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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 132 Records
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1982 (11) TMI 184 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... with them in taking this view. Neither their Lordships of the Supreme Court meant to lay down any such law in Gurbaksh Singh's case (supra) and nor could residence of the accused in such cases play any role in the matter. Section 190 of the Code (Section 190 of the Central Code) speaks of taking cognizance of the offence, but not of the offender. Likewise Chapter XV of the Code (Chapter XIII of the Central Code) which deals with the jurisdiction of the criminal Courts in inquiries, and trials, including the ordinary place of inquiry and trial, also speaks of the trial of the offence but not of the offender. That apart, even Section 438 of the Central Code (497-A of the Code) does not in terms makes relevant the residence of the person seeking enlargement on anticipatory bail. 10. For all that has been stated heretofore, the objection taken by the State survives and the petition is dismissed accordingly. The order granting interim relief to the petitioner is also vacated.
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1982 (11) TMI 183 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ut by CBI we rejected her request since we felt that disclosure Of the CBI report would prejudice the fair trial of the accused. Mrs. Hingorani also applied to us on a previous occasion for fixing an early date of hearing of the writ petition for the purpose of determining the question as to whether the State is liable to pay compensation to the blinded prisoners on the basis that the petitioners were blinded in police custody but since any observations which might be made by this Court while determining this question might prejudice the fair trial of the accused, we declined that request also. Mrs. Hingorani has again' repeated that request before us today but for the same reason, namely, that fair trial of the accused should not be prejudiced in any manner whatsoever, we are not at present inclined to give any such direction as is sought by Mrs. Hingorani. But, we shall await the progress of the trial. The trial must go on fairly and speedily and in accordance with law.
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1982 (11) TMI 182 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ppellant is found guilty as a result of the trial, the Judicial Magistrate may impose a proper sentence upon him and if on the other hand, he is found not guilty, he may be acquitted. 3. Before parting with this case, we may point out that Mr. Veerappa, learned advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondent wanted to file an affidavit in reply to the special leave petition but we thought it unnecessary to grant any further time to the respondent to file such affidavit because we are disposing of the appeal on a pure question of law which does not depend on the facts of the case. Since we are remanding the case to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, we direct that the bail already granted to the appellant by us will continue for a further period us will continue for a further period of two weeks, in order to enable the appellant to apply for bail before the Judicial Magistrate and then it will be for the Judicial Magistrate to decide whether to grant bail and on what terms.
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1982 (11) TMI 181 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on properly in ordering the confiscation of the two fixed deposit receipts and the cash amount found in the house of the appellant. The appellant has been convicted under Section 5(1)(e) precisely for the reason that he was in possession of the two receipts and the aforesaid cash sum. It cannot then be said that the order of confiscation in regard to these amounts has not been properly passed or has been passed without any application of mind. 5. Mr. Bana drew our attention to certain decisions, particularly the decision of this Court in Remo Paul Altoe v. Union of India, but that cannot help him because the question which he has raised before us was expressly left open in that case. 6. For these reasons, we confirm the order of confiscation and dismiss the appeal. The amount of rupees three thousand which was directed by this Court to be paid to the appellant out of the confiscated amount, in order to enable him to prosecute this appeal need not be refunded by the appellant.
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1982 (11) TMI 180 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eful argument by Shri B.L Sharma make out a plausible case at first sight as it highlights Ajmer's claim over Bhilwara but on a mature thoughtful and deep consideration of the entire matter. I have not been able to persuade, myself to open the flood gates of High Court for these political controversies. The admission of the case for further consideration would only mean the opening of pandora's box for encouraging of regional oriented controversies in writ jurisdiction and the logical expansion would result in assuming role of a third chamber by creating a forum of zero hour or adjournment motion debates in the judicial field which are impermissible, inexpedient, extraneous and unconstitutional. 23. I have, therefore, resisted the first impulse of normal temptation to admit this controversy by rejecting the same in wider constitutional interest as explained above. 24. With the above observations, this writ petition fails and therefore, the same is dismissed in limine.
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1982 (11) TMI 179 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dministration of justice and in order to prevent very obvious failures of justice, to interfere even in such a matter in a very exceptional case such as the one that was before the Court. 7. The position before us is far better than the situation was before the Court in the aforementioned case. The appellant sought amendment relying upon this decisions of the High Court itself and the decisions provided a comparable yardstick for effectively disposing of the real controversy before the High Court and the amendment was sought before the High Court proceeded to dispose of the appeal. 8. Accordingly, interest of justice demands that we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court rejecting the application and grant the amendment application and remit the matter to the High Court. The High Court will permit the respondent to raise any contention permissible in law and dispose of the appeal on merits. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 178 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rection, to the case on hand, with the plea that possession taken before the initiation of the proceedings cannot enure for the purpose of Section 52 and such possession will not be possession taken under Section 18. This, according to us, is a farfetched assumption and cannot be accepted. 18. Respondent's counsel submits that the owners are entitled to interest at 12 per cent from the date of Ext. P-2. The learned Judge has awarded interest as claimed. This is assailed by the Additional Advocate General. We feel that this contention is justified. We held that the Petitioners will be entitled to 6 per cent interest on the amount awarded from the date of Ext. P-2. 19. For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the learned Judge that Ext. P-4 is invalid and was passed without jurisdiction we dismiss the appeal and declare that the Petitioners are entitled to the compensation awarded with interest at 6 per cent from the date of Ext. P-2 till realisation. No order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... his choice and even examine witnesses and participate in the enquiry. The earlier cross-examination may also be retained as part of the record. Both sides would be entitled to adduce fresh evidence both document and oral, if considered necessary. The first respondent would be entitled to call upon the appellant to produce any document which he desires for effective adjudication subject to the decision of the Enquiry Officer about its relevance and necessity for efficient and just disposal of the enquiry. As the order of dismissal is being set aside and the enquiry is being continued, the order suspending the first respondent from service pending enquiry would be revived and the appellant should pay substance allowance throughout this period and till the end of the enquiry which would be continued hereafter after taking credit of whatever payment that had been made since the suspension order and till today. The payment herein directed should be made within a month from today.
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1982 (11) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hem here. It may be pointed out that the High Court also repelled the plea raised by the contesting respondents that pursuant to a compromise affected by Narayanibai in a suit filed by her against the trust it was not open to her to claim from the trust a one-fourth share in that estate. The High Court rightly pointed out that the question did not arise because she could not be regarded as having given up a right then which vested in her only on the death of Jagannathdas on October 7, 1957. On the question whether the suit was barred by limitation the High Court, in our opinion, also rightly concurred with the trial court in maintaining that it was not. No argument has been seriously raised before us in respect of these two points. In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court are restored. The appellant is entitled to his costs from the second and ninth respondents. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (11) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... both these provisions relate to allowing an amendment of the election petition subject to such terms as to costs or otherwise with a view to furnish the particulars of any corrupt practice. The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath's case, (supra) is therefore distinguishable. It must accordingly be held that the High Court was not justified in striking out paragraphs 4 to 18 of the election petition acting presumably under Order VI, r. 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground that the facts stated therein were not sufficient to formulate a complete cause of action under s. 100(1) (d)(iv) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 i.e. due to non-disclosure of material facts. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs. The judgment of the High Court striking out the averments in paragraphs 4 to 18 of the election petition is set aside and it is directed to proceed with the trial according to law. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (11) TMI 174 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
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... ... ..... ames of the parties and their addresses, the bill numbers, quantity and the amount involved. ( 9. ) In spite of the furnishing of such details, the assessing authority made no verification of any of those particulars and yet negatived the claim for exemption put forward by the assessee. It was in those circumstances that the Bench of this Court observed that once the dealer furnishes the necessary information to show that the goods had suffered tax already at the point of first purchase, it is for the assessing authority to verify the correctness of the information furnished by the assessee. So far as the present case is concerned, there has been a good amount of enquiry and verification by the departmental authorities, on the basis of which, indeed, they have granted substantial relief to the assessee. ( 10. ) For the above reasons, the tax revision case fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Advocates fee ₹ 250.
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1982 (11) TMI 173 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d thereby the executing appellate Court deprived the decree-holder of the legitimate fruits of the decree he obtained in all the Courts. The finding of the first executing appellate Court that the non- deposit could not be due to any bona fide mistake, is absolutely untenable for the reason that while the appellant has deposited in total ₹ 17,936.00 from time to time as directed by the Courts, there was absolutely no reason as to why he would not have deposited 25 paise, unless it was due to a mistake. This was pre-eminently a case in which the first execution appellate Court ought to have exercised its discretionary powers under section 148 CPC and accepted the delayed deposit of 25 paise, 85 was done by the original executing Court. o p /o p 9. In the result, we allow the appeal with costs, set aside the orders of the High Court as well as the first execution appellate Court and restore the order of the original executing Court. o p /o p S.R. Appeal allowed. o p /o p
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1982 (11) TMI 172 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are annexed as Exhibits ‘D’ and ‘E’ to the petition, are quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to issue to the petitioner the Export House Certificate under the ‘Import Policy April 1978-March 1979’ within a period of one month from to-day. The grant of Export House Certificate would entitle the petitioner to seek certain facilities as provided by paragraph 174 of the Scheme. Shri Desai points out that one of the facilities is the additional licence and the application for the same was required to be filed prior to February 28, 1979 as provided by paragraph 177 of the Scheme. As the time for making the application has already expired long back, it is directed that in case the petitioner makes an application within a period of three months from the date of grant of Export House Certificate, then the respondents shall consider it on merits and do the needful. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 171 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be seen is whether the article imported is liable to duty under the Excise Act and for that purpose, reference will have to be made to the provisions of the Excise Act alone. The learned single Judge has further held that if an article comes under the description of an item chargeable under the Excise Act, it will be liable to countervailing duty which shall be equal to the excise duty payable for it. We are in complete agreement with the reasoning given by the learned single Judge. The goods imported will definitely fall within the definition of ‘aluminium’ in Item 27 of the Excise Act and that would suffice for ascertainment of countervailing duty as contemplated under Sec. 2-A of the Tariff Act. The Central Government in its order in Review No. 4025 of 1972, has correctly applied the principles and has upheld the levy of countervailing duty on the goods imported by the appellant herein. 8. The writ appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 170 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iefs prayed for. 6. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition. The respondents are directed to grant to the petitioners Export House Certificate within a period of one month from to-day. 7. Shri Dhanuka invited my attention to paragraph 187 of the Import Policy and pointed out that the application for additional licence which an Export House Holder is entitled to, are required to be filed before September 30, 1981 and as that date has already expired long back, it is necessary to fix certain time before which the petitioners could make that application. 8. The respondents are directed to consider the application for additional licence as contemplated by paragraph 187 of the Import Policy, if any, filed by the petitioners, within a period of three months from the date of grant of Export House Certificate on merits. 9. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 169 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Aurobindoism-if one may be excused for using the word `Aurobindoism' to describe what Shri Aurobindo taught and practised and what he was understood by his followers to have taught and practised-was a religion?
Whether the followers of Shri Aurobindo could be called a religious denomination/
Has the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 26 been infringed by the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980?
Held that:- If the society consists of the disciples and followers of Sri Aurobindo, if its primary object is to profess, practise and propagate the system of Integral Yoga, and, if, therefore, it is a section of a religious denomination, the circumstance that it is engaged in several secular activities and has represented itself to be a non-religious organisation for certain purposes cannot detract from the fact that it is a section of a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 Therefore, we must hold, the Aurobindo Society is a section of a religious denomination within the meaning of the expression in Art. 26 of the Constitution.
the administration of the property of a religious denomination is different from the right of the religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and that laws may be made which regulate the right to administer the property of a religious denomination. Questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or institution are not matters of religion to which clause (b) of Art. 26 applies. We are, therefore, of the view that the Auroville Emergency Provisions Act which provides for the taking over the management of Auroville for a limited period does not offend the rights guaranteed by Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (11) TMI 168 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... if any industry is not dealing with the repair of goods then it is not entitled to any exemption. The argument of Mr. Joshi is absolutely devoid of any force. The words manufacture, production, processing or repair of goods are all independent. There is clear absurdity in the interpretation sought to be given by Mr. Joshi. There cannot be any manufacture or production in respect of repair of goods. Thus, in our view, irrespective of repair of goods, if any industry is consuming the energy in the manufacture or production of any goods then it is certainly entitled to the benefit of the notifications issued from time to time by the State Government in pursuance of Sub-clause (iii) of Section 3 of the Act. The respondents would, therefore, give the benefit of the notifications to the petitioner company as given in this regard to other industries. 20. All the three writ petitions are, therefore, partly allowed in the manner indicated above. The parties shall bear their own costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 167 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as well as the allotment of shares by the company to the assessee, were recorded in the company s books, by means of appropriate entries in the company s assets account and the share capital account. The consideration thus was shown as a cancellation of one debt by another a debt by the company for the value of the machinery purchased and an obligation of the petitioner to subscribe to the face-value of the equity shares. In the face of these entries in the accounts cancelling two interconnected or interdependent debts, the consideration must be held as equivalent, or akin, to cash and cannot be treated as a mere exchange or barter. We are therefore convinced that even on the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab 1967 20 STC 430 (SC) the Tribunal s decision in this case must be held as correct. The revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner will pay the costs of the State Government. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (11) TMI 166 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stand and sought to file the C forms. This the Tribunal did not allow. We are unable to hold that the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal in refusing to receive the C forms is either arbitrary or perverse. We are, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. Venkatarama Reddy that the transactions Nos. 5 and 6 must also be taxed at the concessional rate mentioned in section 8(1) receiving the C forms. When once C forms are not received, it would automatically follow that the higher rate mentioned in section 8(2) would be attracted. The tax revision case is allowed in part and it is declared that the transactions shown at items Nos. 1, 2 and 3 mentioned in the judgment of the Tribunal shall be charged only at the concessional rate mentioned in section 8(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, as it obtained for the relevant assessment year. In other respects, the tax revision case is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (11) TMI 165 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en struck by the learned Judges in that case from that expressed either by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra 1976 37 STC 319 (SC) or by this Court in the subsequent case of Arkay s National Engineering and Foundry Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 46 STC 394. As a matter of fact, the learned Judges of this Court in the decision cited by the Government Pleader while restating the ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra 1976 37 STC 319 (SC) relied on the self-same passage in the Supreme Court s decision which we have quoted earlier in this judgment. For all the above reasons, we hold that the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was the right one and the Board of Revenue was not justified in reversing that order. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Board s order, and restore that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The appellant will have its costs from the State. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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