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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 203 Records
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1981 (2) TMI 256 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not called as a witness) was heard to declare that he had seen B commit a crime. This makes highly probable that B did commit that crime. Therefore A's declaration is a relevant fact under Section 11 this was not the intention of the section as is shown by the elaborate provision contained in the following part of Chapter 11 (Sections 31 to 39) as the particular classes of statements, which are regarded as relevant facts either because the circumstances under which they are made invest them with importance, or because no better evidence can be got. The sort of facts which the section was intended to include are facts which either exclude or imply more or less distinctly the existence of the facts sought to be proved . We, therefore, do not think that Section 11 may be invoked in the present case, in the manner suggested by the learned Counsel. In the result we accept the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and direct the appellant to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1981 (2) TMI 255 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ied on even if not genuine. 17. In Ganpat Raoji's case reference is made to two other judgments. They were decided before the enforcement of the present Code, when any provision corresponding to Section 294 of the Code was not in existence. The accused could not waive the proof by admitting or not disputing the genuineness of any document. Mode of proof prescribed under the Evidence Act could not be taken dispensed with. These judgments and others to which Mr. Phadkar wanted to draw our attention cannot be said to be good law any more. 18. We accordingly hold that sub-section (3) of Section 294 of the Code covers post-mortem notes and every other document of which genuineness is not disputed. Thus such documents can be read in evidence as genuine without the formal proof. In our view, Ganpat Raoji's case is not correctly decided. 19. The Criminal Appeal will now be sent back to the Division Bench for disposal in accordance with law. 20. Reference answered accordingly.
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1981 (2) TMI 254 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... g punished for Contempt of Court. 7. It was argued that the wife had alternate remedies under the Guardian and Wards Act and the CrPC and so a Writ should not have been issued. True, alternate remedy ordinarily inhibits a prerogative writ. But it is not an impassable hurdle. Where what is complained of is an impudent disregard of an order of a Court, the fact certainly cries out that a prerogative writ shall issue,. In regard to the sentence, instead of the sentence imposed by the High Court, we substitute a sentence of three months, simple imprisonment and a fine of Rupees Five hundred. The sentence of imprisonment or such part of it as may not have been served will stand remitted on the appellant-petitioner producing the child in the High Court. With this modification in the matter of sentence, the appeal and the Special Leave Petition are dismissed. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 677/81 is dismissed as we are not satisfied that it is a fit case for laying a complaint.
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1981 (2) TMI 253 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . Sanghi states that if it is decided to continue the inquiry, as only arguments have to be heard and orders to be passed, he will see that the inquiry is concluded within two months from the date of the decision of the criminal court. If the respondents are convicted, then the legal consequenses under the rules will automatically follow. We might mention that at the time when special leave was granted by this Court, it was ordered that the respondents should be paid a lump-sum of ₹ 10,000/- each apart from the 75% allowance. We think that in the interest of justice the department may not insist on the refund of the amount of ₹ 10,000/- until the result of the departmental inquiry and if the departmental inquiry concludes in their favour, the amount will be either refunded or adjusted against their dues. With these observations, the appeal is accepted and the judgment of the High Court is quashed. Parties will bear their own costs throughout. S.R. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 252 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... basis of relevant considerations it is not possible to say that the appointment of a Government official is obnoxious to the law. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed insofar that the selection of candidates for admission to the M.B.B.S. course of the Government Medical Colleges at Srinagar and at Jammu for the year 1980-81 made on the basis of rectifying regional imbalances is quashed and the respondents are directed to fill up those seats on the basis of open merit. The candidates who will be displaced in consequence have already completed a few months of study and in order to avoid serious prejudice and detriment to their careers it is hoped that the State Government will deal sympathetically with their cases so that while effect is given to the judgment of this Court the rules may be suitably relaxed, if possible by a temporary increase in the number of seats, in order to accommodate the displaced candidates. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.
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1981 (2) TMI 251 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... IR 1959 S.C. 57 and Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh AIR 1961 S.C. 1097. 12. Thus, the High Court in this case had no jurisdiction after reversing the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below on the question of adverse possession to remand the case to the Additional Judicial Commissioner on the question of title which also was concluded by the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the two courts indicated above. 13. The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that the first judgment of the High Court remanding the case to the Additional Commissioner was clearly without jurisdiction and as a logical result thereof the order remand and all proceedings taken thereafter would become void ab initio. 14. For these reasons, therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court appeal as also the judgment of the High Court dated 17th February, 1967 and decree the Plaintiff's suit. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will no order as to costs.
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1981 (2) TMI 250 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l petitioners cannot join in tiling a single writ petition. Even if they are allowed to join, they would be liable to pay court-fee as if each of them has filed a separate writ petition and each one of the petitioners would have to pay; ₹ 100/-. As we have held that a single writ petition by several petitioners is not maintainable and as the learned counsel for the petitioners state that they may be permitted to amend the writ petition by striking off the names of the other writ petitioners except the 1st petitioner, the petitioners are allowed to amend the same accordingly. The petitioners are permitted to tile separate writ petitions on behalf of each of the petitioners whose names have been struck off from the several writ petitions before us. The petitioners are permitted to effect the necessary amendment and retain the name of the 1st petitioner alone. After each writ petition is so amended, the mailers, may be placed before the learned single Judge for admission.
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1981 (2) TMI 249 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iff did not from the fourth from the judgment of reference has been made in paragraph 20 of the judgment to the payment of only ₹ 800 out of ₹ 2000 the balance of ₹ 1200 being retained for payment after getting possession of the property from defendants 1 and 2. Referring to this aspect and to the evidence of D. W. 2, the court below came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not at all put in possession of any portion of the suit survey number. The result was that the breach occurred simultaneously with the sale deed and, therefore, there is no question of any later date being taken into account. As the breach occurred on the date of the sale, namely 16-6-1969 and as the suit as against the fourth defendant was filed only in Sept., 1972. more than three years later, as a result of the amendment of the plaint, the suit is clearly barred by limitation. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed and there will be no order as to costs. 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1981 (2) TMI 248 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 2357 and 2358 of 1980 are allowed, the judgments and decrees of the Additional District Judge are set aside and those of the Judge. Small Cause Court, restored R. S. A. No. 2997 of 1979 is also allowed and after setting aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, the plaintiff's suit is decreed for a sum of ₹ 5765.79 against all the defendants jointly and severely. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to interest on the decretal amount at the contractual rate from the date of institution of the suit till realization R. S. A. No. 401 of 1980 is also allowed, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is decreed for a sum of ₹ 10618.24 against all the defendants jointly and severally. The plaintiff would also be entitled to interest on the aforesaid amount at the contractual rate from the date of institution of the suit till realization. The parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Order accordingly.
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1981 (2) TMI 247 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... over the management. On the other hand, the interpretation of the various clauses of the documents clearly shows that sufficient care has been taken by the Pani family to see that the dedication to the family deity is not changed even if the family becomes extinct. Having, therefore, carefully perused the oral and the documentary evidence in the case we are satisfied that the conclusions arrived at by the High Court are wrong and are based on misinterpretation of Ext. A and Ext. 1 and misreading of the oral evidence led in the case, which, as we have shown, runs counter to the conclusions arrived at by the High Court. For the reasons given above, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court, decree the plaintiffs-appellants suit and restore the judgment of the trial court. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, the appellants will be entitled to costs of the appeal in this Court quantified at ₹ 4,000/- (Rupees four thousand only) Appeal allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 246 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onsidered as valid ground for rejecting account book of the assessee. II may arise either when recorded stock is more or less than actual stock found at time of survey. If it is less then it is obvious that entries are not made in ordinary course of business and sale and purchase of assessee cannot be said to be verifiable. But similar is not the position when stock recorded is more. While construing a provision of law the normal human dealing cannot be ignored. If a dealer is so dare devil as to make entries at an exaggerated figure and effect sale or purchase of goods to avoid payment of tax, as suggested by Standing Counsel and undertake grave risk it cannot be determinative of normal course. The revising authority therefore did not commit any error in holding that difference in stock did not furnish material for rejection of account book. 5. In the result this revision fails and is dismissed. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which is assessed at ₹ 200/-.
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1981 (2) TMI 245 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... decision referred to above, they do not appear to have followed it in practice, except in the cases of the five respondents referred to above. In fact no reasonable basis has been adopted in making the allotments in favour of the new allottees and denying allotments to the petitioners. In the circumstances the petitions are partly allowed, the impugned orders of allotments except in favour of respondents, M/s Rajindra Resin and Turpentine Industries, M/s Sud Pine Industries, M/s Kashmir R & T Works, M/s Bakshi Resin & Turpentine and M/s K. C. Soni Resin & Turpentine are quashed. The petitions are partly allowed. The Rules are made absolute except as against these five respondents. The respondent. No. 1, the State of Jammu and Kashmir, is directed to make the other allotments of the raw-materials to the applicants in the light of the observations made above. 10. Respondent No. 1 shall pay costs of ₹ 100.00 to each of the petitioners. Petition partly allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 244 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... become necessary to establish modern market yards with conveniences and facilities. When this was sought to be done there were representations by the traders and the Government appears to have thought that it was advisable to give the traders sufficient time to enable them to prepare themselves to move into the new market yards. The notifications establishing new market yards were therefore, cancelled and the old markets were allowed to function for some time. Later when the time was thought to be ripe, notifications establishing new market yards were once again issued. It is, therefore seen that the seeming confusion was not the result of any arbitrary or erratic action on the part of the Government but was the result of a desire to accommodate the traders as much as possible. We, therefore, see no force in any of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. All the Writ Petitions and Civil Appeals are therefore, dismissed with costs. Petitions and Appeals dismissed.
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1981 (2) TMI 243 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt for different destinations taking into consideration the quantity of the goods, the time for unloading, sorting, etc., and has further directed that reloading or transhipment should be done within a time to be fixed by the Terminal Tax Officer. Though the directions given are correct but they will have to be construed in the light of the various factors which we have referred to. Rule 26 will have to be interpreted on the footing that s. 178 of the fact does not contemplate levy of terminal tax for goods meant for destinations other than Delhi. For the reasons given above, we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment except the portion quashing the impugned orders. That portion we uphold (though on grounds different from the ones given by the High Court) in the light of the decision given and the observations made by us regarding the interpretation of s. 178 of the Act. In the special circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 242 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the company is not legally maintainable; (2) that the company is not an interested person so as to give it a right to become a party to the proceedings in reference before the District Judge; (3) that the only right under the Act available to the company is to appear and adduce evidence for the determination of the amount of compensation, and (4) that the company by itself would have no right to file an appeal. 43. In view of my aforesaid conclusions, the revision petitions filed by the petitioner are dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs. 44. I have had the privilege of going through the judgment recorded by my Lord the Chief Justice and my esteemed brother Prem Chand Jain, J., and with respect to the former, I concur with brother Jain, J. 45. In accordance with the majority decision the revision petition filed by the petitioner are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case was make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1981 (2) TMI 241 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vances of the petitioners would be removed. To be on the safe side, however we allow the stay granted in all the petitions to continue until the provisions of respective Sub-Clauses 3 and 5 passed by the State Governments concerned are withdrawn. We may also emphasise the fact that the amount of sugar taken by the Government through levy should be properly stored and duly protected from rain and rot and be despatched to the various control depots expeditiously in order to ensure a quick and equitable distribution of the commodity amongst the people at moderate rates. The Government may also consider the desirability of giving a bare minimum hearing to the representative of the owners of the cane crushers in future before fixing the rate at which the levy is taken from the owners so as to see that the owners of the crushers are not put to such great loss that they are completely wiped out from business. With these observations the petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1981 (2) TMI 240 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ission of the learned Counsel was that even if the confession to the Magistrate was accepted as voluntary it has not been sufficiently corroborated to justify the conviction of the accused. It is now well settled that in order to sustain a conviction on the basis of a confessional statement it is sufficient that the general trend of the confession is substantiated by some evidence which would tally with the contents of the confession. General corroboration is sufficient-vide Subramanian Goundan v. State of Madras (1). In the present case the confessional statement refers to the motive for the occurrence. This part of the confession is corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 1. The confessional statement refers to the accused having thrown a big stone on the head of the deceased. This part of the statement is corroborated by the medical evidence. We think that there was sufficient general corroboration to justify the High Court acting upon it. The appeal, is therefore dismissed.
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1981 (2) TMI 239 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which the right to minerals belongs to private owners and those owners seek permission to quarry black granite the applications will have to be dealt with under the relevant rules in Sec. III of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules. Rule 8C, it may be noted, does not impose a general ban on quarrying black granite but only imposes a bar on the grant of leases of quarrying black granite. Appeals and Special Leave Petitions which arise out of applications for the grant of permission to quarry black granite in the Patta lands belonging to the applicants themselves, have therefore, to be dismissed. The result is, Special Leave Petition Nos. 9257, 9259, 9260, 9271, 9273 to 9282 and 9284 of 1980 are dismissed and Special Leave Petition Nos 9234 to 9248, 9250 to 9256, 9258, 9261 to 9270,9272,9283,9285,9286,9288,9289 and 9290 of 1980 are granted and Appeals allowed. Civil Appeal Nos. 2602 to 2604 of 1980 are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1981 (2) TMI 238 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... 8 of the Customs Act on 15-1-80. Miss Jethamalani relied upon the decisions of this Court in Icchu Devi v. Union of India (1980) AIR 1980 and Smt. Shalini Soni v. Union of India (1980) AIR 1981 No counter has been filed on behalf at the State of Maharashtra, but Shri O.P. Rana, learned Counsel for the State of Maharashtra urged that the copies of the documents were not supplied to the detenu as the detenu was already aware of the contents of the documents. That is hardly an answer to the submission made on behalf of the detenu. The detenu was entitled to be supplied with copies of all material documents instead of having to rely upon his memory in regard to the contents of the documents. The failure of the detaining authority to supply copies of such documents vitiated the detention, as has been held by this Court in the two cases cited by counsel. The detune is, therefore, entitled to be released. He is accordingly directed to be released forthwith. The petition is allowed,
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1981 (2) TMI 237 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... raid peacefully. Even though what we have just stated is a general prima facie impression that we have formed at this stage on the materials available to us at present, it may not be possible to come to a conclusive finding about the falsity or otherwise of the complaint. But then we think that it would amount to giving a go-bye to Section 108 of the Gold (Control) Act, if cases of this type are allowed to be pursued to their logical conclusion, i. e., to that of conviction or acquittal. In this view of the matter we do not feel inclined to up-set the impugned order, even though perhaps the matter may have required further evidence before quashing of the complaint could be held to be fully justified. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 7. Before parting with the judgment we deem it only fair to indicate that no- expression of opinion herein shall be taken into consideration in the cross case which is pending against the appellant at the instance of the Customs authorities.
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