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1982 (9) TMI 245 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... aram 1982 Cri LJ 1462, held that the word "immediately" means "forthwith" and the accused in entitled to acquittal if a copy of the report of the analysis is not sent to him forthwith. The facts of Tukaram's case disclose that there was a delay of six days, after the institution of the prosecution, in the sending of the report to the accused. Even then this Court held that the accused was entitled to an acquittal on the ground of the contravention of Rule 9-A which, I have already pointed out above, is somewhat analogous to Rule 9(j) as it originally stood and as it should apply to the facts of this case. The order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Magistrate, therefore, deserves to be confirmed on this ground which has been pressed by Mr. Ganatra. 7. In he result, the appeal is dismissed. The order of acquittal is passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Malegaon in Criminal Case No. 618 of 1973 is confirmed. 8. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (9) TMI 244 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ibunal which took the view that in spite of the fact that the CWT had passed order under s. 18 (2A), still appeal to the AAC is competent and, therefore, sent back the appeals to the AAC for disposal in accordance with law. On the basis of the decision of the Tribunal, at the instance of the Revenue, the above mentioned question has been referred to this Court for answer. 4. For the reasons stated by us in the judgment delivered in MCC No. 444/79 (CWT vs. Kekatpura Ginning & pressing Factory, since reported in (1982) 31 CTR (MP) 287 ) today, our answer to the question referred to above is in the affirmative and we hold that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the appeal before the AAC was maintainable against the order of the WTO imposing penalty under s. 18 (1)(a) of the WT Act irrespective of the fact that the CWT had dismissed the petition of the assessee under s. 18 (2A) of the Act. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1982 (9) TMI 243 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... escribed as undertakings "as produce the same goods". Therefore, in our opinion, the proposed scheme of merger or amalgamation between these two companies cannot be sanctioned by this court without the prior approval by the Central Govt. under Section 23 of the Act. 31. In that view of the matter, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and order appealed from are set aside. We hold that prior approval of the Central Govt. is necessary before the scheme of merger or amalgamation between the two companies before us can be sanctioned by this court. 32. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. 33. In view of the fact that there is no judgment of the Supreme Court on this important aspect of the matter, on the oral applications of the learned counsel for the respondent, it is certified that it is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. Let a separate certificate be issued expeditiously. Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. 34. I agree.
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1982 (9) TMI 242 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... corporation which is carrying out such work must take great care to see that the provisions of the labour laws are being strictly observed and they should not wait for any complaint to be received from the workmen in regard to nonobservance of any such provision before proceeding to take action against the erring officers or contractor, but they should institute an effective system of periodic inspections coupled with occasional surprise inspections by the higher officers in order to ensure that there are no violations of the provisions of labour laws and the workmen are not denied the rights and benefits to which they are entitled under such provisions and if any such violations are found, immediate action should be taken against defaulting officers or contractors. That is the least which a government or a governmental authority or a public sector corporation is expected to do in a social welfare state. These are the reasons for which we made our Order dated 11th May 1982.
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1982 (9) TMI 241 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... development. The suit was Therefore dismissed as withdrawn. No permission to file fresh suit on the same subject-matter was sought for or given. (16) According to the plaintiff-company, the said withdrawal of the suit should preclude the landlady in this suit from seeking the same relief. In my opinion however the bar imposed by Order 23 Rule I applies to suits and not to defenses. See in this respect the decision reported as Radhey Sham v. Mohd. Nasir Khan Moreover according to the landlady the cause of action and subject matter for her has changed in the present case inasmuch as the plaintiff company has now re-entered the premises in terms of the order dated 27th May, 1982. The cause of action in the earlier suit had lapsed when possession had been delivered to her by L.L. Jain. I am Therefore of the opinion that the withdrawal of that suit does not prevent the imposition of the limitation on the plaintiff-company as mentioned in the orders dated 27th and 28th May, 1982.
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1982 (9) TMI 240 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... an it be said as a rule that privately owned and managed institutions imparting higher medical education would become instrumentalities or agencies of the State merely by virtue of the provisions of the Indian Medical Council Act or the respective Universities to which they may stand affiliated; and (iv) Regulation II of the Medical Council of Indian with regard to the selection of students to the medical faculty lays no statutory public duty on the respondent-Medical College nor confers any legal right on the petitioners to enforce the same and consequently the pre-requisites for a writ of mandamus are, not even remotely satisfied. 36. In view of the findings aforesaid, all the three Civil Writ Petitions are thus not maintainable and are hereby dismissed. In view of the somewhat intricate legal and constitutional issues involved, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Satya Parkash Goyal, J. 37. I fully agree. S.S. Kang, J. 38. I fully agree. 39. Petitions dismissed.
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1982 (9) TMI 239 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nsideration before Amiya Kumar Mukharji J., in Civil Rule No. 4882 (W) of 1977 (Modern High School for Girls v. Commr. of Income-tax) and there, his Lordship, after considering the relevant facts, verbally directed the Commissioner of Affidavits to get the application re-affirmed by the deponent before him and on such directions, the deponent of the application before his Lordship, subsequently re-affirmed his application on 26th August, 1977. It must also be kept on record that in the case of Ajit Sanyal v. Basiruddin Mondal, (1982) 1 Cal LJ 483 (1982 Lab IC 796), a Bench determination of this Court, has observed that procedure provided for suits in the Code is not applicable to writ proceedings. But, there would be no bar to Court in adopting such procedure, if need be, in its discretion and that too for acting in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. I am of the opinion that the views as expressed by me would not prejudice the petitioners.
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1982 (9) TMI 238 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... nd. In our view, the question is not whether the expression "manage" is wide enough to include the process of diversion but the question is what case is the appellant called upon to meet. Has he to meet the case of actual or accomplished diversion of Govt. funds or the case of an attempted diversion of Govt. funds and if in this behalf the material on record shows that there was non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority to the facts that obtained at the time of the passing of the impugned order, it can be said that the appellant was certainly prejudiced in the matter of making effective representation. 8. Having regard to the above discussion we are clearly of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case the constitutional safeguard mentioned above was clearly breached and, therefore, the impugned order deserves to be quashed. We, therefore, confirm the appellant's release already directed by our order dated 9th September, 1982.
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1982 (9) TMI 237 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... been received by the Registry of the Supreme Court on September 14, 1982, from Yervada Central Prison, Pune, intimating that the detenu has been certified by Psychiatric Department of the Armed Forces Medical College, Pune, that he is not suffering from any unsoundless of mind. We hope to receive the original report forwarded to us by post before we pronounce the order. In fact, awaiting the report we postponed pronouncement of this order because if in fact a satisfactory report by a competent Psychiatrist of the detenu suffering mental disorder on account of continued detention was brought to our notice it would have considerably weighed with us on the question whether we may terminate continued detention of the detenu on humanitarian grounds. The report being to the contrary that aspect need not detain us anymore. 11. These were all the contentions urged in this petition and as we find no merit in any of them, both the petition and the special leave petition are dismissed.
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1982 (9) TMI 236 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 1981, he forwarded his comments on October 31, 1981. In this connection there is an affidavit of one Rajendra Prasad Singh, Deputy Collector of Gopalganj. He is not the detaining authority. As stated in his affidavit even though the District Magistrate was asked to send his comments by special messenger latest by October 27, 1981, the District Magistrate sent his comments on October 31, 1981, presumably by post which was received by State Government on November 4, 1981. Barring giving out the dates there is not the slightest explanation for the delay by District Magistrate as also the State Government. Even the rotating of the files from the Deputy Secretary to the Special Secretary and then the Chief Minister has taken unusually long time. On the whole we consider in the circumstances of this case delay of 28 days in disposing of the representation as inordinate delay which would vitiate the order. Therefore, on this short ground we quash and set aside the detention order.
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1982 (9) TMI 235 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... d tender for deposit of the amount due in treasury or bank to the assessee. This course must have been followed in the instant case as well. There is no reason for us to think that the ITO would have departed from this well-known and well-established practice of the department when an order of assessment was made and it was found that certain amount of income-tax was due from the assessee. 9. For the foregoing reasons, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the assessee that the notices of demand in respect of the assessment years in question were not served on the karta and that the proceedings for recovery of arrears of income-tax illegal were for want of such notices. 10. In view of what has been held above, the recovery proceedings or the order of the Com missioner do not suffer from any illegality and do not call for any interference. This writ petition has no merit and must fail. 11. The writ petition is dismissed with costs. Stay order, if any, is discharged.
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1982 (9) TMI 234 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... about the rejection of his representation vide Department’s letter Annexure P/9 that he approached this Court for relief. This apart, the objection regarding laches or the non-availing of the alternate remedy cannot be heard in respect of an order which is on the face of it illegal and opposed to the principles of natural justice. The contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent must therefore, be repelled. 9. In the result, this Writ Petition succeeds and it is ordered as follows (a) the impugned orders, i.e., Annexure P/7 and its reiteration in Annexure P/9, are quashed to the extent that they will not apply to the petitioner; (b) A Mandamus is issued to the respondent to delate the name of the petitioner from circular bearing No. 14/80-81/HQ, dated June 12, 1980, debarring him from import licences etc. in consequence of the action taken vide the impugned order, Annexure P/7. 10. There shall be no order as to costs of this Writ Petition.
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1982 (9) TMI 233 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... believe that the petitioner was guilty of any contravention of the Gold Control Act or Rules. I therefore hold that the seizure of 495 pieces was without justification. 7. But, I cannot say the same thing about the seizure of 66 pieces of gold. These pieces of gold received by the petitioner on 4-8-1982 were never accounted for G.S. 12 Account. I consider that circumstances as furnishing a sufficient reason to the third respondent to believe that the petitioner has contravened the provisions of the Gold control Act in relation to the 66 pieces of gold. But in the circumstances of this case, I hold that the Gold Control Officer, cannot make that reasonable belief relating to 66 pieces of gold into a justification for seizing the entire gold. It is for these reason, I have set aside on 24-9-1982 the order of seizure passed by the third respondent in so far as it related to 495 pieces of gold and confirmed the order of seizure in so far as it related to 66 pieces of gold.
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1982 (9) TMI 232 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
... ... ... ... ..... on the ground of time bar, the order demanding duty in respect of the use of sulphuric acid in the manufacture of sodium hexameta phosphate and the use of that phosphate in the appellants’ factory for the treatment of water which is used in the manufacture of fertilizers, is untenable. So far as supplies to the sister concerns is concerned, the Notification benefits would not, however, be admissible unless Chapter X procedures were followed by the appellants. The Board accordingly directs that the orders demanding duty be set aside and the question of recovery of duty in respect of supplies to the sister concerns be only reconsidered in the context of the procedure followed for such supplies and the accounting arrangement available for the verification of actual use. 6. As prima facie there is no evidence to suggest that there has been any attempt at evasion of duty or any wilful mis-statement the orders of penalty are not sustainable and these are also set aside.
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1982 (9) TMI 231 - CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
... ... ... ... ..... c. in addition to that of the industrial unit so far as the requirement of water is concerned. As without the Settling Tank Pump House, the industrial unit would not be able to operate and it is an essential part of the industrial unit, the electricity consumed in that Pump House has to be considered as consumption in the industrial unit itself. The Collector’s finding that the appellants were guilty of mis-statement is also wrong. After finalising the RT-12 Returns over a long period, it cannot remain open to the Department to question those assessments and to go back for raising demands for duty under Rule 9(2). The role of the Settling Tank Pump House could not have been unknown to the Department. Even on that ground, the demand for duty must be held to be time-barred. In any case, that question is not really relevant, as even on merits, the Collector’s orders are not sustainable. The orders of the Collector are accordingly set aside and the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (9) TMI 230 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
... ... ... ... ..... not expressly stipulated in the notification, it is implicitly built into the meaning and scope of the term ‘drug intermediate’. It would obviously be not correct to say that the portion of the said chemical used by dyestuff and other non-drug industries should also be given the exemption which under the law is available only to ‘drug intermediates’. 7. In the result, Government hold that the ratio of their earlier decision contained in order No. 642B/1981 cited above would equally apply to the goods in question, viz., Methyl Aceto Acetate for being treated as a drug intermediate for purposes of exemption Notification No. 55/77-CE, dated 1-3-75 and that the benefit of this exemption notification should be extended to Methyl Aceto Acetic Ester to the extent it is used by the petitioners for the manufacture of Analgin and the Assistant Collector is satisfied in this behalf. 8. Government dispose of all the 10 revision applications accordingly.
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1982 (9) TMI 229 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... er applicable to the item “Coffee” nor “Coffee-chicory Mixture” and hence the goods “Coffee-chicory Mixture” is liable to excise duty under Item No. 68 of the First Schedule of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as a distinct excisable goods in the manner taxed by the Department. 85. For these reasons, this Writ Appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee ₹ 250/-. 86. On the pronouncement of the judgment, oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was made. We are unable to certify that this Writ Appeal involves such substantial questions of law of general importance which would require consideration by the Supreme Court or that it is otherwise a fit case for the grant of leave. Leave is refused. 87. The learned Counsel also requested for stay of the collection of excise duty. We do not think that the circumstances of the case justify the grant of any stay. Stay refused.
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1982 (9) TMI 228 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... f the opinion that section 18(7) is not at all attracted in the present case. A Division Bench of this Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 204 of 1976 decided on 7th December, 1979 has taken a similar view in the case of Bharat Ice and Aerated Waters (Private) Limited, Civil Lines, Jabalpur, which is also one of the three constituents of the distributing agency, namely, Jabalpur Ice Distributing Agency . We see no reason to differ from the view so taken. 4.. Our answers to the aforesaid questions are as follows (i) The assessment under section 18(7) of the Act was not justified. (ii) The evasion of tax is not established. (iii) In view of the answers to questions Nos. (i) and (ii), this question need not be answered. (iv) The order of the first appellate authority was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of Revenue and therefore, interference in revision under section 39(2) was not justified. 5.. The parties are directed to bear their own costs of the reference.
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1982 (9) TMI 227 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... unal failed to notice was that the material produced by the assessee as also the high authorities of the Government as well as the exports of Chandra Shekhar Azad University had treated the chalnas manufactured by the assessee as agricultural implements. It is, therefore, necessary that the Tribunal again goes into the question as to whether the ghuria chalnas manufactured by the assessee are or not the agricultural implements. In the result, the revision is partly allowed. The Tribunal will accept the certificate granted by the Khadi and Village Gramodyog Commission to the assessee as sufficient compliance to Notification No. ST-2783 dated 1st June, 1963, and the assessee would be entitled to exemption. The Tribunal will further examine the question as to whether the ghuria chalnas made by the assessee are exempt from taxation under notification No. 911-dated 31st March, 1956, as amended from time to time afresh in accordance with law. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1982 (9) TMI 226 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the assessing authority or any other body has no power to create a fiction of its own and foist fiscal liabilities on the basis of such fictions. It has already been seen how the observation in State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Shafeeq Ahmed and Co. 1979 44 STC 263 at 264 (App) have been held to be rather widely and broadly stated and the observations extracted above would also support this view. We may add that we are inclined to accept the reasoning in State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rafeeq Ahmed and Co. (T.C. No. 500 of 1977, dated 16th July, 1981, since reported in 1983 52 STC 281), as laying down the correct position with reference to such transactions. Having regard to the aforesaid considerations, we are of the view that the Board was in error in having restored the order of the assessing authority. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Board of Revenue is set aside and that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored. There will be no order as to costs.
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