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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 155 Records
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1981 (11) TMI 199 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for the B party respondents, finally submits relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhinka v. Charan Singh, 1959CriLJ1223 that there was already a decision of the Civil Court in respect of the subject matter of the dispute and therefore the proceedings under Section 145(5), Cr.P.C. were without jurisdiction. But it is clear from the record that the proceedings under Section 145(5), Cr.P.C. are in respect of the property bearing Municipal No. 9-5-85/A/2, whereas the decree obtained by the B party respondents in O.S. No. 1039 of 1980 on the file of the IV Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, is in respect of the property bearing Municipal No. 5.9.85. In the circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel is devoid of any foundation. 25. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and the order of the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, is set aside and that of the Special Executive Magistrate, Hyderabad, is restored. 26. Revision allowed.
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1981 (11) TMI 198 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tions between the two groups of the brothers, the will was the natural outcome to avoid further future litigation. 13. We do not find any suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the will. The circumstances pointed out by learned Counsel are not only not suspicious but normal as pointed out above. The rule, as observed by the Privy Council, is that "where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, not as obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth." 500 C.W.N. 895 14. The trial court was wrong in holding that the circumstances in question were suspicious and the High Court was fully justified in setting aside the judgment of the trial court. We are in entire agreement with the judgment of the High Court. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 197 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... er passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge be set aside and suitable sentence be imposed on both Banwari and Barjor Singh here or whether the case should be remanded back to the court concerned, who may hear the parties and then give suitable sentence to the accused. 5. To my mind it is a proper case in which the case should be sent back to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who may award suitable sentence to the accused because then the accused would have a right to appeal, if necessary after obtaining a condonation of the delay in filing the appeal and that right of the accused must not be denied to them. 6. The order of the I Additional Sessions Judge Sri D.N. Shukla in this case is, therefore, set aside and the case is remanded back to the Additional Sessions Judge concerned, who will hear the parties on the sentence to be awarded under Sections 307 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code to the accused and dispose of the case. 7. The revision is allowed accordingly.
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1981 (11) TMI 196 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ebtor. 9. In view of Section 137 of the Contract Act and also in view of various judgments on this point, the surety's liability towards the creditor remains uneffected, even when the creditor has chosen not to sue the principal debtor. 10. In the instant case, not only the plaintiff bank filed a suit against the principal debtor but also against the guarantors. By preferring its claim before the Liquidator and its claim being admitted by the Liquidator, the plaintiff bank has not foregone its right to proceed against the guarantors and such preference of claim before the Liquidator did not amount to foregoing their claim against the guarantors and also that did not amount to any variation of the contract that was entered into by and between the parties. 11. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the plaintiff bank was entitled to proceed against the guarantors in this suit. In the result, I disallow the objection that has been raised by the guarantors in this suit.
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1981 (11) TMI 195 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... great deal of stress on the expression "terms" used in the clause. In my opinion, this is not the meaning of the word "terms". It means articles of agreement, bargain or transaction. It means any dispute or difference arising out of the contract, terms whereof are set forth in the document, shall be settled by arbitration. I, Therefore, hold that there is a dispute and the dispute is referable to arbitration. 31. For these reasons I order the agreement to be filed and refer the matter to arbitration. I appoint Mr. M. S. Joshi, a retired judge of this court, to act as the sole arbitrator in this case and to give his award on the dispute between the parties. I fix his fee at ₹ 4,000 to be paid in equal shares by the petitioners and official liquidator. Ultimately, it will be in the arbitrator's discretion to decide the question of costs. 32. The parties are directed to appear before the arbitrator on 9th January, 1982 at 11 a.m. at his residence.
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1981 (11) TMI 194 - MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ring Kulia Khand from Khandsari sugar bears similarity with the process used in preparing Bura from sugar. Khandsari sugar is dissolved in water and to the solution are added certain purifying agents. The mixture is then heated and the impurities come to the surface in the form of scum which is removed. The refined solution is then poured into wooden moulds and the moulds are allowed to cool when the liquid takes a solid shape. This substance is then taken out of the moulds and is called Kulia Khand. Nearly the same process is undertaken in preparing Bura from Sugar. For these reasons, we are of opinion that the petitioner's case does not fall under the proviso to section 4.(1) of the Entry Tax Act and the sales tax authorities were right in charging entry tax at the rate of 2 per cent in accordance with section 4 (1) and Entry No. II in Schedule II. The petition fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. The security amount be refunded to the petitioner.
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1981 (11) TMI 193 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at where the rejection of books of accounts is purely on a technical reason, the taxable turnover should normally be accepted. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax v. M/s. Pilot Shoe Factory, 1976 UPTC 668; Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Girja Shanker, 1981 UPTC 912 and M/s. Delite Engineering Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, 1981 UPTC 959). 4. No abnormal circumstances appear on the record of this case to hold that the applicant's disclosed turnover ought not to have been accepted. 5. The revision succeeds in part. The order of the Tribunal upholding the rejection of the books of accounts of the applicant is upheld. Its order relating to enhancement of the taxable turnover, over the one disclosed by the applicant, is set aside. The disclosed turnover of the applicant for the year in question is to be accepted. 6. A copy of this order shall be sent to the Tribunal as required by Section 11 (8) of the Act for necessary action. 7. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 192 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Constitutional validity of new Section 6-11 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, substituted by the Karnataka Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1981 - court-fee payable by each petitioner - petition in which thirteen petitioners had joined - Held that: - each of the petitioners in the present writ petition, has his own distinct and separate cause of action arising out of his liability to pay the tax individually under the impugned taxing provision. Since the present writ petition embraces more than one of such causes of action and separate relief's sought therein, namely, to restrain the respondents from enforcing the impugned taxing provision against each of the petitioners, are based on them (such causes of action), it (the present writ petition) is chargeable with the aggregate amount of the court-fees with which the petitions would be chargeable under the Act ' if separate writ petitions had been presented in respect of several causes of action, a required by sub-section (3) read with substitution (4) of Section 6 of the Act.
Under Clause (S) of Article I of Sch. II of the Karnataka Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 read with sub-sees. (3) and (4) of Section 6 of that Act, each of the petitioners, in the present writ petition, is liable to pay thereon a separate court-fee of ₹ 100, as if he had presented a separate writ petition.
Appeal dismissed.
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1981 (11) TMI 191 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ces itself is that the apparent tenor of the document must be accepted unless there is some impediment in doing so. The burden of proving that impediment was on the defendant-respondent. He has not led any evidence to show the circumstances in which Said Mohammad was led to sign blank stamp papers. Ch. Birbal Singh's case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. 19. On the basis of this case, learned counsel further submitted that the question of appreciation of evidence is within the domain of the last court of fact and this court must accept the assessment made by that court. This principle is not applicable in the present case. I have already referred to the grounds on which the assessment of evidence made by the court of appeal stands vitiated in law. 20. The result is that this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The decree of the first court of appeal is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The appellants shall be entitled to their costs throughout.
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1981 (11) TMI 190 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... den by law and such as defeated the provisions of law. Further, it cannot be disputed that evasion of taxes is opposed to public policy. What is permitted is lawful avoidance of taxes, or in other words to so arrange ones affairs as to reduce the incidence of taxes to the minimum leviable under the law, but evasion of the law, or falsification of accounts or deliberate non-payment of taxes though due or attempt to avoid payment of taxes by violating the tax laws is certainly not permitted. I have, therefore, not the slightest hesitation in holding that the agreement between the parties in so far as it related to earning of concealed profits, or concealment of the profits earned by falsification of accounts, was wholly void and no Court could enforce the agreement by directing an enquiry into the amount, or the destination, of the concealed profits in order to enforce the recovery of the share therein of one party from another. 9. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 189 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts of ₹ 20,000/- each with the usual default clause. After hearing both the learned advocates and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we think that the defendants should be permitted to pay the decretal amount in installments of ₹ 15,000/- per month payable on 5th November, 1981 provided he pay a sum of ₹ 1,00,000/- on or before the 1st October, 1981 and continues to pay installments of ₹ 15,000/- each on the 5th of every subsequent month beginning from 5th November, 1981. In the event of default in the payment of a sum of ₹ 1,00,000/- on or before 1st October, 1981 or in the payment of subsequent any two installments as indicated above the Bank would be entitled to recover the entire dues by sale of the mortgaged property and recover the balance, if any, from the other property of the defendants or their person. The appeal is dismissed with costs with the above modifications. The defendants will bear their costs of this appeal.
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1981 (11) TMI 188 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Code. After 15 days, the accused can only be kept in judicial custody or any other custody as ordered by the Magistrate, but not the custody of the Police. 21. In these circumstances, we have to accept this petition and set aside the order of the Magistrate. Now the question arises as to what further orders are necessary because the 15 days mentioned in Section 167(2) have already expired. We think the interests of justice demand that the Magistrate should take up this case and pass such order as he would have been able to pass on 4th September 1981 if he had not been compelled to follow the judgment in Gian Singh's case (1981 Cri LJ 100) aforementioned. He will thus be able to pass an order directing custody of the police for the unexpired period out of 15 days as remained on 4th September 1981. This, order should be immediately conveyed to the Magistrate to pass such orders as he deems fil in accordance with the directions contained herein. dusty. Petition allowed.
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1981 (11) TMI 187 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... l between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties. Tyagaraja Mudaliyar and another v. Vedathanni. The Trial Court was right in permitting the respondent to lead parole evidence in support of her plea that the sale deed dated January 7, 1953 was a sham document and never intended to be acted upon. It is not disputed that if the parole evidence is admissible, the finding of the court below in favour of the respondent must be accepted. The second contention on behalf of the appellant must also fail. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1981 (11) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ve nature and thus violative of Art. 19(1)(g) or Art. 301 of the Constitution. The State Government in its return has stated that there is no ban on the export of wheat from the State of Uttar Pradesh to various other States or from one district to another within the State, subject to the making of an endorsement by the Deputy Marketing Officer or the Senior Marketing Officer concerned. The petitioners who are wholesale dealers of food grains in the State of Uttar Pradesh are, therefore, free to carry on their business within the permissible limits, i.e., they may carry on their trade or business or enter into inter-State or intra-State transactions of wheat subject to the stock limit of 250 quintals at a time. In the result, the writ petitions must fail and are dismissed. The stay orders passed by the Court, from time to time, stand vacated. Formal orders for vacating stay granted in those matters need not be issued. There shall be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1981 (11) TMI 185 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent should have failed on that ground. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the plaintiff’s suit. Before concluding we would like to add that with due respect, that the judgment of the High Court is not very satisfactory as it has not made any real attempt to apply its mind to the substantial question of law that was involved in the case and seems to have rushed to its conclusions even without considering the authorities on the subject particularly the one referred to in the judgment as also the authoritative decision of this Court referred to above which was pronounced five years before the judgment of the High Court was given. From such a prestigious High Court as Bombay we do expect a more careful and cautious approach in a matter like this. As the respondents have not appeared before us, we make no order as to costs in this Court. The appellant will certainly be entitled to costs in the Courts below. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (11) TMI 184 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n points argued by the learned Attorney General on behalf of the appellant Companies. In the High Court, an additional point was taken, based upon the agreement dated June 24, 1976, which was entered into between the appellant Companies and respondent 1. It was contended in the High Court that respondent 1 had waived its power of taxation by that agreement and, therefore, the imposition of property tax was invalid. The High Court has given weighty reasons for rejecting that argument and we endorse those reasons. We adopt, particularly, the reasoning of the High Court that in the meeting of January 29, 1976, respondent 1 had decided to give up its right to impose the Octroi tax only. The Chairman of respondent 1, therefore, acted beyond the scope of his authority in entering into the agreement with the appellant Companies, under which respondent 1 bound itself not to impose any tax whatsoever. For these reasons the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1981 (11) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntion loses all force and must be rejected. In the result we hold that the petitioners and through them the Shia community of Mohalla Doshipura, Varanasi have established their existing customary rights to perform their religious rites, practices, observances, ceremonies and functions minus the recitation and utterance of Tabarra (detailed in the writ petition) over the Plots and structures in question and respondents 5 and 6 and the Sunni community of Mohalla Doshipura are permanently restrained by an injunction from interfering with the exercise of said rights in any manner by the petitioners or members of Shia community and respondents 1 to 4, particularly the executive magistracy of Varanasi is directed, if action under s. 144 Cr. P.C. is required to be taken, to issue their orders under the said provision having regard to the principles and the guidelines indicated in that behalf in this judgment. The writ petition is thus allowed but each party will bear its own costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 181 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been opposed on the ground of delay, but, I think, having regard to the extreme intricacy of the law and the possibility of misunderstanding, that in the interests of justice the application ought to be allowed. Accordingly, Nemkumar and Shantabai will be deemed to have been added as petitioners. I was explicitly told that there is no conflict of interest between them and the original petitioners and order may be made in favour of any or all of them. 68. For these reasons, this petition is allowed. The order by the Collector confiscating the gold seized on 9th July 1968 and levying a penalty on Ratanbai, as well as the orders of the Administrator and the Central Government unholding the same, are quashed. The gold will be returned forthwith to the petitioners, who will nominate one of themselves in writing to take delivery of the same. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, in particular the difficulty of the questions of law, I make no order as to costs.
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1981 (11) TMI 180 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... he warehousing period for a month with effect from 13-2-1979. The Asstt. Collector did not accede to his request and confirmed the demand accordingly. The appellate Collector upheld the order-in-original. While the proceedings were going on with the Asstt. Collector the excise duty on unmanufactured tobacco was exempted with effect from 1-3-1979. 3. The applicant’s main argument is that since the tobacco remained in the warehouse even after 1-3-1979, the central excise duty is not leviable in view of the fact that duty on un-manufactured tobacco was exempted with effect from 1-3-1979. 4. Government observe that with the abolition of duty on tobacco the applicant’s plea for application of nil rate of duty at the time of payment/clearance cannot be dismissed whatever be the circumstances as the tobacco had yet to be cleared from the warehouse at the material time. Government accordingly accept the applicant’s plea and allow the revision application.
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1981 (11) TMI 179 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... and such assessees are not entitled for the benefit of Notification No. 14/76-C.E., dated 23-1-1976. Furthermore in case such assessees do not opt for the Chapter VIIB procedure they would automatically continue to work under Chapter VIIA and not Chapter V of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and would also not be eligible for the benefit of Notification No. 14/76-C.E. and therefore the second proviso of Notification 14/76 would not be attracted in such cases. Since in the present case the assessees have possessed a Central Excise Licence from 1973 and have opted out of the simplified procedure with effect from 1-11-1977 they cannot be prevented from the benefit of Notification No. 218/1977 dated 15-7-1977 since the second proviso of Notification No. 14/76, dated 23-1-1976 is not attracted for them, 6. In view of the above Government hold that the impugned order in appeal does not warrant any review. The review proceedings initiated by Government are, accordingly dropped.
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