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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 203 Records
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1981 (8) TMI 254 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s not even an industrial establishment it is not necessary for us to decide that point since that has not been the finding of the authority at all. But nonetheless we must accept the contention of Mr. Chakraborty that the authority wholly misread the definition of the term 'factory' as in section 2(k) of the Factories Act, in thinking that the Board is a factory within the said definition. Such a decision is based upon a fundamental misconception that the dock workers are the workers employed by the Board and that they are so employed in a manufacturing process. We must, therefore, uphold the contention of Mr. Chakraborty that the authority went wrong in holding that the Board being a factory would come within the purview of the provision of section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. In the result, this application succeeds and the impugned order being set aside the application for the claim is dismissed since it was not maintainable in law. B.C. CHAKRABARTI, J. I agree.
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1981 (8) TMI 253 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the meaning of the Explanation of Section 20(a) of the Act. Since 11.9.78 is the date when the summons was served and one month's time is allowed for filing the written statement though it may be the date for taking any steps by the defendant, and therefore, by that date the defendant should have complied with the provisions of sub-clause (4) of Section 20. Admittedly, this has not been done in the instant case. The rent was deposited only on 24.10.78 while the period of one month for filing written statement expired on 11.10.78. In these circumstances, therefore, the defendant could not avail of the advantage under sub-Section (4) of Section 20 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and is liable to ejectment. The decision of the court below, therefore, is perfectly justified and it cannot be interfered with in revision. 12. No other point is pressed. The revision is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own courts.
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1981 (8) TMI 252 - ITAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... he institution is existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. However, if the surplus can be used for non-educational purposes, it cannot be said that the institution is existing solely for educational purpose and such institutions will not be liable for exemption under section 10(22). But in such cases the applicability of section 11 can be examined and if the conditions laid down therein are satisfied, the income will be exempt under section 11." From the guidelines available from the circular, it is clear that where a trust or a society has only "educational" objects and whose profits cannot be diverted for any other purposes, it will be treated as exempt under section 10(22). The view expressed in the circular represents a reasonable interpretation, of clause (22) of section 10 and in that view, the income of the assessee is clearly exempt under section 10(22). 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the assessment annulled.
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1981 (8) TMI 251 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is true and the terms of Ext, 2, Deed of Lease, were accepted by the plaintiffs and they were acted upon. So the question of fraud is ruled out. Had there been any fraud, plaintiff No. 2 would not have accepted possession of only the four rooms and paid Municipal taxes to the extent of 1/3rd share. The defendant No. 2 has stated that plaintiffs had l/3rd share. Hence the submissions made on behalf of the respondents cannot be accepted. The decree must, therefore, be modified. 17. The appeal is allowed. It is hereby declared that the plaintiffs and the defendant No, 1 have 1/3rd share and 2/3rds share respectively in the disputed property subject to the right of residence of defendant No. 2 with respect to two rooms allotted to her, as well as her right to get ₹ 6 per mensem for her maintenance out of the income of the property for her life. The judgment and decree appealed against be modified accordingly. 18. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. 19. I agree.
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1981 (8) TMI 250 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e provisions of sub- section above exracted made it imperative for the District Court and the High Court not to entertain the objection whether or not it was otherwise well founded. We, therefore, refrain from going into the question of the correctness of finding arrived at by the High Court that the Manjeri Court had territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application praying for final decree. 4. In the result we accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand the case back to it for deciding on merits the appeal which culminated in that judgment. As the proceedings for the final decree have been pending since 1966, we further direct that the High Court shall decide the appeal last mentioned at the earliest possible and, in any case, within three months from the receipt of the records from this Court. The Registry shall take immediate steps to have the records despatched to the High Court. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1981 (8) TMI 249 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the defendant-appellant that the High Court has erred in passing the decree for possession and mesne profits against the defendant. The proper remedy for the plaintiff in this case was to file a regular suit for partition in respect of all the properties and not a suit for possession of plots of one village and mesne profits. 44. The second contention that disputed estate was a partible estate has been raised only to be repelled. The overwhelming evidence on the record leaves no room for doubt that the disputed estate was an impartible estate till the death of the original plaintiff in 1957. 45. In the result the first appeal No. 209 of 1970 filed by the plaintiff is dismissed while the other appeal filed by the defendant, No. 2280 of 1970, is allowed and the decree passed by the High Court is set aside and the decree of the Trial Court as affirmed by the first appellate court, is restored, 46. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 248 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt application is a mere abuse of the process of the Court and is a machination of Mohan Lal Mittal through his son, Promod Kumar Mittal, to set up one of his companies, Purna Investment Private Limited holding some shares as hereinbefore stated in the capital of the Respondent Company, Andhra Steel Corporation Limited. 11. Therefore. I need not go into the other question which has been raised by Mohan Lal Mittal in the main application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil P. C. and, therefore, the said question cannot be raised again by this circuitous process by adding or intervention of a party who has no locus standi in the suit where the Respondent Company, Andhra Steel Corporation Limited, is represented and Mohan Lal Mittal himself is representing through leading Counsel and opposing the application by raising some objections as sought to be raised in the present application. 12. In that view of the matter. I have no hesitation in dismissing this application with costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 247 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the neglect or indifference of their employees. It is impossible to hold that it was a device to cover an ulterior purpose. The appeal involves substantial questions of law. Two pertinent clauses of the Assam Paddy and Rice (Licensing & Levy) Order, 1980 as well as a notification issued by a competent authority were declared ultra vires by the learned single Judge. The petitioners have no other remedy but to appeal against the order "to bring into life the provision of the Order." We have considered this aspect of the case as well while considering the prayer of the petitioners. Upon the whole, we hold that the application Under Section 5 was maintainable and the petitioners were entitled to extension of time as they had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period. These were the reasons for which we extended the period and condoned the delay and allowed the petition by our order dated 11-8-81, There will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 246 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pted on principle laid down by this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pilot Shoe Co., 1976 U. P. T. C, 668. Higher consumption of electricity by itself or decline in turnover have not been accepted as good ground for rejection of account-books. But failure to maintain stock register as required under Section 12 (2) of the Act even though for a part of the year as Section 12 (2) was amended in March, 1973, could result in rejection of the account-books and the finding of the revising authority that account-books of assessee cannot be accepted for this year cannot be said to be an error of law but this is only technical in nature. 3. In the result the revision suceeds and is allowed in part. The order rejecting the account-books is maintained but the assessee's disclosed turnover shall be accepted. A copy of this order shall be sent to the Tribunal for action under Section 11 (8) of the Act. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which is assessed at ₹ 300/.
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1981 (8) TMI 245 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... accounts even after recording a finding that assessee who was manufacturer did not maintain any manufacturing account. 3. But the disclosed turnover of assessee has to be accepted as the defect was technical in nature on the principle laid down by this court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pilot Shoe Co., 1976 UPTC 668. 4. In the result this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by tribunal is set aside. The account book of assessee shall stand rejected but the turnover determined by tribunal is maintained. A copy of this order shall be sent to tribunal to take action under Section 11 (8) of the Act. As no body has appeared for assessee there shall be no order as to cost.
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1981 (8) TMI 244 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... k will pay the amount of ₹ 39,595.36p. to the Life Insurance Corporation forthwith. Unused cheque book of the aforesaid account will be returned to the Corporation. (26) It is clarified here that this amount of Rs'. 39,595.36 has already been taken into account in arriving at the figures of ₹ 94,917.14 and ₹ 1,10.694.65 p. (27) Defendants have paid ₹ 10201- to the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. vide receipt No. 504786 dated 28th April, 1980. This is the fire insurance premium in respect of policy No. 51328 for the year 1980. Counsel for the Corporation says that they also paid fire premium amounting to ₹ 4761- on April 1, 1980 in respect of the same property. The Corporation has no objection if the defendants' claim the refund of ₹ 1020.00 from the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. I therefore allow the defendants to claim refund of .the said amount from the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. .Ltd.
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1981 (8) TMI 243 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... two objects mentioned in Section 3. of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.... Sub-clause (e) of Clause 5, we have already stated, enables the licensing authority to give preference to a cooperative society in certain circumstances; but it does not create a monopoly in favour of cooperative societies. The preference given has a reasonable relation to the objects of the legislation set out in Section 3 of the Act; therefore, Sub-clause (e) of Clause 5 of the Control Order, 1961, cannot be held to be bad on the ground of class legislation, but the passing of an order under the sub-clause for a purpose not contemplated by it will amount to discrimination and denial of the guarantee of equal protection of the law. 14. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the submission of the petitioners that the preference to be shown to cooperative societies creates a monopoly in their favour and is discriminatory. In the result the Writ Petitions and Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.
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1981 (8) TMI 242 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... owing that with respect we are of the view that the question of law was wrongly decided by the tribunal. We would, Therefore, hold that the tribunal was wrong in law in coming to the conclusion that there was a completed sale of shares on 5-2-1948. In our view no equitable title in the ownership in the said shares passed on either to Mrs. Jain or Dalmia. In our view the sum of ₹ 3,59,559(which has been wrongly printed as ₹ 3,50,559 at page 5 of the paper book, because both the counsels for the parties have agreed that the correct figure should be ₹ 3,59,559) was liable to be included in the income of the assessed and taxed as such as held by the Income Tax Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioner; and the Income Tax Tribunal committed an illegality in holding that it was not liable to be taxed and ordering deletion. We would, Therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favor of the Revenue, The reference is answered accordingly.
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1981 (8) TMI 241 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e learned Trial Judge until the disposal of the appeal. Save the order that we have already made, that is to say, admitting the memorandum of appeal there will be no further order on this application. Save to that extent all interim orders are vacated. 5. Appeal from the orders dated 27th July, 1981 and 15th July, 1981 is to be consolidated and one set of Paper Book cyclostyled or typewritten in both the appeals is to be filed within one month from date. Notice of appeal is waived. Settlement of index is dispensed with. All papers used in the Court below including the order appealed from and the order admitting the appeal will be included in the Paper Book. In case certified copies of the orders are not available within the time aforesaid, liberty is given to the appellant to file a supplementary Paper Book to include the certified copies of the orders, Department to issue certified copies of the orders expeditiously. 6. Costs of this application will be costs in the appeal.
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1981 (8) TMI 240 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pt to refer the matter to arbitration and had appointed its arbitrator. The respondent also had appointed its arbitrator without prejudice to its contention that this was wholly without jurisdiction. Thereafter the arbitration did not proceed and by an order of this Court dated the 11th Sept. 1975 of Mr. Justice Salil K. Roy Chowdhury the authority of the arbitrators was revoked. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the appellant that in view of these proceedings it could not be said ex facie under Order 7 Rule 11 that the claim was barred by limitation and was not maintainable. Though we are inclined to think that there is good deal of substance in the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the claim was barred on this score also, in the view we have taken on the first aspect of the matter it is not necessary to adjudicate on this aspect of the matter. 6. In the premises, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. C.K. Banerji, J. 7. I agree.
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1981 (8) TMI 239 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... d last did not arise under the Bombay Act but interpreted the provisions of a Madhya Pradesh legislation in regard to landlords and tenants. We may further state that the case first noted is a four Judge decision and is binding on a Bench of three Judges. No question of any dissent such as has been referred to by Mr. Lalit, therefore, arises. Jai Singh's case (supra) holds the field till today in so far as the Bombay Rent Act is concerned and we are bound by it. 2. In these circumstances we dismiss the petition for special leave.
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1981 (8) TMI 238 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... elines or principles. Furthermore, as the cases of A.I. AHs and I.A.C. AHs are identical, an extension up to the age of 45 in the case of one and 40 in the case of other amounts to discrimination inter se in the same class of AHs and must be struck down on that ground also. 131. The result of our striking down these provisions is that like A.I. AHs, I.A.C. AHs, also would be entitled to their period of retirement being extended up to 45 years until a suitable amendment is made by the Management in the light of the observations made by us. 132. For the reasons given above, therefore, the writ petitions are allowed in part as indicated in the judgment and the Transfer Case is disposed of accordingly. So long as the Rule of I.A.C. is not amended the General Manager will continue to extend the age of retirement of I.A.C. AHs. up to 45 years subject to their being found medically fit. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1981 (8) TMI 237 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... terest paid by the assessee, then only net amount could be taxed. Similarly, if the interest received was less than the interest paid difference only should be allowed, while computing the income for other sources. The real income from interest has to be determined in this manner and to be considered while making the assessment. If the issue is considered from this angle which seems to us to be the proper approach, neither the Punjab and Haryana High Court decision in Orient Carpets’ case (supra) would stand in the assessee’s way nor the plea that the interest paid by the assessee is not expenditure contemplated under section 57(iii), could deprive the assessee the benefit of the adjustment of the interest paid against interest received from the Government. We direct the interest paid under section 220(2) amounting to ₹ 18,597 be adjusted against the interest received under section 244 amounting to ₹ 19,490 and the net amount only should be taxed. 15.
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1981 (8) TMI 236 - GUJARAT- HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the negative and against the Revenue. 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the interest deficit to the extent of ₹ 6,453 was not deductible while determining the total income? In the affirmative and against the assessee in view of Smt. Padmavati Jaykrishna v. CIT 1975 101 ITR 153 (Guj). Question referred at the instance of the Revenue. Question Answer 4. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the lands in question were, on the date of their transfer, agricultural lands? Reference answered accordingly. In the negative and against the assessee. There will be no order regarding costs. The learned counsel for the assessee applies for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under section 261 of the Income-tax Act. We do not consider this to be a fit case for the grant of a certificate. The certificate is, therefore, refused.
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1981 (8) TMI 235 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... just and reasonable. We think that it is not enough to say that preference should be given because a certain kind of process was gone through by the Selection Committee. This is all that the supposed statement of reasons amounts to. We, therefore, think that the mandatory provisions of Regulation 5 (5) were not complied with." With respect we fully agree and hold that the Select List prepared in accordance with the recommendations of the Selection Committee made in its meeting held on the 18th of September 1963 contravened the mandate in sub-regulation 5 of regulation 5. 5. In the result we accept the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and quash the Select List just above mentioned in so far as it relates to the appellant, as also the order of his reversion. He shall be entitled to all consequential benefits even though he has since retired from service. In the circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their respective costs. Appeal allowed.
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