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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 223 Records
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1983 (2) TMI 329 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h regard to money and clothes on 25th January, 1980. A list setting out the details was made over. Mr. V. D. Khanna supplied the clothes etc., as also, a part of the money on the date of the engagement i.e. 26th January, 1980. Subsequently, on 27th January 1980 further demands were made for television, refrigerator, double bed, a sofa, two-in-one, utensils, clothes etc. to be given in consideration for the marriage. Mr. V. D. Khanna, also tried to meet these demands. So obviously, there was some agreement in the matter. But, as the dowry demanded had been only partially provided, the petitioners continued to make demands, even subsequent to the marriage, on 4th March, 1980. So in the facts of the present case, the abovementioned decision of the Bombay High Court is neither pertinent nor relevant. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that no prima facie case is made out. 57. In the result and for the reasons outlined above, the petition is dismissed. 58. Petition dismissed.
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1983 (2) TMI 328 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... here shall be no upper limit to the number of permits to be issued for stage carriages and the second notification which says that the Transport Authorities shall have regard only to matters referred to in Clauses (a), (b), (d) and (f) of Sub-section (1) of Section 47 of the Act and thereby precludes the Transport Authorities to take into consideration matters contained in the proviso to Section 47(1) and in Sub-section (1A) to (1H) of Section 47 of the Act are ultra vires the Act and they are liable to be struck down. 23. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court in each of these cases and declare that the Notification No. 68 T/XXX-4-15 KM/79 dated January 10, 1981 and the Notification No. 241 T/XXX-4-15-P/79 dated January 23,1981 issued by the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh under Section 43-A of the Act are ultra vires and, therefore, void and ineffective. 24. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (2) TMI 327 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r convenient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. Pursuant to the power conferred under Section 58 of the Act General Regulations, 1949 have been framed. Regulation 17 (1) states "Subject to the provisions of the Act, any rules made by the Central Board in regard to expenditure to be incurred by or on behalf of the Bank and any directions, which may be given by the Governor either generally or in any particular case in regard to the conduct of the business of the bank, the Deputy Governors and Executive Directors are hereby severally empowered to exercise any or all the powers and do any or all acts and things which may be exercised or done by the Bank." This regulation has been challenged by Mr. Radhakrishnan. I am therefore, of the view that the Directions which had been issued by the Deputy Governor in the name of the Reserve Bank of India are valid. In the circumstances, the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1983 (2) TMI 326 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uch orders passed by the High Court. 17. My learned brother is, however, of the view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the orders of the High Court refusing to set aside the abatement and to bring the legal representatives on record should be set aside and the appeal should be heard on merits by the High Court. 18. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, bearing in mind that the appeal is from a preliminary decree in a partition suit in which the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased respondent had also made an application, though 'misconceived, for being substituted and brought on record. I do not propose to press my doubts to the point of dissent. Hearing of the appeal on merits, in the instant case, cannot cause any irreparable prejudice to the parties though there can be no doubt that partition proceedings will have to be unnecessarily prolonged. 19. With these observations I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother.
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1983 (2) TMI 325 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to prevent any sale of the infringing product in Delhi. In this sense, the Court will have jurisdiction whether any sale in Delhi has taken place or not. In any case, as already stated, the decision is of a preliminary nature; once the exact scope of what the defendants intend to do is known, it is open to the Court to return the plaint. In that sense, it is not a final decision and is not open to appeal at the preliminary stage being not a final adjudication. 12. For these reasons, we would accept the preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal with the observations that it will be open to the plaintiffs or the defendants to agitate the question of jurisdiction along with any other claim that they may have after the suit has been decided, and it will also be open to the Court trying the suit to return the plaint if it is subsequently found that this Court has no jurisdiction as provided in Order 7, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1983 (2) TMI 324 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses; and fourthly, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The doubt should, however, be reasonable and ... should be such which rational thinking men will reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of a timid mind which fights shy-though unwittingly it may be-or is afraid of the logical consequences, if that benefit was not given." 19. We have closely perused the evidence produced in the case and also gone through the two judgment of the Sessions Court as well as the high Court, and after hearing the counsel for the parties at some length we are satisfied that the conclusions arrived at by the Sessions Court were fully justified and should not have been lightly set aside by the High Court. 20. For the reasons given above the appeal must succeed and it is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court dated 17th September, 1975 is set aside and that of the Court of Sessions is restored.
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1983 (2) TMI 323 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y out the direction herein given. The officer so appointed shall invite tenders or take best possible methods including public advertisements for securing highest price. He must fix the date on which he will consider the offers. He must give advance notice and inspection if the parties desire, of the vehicles and creditors will equally be entitled to bring offers and or to make their own offers and ultimately, the offers should be submitted to the learned Company Judge for confirmation. 8. It was pointed out that there is an amount to the credit of the petitioner-Company in a Bank but it cannot be withdrawn. It was urged that the amount is necessary to buy new vehicles. A direction should be sought from the learned Judge. The Company Judge may consider the request of the Petitioner-Company to withdraw the amount from the Bank for the purpose of purchasing new chassis for having new buses. 9. All the petitions are disposed of subject to directions and observation herein made.
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1983 (2) TMI 322 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... addition of ₹ 75,000 in the case of the assessee, and that being so, no separate addition should have made for household expenses. We agree with Shri Ranka. The assessee having been in possession of the income ₹ 75,000 outside the books, household expenses would have been met out of that income and there is no need to make any separate addition for household expenses. We, therefore, delete the addition of ₹ 6000, though we agree that the ITO rightly estimated the household expenses at ₹ 12,000. 2. The assessee also raised the legal objection that the ITO was not right to make reference under section 144B to the IAC. The assessee returned income of ₹ 259 and the ITO computed the total income at ₹ 1,04,710. There being a variation of more than ₹ 1,00,000 between the returned income and the assessed income, we hold that the ITO was right in sending draft order to the IAC under section 144B. 3. In the result the appeal is partly allowed
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1983 (2) TMI 321 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in a case where after the sentence of death is given, the accused person is made to undergo inhuman and degrading punishment or where the execution of the sentence is endlessly delayed and the accused is made to suffer the most excruciating agony and anguish, is it not open to a court of appeal or a court exercising writ jurisdiction, in an appropriate proceeding, to take note of the circumstance when it is brought to its notice and give relief where necessary?
Held that:- The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a sentence of death imposed by a court of Session must be confirmed by the High Court. The practice, to our knowledge, has always been to give top priority to the hearing of such cases by the High Courts. So, also in this Court. There are provisions in the Constitution (Arts. 72 and 161) which invest the President and the Governor with power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death. Making all reasonable allowance for the time necessary for appeal and considered of reprieve, we think that delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Art. 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death. We therefore accept the special leave petition, allow the appeal as also the Writ Petition and quash the sentence of death. In the place of the sentence of death, we substitute the sentence of imprisonment for life. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (2) TMI 320 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... hich meant complete insulators and not insulator shells made of porcelain. He also relied on the Delhi High Court ruling in C.W. 3980/82-Orient Ceramics Ltd., to show that the Government has the right to issue Tariff Advices for the guidance of the lower authorities. He, therefore, wanted the appeal to be rejected. 6. The Tribunal has carefully considered the arguments on both sides. There is no escape from the fact that porcelain insulators, without any fittings, are known as such in trade and commercial parlance. The ISI specifications also support the contention that hollow ceramic insulators are treated as such before any metal fittings are attached to them. It would also be difficult to say that Notification No. 152 of 71 which exempts porcelain insulators became otiose by issue of a Tariff Advice over-night. In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the contentions of the Department and we allow this appeal. The order of the Appellate Collector is set aside.
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1983 (2) TMI 319 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the declaration prayed for. In the result we allow the appeal preferred by the Union of India, the original defendant, and reverse and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and order that the suit of the plaintiff be dismissed. The appeal is allowed accordingly with cost. Since we are allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit of the plaintiff the cross-objections are also ordered to be dismissed. 43. At this stage the counsel for the plaintiff-company prays for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The case has been decided on the facts and circumstances of the case and mainly on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary facts entitling itself to claim the refund of the amount paid by it. In our view no substantial question of law of general importance is involved in this case and in our opinion no such question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court and hence the certificate as prayed for is refused.
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1983 (2) TMI 318 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... to the lower authority for going into this aspect. The Department’s representative also could not say offhand whether the inputs in question really fell under Item 68 or under some other item. In the circumstances, we consider it necessary to remand this aspect of the matter to the Appellate Collector so that refund for the period now allowed by us is granted only after the Appellate Collector is satisfied that the appellants were entitled to set-off in respect of the subject inputs in terms of notification No. 178/77-C.E. 5. Accordingly, we modify the impugned Order-in-Appeal to the extent that the appellant’s claim for refund in respect of the period upto 30-6-1978 is held to be within time but we order that this refund may be granted to the appellants only after the Appellate Collector has gone into the master of classification of the subject inputs and satisfied himself that they were classifiable under Item 68-CET. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1983 (2) TMI 317 - COLLECTOR (APPEALS) CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nstead of rejecting them as inadmissible. I also accept the appellants other contention that the declaration in form D-3 is not a pre-requisite for claiming duty relief under the Notification No. 178/77 as amended. What can be deemed to be provided is that the Asstt. Collector should be satisfied that the conditions mentioned in the notification have been fulfilled. This satisfaction can be obtained by causing necessary enquiries into the accounts maintained by the appellants. On the basis of these enquiries the Asstt. Collector could have come to a conclusion regarding the admissibility or otherwise of the refund claim. 6. For the reasons discussed above, I hold that the Asstt. Collector’s order has been passed in contravention of principles of natural justice and that his findings are not based on facts. I, therefore, set aside his order without prejudice and direct that he should reconsider the matter de novo, keeping in view the observations made herein above.
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1983 (2) TMI 316 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... read with Explanation I to Item 6, these would cover only mineral oils which can be described as “liquid” at ordinary temperatures. The test results of various samples as set out in the statement annexed to the appeal as Annexure I, show that a number of the samples were reported by the Chemical Examiner as being “semi-solid at room temperature”, “solid at ordinary temperature”, etc. We consider that where-ever one of the above descriptions has been applied by the Chemical Examiner to any sample, the product should be taken as not covered by Tariff Item 8, 9 or 10, as the case may be, but should be classified under Item 11A, and be eligible for exemption from duty in terms of Notification No. 74/63, dated 18-5-1963. In the result, we partially allow the appeal in respect only of such goods which the relevant samples showed as having been either solid or semi-solid at room temperature/ordinary temperature. The appeal is otherwise rejected.
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1983 (2) TMI 315 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... y be excise duty or import tariff or export levy and subsequently it is contested that they were wrongly collected, without contesting the rate or accepting certain rates, will stand on different footing than the type of cases before us where question would normally be whether an exemption notification or a concession notification issued under Rule 8 and/or Rule 192 will affect the rate of duty. Such cases certainly would involve a question in relation to rate of duty of excise which are contemplated under sub-section 2 of Section 35D to be dealt with by a Special Bench. To repeat, when the question comes up for determination of duty, may be with reference to an exemption or concession notification, it would necessarily affect the rate and, therefore, the question would be in relation to the rate of duty. Therefore, I cannot be a party to my Brother’s viewpoint that the jurisdiction of the case did not vest but a chance factor brought the case before the Special Bench.
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1983 (2) TMI 314 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... f soap. This was the ratio of the unreported decision of the Hon’ble Justice Parek of the Bombay High Court in Misc. Petition No. 1402 of 1975, (Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India), cited before us (Para 6 of the photocopy filed before us does not appear to be correct or complete because the notification is extracted while what was intended was the reproduction of Item 12 of the 1st Schedule to the Act). The case in hand, on the contrary, is governed by the judgment reported in 1980 E.L.T. 704 (Bombay) (Indian Vegetable Products Ltd. v. Union of India) referred to and distinguished in the aforesaid unreported decision in the Tata Oil Mills case. The distinction drawn was precisely that in the case in 1980 E.L.T. 704, the intermediate product was covered by Item 13. 15. In the premises, following respectfully, the ratio of the decision in 1980 E.L.T. 704, the Revision has no merits and deserves to be dismissed and I accordingly propose an order of dismissal.
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1983 (2) TMI 313 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... and use only small quantities. We cannot agree that the catalyst solution which contains duty paid polyamide/amino resin is a new product for the purpose of Item 15A and needs to be charged to duty. There is no evidence that the resin polyamide underwent a change in character such as might happen by co-polymerisation or some such chemical modification when it entered into solutions in the organic solvent e.g., isopropyl alcohol or toluene; nor have the Central Excise authorities made such a finding. Furthermore, the Excise authorities have not challenged the assessees claim that the two substances epoxy and the catalyst, in separate packs, are used together to make zinc rich epoxy primer. There is good reason for saying that the two should, for assessment, form one common substance meant to be used as one and actually used so (a primer/paint). 5. We accordingly allow the appeal and direct that the two-pack paint be assessed under Item No. 14-I(5)-Central Excise Tariff.
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1983 (2) TMI 312 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... The more trivial the final process carried out, the stronger would be the case to argue that it is not a process of “manufacture”, and that the article is therefore not leviable to the additional duty of customs. Such an interpretation would obviously fly in the face of the very wide amplitude of Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, and we do not therefore find it to be a correct or convincing interpretation. 12. We observe that in the present case, the additional duty as well as the basic duty, has been charged not on the full value of the re-imported articles, but only on the repair charges, freight and insurance. Even in equity, apart from the legal position which has been explained above, the appellants have no case for further relief. 13. In the result, we hold that additional duty of customs was leviable on the tyres which are the subject matter of this appeal. We accordingly uphold the decision of the Appellate Collector and reject the appeal.
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1983 (2) TMI 311 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, has also taken the view in the case of Afro-Asian Associates, Bombay, and Sun Export Corporation, Bombay v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (reported in 1983 ECR 183D (Cegat) 1983 E.L.T. 372 that “unless the particular Act under consideration makes provision for any type of condonation or extension of time on cause being shown or otherwise, it is not open to the court and particularly to a tribunal within the confines of the same Act to induct provisions of general law of limitation into the statute and relax the time limit provided therein.” 12. In the light of the ratio laid down in the various rulings cited supra, we have no hesitation to hold that a claim of refund barred Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 will have to be dismissed in limini and a time barred application cannot be entertained by condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act under any circumstances. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
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1983 (2) TMI 310 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... after considering the representations, if any, made by such exporter or agent, and for reasons to be recorded in writing exempt such exporter or agent from the provisions of such rules and allow drawback in respect of such goods.” 5. We pointedly enquired of both the representative of the appellant and of the Department as to whether this power of relaxation is exercisable by an authority subordinate to the Central Government. There seems to be no delegation. The rule-making authority viz., the Central Government has by rule 15 reserved to itself the power to relax any of the rules in special circumstances and for special reasons. We do not think that such a power is exercisable by a subordinate authority like the Appellate Collector and if in any particular case it was done so, we should think that it was done without jurisdiction. The claim for drawback has been correctly rejected by the Assistant Collector and the Appellate Collector. The appeal is dismissed.
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