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Showing 1 to 20 of 181 Records
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1982 (12) TMI 231 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... udgment of the learned Single Judge and left it open to the appellant-company to satisfy the Market Committee in respect of any transaction which does not fall within the scope of their judgment. 10. The question is as regards the situs of the sale. If the sale transaction took place within the Market Committee either by delivery of the goods or by weighment thereof, the transaction would fall within the ambit of Rule 29(7). After having heard learned Counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that no interference with the judgment under appeal is called for except that it is necessary to make it clear that the delivery and weighment to be taken into consideration by the market Committee in respect of the past transactions regarding which the demand has been made and also future transactions must be delivery and/or weighment without which there will be no sale at all in law. Subject to this clarification we dismiss the appeal and direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 230 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... enable then the order passed by the Magistrate will have to be set aside. In this view of the matter, there is no question of cancellation of bail by the prosecution under section 437(5) of the Code. (Sic) Accordingly, this application is maintainable. 16. Thus having held that the date of arrest by police under section 57 is to be excluded while computing the period of 90 days, the accused was in custody for more than 90 days the order of the learned Magistrate and he earned a right to be release on bail and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, has rightly granted bail to the accused in accordance with the provisions of section 167(2) of the Code, and provisions of section 10 of the General Clauses Act not being applicable, this application must fail. 17. In the result, this criminal writ petition fails. The order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, in Revision Application No. 306 of 1982, dated October 7, 1982 is herein confirmed. Rule discharged.
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1982 (12) TMI 229 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cured. The detention of the accused persons cannot, be justified under any provision of law. Thus, they are entitled to be enlarged on bail , K.D. Sharma, Chief Justice in Narayan v. State of Rajasthan 1982 R LR 688 1982 Cri LJ 2319 has also taken the view that once period of 90 days expired before taking cognizance of offences by Court, accused obtained absolute right to be released on bail and their detention after such period, held clearly illegal and it, cannot be validated by a subsequent order of remand under Section 309(2), Cr. p. C. We also subscribe the view already taken by two learned single Judges of this Court, and this answers question No. 3 referred by the learned single Judge. 7. Question No. 4 referred by learned single Judge is covered by Question No. 3 and needs no separate answer. 8. In the result, we find that there was no illegality in the orders of remand passed in this case and as such the bail application filed by the accused-petitioner is dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 228 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... estions mentioned in the referring order by the learned single Judge. 15. The learned single Judge since has referred the whole case for decision by the Full Bench we called upon the learned Counsel for the applicant to argue the case on merits. The learned Counsel only pointed out that by reasons of fact that other co-accused has been admitted to bail the applicant should also be granted bail. This argument alone would not be sufficient for admitting the applicant to bail who is involved in a triple murder case. Moreover, it appears that on merits this application had not been pressed before the learned single Judge but only on legal ground it was prayed that the applicant be admitted to bail. 16. In view of the observations made above- the detention of the applicant does not suffer from any legal infirmity as urged by the learned Counsel for the applicant. The application for grant of bail is accordingly rejected. T.S. MISRA, J. 17. I agree. S. ZAHEER HASAN, J. 18. I agree.
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1982 (12) TMI 227 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t of the High Court and restore the order of conviction recorded by the learned Sessions Judge against the respondents under Section 395 of the Penal Code. The learned Judge had sentenced each of the respondents to rigorous imprisonment for three years. The judgment of the High Court is already a decade old. (We are beholden that we are not yet faced with cases in their Silver jubilee year). Respondents have been on bail after undergoing a substantial part of the imprisonment. We understand that some of them are not working as Veterinary doctors or Assistants and have settled down as married men with children. Taking these factors into account, we sentence each of the respondents to rigorous imprisonment for the period already undergone by them. We, however, impose upon each one of them a fine of rupees three thousand, which they shall pay within three months from today. Failing such payment, the respondents shall each undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months.
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1982 (12) TMI 226 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lso laid down in Jayaram Mudaliar's case, (AIR 1973 SC 569) where their Lordships of the Supreme Court recognised the general principle that during the pendency of an action, of which the object is to vest the property or obtain the possession of real estate, a purchaser shall be held to take that estate as it stands in the person of the seller, and would be bound by the claims which shall ultimately be pronounced. When a suit is filed in respect of immovable property, the jurisdiction, power or control over the property involved in the suit is acquired by the Court, pending the continuance of the action and until the final judgment is pronounced and any transaction or dealing of the property by the parties to the suit or proceedings would not affect the decree or order which may be passed by the Court. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of this appeal.
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1982 (12) TMI 225 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r hearing is necessary before passing an order of extension of the period of take over. In this connection it has to be taken notice of that the owner whose undertaking is taken over is already heard at the time of exercise of the power under Section 18AA. The owner can also apply under Section 18F that it is not necessary that the order of take over should remain in force and the Central Government can cancel the take over under that section. Having regard to the hearing to which the owner of the undertaking is entitled at the time of passing of the order of take over and to the provision in Section 18F, which enables him to apply for cancellation of the order of take over, we do not think that there is an implied duty cast on the Central Government to hear the owner of the undertaking when it merely passes an order extending the period of take over. 15. The petition fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. The security amount be refunded to the petitioners.
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1982 (12) TMI 224 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ged by Rule 8(2A) and paragraph 3 of Annexure I to the Second Schedule of the Central Health Service Rules, 1963, as amended by the Central Health Service (Amendment) Rules, 1966, and was therefore eligible to be considered for appointment to the post of Associate Professor of Radiotherapy in Maulana Azad Medical College which had fallen vacant in 1973. The second respondent shall give effect to the declaration. As a necessary consequence, we direct the Union Public Service Commission to re-advertize the post of Professor of Radiology in Malulana Azad Medical College, New Delhi which had fallen vacant during the pendency of the appeal and call the appellant for an interview for being considered appointment to that post. 43. We wish to clarify that the declaration shall not adversely affect or act to the detriment of any person who was and is senior to the appellant in the Central Health Service or had already been appointed as Associate Professor in the concerned speciality.
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1982 (12) TMI 223 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ice. 72. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the judgment of the learned Judge, dismiss the writ petition and discharge the Rule Nisi. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the cross-objection is dismissed. HINDALCO is granted six weeks' time from date to pay to the Aluminium Regulation Account all amounts payable by it to the said Account for the period in question. There will be no order as to costs. 73. A prayer has been made on behalf of HINDALCO for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134A of the Constitution. In this connection it may be said that all the questions of law have been decided by us wife reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court as also of the decisions of the other High Courts and the Privy Council. 74. In the circumstances, we do not think that it is a fit case for the grant of a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court. The prayer for a certificate is, accordingly, disallowed. Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. I agree.
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1982 (12) TMI 222 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... onal or political vendetta at the instance of some disgrunted political leaders, that no prima facie case of forgery or misconduct is made out on the materials on the record, that the Court's jurisdiction in dealing with the application under s. 311 of the Code is only to see whether the Public Prosecutor had applied for withdrawal in the interest of Public Justice, or he has done so actuated by improper or oblique motive, that a substantial amount of loan has already been realised, that the continuance of the criminal case in the circumstances of this case will be only an exercise in futility at the cost of public money and time, that the trial court as well as the High Court were satisfied with the grounds for withdrawal taken by the Public Prosecutor, the view taken by the trial court as well as the High Court in my opinion does not suffer from any infirmity and is a just and proper one. For the reasons given above the appeal must fail and it is accordingly dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 221 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hich has been carried on for a decade and half I am constrained to remit the case back for a fresh disposal though further enquiry is limited in its scope. I believe interests of justice require such a course and that is why I have chosen to hear on a question which is not directly covered by the two questions formulated at the time of admission of the Second Appeal. sale deed Ext. P2 cannot be sustained as one executed to discharge the antecedent debts the question whether it could be said to be supported by family necessity in the light of the evidence on the other issues necessarily calls for consideration by the trial court. That court will go into that question and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. That shall be done expeditiously. The court fee paid on the memorandum of Second Appeal will be refunded to the appellants. Parties are directed to suffer costs in the appeal. The case will stand posted in the Court below for appearance of parties to 17-2-1983.
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1982 (12) TMI 220 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... me. It has been represented to us that the said decision is pending review in this Court. I, therefore, refrain from dealing with the said decision and from making any observations or comments on the same. I agree with my learned brother that these writ petitions must fail and should be dismissed. Costs generally follow event. To my mind, however, when a citizen is deprived of his property by a State action and feels aggrieved by the act of the State and approaches the Court and if it cannot be said that his grievance is absolutely frivolous, the citizen in such a case should not be saddled with the costs simply because the Court finds that his grievance has no valid legal basis. To my mind, it cannot be said that the Writ petitions filed by the petitioners were vexatious particularly in view of the earlier decision of this Court in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. P.K. Agarwala.(1) I would, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 219 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... a prima facie case for summoning the accused has been made out and the High Court was absolutely wrong in holding that the allegations made in para S are vague. The High Court failed to consider that the allegations were quite clear and explicit so as to be sufficient for taking cognizance of the offence against the accused. Further details would have to be given in the shape of evidence when the trial proceeds and in view of the clear allegations made in para 5 of the complaint, we are not in a position to agree with the High Court that it is a fit case in which it should have exercised its discretion under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in order to quash the proceedings against the accused-respondents. For these reasons, therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Metropolitan Magistrate as a result of which all the accused will now be summoned and placed for trial in accordance with law. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (12) TMI 218 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... would not like to say anything further at this stage. We leave the entire matter to the discretion of the court concerned so that it may act according to law. We would, however, make it plain that the mere fact that the proceedings have been quashed against respondent Nos. 2 to S will not prevent the court from exercising its discretion if it is fully satisfied that a case for taking cognizance against them has been made out on the additional evidence led before it. For these reasons, therefore, we allow this appeal only to the extent that the order of the High Court quashing the proceedings against the Manager (Rohtagi), respondent No. 1, is hereby set aside and that of the Metropolitan Magistrate is restored. As regards the other respondents (Directors) the order of the High Court stands and the appeal in respect of these respondents only will stand dismissed. An attested copy of this judgment be placed on the file of criminal appeal No. 749 of 1980. Appeal partly allowed.
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1982 (12) TMI 217 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... submission that the Government authorities have not acted fairly. Even assuming that what is averted by the petitioners as accepted practice and procedure is correct, still the failure would not vitiate the grant of import licence. After all M.E.I. is only a division of D.G.T.D. and it is not in dispute that D.G.T.D. has given clearance for import. In my judgment, the challenge in the petition is without any substance and is required to be repelled. On perusal of the petition and the returns, an inescapable conclusion arises that the petitioners are fighting this litigation with a view to prevent respondent No. 3 from entering into market of manufacture of collapsible tubes and becoming competitor to the petitioners. In my judgment, the claim of the petitioners that the Government has not acted with fair play is without any substance and the petitioners are not entitled to any relief whatsoever. 15. Accordingly, the petition fails and the rule is discharged with costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 216 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nce to sub-heading (3). 12. Shri Iyer drew the Tribunal’s attention to a passage in the Explanatory Notes to the Customs Co-operation Council Nomenclature (pp. 1156 to 1159 in Volume III) in support of his contention that the subject goods were appropriately classifiable as “Insulators of any materials”. The Tribunal observes that these Explanatory Notes, although not a part of the Customs Tariff Schedule, have considerable persuasive value in the interpretation of the Nomenclature and of any Tariff based on it. In view, however, of the conclusion reached above, with reference to the wording of the entries in the Customs Tariff Schedule itself, it is not necessary to rely on the Explanatory Notes. 13. In the result, the Tribunal holds that the Appellate Collector’s finding that the goods were rightly classifiable under sub-heading (1) of Heading No. 85.18/27 of the Customs Tariff was correct. The revision application is accordingly rejected.
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1982 (12) TMI 215 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ity of the seized goods was not required. Accordingly, I am of the view that no case is made out for invoking the extra ordinary and equitable jurisdiction in the circumstances of the present case. However, the subsequent orders for not allowing the petitioner to redeem the truck for ₹ 7000/-, are unjustified. The learned counsel for the respondents could not show me any law under which enhanced amount of ₹ 19,318/- could be claimed by the respondents for the redemption of the truck. The truck was also considerably damaged in the possession of the Customs authorities and the Motion Bench had observed that, if so advised, the petitioner could claim compensation for the damage caused by the negligence of the Customs authorities. Accordingly, the subsequent orders not allowing the petitioner to redeem the truck on payment of ₹ 7000/-, are quashed. 5. In the result, this petition is partly allowed as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (12) TMI 214 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e provisions of the Customs Act, as is in the present case, gets barred if made beyond the period prescribed in terms of section 27 of the Act. It does not appear that any period of limitation other than that contained in section 27 governs an application for refund. The three year period of limitation under the Limitation Act, relied upon by the Appellant, is for a suit in a Civil Court on a cause of action arising under section 72 of the Contract Act and not for an application for refund under the provision of the Customs Act, 1962. 8. In this case, the duty was paid on 13-4-1978 whereas the claim for refund of duty was received by the Refund Department of the Custom House on 24-10-1979, far beyond the time-limit of 6 months specified by section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the decision of the lower authorities to treat the refund claim as barred by limitation to be correct. 9. The appeal in accordingly dismissed.
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1982 (12) TMI 213 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... of Item 18. They also do not fall under Item No. 18E as they are not non-cellulosic spun yarn. There is no other specific tariff item for yarn under which the impugned HDPE tapes could be covered and since HDPE is a well known plastic raw-material, tapes made from this material could rightly be covered under Item 15A(2) as “articles made of plastics, all sorts, ......” and they were exempt from payment of duty under Notification No. 68/71-CE. Having so held, it is unnecessary for us to go into the other arguments of the appellants and of the Department as to whether the impugned HDPE tapes were monofilament yarn or not and whether the exemption under Notification No. 164/72-CE was merited or not. 7. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, with consequential relief, on the short point that the impugned HDPE tapes were not man-made filament yarn falling under Item 18 but were articles of plastic falling under Item 15A(2) and exempt under Notification No. 68/71-C.E.
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1982 (12) TMI 212 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... y cause could be set up by party before the customs authorities as justification for the delay, and it being the established proposition that the general law of limitation cannot be invoked before quasi-judicial authorities, which proposition has been laid down by the Supreme Court, in the case earlier referred to, namely; AIR 1975 SC 1039 and also subsequently in another case, reported as AIR 1978 SC 209. 32. On a resume of the foregoing discussion making reference to number to authorities wherein the principle that statutory authorities are bound by the time limit provided by the Statute, was approved and confirmed, we do not find ground to interfere in the present appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed. 33. This order would also dipose of another appeal No. CB/SB/T/A. No. 176/81-D, M/s. Sun Export Corporation 41/42, Atlanta 205, Nariman Point, Bombay also argued today by Shri T.V. Krishnamurthy on identical contentions and the same is also hereby dismissed.
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