|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 205 Records
-
1980 (7) TMI 277 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... either suo motu or otherwise. The Allahabad High Court has rejected the argument that it is the date of the knowledge of the contempt, which is the starting point for limitation prescribed in S. 20, and not the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In view of the clear language used in S. 20 the Karnataka High Court has found it impossible to take the view that the date of knowledge of the complaint has any relevance for the purpose of computing the period of limitation . 25. In the light of the view, which we have taken, we are of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to show that the contempt was committed within one year of this court having first issued notice in this case (23-11-1979). Since the condition precedent to the, exercise of our jurisdiction is not satisfied, our jurisdiction to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is barred under S. 20. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged. 26. Petition dismissed.
-
1980 (7) TMI 276 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... has been alleged that Pt. Ram Naresh Triapthi had executed a will dated 19-4-56 in respect of his entire property and under that will Vijai Kumar had been made entitled to all assets of Hindi Mandir Prayag. Since, however, the will had not been proved, the question of non-joinder did not arise and was rightly repelled by the trial court. Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that no decree shall be reversed or substantially carried in appeal on account of non-joinder of the parties not affecting the merits of the case. The non-joinder of Vijai Kumar does not affect the merits of the case. It is true that this Section 99 does not apply to a case of non-joinder of necessary party but to my mind, Vajai Kumar was not even a proper party what to say of necessary party. Hence, non-joinder was inconsequential. 28. No other point was argued. 29. In the result, the two appeals fail and are dismissed, But in the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1980 (7) TMI 275 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r release on bail, the petitioner shall attend the D.R.I. Office from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. daily for fifteen days. The petitioner will thereafter attend the D.R.I. Office as and when required until charge-sheet is filed. The petitioner shall not directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from giving such information to the D.R.I. Office or to Court. The petitioner shall not leave Greater Bombay without the permission of the Court before whom the remand application is made. The D.R.I. authorities will permit the petitioner-accused half an hour lunch time. 21. Shri Parsurampuria has stated that the petitioner has already deposited ₹ 1,00,000 in pursuance of the previous order passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the petitioner holds a receipt for the same. The said amount should be treated as deposit under this order also. 22. Application allowed.
-
1980 (7) TMI 274 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of S.K. Thacker was that of the entire lands constituted part of a petrol pump. The Burmah Shell was the tenant in regard to that part and ₹ 225 per month was being received as rent from Burmah Shell. The lands only having been acquired and the other properties having been left intact with the claimants, the claim for capital value on the basis of the rent is clearly untenable. We see no merit in this claim of the claimants as well. 13. No other point was raised either on behalf of the appellants or the respondents. 14. For the reasons, stated above, we find no merit in these appeals and they are dismissed accordingly. The cross-objection in F. A. Nos. 437 and 440 of 1969 is allowed in part as indicated earlier. The statutory compensation and the interest thereupon will be paid proportionately to the claimants from the date of dispossession. The cross-objections in other appeals being devoid of any merit are dismissed accordingly. The parties shall bear their own costs.
-
1980 (7) TMI 273 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... chargeable to tax had escaped assessment in the assessment years in question and that, therefore, he was entitled to commence reassessment proceedings. This, in our opinion, is not a case where an error was discovered by him on reconsideration of the same material (and no more); the error was, in fact, discovered as a result of instruction or knowledge derived for the first time from the pronouncement of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, on the question of the true meaning and content of section 40( b). As a result of the foregoing discussion, we come to the conclusion that the proceedings under section 147(b) of the Act were validly initiated in the instant case. Accordingly, we answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative. So far as the second question is concerned, as earlier stated, the assessee has not pressed the same and it is, therefore, not required to be answered. -The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner.
-
1980 (7) TMI 272 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... which had decided this issue, and since there are no contrary decisions of any other High Court, we have to, with respect, apply that decision to the facts of the case. In view of this, the appeals would stand allowed and additions suggested by the Commissioner's order would not stand. 11. The appeals are allowed. Per Krishnamurthy - I wish to add that although I was a party to a different view on the constructions of the provisions involved, I agree with the view taken by the Accountant Member and the order passed by him in view of the decision of the Karnataka High Court in T.T.(P.) Ltd. v. ITO 1980 121 ITR 551 which has considered the provisions of sections 40(c ) and 40A(2). Judicial propriety requires that when there is a High Court decision, particularly when there is only one on the question of law, in regard to an All India Statute like the Income-tax Act, the tribunal should follow the view taken therein. 12. I, therefore, agree that the appeal should be allowed.
-
1980 (7) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the other material that may have been collected by the inquiry officer, relevant to the charge against the accused-appellant. With this observation, we would dismiss these appeals (Nos. 208-209 of 1974) and send the case back to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law. Since the case is already old, the proceedings shall be conducted as far as possible, from day-to-day on top-priority basis, and disposed of preferably within three months of the date or which the records are received in the trial court. Since the legal questions raised before us in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 630 of 1977 are the same as in Criminal Appeals Nos. 208-209 of 1974, and the learned counsel for the petitioners therein has adopted the arguments of Shri R.K. Garg, appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeals Nos. 208-209 of 1974, that Special Leave Petition, after granting special leave to appeal, will also stand disposed of by this judgment. N.V.K. Appeals dismissed.
-
1980 (7) TMI 270 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sfied that it cannot be held that in the settlement which was arrived at before the High Court of Calcutta, there was a complete rebate of the interest, as the order of the Calcutta High Court which is at pp. 6 and 7 of the paper book states that leave was granted to the official liquidator to accept ₹ 1,65,000 " in full satisfaction of the claim, interest and costs against the debtor ". Thus, interest was also taken into consideration while allowing settlement at ₹ 1,65,000. It would be a conjecture to try to find out how much remission was given on account of interest. So, it is not possible to identify conclusively the particular item for which remission was granted, and then how much for each item. Section 10(2A) was thus not available to the department because of what has been stated in Tirunelveli Motor Bus Service v. CIT 1970 78 ITR 55 (SC). In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and against the department.
-
1980 (7) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that no more delay shall take place and the Central Government shall put the respondent in his position as Brigadier in charge of the Military Farms by tomorrow. Law is highly allergic to procrastination. We refuse the review, but in the circumstances without costs and hope that the chapter of unfortunate events referred to in the affidavits will be treated as closed in a spirit of mutual goodwill. It has been brought to our notice that there is a direction by the vacation judge that the extra salary that the respondent may be entitled to in the event of success should be deposited into court by the Central Government and that has been done. The respondent will draw that sum from court. But there will be no direction that the petitioner should refund the extra salary if any, drawn by him because, after all, he must have functioned - pending orders of this Court, as Director of Military Farms and so we do not think it just to make any order for refund against the petitioner.
-
1980 (7) TMI 268 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... that purpose and not that the rejection of accounts itself was not justified. Therefore, on the facts of the present case in my opinion the irregularity having occurred in the course of assessment proceedings the assessment order cannot be annulled as being legally bad or defective. The proper course would be to remand the case for removal of that irregularity, that is, for giving the assessee an opportunity of cross-examining the Lucknow party. For this purpose the case has to go back to the Sales Tax Officer. 7. In the result, therefore, the revision is allowed and the order of the Revising Authority is set aside. The question as to whether and if so to what extent any enhancement can be made to the disclosed turnover because of the alleged incriminating material is referred back to the Assessing Officer who will make the assessment after affording an opportunity to the assessee of cross-examining the representative of the Lucknow party. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1980 (7) TMI 267 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ing In an appeal in the High Court and the High Court passed an order nullifying the decree of the trial Court having regard to Section 4(c) of the Act. 2. We do not think there is substance in the submission. True, the petitioner is right in saying that the High Court should not have "nullified" the decree of the trial Court but should have merely declared that the proceeding stood abated, which of course, means that the civil proceeding comes to nought. Regarding the constitutional submissions we are not called upon to investigate the merits for the short reason that both the points have been covered by two decisions of this Court Ham Adhar Singh v. Ramroee Singh and Ors. and Chattar Singh and Ors. v. Thakur Prasad Singh Indeed, High Court has merely followed these two decisions in reporting the contentions of the appellants. We, therefore, see no merit in the Writ Petitions and dismiss them. 3. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
-
1980 (7) TMI 266 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... which it erects to most people and to many types of claims." Why drive common people to public interest action ? Where Directive Principles have found statutory expression in Do's and Dont's the court will not sit idly by and allow municipal government to become a statutory mockery. The law will relentlessly be enforced and the plea of poor finance will be poor alibi when people in misery cry for justice. The dynamics of the judicial process has a new 'enforcement' dimension not merely through some of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (as here), but also through activated tort consciousness. The officers in charge and even the elected representatives will have to face the penalty of the law if what the Constitution and follow-up legislation direct them to do are defied or denied wrongfully. The wages of violation is punishment, corporate and personal. We dismiss this petition subject to the earlier mentioned modifications. Petition dismissed.
-
1980 (7) TMI 265 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tract with the President of India dated May 1, 1963, for the supply of water, did not represent agricultural income ? " The question, as re-stated above, is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The second question also needs modification as would be evident from the discussion of the facts of the case and the submissions of either side, which we have set out in the earlier part of our judgment. The real question for our decision is " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the losses claimed by the assessee in the sum of ₹ 9,973 can be regarded as loss in a speculation business and is to be treated and dealt with separately for purposes of carry forward and set off under section 73 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? " We answer this question too in the affirmative and against the assessee. The department will have its costs of these references. Counsel's fee ₹ 500 (one set).
-
1980 (7) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... inspect the other material that may have been collected by the inquiry officer, relevant to the charge against the accused-appellant. With this observation, we would dismiss these appeals (Nos. 208-209 of 1974) and send the case back to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law. Since the case is already old, the proceedings shall be conducted as far as possible, from day-to-day on top-priority basis, and disposed of preferably within three months of the date or which the records are received in the trial court. Since the legal questions raised before us in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 630 of 1977 are the same as in Criminal Appeals Nos. 208-209 of 1974, and the learned counsel for the petitioners therein has adopted the arguments of Shri R.K. Garg, appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeals Nos. 208-209 of 1974, that Special Leave Petition, after granting special leave to appeal, will also stand disposed of by this judgment. Appeals dismissed.
-
1980 (7) TMI 263 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he appellant or any other elector did not make any application or complaint at the trial of the Election-Petition in the High Court, that the electionpetitioner has abandoned the prosecution of the petition or withdrawn from it and that the applicant be substituted for the election-petitioner to continue the proceeding under Section 110(3) (c) of the Act. It will bear repetition that the appellant took no interest, whatever, in the controversy in the Election Petition which was confined only to the election-petitioner and respondent 1. Conditions 1 and 3, the satisfaction of which is necessary to give locus standi to a person to file an appeal under Section 116-C, have not been fulfilled in the instant case. The appellant cannot, by any reckoning, be said to be a ‘person aggrieved’ by the decision of the High Court, dismissing the Electionpetition. We, therefore, allow this preliminary objection and on that ground dismiss this appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1980 (7) TMI 262 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n in the provisions of the Constitution. I would therefore declare Section 55 of the Constitution (Forty second Amendment) Act, 1976 which inserted sub-sections (4) and (5) in Article 368 as unconstitutional and void on the ground that it damages the basic structure of the Constitution and goes beyond the amending power of Parliament. But so far as Section 4 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 is concerned. I hold that, on the interpretation placed on the amended Article 31C by me, it does not damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution and is within the amending power of Parliament and I would therefore declare the amended Article 31C to be constitutional and valid. I have also given my reasons in this judgment for subscribing to the order dated 9th May, 1980 made in Waman Rao’s case and this judgment ill so far as it sets out those reasons will be formally pronounced by me when Waman Rao’s case is set down on board for judgment.
-
1980 (7) TMI 261 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... art of the argument, it is found that the Government of India has considered the main contention in the later part of the order when it observed that the appellant had no clear intention of investing the gold as contended and the mere presence of an application form does not entitle the appellant to immunity from law. It cannot, therefore, be said that the order of the Government of India is vitiated merely because it was mistaken in respect of one part of the argument when the Government of India has given a decision on the main argument advanced. 8. For all the above reasons, we do not see reason to interfere with the well considered judgment of our brother Justice Jeevan Reddy. Hence the appeal is dismissed. 9. An oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is made by Sri Sarathy. We do not consider any question of law of general importance which requires to be considered by the Supreme Court is involved in this appeal. The application is rejected.
-
1980 (7) TMI 260 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS
... ...
... ... ..... ket enquiry, neither of these reports were made available to them nor were they given an opportunity to cross-examine the experts who had made the valuation. 3. The Board observes that the principles of natural justice demand that the reports of the valuation and the market enquiry should be made available to the appellants and that if they so desire, they should be given an opportunity to substantiate their case by cross-examination of those who had given their opinion that the goods were over-valued. These have not been done in this case. 4. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the appeal, the Board remands back the case to the authority to decide it afresh after due observance of the principles of natural justice.
-
1980 (7) TMI 259 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY
... ...
... ... ..... h are different in the case of each kind ? In the order passed by the lower authority, there is no finding that the under-valuation was contrived by the appellants or that they were privy to the indentor and the supplier being cited as the persons concerned. From the records it is seen that the personal penalties were not imposed as “persons concerned” but because the goods were not available. In view of the foregoing, the appeals are allowed and the orders imposing personal penalties of ₹ 6000/-, ₹ 8000/- and ₹ 7000/- on M/s. Hind Hosiery Mills, Ludhiana are set aside. Their licences No. 2620089, dated 30-3-1971, 2019684, dated 8-5-1971, 2623039, dated 19-11-1971, 2621100, dated 24-6-1971 may be debited to the extent required, if otherwise in order. Since the indentor M/s National Well and Synthetic Corpn. have filed separate appeals regarding the imposition of personal penalties on them, no orders are passed in these appeals on that aspect.
-
1980 (7) TMI 258 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o submitted that Ex. 1 and Ex. 1A were superseded by Ex. 11 and Ex. 11A which do not contain such an endorsement. But this argument need not detain us as, in our opinion, endorsement, or no endorsement, if it is even otherwise proved that 1 1b. of fents and seconds contained 3 yards of cloth. P.W. 2 Amba Lal, Inspector, Central Excise, Jodhpur has stated that on checking he found that 1 lb. of fents and seconds contained 3 yards of cloth. He also states that he made enquiries at the Mills and was told that on an average 3 yards of cloth was equal to 1 lb. in weight. D.W. Mohan Lal, Manager of the Mills, has not denied the aforesaid assertion made by Shri Amba Lal. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the learned District Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that the yardage should be calculated at 3 yards per pound. 51. The result is, that we do not find force in any of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and dismiss the appeal with costs.
........
|
