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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 199 Records
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1981 (4) TMI 284 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ment and that a show cause notice was issued to ascertain the culpability of each of the Directors of the Company. The first plea is not available to the complainant as under section 470 of the Cr. P. C. extension of the period of limitation for obtaining sanction is permissible when under any law sanction is required. The relevant law, namely, the Companies Act nowhere provides that for a prosecution under section 295(4) a sanction of the Central Government is necessary. As regards the other plea, it appears from the record that the Directors were asked to show cause on 6th December 1977, that is, after the period of limitation. Since the cognizance was already barred by that time, the prosecution cannot avail of such a plea to circumvent the inhibition of limitation. For the above considerations, it must be held that the instant prosecution is barred by limitation. The application accordingly succeeds and the Rule is made absolute. The impugned proceeding is hereby quashed.
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1981 (4) TMI 283 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... therefore, we feel that although the murders committed by Sahai were extremely gruesome, brutal and dastardly, yet the extreme penalty of death is not called for in the circumstances of this particular case. 25. For these reasons, therefore, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court acquitting the respondents and convict all the respondents under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence them to imprisonment for life. We also convict Barrakkey alias Krishan Kumar under Section 148 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for two years. We further convict Parag and Ambika under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence them to rigorous imprisonment for one year each. Sentences are ordered to run concurrently. The bail of the respondents is hereby cancelled and the Sessions Judge shall issue warrants and take the respondents under custody and send them to jail to serve out the sentences imposed.
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1981 (4) TMI 282 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e profession throwing a shoe at a Judge. 9. Those who are informed of the question and think deeply upon it entertain no doubt that the Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the same mechanism which administers justice to the people. Many members of the Bench are drawn from the Bar and their past association is a source of inspiration and pride to them. It ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestionably true that courtesy breeds courtesy and just as charity has to begin at home, courtesy must begin with the Judge. A discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned instrument in the setting of a courtroom. But members of the Bar will do well to remember that such flagrant violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without which no democracy can survive. 10. All this, of course, is said without meaning any disrespect to Shri Bhagirath Das. Not he, but what he said, is the cause of this comment.
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1981 (4) TMI 281 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the date of the offence. The object which the statutes seek to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation. The prosecution against the respondent being barred by limitation the conviction as also the sentence of the respondent as also the entire proceedings culminating in the conviction of the respondent herein become non-est. For these reasons given above, we hold that the point of law regarding the applicability of Section 468 of the CrPC has been correctly decided by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. This Court has also taken the same view in a number of decisions. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondent will now be discharged from his bail bonds.
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1981 (4) TMI 280 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ose tax on them and for non-compliance of directions, Assessees make themselves liable for being visited with penalty. It is appropriate that the order-sheets should be properly maintained, orders issued out from the Income-tax establishments should be July sealed and signed by the officers. Since it is not the contention of the Standing Counsel that any statutory provisions authorise unsigned and unsealed documents to be issued out of the office, we take it that the prevailing practice is more out of default in complying with the normal requirements by the public officers and we expect that the Commissioner of Income-tax will issue appropriate circulars and ensure that such defects do not occur henceforward. 5. In our view, the question is completely one of fact and the Tribunal was right in refusing to refer the questions posed by the Assessee for opinion of the Court. Both the applications are accordingly rejected. We make no order as to costs. J.K. Mohanty, J. 6. I agree.
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1981 (4) TMI 279 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ;s contention before us that it the assessee’s learned counsel (sic), no such objection was raised by the department, the only question being whether the flat could be held to be used for the purpose of business when it was lying vacant. Besides, the question as to whether it is in the nature of guest-house or not requires investigation of materials and facts to support the same which are not on record and none has been pointed out. The objection is, therefore, rejected. 26. In the result, the appeal and the cross objection are partly allowed. 27. As in the other Special Bench case, so here too, we wish to record our appreciation and compliment to the learned departmental representatives Shri G.S. Bhargava and Shri T.S. Srinivasan and the learned counsel for the assessee Shri S.E. Dastur for their researchful and competent assistance and guidance in our attempt to decide a somewhat difficult and baffling question involved in interpreting the provisions of section 40(c).
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1981 (4) TMI 278 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... based were not supplied to the detenus along with the grounds of detention. In view of the long line of decisions of this Court, we have no option but to direct the detenus to be set at liberty forthwith. It is so ordered.
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1981 (4) TMI 277 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation of evidence. It is true that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution this Court normally does not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the High Court. But when it appears that the findings of facts arrived at are bordering on perversity and result in miscarriage of justice, this Court will not decline to quash such findings to prevent the miscarriage of justice. 8. In our opinion the guilt of the two respondents has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and their acquittal resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. In the result we set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned High Court and convict respondent Kalki alias Kali under section 302 of the Penal Code and respondent, Amara, under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code, and sentence each of them to suffer imprisonment for life. The appeal is allowed. The respondents are said to be on bail. They shall surrender forthwith to serve out their sentences. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (4) TMI 276 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ance was placed thereon for the purpose of confirming the cancellation order passed by the authority in the first instance. The Appellate Authority has also stated that non-production of godown licence etc. was violative of the Drug Rules. If, as explained by the appellants in their reply dated December 17, 1979, the said licence had been deposited in the office of the Civil Surgeon for renewal; how could it be produced? It shows non-application of mind by the Appellate Authority to the explanation furnished and there is nothing to indicate that the explanation was false. 2. In the circumstances, both the impugned orders-initial order of the State's Drug Controller dated 23-8-1980 as well as the order of the Appellate Authority dated 30-10-1980 are set aside and we direct that the respondent should proceed afresh to deal with the appellants in the matter of cancellation of their licence after giving them proper opportunity and following the principles of natural justice.
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1981 (4) TMI 275 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rst appellate Court and remand the case to the first appellate Court which, after granting the application under order 41, r. 27 and taking the certified copy of the decree in partition suit No. 4/74 on record and after giving an opportunity to the parties before it to lead any additional evidence pursuant to this additional evidence, would decide the following two questions (1) Does the partition decree transfer the suit shop to Pyarelal Sharma exclusively ? (2) If yes, can the respondents (plaintiffs) maintain action and are entitled to evict the appellant (defendant) on the ground of personal requirement of Manohar Lal Sharma (respondent 1) and/or on the ground of default as contemplated by s. 11(1)(d) of the Rent Act ? On the evidence on these issues the Court may mould the final relief consistent with its findings. With this direction the appeal is remanded to the first appellate Court. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (4) TMI 274 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ervice with all consequential benefits. o p /o p No case is made out for departure from this normally accepted approach of the Courts in the field of social justice and we do not propose to depart in the case. o p /o p Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the Award of the Labour Court dated May 31, 1980, is set aside. We hold that the termination of service of the appellant was ab initio void and inoperative and a declaration is made that he continues to be in service with all consequential benefits, namely, back wages in full and other benefits, if any. However, as the Award is to be made by the Labour Court, we remit the case to the Labour Court to make an appropriate Award in the light of the findings of this Court. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant in this Court quantified at ₹ 2000 within four weeks from the date of this judgment and the costs in the Labour Court have to be quantified by the Labour Court. o p /o p S.R. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1981 (4) TMI 273 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... appeal back to the single Judge with the answer rendered by them to the question referred by the single Judge and left it to the single Judge to dispose of the second appeal according to law. 2. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the Division Bench dismissing the Second Appeal with costs and direct that the Second Appeal shall be disposed of by the single Judge of the High Court in accordance with law without being influenced by any observations made by the Division Bench on merits but on the basis that the order dt. Jan. 21, 1963 made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner was not final and binding on the parties. The single Judge will consider whether having regard to the boundaries and the area specified in the Sale Certificate dt. 7th June, 1963 read with the corrigendum dt. 22nd Sept. 1964, any portion of the property conveyed to the appellant was illegally In the possession of the respondents. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal.
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1981 (4) TMI 272 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... concluded by the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the trial court and the first appellate court. It is also concluded by concurrent findings of fact that the respondent needs a portion of the building for starting the business of a medicine shop. What should be the location of the shop and what its dimensions is a matter which remains for decision. And there is the further question of considering the availability of s. 18 of the Act to the appellants. Both these questions, I think, should be left to the first appellate court. Accordingly, I allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and of the first appellate court and remand the case to the latter court for permitting the appellants to amend their written statement and allowing the parties to lead such evidence as is consequentially called for, and thereafter to decide the case afresh in the light of the observations made above. I would leave the parties to bear their costs. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (4) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ssion, and his judgments and orders would be those of the Court of Session. They would continue to be valid as the judgments and orders, of the Court of Session, notwithstanding that his appointment to such Court might be declared invalid. On that account alone, it can never be said that the procedure prescribed by law has not been followed. It would be a different matter if the constitution of the Court itself is under challenge. We are not concerned with such situation in the instant cases. We, therefore, find no force in any of the submissions of the learned counsel. Shri Govindan Nair attempted to argue that the confiscation was not justified on the merits. We find no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the lower Courts. Shri Phadke requested us to widen the scope of the appeals and to permit him to canvas the correctness of the convictions and sentences also. We declined to do so. All the appeals are dismissed. P.B.R Appeals dismissed.
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1981 (4) TMI 270 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... the affidavits remained unrebutted on record. Therefore, there is no reasons to ignore the affidavits of the partners. The whole argument of the Revenue was that the entire evidence was filed before the AAC after the negative statement was made by Shri. M.C. Ranka, Advocate. Filing of the evidence after the statement made by Shri M.C. Ranka, cannot be capitalised by the revenue, because the assessee was not given any opportunity by way of notice under s. 143 (2) to file evidence by the ITO and needful could have been done by the assessee only before the Appellate Authority. We, therefore, hold that there is ample evidence on record to show that the donations were with the specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus. The donations will, therefore not be included in the income of the assessee in view of s. 12 of the IT Act, 1961. For the reasons, we uphold the combined order of the AAC and reject the contentions of the revenue. 4. Both the appeals are dismissed.
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1981 (4) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n a number of decisions starting from Smt, Icchu Devi Choraria's case to the case of Kamla Kanahiylal Khushalani W. P. No. 5873 of 1980. decided on Jan. 6. 1981 . it is manifest that the question of demanding the documents is wholly irrelevant because it is the constitutional mandate which requires the detaining authority to give the documents relied on or referred to in the order of detention pari passu the grounds of detention in order that the detenu may make an effective representation immediately instead of waiting for the documents to be supplied with. In the instant case, the detenu did make a representation promptly on Dec. 30, 1980 but was seriously handicapped in making an effective representation because the aforesaid documents which were of vital importance were not supplied to him. 3. For these reasons therefore, the continued order of detention of the detenu is rendered void. We, therefore, allow this petition and direct the detenu to be released forthwith.
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1981 (4) TMI 268 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... insured, he or they shall get the amount. Sub-section (5) deals with the situation where the nominee dies in the life-time of the assured. I do not quite see any scope for supplying anything by the court in these provisions. (26) Upon a survey of these decisions, I am of the view that the majority of the courts have read the statute negatively and have implied what was never intended. Limitations and restrictions have been imposed where none was desired. And support was sought from outside, old and unrelated decisions for the pre-determined conclusions which are against the categorical and clear statutory provisions and the will and the intention of the deceased. I have no hesitation in holding that the nominee takes the money by way of statutory testamentary disposition. He is not a trustee for or an agent of the heirs or successors of the assured, .nor is the insurance money available to any creditor. I, therefore, dismiss this appeal. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1981 (4) TMI 267 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... after discovery of mistake in payment of duty. The recovery of excise duty by the department was obviously illegal and contrary to law and the petitioners are entitled to refund of excess duty paid from August 23, 1971 onwards. The Department would compute the amount of excess duty paid and would refund the same. 45. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. The respondents are further directed to levy excise duty on phenolic moulding powder manufactured by the petitioners under Notification dated June 1, 1971 till February 26, 1980. The respondents are also directed to compute the claim of the petitioners for excess duty paid from August 23, 1971 onwards and refund the excess amount recovered within a period of three months from today. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The Bank guarantees furnished by the petitioners to continue for a further period of three months from today.
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1981 (4) TMI 266 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
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... ... ..... en deleted from the barred list. He submitted that the other articles were in the nature of components only and these could not attract penal action. He further stated that even the bill of entry showed that the goods had been assessed as components. He requested for refund of the fine. 4. The Board carefully considered the written and oral submissions made by and on behalf of the appellants. 5. The Board observes that the plea that during the relevant period the word ‘component’ of photographic equipment had been removed from Appendix 3 is correct. It also appears to the Board that the lenses were components of a camera and not independent equipments by themselves has substantial force. The Board observes that in any case as the importation has been effected by a newspaper for its own use, there is scope for liberal treatment. On all these considerations the orders of confiscation are set aside with the direction that the fine already paid be refunded.
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1981 (4) TMI 265 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE (APPEALS), BOMBAY
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... ... ..... -1977, permitted act-off of the duty paid on the goods used in the manufacture of other excisable goods. There is a difference in the expressions “manufactured from” and “used in the manufacture”. Perhaps the first set of expressions presupposes that the ‘inputs’ should constitute component part of the finished products, whereas in the case of second set of expressions, it is not necessary that the ‘inputs’ should constitute component part of the finished products. In the Notification under consideration, the latter set of expressions have been used. Thus, so long as any duty paid goods (following up under Item 68) has been used for the manufacture’ of a finished product, regardless whether this constitutes a component part of the finished product or not, a manufacturer shall be entitled for the set-off of duty. Accordingly, I accept the appellants’ contention and set-aside the impugned order. The appeal is allowed.
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