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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 241 Records
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1983 (1) TMI 292 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cause why they should not be assessed as an AOP. The respondent shall be free to proceed with the assessment of Sadhna Enterprises in accordance with law and if the impugned notice (Annex. 'A') relates also to the assessment of Sadhna Enterprises as stated in the return this order shall not have any effect on the said notice in that respect. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, this petition is allowed. Both the notice dated 23-3-1981 (Annex. 'A') and the letter dated 23-3-1981 (Annex. 'B') issued by the respondent to the petitioner are quashed. The respondent shall be at liberty to proceed with the assessment of the petitioner in respect of his income for the assessment year 1978-1979 on the basis of the return voluntarily filed by the petitioner in accordance with law. In the circumstances, the parties hall bear their own costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, be returned to the petitioner after verification.
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1983 (1) TMI 291 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion, he is required to be produced, before the Magistrate within the period of 24 hours of such arrest and such arrested person cannot be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of such judicial authority. Therefore so far as detention other than preventive detention is concerned, the provisions of Article 22(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India will apply and so far as preventive detention is concerned the remaining provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution of India will apply. All those cases in which the Supreme Court has interpreted Cause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India in relation to preventive detention, will not apply in cases of arrest or detention under law other than the law of preventive detention. 56. In this view of the matter, I cannot accept Mr. Barot's last argument. 57. In the result, the present proceedings fail as indicated above. The petition is accordingly dismissed and the rule is discharged. 58 x x x x x
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1983 (1) TMI 290 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have acknowledged the execution on behalf of Maharaj Kumar Vishwanath Singh before the Registrar, and in any event in the petition of appeal before the Collector of Bhojpur the respondents 6 to 8 had said that the sale deed was executed by their father. 20. Learned Standing Counsel No. 4, who appeared for the official respondents, practically did not make any argument and simply stated that he would adopt the arguments of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents. 21. Therefore, on consideration of the arguments advanced before us, I find that the Consolidation Authorities have completely misdirected themselves in allowing the objection of the respondents 6 to 8 and their orders cannot be sustained. 22. I would accordingly allow this application and quash the orders contained in Annexures 7, 8 and 9. Let an appropriate writ issue accordingly. The petitioner would also get his costs. Hearing fee, however, is assessed only at ₹ 500/-. K.B. Sinha, J. 23. I agree.
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1983 (1) TMI 289 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aised in the appeal to the Subordinate Judge, it is necessary to determine it as it affects the jurisdiction of the Civil 7. We think he was in time. If there was any decision at all in the sense of the Act, it could not date earlier than the date of the communication of it to the parties; otherwise, they might be barred of their right of appeal without any knowledge of the decision having been passed. 8. As to the points on which plaintiff has appealed, it is only necessary to consider the second. 9. We are of opinion that the procedure was altogether irregular and the decision cannot be binding on plaintiff. 10. The Act requires the officer to take the evidence himself. He cannot delegate this duty. Colonel Cloete contented himself with accepting the report of a subordinate, Booth Singh, and writing a decision at Coimbatore. We must hold that the decision is wholly void and should be set aside. We, therefore, allow the appeal; but each party will bear his costs throughout.
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1983 (1) TMI 288 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... questions involved. 3. Without entering into the controversy as to the meaning to be given to the words "otherwise terminated" in Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 with a direction that respondent No. 1 may prefer an appeal to the prescribed authority under Section 37 of the Act, if so advised. If such an appeal is preferred within 30 days of the passing of this order, the prescribed authority shall entertain and decide the appeal on merits, without any objection as to limitation. 4. The appeal therefore succeeds and is allowed with costs. The Judgment of the High Court is set aside without expressing any opinion on its correctness or otherwise. The writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 in the High Court is dismissed. The costs throughout are quantified at ₹ 3000/- which will be paid by respondent No. 1.
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1983 (1) TMI 287 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of rigorous imprisonment for three years, and a fine of ₹ 3000/- or in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years more. 9. The result therefore is that the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The judgment of the High Court dated January 10, 1975 is set aside and instead the judgment and sentences of the learned Sessions Judge dated February 13, 1974 are restored subject to a modification in the sentence. Respondent No. 1 is convicted for having committed an offence punishable under Sections 304 Part II and 323 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years, with a fine of ₹ 3000/-or in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years more. The entire amount of the fine, if realized, be paid over to the heirs of the deceased. Respondent No. 2 Balbir Singh is convicted for having committed an offence punishable under Sections 304 Part II and 323, both read with Section 34 and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 18 months.
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1983 (1) TMI 286 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the commissioners in the winding-up proceedings ought not to be treated as part of the record but must stand expunged. We do not think we should accede to the learned Counsel's request. For all that is before us in this appeal is the order of the learned Judge. We are setting aside that order. What effect our judgment holds is not a matter on which we should animadvert. As an appellate Court we can only pass an appellate order. We cannot be explaining what its consequences will be, either in law or on facts, in follow-up proceedings. 26. Having considered the order of Shanmukham, J., with the care and respect which it deserves, we are of the view that the grounds on which that order is founded are untenable. What is more, the passing of the order without affording the Company an adequate hearing cannot be justified. These defects in the order can only be cured by setting it aside. We accordingly do so. In the circumstances, however, there will he no order as to costs.
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1983 (1) TMI 285 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... made that no opportunity had been given to them to lead evidence in the trial Court. No prayer was made before the appeal Court below for an opportunity to lead additional evidence. Apart from that no case is made out under Order XLI, R. 27 of the Civil P. C. even to persuade this Court to ask for additional evidence. Law does not given a right a litigant to ask for an opportunity to lead evidence in the appeal Court. Both the Court below did not have any difficulty in proceeding with the suit and the appeal and passing the appropriate decree on the basis of the material which the parties placed before the Court after having been given all the opportunity in law available to them. Moreover, we are hearing a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. There is thus no question of permitting the petitioner-second defendant to lead additional evidence at this stage. In the result, the petition must fail. Rule is accordingly discharged with costs. 17. Rule discharged.
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1983 (1) TMI 284 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be in the hands of the creditor. (e) the creditor would render a true and proper account of all its dealings with the assets of the company under the deed of mortgage to the District Judge within six weeks and to pay the surplus, if any, to the bank within two weeks of the rendition of such accounts. If the creditor fails to render the accounts, the District Judge would take all such steps as may be necessary to obtain a complete account of the dealings of the creditor, with the assets, including an account of the outstandings of the creditor, the realisations made by the creditor from time to time and the true valuation of the assets at present held by the creditor, in the proceedings pending before the District Judge. The stay of proceedings before the District Judge is vacated and on the rendition of accounts and payment to the bank, if any, the District Judge would dispose of the proceedings for compromise in accordance with law. 19. There would, however, be no costs.
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1983 (1) TMI 283 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nds of justice. Accordingly, two increments with future effect of the appellant be withheld and he must be paid 50 of the arrears from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. 16. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The Order dated May 6, 1977 removing the appellant from service and the Order dated 31st January, 1978 of the Chief Conservator of Forest, Himachal Pradesh, Simla dismissing his appeal and the Order of the High Court dismissing his petition in limine are quashed and set aside. The appellant is reinstated in service. His two increments with future effect shall be withheld. He should be paid 50 of the arrears of salary from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement. The period between the date of termination of service and reinstatement shall be treated for other purposes as on duty. The Order reinstating the appellant in service must be carried out within four weeks from today and the arrears shall be paid within four weeks thereafter.
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1983 (1) TMI 282 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itutional, as it offends Arts. 311 and 14 and is arbitrary and unreasonable. We have considered the question whether any provision of the Gujarat Panchayats (Third Amendment) Act, 1978 might be salvaged. We are afraid that the provisions are so interwined with one another that it is well-nigh impossible to consider any life saving surgery. The whole of the Third Amendment Act must go. In the result the Writ Petition Nos 4266-70 are allowed with costs quantified at ₹ 15,000. The directions given by the High Court, which we have cor firmed, should be complied with before June 30, 1983. In the meanwhile, the employees of the Panchayats covered by the appeal and the Writ Petitions will receive a sum of ₹ 200 per month over and above the emoluments they were receiving before February 1, 1978. This order will be effective from February 1, 1983 The interim order made on February 20, 1978 will be effective upto January 31, 1983. The amounts paid are to be adjusted later.
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1983 (1) TMI 281 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the finder or the person on whose property the chattels were found. On a conspectus of these decisions and also the observations made by Salmond in his 'Jurisprudence' I hold that this contention is, therefore, without any merit and so it cannot be sustained as I have already held that the mineral coal-wastes, belong to respondent No. 3 who is the owner of them and the respondent No. 3 did not abandon his right, title or interest in the said mineral. 20. For the reasons aforesaid all the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners having failed this Rule fails and as such the same is discharged without any order as to costs. All interim orders are vacated. The money or bank guarantee that has been furnished in favour of the Registrar, Appellate Side of this court will be utilised towards the price of the slurry which have been removed by the petitioners and are sold in the market and if any balance is left the same will be returned. Prayer for stay is rejected.
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1983 (1) TMI 280 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... while examining orders passed by such customs authorities, acting under the Act, has to examine their propriety and legality solely with reference to the provisions of the Act itself, and we find that the Customs Act does nowhere contemplate that any cause could be set up by the party before the customs authorities as justification for the delay, and it is the established proposition that the general law of limitation cannot be invoked before quasi-judicial authorities, which proposition has been laid down by the Supreme Court, in the case earlier referred to; namely A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1039 and also subsequently in another case, reported as A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 209. 34. On a resume of the foregoing discussion, making reference to a number of authorities wherein the principle that statutory authorities are bound by the time limit provided by the Statute was approved and confirmed, we do not find any ground to interfere in the present appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed.
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1983 (1) TMI 279 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... chedule because the short question before us is about the correctness and validity of levying c.v. duty under item 15A(1) which we hold was totally wrong and unjustified. Therefore, accepting the assessee’s appeal, we direct that the c.v. duty in respect of the consignment covered by Bill of Entry mentioned in the beginning of the order be refunded. The basis of our decision is that the crushed scrap is not from pure plastic sheets and not being capable of direct moulding cannot be considered as plastic material within the ambit of item 15A(1) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. 11. Before parting, we like to observe that if a particular goods is sought to be brought to tax or duty under a statute, the onus would be on the Revenue to establish the validity and correctness of its decision. On the other hand, if exemption is provided by a statute the burden is always on the taxpayer to establish that it comes within the exemption ambit.
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1983 (1) TMI 278 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ation No. 48-Cus., dated 1-3-1979. The quasi-judicial authority has, indisputably, jurisdiction to determine the question of such eligibility. Nor does he exceed the jurisdiction if the exercise of such jurisdiction was neither incompetent nor in bad faith, nor in violation of the principles of natural justice. 13. In A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 638 (M/s. Madras Rubber Factory v. Union of India) it had been categorically held that the application for refund of duty charged in excess beyond the statutory period of limitation prescribed under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 is barred and hence rightly rejected. It is not, however, a case where it has been urged either that the assessment was without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. 14. Further, having applied under Section 27 of the Customs Act for refund, it is futile for the Appellant to contend that the period of limitation prescribed therein is inapplicable. Obviously, the Appellant cannot have it both ways.
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1983 (1) TMI 277 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... r. Where a “narcotic drug” or “narcotic” by itself qualifies to be a “medicinal preparation” in terms of Section 2(g) of the Act, it is difficult to exclude it from the ambit of Item I(iii) of the Schedule while including a “medicinal preparation” containing a narcotic, howsoever small in content. 18. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word “contain” is “comprise” apart from “include” Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary . A “medicinal preparation” containing narcotic drug or narcotic can thus be one comprising, may be wholly, of a narcotic drug or narcotic. Thus understood, the absurdity that may arise if Item I(iii) of the Schedule can be applicable to a medicinal preparation with a trace of narcotic however small, and not to another comprising wholly of the narcotic itself, is avoided. 19. In the result, the appeal cannot sustain and is hereby dismissed.
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1983 (1) TMI 276 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... of Finance (Department of Revenue and Insurance) and two others reported in Journal of Shipping Customs and Transport Laws (1975)-8 (JSCTL) where the High Court following Nityanand v. Life Insurance Corporation of India - A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 209, has in similar facts taken a similar view. 23. As a result of aforesaid discussion, we find that the application for refund made by the appellants was beyond the time fixed by section 27(1) of the Act and, therefore, barred by limitation. The order of the Appellate Collector of Customs rejecting the appellants’ claim as time-barred was, therefore, correct. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to discuss the other point on merits, whether in view of the ship having anchored in Indian waters before issue of the notification on 15-10-1977, the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the notification aforesaid or not. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the order of the Appellate Collector of Customs, confirmed.
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1983 (1) TMI 275 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... hat the equipment was used for a working demonstration for one or more days-at Bombay. There is nothing to repel the findings of the Asst. Collector of Customs (Drawback), that on the exporters, own admission the goods were actually taken to use. The findings of the Appellate Collector of Customs also indicate that a claim of use of the equipment was made in a letter addressed to the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. We are satisfied that in the circumstances of the case the equipment was in fact taken into use. We agree with the stand of the Departmental Representative that in terms of Notification No. 19-Customs dated 6-2-1965 the relevant criteria are (a) the goods must have been taken into use, and (b) the time that lapsed between clearance of the goods from out of Customs control on import and the time when the goods are brought back to Customs control on export should be as set out in the notification. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly rejected.
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1983 (1) TMI 274 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... emsp; In the light of the foregoing, it would be apparent that Mr. Albert, despite his participation in a common pursuit along with two other persons, had received comparatively harsher punishment dis-proportionate to his degree of participation in the common nefarious pursuit and it gets aggravated in contrast to the meagre punishment suffered by the rest. In coming to this conclusion, we have not for a moment forgotten the basic principle that in dealing with persons indulging in economic and social offences which tend to paralyse the nation’s economy, there should be no scope for misplaced sympathy. But all the same, the need to tailor the penal treatment to the individual offender cannot be ignored. The Tribunal directs that having regard to all the circumstances of the case and more particularly the considerable amount of hardship already undergone by the appellant the personal penalty imposed on Mr. Albert be reduced to ₹ 1000/- (Rupees one thousand only).
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1983 (1) TMI 273 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... penalty shows that the orders was not arbitrary. It is also not known whether any enquiry into the financial standing was independently made. However, when the appellant produced evidence of financial inability and asked for a hearing, it would be reasonable for grounds to be given why such evidence was not wholly acceptable or why a personal hearing was not considered necessary. In this sense, the order cannot be said to be a speaking order. 6. In the present appeal, considering the value of the goods, as distinct from the market value, the penalty is rather high and there appears to be some force in the appellants’ plea that it should not be extortionate. 7. The Tribunal is not in favour of itself going into the merits of the case. But in the interests of justice, the case is remitted back to the Appellate Collector with the direction that he should grant a hearing to the appellant on the matter of deposit and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law.
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