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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 175 Records
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1982 (1) TMI 215 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arded principle has been taken to be alive and kept followed to the effect that the Court power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stands ousted altogether when the defence is closed by the accused. But it appears to me that interests of justice and all steps in aid of it have to remain paramount. These cannot be dwarfed or hurdled even by Judge-made law. Thus, it is the law as laid down by the Supreme Court which I am obliged to follow, and which I do. distinguishing the aforementioned Single Bench judgments of this Court on principle. 10. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is held that the power of the Court to examine a witness for the just decision of the case as conferred by Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be curtailed in any manner or beyond any staging, so long as the Court retains seize in of the matter. The impugned order, in the light thereof, is unassailable. Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 214 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ns as the Government. Further, it has been laid down in Som Prakash's case (supra) that a Government company being a State under Part III and not under Part XIV of the Constitution, the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution is not available to an employee of a Government company. 23. In the instant case, the Corporation being a Government company under the control of the Government of India is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and is, therefore, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court subject to this that the appellant will not be entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution, No other point has been urged by either party. 24. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the learned Judge is set aside and the case is sent back to the appropriate Bench which shall now dispose of the rule nisi on merit. 25. The appeal is allowed, but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 213 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... enforced at the instance of citizens of this country or associations of such citizens of this country or associations of such citizens, by courts in India, unless such obligations are made part of the law of this country by means of appropriate legislation. 19. In the result, we do not admit this appeal, but dismiss it, though on a ground different from the one on which the learned single Judge rested his decision. After, we pronounced the above judgment, the learned counsel for the appellant made an oral application for grant of a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court from our judgment. 20. In our decision, we have merely followed the ruling of the Supreme Court in Jolly George Varghese vf Bank of Cochin 1980 2SCR913 . Therefore, no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, can be said to arise from our judgment. 21. Hence, we decline to grant the certificate prayed for and dismiss the oral application.
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1982 (1) TMI 212 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... laterally and in an arbitrary and unfair manner refuse to carry out its obligations and thereby wreck. During proceedings Corporation was prepared to disburse the loan if refinance was available. That means the Corporation did not consider it risky to disburse the amount provided it stood refinanced. We have already pointed out earlier that the parties did contemplate a situation where refinancing may be refused. It is, therefore, obvious that, this rider is being placed as a mere excuse. In the circumstances, we are in agreement with the learned single Judge that this is a fit case in which the jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be invoked to assist the Company, an innocent victim 11. These were all the submissions made before us by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the appellant Corporation. As we did not find any merit in these submissions, we passed the order dismissing the appeal with costs on 12th Oct. 1981. 12. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 211 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ction between appeals from orders of acquittals under sub-s. (1) of s. 378 in respect of (1) offences punishable with sentence of death or imprisonment for life and triable by Court of Sessions, and (2) other offences. All appeals falling under category (1), together with applications for leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378, have to be heard by a Bench of two Judges, and other appeals falling under category (2), together with applications for leave under sub-s, (3) of s. 378, are to be heard by a Single Judge. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The order passed by the High Court, dismissing the application for leave under sub-s. (3) of s. 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, filed by the State Government of Madhya Pradesh, is set aside, and it is directed that the application shall be dealt with by a Bench of two Judges as required by r. 1 (q) (ii), Chap. I, Part I, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules, prior to its amendment. H.L.C. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (1) TMI 210 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion received and the legal advice sought and believed to be true and correct and nothing has been concealed there from". (3) Order 19 Rule 3(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides, "AFFIDAVITS shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted provided that the grounds thereof are stated" Thus affidavits are either affirmed as true to knowledge, or from information received provided the source of information is disclosed, or as to what the deponent believes to be true provided the grounds for such belief are stated. If the affidavit lacks such verification it is of no use. In A. K. K. Nambiar v. Union of India and another, 1970 3SCR121 , it has been observed that if affidavits were not properly verified they cannot be admitted in evidence. It, Therefore, must be held that two affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiff are value less.
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1982 (1) TMI 209 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bles and drinks and rendering of service is merely incidental then the transaction may, amount to sale. But if, on the other hand, there is a transaction in which service is coupled with supply of foodstuffs and supply of foodstuffs is part of and incidental to the service, then the transaction may not amount to sale. 6. We are, therefore, of the view that it will be for the assessing authority to ascertain the facts in each case and then to determine upon such facts whether a sale of foodstuffs or drinks was intended and decide the matter in the light of the aforesaid decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. 7. As only a notice to show cause has been served upon the petitioners and an enquiry to ascertain the facts is yet to be made on the basis of which alone the nature of the transactions could be determined, we are unable to entertain the writ petitions at this stage. 8. In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed subject to the observations made above.
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1982 (1) TMI 208 - PUNJAB-HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... keep the complaint even on the file to be formally pending at the pre-cognizance stage, all the more when nearly seven years have elapsed from the date of the commission of the offence. There has to be an end to litigation at some point of time. If the complainant had failed to appreciate the starting point of limitation, there would be nothing now for him to explain the delay when he stands confronted that such period commences from the date of making the defamatory statement. There is nothing in the complaint, as also from the judgment of acquittal, to suggest that the interest of justice would require this old matter to be raked up for the sake of satisfying private vendetta. The complainant having neglected to explain the delay rightfully in the first instance cannot be permitted to do now. 6. For the foregoing reasons this petition is allowed. Not only are proceedings from the cognizance stage onwards quashed, but the complaint is dismissed as well. Ordered accordingly.
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1982 (1) TMI 207 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rd to the particular context in which the writ of mandamus has been granted. 44. To sum up it is held that where a society registered under the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act is in essence an instrumentality or agency of the State, it would become amenable to the writ jurisdiction under, Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the same manner as the State itself. The ratio in the earlier Full Bench case in Ajmer Singh v. Registrar Co-operative Societies Punjab (supra) is elaborated or qualified to the extent aforesaid. 45. It is further held that the Punjab Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Limited (Respondent No. 3) is not an instrumentality or a projection of the State. 46. For the detailed reasons recorded above, the primary relief of a writ of certiorari, claimed against Respondent No. 3, is not maintainable and the petition has, therefore, to be necessarily dismissed. In view of the somewhat ticklish questions involved, we leave the parties of bear their own costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 206 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot; The reasoning given by this Court with regard to the applicability of sub-section (1) of section 28 will equally apply to the applicability of sub-section (3) of section 28. This is an additional reason why this Court should not interfere with the eminently just order of the High Court. The High Court had amended the decree passed by the first appellate court and passed a decree for possession not only against the transferors but also against their transferee, that is, the petitioner. Procedure is meant to advance the cause of justice and not to retard it. The difficulty of the decree-holder starts in getting possession in pursuance of the decree obtained by him. The judgment-debtor tries to thwart the execution by all possible objections. In the circumstances narrated above, we do not find any fault with the order passed by the High Court. For the reasons given above the petition for special leave to appeal must fail and it was accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 205 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rned Counsel for the State-appellant, it must be noticed that in Tek Chand Bhatia's case 1980 Cri LJ 316)(supra, the Supreme Court had explained away Kacheroo Mai's case 1976 Cri LJ 336)(supra) to be kept confined to the particular facts of that case as it was largely based on the circumstance that the standard of quality and purity in respect to the article involved therein had not been prescribed. The Supreme Court also noticed in Tek Chand Bhatia's case that in view of Rule 48-B of the Rules having been framed on the subject of the said article, the decision in Kacheroo Mai's case supra) was rendered Inapplicable. As is by now clear, we have based our decision not on the basis of the aforereferred to two cases of the Supreme Court, but on reasoning of our own applying the requirements of els. (1) and (m) read with the proviso in preferrence to Clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act. 12. Thus for the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 204 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y was also rejected. In the face of these facts which are not disputed it seems to us very clear that both the first appeal Court and the High Court were right in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was denied reasonable-opportunity to defend himself at the disciplinary inquiry; it cannot be gainsaid that in the absence of necessary particulars and statements of witnesses he was prejudiced in the matter of his defence. Having regard to the aforesaid admitted position it is difficult to accept the contention urged by the counsel for the appellant that the view taken by the trial Court should be accepted by us. We are satisfied that the dismissal order hat been rightly held to be illegal, void and inoperative. Since the plaintiff has died during the pendency of the proceedings the only relief that would be available to the legal heirs of the deceased is the payment of arrears of salary and other emoluments payable to the deceased. 4. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 203 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cate. He lost in both courts in the rent control proceedings and has now rushed to the criminal court. This itself speaks volumes. Add to this the fact that another suit between the parties was pending from 1975. The conclusion is inescapable that invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court in this background is an abuse of the process of law and the High Court rather glossed over this important fact while declining to exercise its power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. 15. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Secunderabad, ought not to have taken cognizance of the proceedings for reasons herein indicated in respect of different offences. We consider it to be a fit case to invoke jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. P.C, 1973. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and quash the proceedings before the learned Chief Judicial Migistrate, Secunderabad. We are not inclined to make any order in respect of costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 202 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... only such steel ingots which are manufactured from the raw materials specified therein with the aid of electric furnace. Therefore, Notification No. 16 of 79 is in some respects wider in scope bringing into its ambit even such steel ingots as are manufactured from raw materials which are not specified in Notification No. 237 of 75. In view of the above, the Government consider that it cannot be said that runners and risers obtained during the manufacture of steel ingots from the raw materials specified in Notification No. 237 of 75 are exempt only from the date of Notification No. 16 of 79. In that view of the matter, the Government find considerable force in the petitioners’ plea in this regard that Notification No. 16 of 79 cannot be interpreted to have the effect of levying duty on goods already exempted under Notification No. 237 of 75 and accept the same. 5. The Government accordingly set aside the impugned order in appeal and allow the revision application.
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1982 (1) TMI 201 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... under Rule 11 by the authorities below. 6. The Government further observe that even on merits the petitioners have no case as on a plain reading of the language of the Notification No. 65 of 1972 the benefit of the exemption envisaged therein was available only if any yarn was used in the same composite mill in which it was manufactured and not when it is removed for use in another composite mill. In this regard the Government consider that if the exemption were to be extended to the yarn used in another composite mill, then the condition limiting of the benefit of the exemption to a composite mill is well nigh reasoning rendered nugatory and could as well have been deleted. In that view of the matter ‘too’ the Government consider that it could not be said that the petitioners paid the duty under any mistake of law. 7. The Government, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order and accordingly reject the revision application.
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1982 (1) TMI 200 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... om the date of such decision or order” and that since the revision by the Collector as contemplated in Section 35A was in respect of the order in original passed by the Assistant Collector the proceedings have been rightly initiated within one year of such order. 6. The Government observe that the petitioners’ grievance that the Collector had passed the orders without giving them another opportunity of hearing has no substance inasmuch as the Collector had complied with the principles of natural justice by giving them an opportunity for hearing but it is the petitioners who failed to avail of the same. In these circumstances, Government consider that the Collector was in no way bound to give the petitioners another opportunity of personal hearing. 7. In view of the above, the Government do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned order of the Collector which is speaking and correct in law. Government accordingly reject the revision application.
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1982 (1) TMI 199 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... ships they have stated that although the signatures were not there at the appropriate place in the B Forms, the signatures had been obtained on top of each form. 4. Government observe that in their revision application the petitioners have raised several questions of fact inasmuch as they have contested on facts the findings of the Assistant Collector. The petitioners have also made a grievance that they were not heard by the Assistant Collector before their claims were rejected. Having regard to all these factors Government are of the view that it would be in the fitness of things if the matter is decided de novo by the Assistant Collector by issue of a speaking order and in compliances with the principles of natural justice. Government accordingly set aside the order in appeal and direct that the Assistant Collector shall adjudicate the petitioners’ refund claims afresh after granting them a personal hearing. The revision application is disposed of accordingly.
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1982 (1) TMI 198 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... th a man-made fibre and not a natural fibre. As regards the other part relating to man-made fibre the chapter under the heading ‘Tow’ clearly distinguishes between staple fibre and tow as is evident from the following words “ The disadvantage of staple fibre is that ……. The use of tow avoids this …….. ” The petitioners reference to some amending notification issued subsequent to the period involved in the revision application is apparently to Notification No. 280/79, dated 30-10-79 exempting man-made staple fibres made out of tow on which appropriate duty had been paid. This notification could not have retrospective effect. A notification has to be construed strictly and Government are of the view that during the material period Notification No. 64/77, dated 15-4-77, as amended was not applicable to polypropylene tow. 4. In view of the above the Government uphold the order in appeal and reject the revision application.
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1982 (1) TMI 197 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... is not genuine, the person concerned with movement of tobacco on that T.P. 1 are liable to penal action. A duty is cast on the recepient of tobacco to ensure that he gets the goods allegedly duty paid only from known persons, who could be identified later if their claim of selling duty paid tobacco was found to be false at any later stage. In this case, the petitioners had not taken this precaution. Government are therefore unable to accept the petitioners plea of their bona fides at this belated stage and see no reason to interfere with the order in appeal which is correct in law. The revision application is, therefore, rejected.
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1982 (1) TMI 196 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... he commission is eligible for deduction from assessable value. The agency commission is nothing but a trade discount given by the petitioners. Government are, however, unable to accept the petitioner’s claim for the 1% agency commission on the sale of Kassels brand fans through the five regional distributors. The commission given to Bajaj Electricals Ltd. on the sale of Kassels fans through the five distributors could not be said to be in the nature of a trade discount. Under Section 4 only trade discounts are permissible for deduction. Government hold that the 1% commission which is in the nature of brokerage and benefit whereof is not passed on to wholesale dealers, is not eligible to be deducted as a trade discount. As regards the 8.5% discount given to the five distributors on the sale of Kassels fans, Government agree with the petitioners’ contention that the discount is eligible for deduction. The revision application is disposed of accordingly.
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