hold that the importation in question cannot be said to have been made in pursuance of a commitment entered into prior to 3-4-1978, and the petitioners accordingly would not be entitled to the benefit envisaged in the relevant paragraph of the AM-79 Policy. In this view of the matter the confiscation order of the impugned goods is upheld. The Government further consider that the change in the Letter of Credit was made deliberately and knowingly to reap a profit and not under any compulsions of law or morality. In the result, the Order-in-Appeal is upheld and the revision application is rejected.
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1980 (5) TMI 102 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rit in these appeals. According to the judgment of the Full Bench, it has been rightly observed by the learned single Judge that such further inquiry or evidence must be germane to the turnover already on the record and not to the turnover which is sought to be brought in for the first time as a result of some information obtained from somewhere. On the basis of these observations, it has been correctly held that in the present case the revising authority found from the record which was before the Assessing Authority that certain transactions appeared to be bogus. On the basis of what was found in the record the revising authority made further inquiry which he was competent to do. It was not a case where the revising authority initiated the proceedings for revision on the basis of fresh information received by him which was not already a part of the record. For the reasons recorded above, these appeals fail and are dismissed, but with no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1980 (5) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
Whether family should be adopted as a unit instead of an individual for applying ceiling on land holdings?
What should be the size of the family?
Why artificial definition of the family should be adopted?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The object of imposing the condition is obviously to prevent frivolous appeals and revision that impede the implementation of the ceiling policy; secondly, having regard to sub-ss. (8) and (9) it is clear that the cash deposit or bank guarantee is not by way of any exaction but in the nature of securing mesne profits from the person who is ultimately found to be in unlawful possession of the land; thirdly, the deposit or the guarantee is co-related to the land holdings tax (30 times the tax) which, we are informed, varies in the State of Haryana around a paltry amount of Rs. 8/- per acre annually; fourthly, the deposit to be made or bank guarantee to be furnished is confined to the land holdings tax payable in respect of the disputed area i.e. the area or part thereof which is declared surplus after leaving the permissible area to the appellant or petitioner. Having regard to these aspects, particularly the meagre rate of the annual land tax payable, the fetter imposed on the right of appeal/revision, even in the absence of a provision conferring discretion on the appellate/revisional authority to relax or waive the condition, cannot be regarded as onerous or unreasonable. The challenge to s. 18(7) must, therefore, fail.
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