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Showing 1 to 20 of 266 Records
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1983 (11) TMI 342 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appears to be some substance in the contention that it was humanly impossible to consider such large number of objections together with the report under Section 5A in one day. The Lt. Governor also failed to notice the infirmities in the reports under Section 5A filed by the L.A.Cs. The satisfaction expressed by the Lt. Governor in his order under Section 6 is not the real satisfaction but a mere mechanical exercise. The orders passed by the Lt. Governor in regard to the said eleven villages are, Therefore, not sustainable in law and are quashed.
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1983 (11) TMI 341 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... atements, already made by them, it would be premature for this Court to rule if the second condition of sub-section (5) or the condition of sub-section (4) would be satisfied so as to attract the procedure of that section. These persons, nevertheless, satisfy the initial test of being approvers qua the allegations made in the complaint case, but whether or not the procedure of S. 306(5) of the Code would be followed, would depend on the statement that they choose to make. It is, Therefore, not possible to disqualify them at this stage as approvers in relation to the complaint case. 15. For all these reasons the petition fails and, is hereby dismissed. The trial of the complaint has remained stalled for some time on account of the controversy raised in the petition and it would, Therefore, be in the interest of justice that the Court proceeds with the matter with expedition to make up for the time lost in the proceedings leading to the present petition. 16. Petition dismissed.
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1983 (11) TMI 340 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the same. The refusal to supply the concerned reports, in the facts of the instant case was also an act which constituted violation of principles of natural justice. It is true, mere suspicion of guilt, could neither be made the basis of an offence nor a delinquent could be punished on such suspicion only or such suspicion can alone be made the basis of a departmental proceedings. Since suspicion is not proof soon suspicion only, nobody could be found or held to be guilty of an alleged offence. The admitted and practically unexplained delay in initiating the proceedings in this case, on the basis of the decisions as cited at the Bar, have also constituted violation of principles of natural justice. Apart from the above, I do not find any other infirmities in the proceedings, so the submissions of Mr. Moitra, excepting those touching the points as indicated above, should fail. Thus the Rule is made absolute to the extent as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on has failed to prove that the appellant had any knowledge of defalcation of items 2 to 4, In fact, so far as item 3 is concerned, even Mr. Phadke conceded that there is no direct evidence to connect the appellant. 10. In these circumstances, we do not find any justification for the High Court to have interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge in favour of the appellant and having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, we are clearly of the opinion that the case against the appellant has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he was wrongly convicted by the High Court. Even putting the prosecution case at the highest it cannot be said that two views are not reasonably possible, 11. For the reasons given above, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentences imposed by the High Court and acquit the appellant of the charges framed against him. The appellant will now be discharged from his bail-bonds and need not surrender.
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1983 (11) TMI 338 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ste distinguished from 'Khatik' in West Bengal; as is evidenced by the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. It would also be relevant here to point out that the petitioner's father Devendra Kumar Shah, who is a railway employee, has, as indicated by annexure R-V, instituted as 'Particular of Service', mentioned his caste and religion as 'Sunri' and Hindu, and the Director for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Government of India, vide his clarification (Annexure R-VI), clarified that in Madhya Pradesh there is no such community as 'Sunri' which has been declared as Scheduled Caste. The matter being clinched by what we have said hereinabove, it is not necessary for us to go into other documents and discuss the arguments advanced in relation to them. 12. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that the petition deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. We, however, make no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 337 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on under Art. 134A of the Constitution, for grant of a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution from the judgment just now pronounced. 54. We are of the opinion, that this appeal does not involve any substantial question or questions of law of general, importance needing to be decided by the Supreme Court. 55. We accordingly refuse the certificate prayed for and dismiss the oral application. 56. Sri S.A Hakeem, however, submitted that the appellant desires to move the Supreme Court for special leave and that till a certified copy of our judgment is furnished to the appellant, and for a reasonable time thereafter, the operation of the judgment and further proceedings in ejectment should be stayed. We think that this prayer is reasonable. Accordingly, we stay the operation of our judgment and all further proceedings pursuant to the decree of ejectment for a period of 2 months from today. Ordered accordingly. 57. Order accordingly.
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1983 (11) TMI 336 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r modes of payment therefor. In the eye of law the money must be deemed to have gone to the coffers of the Committee to be adjusted against future liabilities. Substantial rights of the parties cannot be governed by the mere fortuitous circumstance of such interim order. Therefore, it appears to us that these at best can be viewed as no more than convenient or concessional mode of either the deposit of market fee or its payment by agreed instalments in future. 18. To conclude we would hold that Section 23-A of the Act particularly, and the amending Punjab Act No 7 of 1981 generally, does not suffer from any constitutional invalidity and is hereby upheld. 19. It is common ground that apart from this significant legal question, the individual cases would need consideration on merits as well. According we direct that these be laid before a single Bench for decision thereon in accordance with the answer to the legal question. J. V. Gupta , J . 20. I agree. 21. Order accordingly.
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1983 (11) TMI 335 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e village for the purpose of cultivating the lands, sowing the seeds, growing it and harvesting it. These processes would doubtless require the presence of the tenant for a greater part of the year which is what the proviso predicates. If the tenant is permitted to leave the village for more than half the year then the very purpose of giving such a vast area for cultivation to a tenant will be foiled. Moreover, the proviso merely insists that the tenant should remain in the village or its periphery for 'greater part of the year' which appears to be not only reasonable but absolutely essential if the land has to be cultivated in a scientific manner in order to yield the maximum possible production, which would result in better and equitable distribution of agricultural products for the use of the people of the country. 25. For the reasons given above all the contentions raised by the petitioners fail and the writ petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 334 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion that the petitioners have come to a wrong forum and should have really gone to the Employees' Insurance Court. 21. In the view which we have taken, all the three appeals are allowed, the order of the learned Single Judge impugned in each of the three appeals is set aside and the notices issued to the petitioners for recovery of the amounts said to be due on account of the employer's contribution are liable to be quashed. 22. In the result, Appeal No. 311 of 1979 is allowed and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition. In Appeal No. 379 of 1979 the rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the petition and in Appeal No. 396 of 1979 the rule is made absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (ai) of the petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in all these appeals. 23. An oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court has been made by Mr. Jayakar. The application is rejected.
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1983 (11) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... urther revision to the State Government under Rule 12 of the Rules of 1935. The final order was thus passed by the State Government in revision and it was communicated to the appellant on 19-12-1965. The period of limitation should have therefore been counted from 19-12-1965 being the date of communication of the order of the State Government. If the period of limitation is computed from 19-12-1965, being the date of communication of the order of the State Government the suit preferred by the appellant on 7-8-1968 would be within time. 3. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remit the case back to the High Court so that the respondents may have an opportunity of supporting the decision of the first appellate Court on the ground decided against them We may however make it clear that so far as the ground of limitation is concerned, it will stand concluded by this decision given by us. 4. There will be no order as to costs of the appeal.
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1983 (11) TMI 332 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... upt practice being made is to prevent wild allegations of corrupt practices being made against the successful candidates so that some restraint is exercised on the persons making those allegations. An affidavit filed in support of an election petition is not intended to be treated as evidence of facts stated in the affidavit itself because ultimately the election petition is to be decided on the evidence recorded by the High Court. After taking into consideration the aforesaid circumstances, the learned judge held that failure to disclose the source of information in the affidavit did not render the affidavit in any way defective. The case is distinguishable and Mr. Ratta cannot derive any benefit from the observations therein. 12. As the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is not accompanied by a proper affidavit, it is not necessary to deal with the case on merits. Consequently, I dismiss the petition on the preliminary objection. No order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 331 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... relevant material must be made available to be objectors because with out it, they cannot possibly must the claim or contentions of the applicants Under Sections 21, 22 and 23 of the Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act. The refusal of the Government to furnish such material to the objectors can amount to a denial of a reasonable opportunity to the objectors to meet the applicant's case. And denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the other man's case is denial of natural justice. 2. On the question of the need to give reasons in support of the conclusions to which the Government has come, the authorities concerned may, with profit, see the Judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor and Ors. , Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Limited v. Union of India & Anr. 1976 Suppl. SCR 489 and Uma Charan v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. . 3. With these observations we dismiss the special leave petition and the appeal.
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1983 (11) TMI 330 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... CTR (Mad) 365 (1980) 122 ITR 430(Mad). In that case the earlier decision of this Court in South India Flour Mills (P) Ltd. vs. CBDT, New Delhi (supra) and also the subsequent decision of this Court in Rajam Pictures vs. Addl. CIT, Madras-I (supra), have been considered and this Court preferred to accept the view in Rajyan Pictures vs. Addl. CIT Madras (supra) as the correct one. 8. In this case, admittedly the appeal has been filed against the relevant assessment and in that appeal the assessee has challenged the levy of interest under s. 217 of the Act. Having regard to the view expressed by this Court in Rajyam Pictures vs. Addl. CIT. Madras-I (supra), and in CIT, Tamilnadu-I vs. City Palaycot Co. (supra) we have to hold that the assessee can challenge the assessee can challenge the levy of interest under s. 217 of the Act in these proceedings. The second question is therefore answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 9. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (11) TMI 329 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on a further analysis of Ghewar Chand's case. Iyer, J. concluded by saying "A discerning and concrete analysis of the scheme of the Act and the reasoning of the Court leaves us in no doubt that it leaves untouched customary bonus." We concur with this conclusion. On the finding by the Tribunal as also the High Court that attendance bonus was being paid from before and it being outside the purview of the Act, the High Court was not right in vacating the Award. The appeal must succeed and the award on this score has to be restored. If the employer had not challenged the Award, the workmen would have had the benefit of the bonus more than a decade back. That justifies awarding of interest. While allowing the appeal of the workmen with costs, we direct that the amount found by the Tribunal for being given as attendance bonus shall carry interest at the rate of 9 per annum from the due date till disbursement. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 2,000. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (11) TMI 328 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant-company could be regarded as a "dealer" within the meaning of section 2(5) read with the explanation thereto of the Orissa Taxation (on Goods Carried by Road and Inland Waterways) Act, 1959?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant-company was a dealer within the meaning of section 2(5) read with the explanation thereto of the Orissa Taxation Act, 1959 as both the principals (the jute companies) had their registered offices in Calcutta (West Bengal), that their principal businesses were carried on in Calcutta (West Bengal) and that the central management and control of the businesses was done from Calcutta. It is true that these two jute companies had storage equipment and godowns at Kendupatna in the State of Orissa but on their own showing (vide certificates of registration) at Kendupatna they had "additional places of businesses".
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1983 (11) TMI 327 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at every employee of the Board is in fact holding his office under the Government. This is not even a case of attempting to pierce the veil and trying to find out the true nature of something after uncovering it but a case where its true nature i.e. the subordination of the Board and its employees to the Government is writ large on the face of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. Having considered all aspects of the question in the light of the high purposes underlying. Article 191(1)(a) of the Constitution, we are of the view that the respondent was holding an office of profit under the State Government and his nomination was rightly rejected by the Returning Officer. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, liable to be reversed. In the result, the judgment of the High Court in set aside and the election petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (11) TMI 326 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e duty of the District Judge in the first instance to try for reconciliation between the parties before granting the decree for divorce. Obviously he has not done so. The impugned decree manifestly suffers from the illegalities and infirmities pointed out herein above and deserves to be set aside. 4. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs and the impugned order and decree passed by the District Judge, Kamrup in DTS No. 12/82 Bidhu Bhusan Dey v. Gauri Dey are set aside. The case is sent back to the Court below for retrial in accordance with law. The District Judge shall give full opportunity to the defendant to cross examine P. W. 2 and any other witnesses that the plaintiff may like to produce. He shall give opportunity to the defendant to lead her evidence in the case. The learned District Judge shall also take steps in accordance with Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The record of the Court below shall be sent back without any loss of time.
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1983 (11) TMI 324 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... made by the High Court is conspicuous by its silence on these two relevant considerations. It is for these reasons that we consider in the interest of justice a compelling necessity to interfere with the order made by the High Court. We accordingly allow this appeal and set aside the order made by the learned High Court Judge and restore the one made by the learned Sessions Judge with following modifications (i) The appellant shall be released or if he is on bail continue ’to be on bail on his furnishing two fresh bail-bonds each in the amount of ₹ 5000 supported by a solvent security. (ii) The ’appellant shall report on first Monday every month before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rajkot at 11.00 A.M. till his trial commences. Thereafter he would be subject to the further orders that may be made-in this behalf by the court which would try him. (iii) Other conditions imposed by the learned Sessions Judge remain unaltered. Order accordingly. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (11) TMI 323 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... lector of Central Excise under Section 80 (amended) and therefore any application against the order or decision of the Gold Control Officer lower in rank than a Collector of Central Excise lies to the Collector (Appeals) and not to the Appellate Tribunal. 18. We find no reason to differ from the judgment given by the Calcutta Bench of CEGAT. 19. As the appellant had filed the appeal before the Gold Control Administrator, Government of India, New Delhi, which was transferred to this Tribunal to be treated as an appeal, we feel that the interest of justice would be served if the appeal papers be returned to the Appellant for being presented, if he so chooses, before the appropriate authority, i.e. the Collector (Appeals) and the Collector (Appeals) shall not reject the appeal on the ground of limitation, if the appeal is presented within 30 days from the date of receipt of the appeal papers by the appellant or on return of the papers by the registry of this Tribunal.
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1983 (11) TMI 322 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... call the person who gave that statement if he so chooses for cross-examination, but he did not make avail thereof. In his reply he expressed complete satisfaction in the impartiality of the adjudicating officer. Therefore it is not open to him to turn round after an adverse order was made to contend that the adjudicatory order is vitiated for non-examination of the person. The order is not violative of the principles of natural justice. The civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the merits of the case and come to its own conclusion. The trial court went into the question on merits and held that the order is arbitrary which is beyond its power and by implication it is excluded. Considered from this perspective, the approach adopted by the appellate court is correct and the appellate court rightly set aside the decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. Therefore it does not warrant interference in this appeal. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed with costs.
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