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Showing 1 to 20 of 237 Records
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1983 (3) TMI 316 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... can only exceed by excluding the date of arrest because on that day, the day starts and it is completed after 24 hours. 6. Therefore, in the present case if the date of arrest which is 19-11-82 is excluded and since the challan was filed on 17-2-83 which was 90th day, the applicants are not entitled to be released on bail under proviso to Section 167(2). On merits, their application for bail was rejected by this Court and no ground has been made out for reconsideration. Suffice it to say that there is prima facie case to show involvements of these 10 applicants in the commission of dacoity at two places on the night of 27/28-10-82. They have also been identified and there are recovery of stolen ornaments from each of the applicants. At this stage, we cannot go into the question whether identification was proper or recovery of the property connect the applicants with the offence. All these things will be seen at the time of trial. 7. Accordingly, the applications are rejected.
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1983 (3) TMI 315 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the High Court is set aside insofar as it holds that the failure to supply a copy of the photograph of the fancy banner referred to in paragraph 18(b) along with a copy of the election petition to the appellant did not amount to a breach of the provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 81 of the Act, and instead we hold that the failure to do so amounted to non-compliance of Sub-section (3) of Section 81 inasmuch as the photograph of the fancy banner was an integral part of the election petition and therefore the election petition must be dismissed summarily under Sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. We further direct that the High Court shall permit the appellant to withdraw the recrimination petition filed by him under Section 97 of the Act in terms of the undertaking given by learned Counsel for the appellant during the course of the hearing of the appeal. 57. The costs throughout shall be borne by the parties as incurred.
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1983 (3) TMI 314 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 137 the right to apply necessarily accrues on the date of the death of the deceased, is unwarranted; (c) such an application is for the Court's permission to perform a legal duty created by a Will or for recognition as a testamentary trustee and is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed. (d) the right to apply would accrue when it becomes necessary to apply which may not necessarily be within 3 years form the date of he deceased's death. (e) delay beyond 3 years after the deceased's death would arouse suspicion and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion. (f) such delay must be explained, but cannot be equated with the absolute bar of limitation; and (g) once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates. 17 and 18. x x x x 19. Ordered accordingly.
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1983 (3) TMI 313 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for those, who relying upon a particular interpretation of a statute, have entered into contracts or other transactions, would find themselves frustrated if a different interpretation is put on that Statute. In the instant case, the question is about the powers of a second appellate Court and it cannot be urged that the interpretation, which we are now placing on Section 36 of the Act, would, cause serious embarrassment to those who have relied on the interpretation put upon section 36 of the Act in 1964 Rn 262 (supra). For all these reasons, our answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is that the restrictions placed on the powers of the second appellate Court under Section 36 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act apply not only to second appeals preferred before the Board of Revenue but also to second appeals preferred before the Commissioner and Settlement Commissioner. Let the case now be fixed before the learned single Judge for disposal. Order accordingly.
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1983 (3) TMI 312 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
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... ... ..... d. It is apparent that without much of effort the petitioner is in a position to market and sell their products in these two cities. The respondent, on the other hand, if injected from selling the soft drink 'Thril' under the agreement with M/s. McDowell Company, are likely to suffer irreparable loss because it has stopped production of its own product 'Nova Cola' and instead has started manufacturing and marketing the product 'Thril' of M/s. McDowell and Company. For this purpose it can be presumed that the respondent must have invested heavily to buy empty bottles for marketing and selling the soft drink 'Thril'. The balance of convenience, therefore, is not in favour of the petitioner. 25. For these reasons I dismissed the application I.A. No. 719 of 1983 and allowed the respondent's application I.A. No. 793 of 1983. The injunction order passed on 16th Feb. 1983, was consequently vacated. 26. I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 311 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ction in the absence of any provision to remand the accused to custody till the order committing the case to Court of Sessions is made. The view with respect is wholly untenable and must be set aside. 15. Mr. Prithviraj, learned Counsel, drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Gauri Shanker Jha v. The State of Bihar and Ors. 1972CriLJ505 . This case is of no assistance because it dealt with the situation under the CrPC, 1898 which did require the Magistrate to be satisfied with prima facie case before an order committing an accused to the Court of Sessions could be made. 16. In view of the discussion, this appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court granting bail to the respondents on the short ground that they could not be remanded to the custody before the order committing them to the Court of Sessions is made, is set aside. However, if in the meantime, the trial is over, no question of taking the respondents into custody pursuant to the order would arise.
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1983 (3) TMI 310 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court for its opinion. 3. Having heard the Id. Counsel for the parties, we have come to the conclusion that the question has to be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Department. The Tribunal has found on the basis of the material on record that the two transfers by Poonamchand and Chandanmal, the two assessees, were so interconnected as would justify the finding that they were parts of the same transaction. It is thus, clear that a circuitous method was adopted by the assessees to evade the implications of cls. (iv) and (v) of s. 64(1) of the Act. In view of the finding, no question of law really arises for our consideration. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in holding that the provisions of cls. (iv) and (v) of s. 64(1) of the Act were applicable to the gifts made by the assessee. 4. our answer to the question is, therefore, in the affirmative and in favour of the Department. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (3) TMI 309 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Petitioner in C.P. No. 11 of 1980. Ashok Kumar Malik, out of the said Petitioners, filed a similar suit as had been tiled by Rakesh Malik, Anil Malik and Sunil Malik who are the Petitioners in C.P. No. 12 of 1980 That suit is still pending. The objection regarding maintainability of the suit in a civil Court was given up by the Defendants in the suit. It is true that the other two Petitioners have not filed the suit Still there are various complicated questions involved in the case which require detailed investigation and that can be done in a Civil Suit. In C.P. No. 29 of 1980, Shanti Parkash Malik and Smt. Kamla Malik have not filed any similar civil suit. However, a fortiori the proper forum for getting the relief is the Civil Court. 23. For the aforesaid reasons, I uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss the petitions with the observation that the Petitioners may get the matter decided from a Civil Court, if so advised. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 308 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntion of the parliament was to restrict the Limitation Act only to the Civil Courts, it would have certainly defined the 'Court' in the Limitation Act. The Parliament has brought out changes in the preamble and also to sections 5, 12, 14, 29 etc." He has also laced reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (1981)ILLJ327SC Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others. However in the view which we have taken it is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter any further. 8. Once it is held that section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to the application filed under section 26(5) of the Rules, then it cannot be disputed that the learned Single Judge was quite justified in allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the dismissal of the application and restoring the same to file. In the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 307 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mere asking. It would be granted in rare cases to prevent manifest injustice, True the court would not rewrite a contract between the parties but the court would relieve against a forfeiture Clause; And, where the contract of the parties has merged in the order of the court, the court's freedom to act to further the ends of justice would surely not stand curtailed. Nothing said in Hukamchand's case militates against this view. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was in error in thinking that they, had no power to extend time. Even so, Shri Jawali submitted that this was not an appropriate case for granting any extension of time. We desire to express no opinion on that question. The High Court will decide that question. We accordingly, set aside that judgment dated 15th January, 1979, of the High Court and direct the High Court to dispose of I.A. No. VIII in Execution Second Appeal No. 89/74 in accordance with law. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 306 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mounts to be recovered. 10. In the result we uphold the award of compensation for requisition of the land ₹ 10,000/- per bigha as determined by the Arbitrator. Similarly we uphold the award of annual recurring compensation for the requisitioning of the land ₹ 200/- per bigha per annum. However, we modify the award of interest and direct that if the compensation amounts have not been paid to the respondents they shall be entitled to interest 6 per annum from the date of the award made by the Arbitrator till the final payment of the compensation. However, if the payments have already been made to the respondents, no recovery of the interest should be made. We direct that the claimants shall be entitled to receive the amounts from the Arbitrator, if they have not been paid already in the meantime. 11. In the result the appeals are dismissed with costs of ₹ 100/- per appeal against the appellant, with minor modification as set-forth above. T.C. Das, J. I agree.
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1983 (3) TMI 305 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that their attention was not drawn to this aspect of the matter when the case was heard before the lower authorities and the Tribunal, the matter was remitted back to the Tribunal to take additional evidence or to direct the ITO to take additional evidence and to make a report to it. On the facts of this case, we are satisfied that it will be sufficient, in the circumstances, to adopt the ordinary course formulated by the Supreme Court in the said decision and call for a supplementary statement of the case from the Tribunal giving its finding regarding, how, in what manner and when the import entitlements were disposed of by the assessee, with details thereof. 6. The Tribunal will submit the supplementary statement of the case in the light of the observations and directions contained hereinabove within one month from the date of receipt of this order. Carbon copies of this order will be supplied to the counsel for the revenue and the counsel for the assessee on usual terms.
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1983 (3) TMI 304 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s only a carrier of the said foreign currency and as such despite his having been found in possession thereof he has discharged the burden, which does not convert his possession into acquisition or any other mode and it remains only as the possession of a carrier, and as such it is not liable under S. 8(1) of the Act. 27. In this view of the matter, the decision of the appellate Board exonerating the respondent though being confirmed, it is entirely on different process of reasoning. Nontheless, the result is the same and the State's appeal cannot succeed. 28. In the result, Rule in Criminal Application No. 970 of 1979 is made absolute. The delay in filing the appeal is condoned. 29. Criminal Appeal No. 741 of 1983 filed by the State fails and is dismissed. The amount of penalty of ₹ 10,000/- as imposed by the Additional Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, be refunded to the respondent as directed by the Appellate Board. 30. Order accordingly.
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1983 (3) TMI 303 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d if it is arbitrary, it smacks of discrimination and a discriminatory treatment in the matter of public employment cannot be overlooked. Accordingly, these petitions must succeed. The order dated September 25, 1980 dispensing with the service of each of the petitioner is quashed and set aside and it is declared that all the petitioners continue to be in service and they should be forthwith reinstated. By an interim order made by this Court, respondents were directed to pay half the salary to the petitioners from the date of dispensing with their services till further orders. Now that it is declared that the petitioners continue to be in service, each of the petitioners shall be paid his full salary with effect from the date of his judgment, but, for the period between the date of dispensing with the service and till today, each of the petitioners should be paid only half the salary. The respondents shall pay the costs to the petitioners and bear their own. Petitions allowed
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1983 (3) TMI 302 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n sub-sections (1) and (8) of section 7 relied upon by the Appellants, therefore, refer to a disqualification for holding or obtaining a driving licence incurred under sections 15 to 17 of the Act and not to any disqualification provided for in the rules. Had the intention of the Legislature been to provide also for a disqualification prescribed by the rules, sub- sections (1) and (8) of section 7 would have been suitably amended when clause (aa) was substituted for the old clause (aa) in section 21(2) by inserting in the said sub-sections the words "under this Act or the rules made thereunder" or by inserting other appropriate words. In our opinion, the Karnatka High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that sub-rule (2) inserted in rule 5 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963, by the said Notification No. HD 16 TMR 73 dated July 7, 1976 was ultra vires of the Act. In the result, these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. S.R. Appeals dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 301 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itions who ranked higher than the respondents Nos. 3 to 15 would not have been deprived of their right of being considered for promotion. The vacancies which occurred prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the amended rules. It is admitted by counsel for both the parties that henceforth promotion to the post of Sub-Registrar Grade II will be according to the new rules on the zonal basis and not on the State-wide basis and, therefore, there was no question of challenging the new rules. But the question is of filling the vacancies that occurred prior to the amended rules. We have not the slightest doubt that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the new rules. 10. For the reasons given above, we find no force in the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants. Both the sets of appeals, therefore, must fail. They are accordingly dismissed. There is, however, no order as to costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 300 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es his power under sub-section (4) of section 16-F of the Act. That provision merely states that in such an event, where the post to be filled up is that of a Principal or a Headmaster, the Director may appoint any qualified person from amongst the candidates who had applied for the vacancy and that such appointment shall be final. The respondent No. 2 satisfied the requirement of sub- section (4) of section 16-F of the Act. The fact that the Deputy Director had disapproved the recommendation of the Selection Committee recommending him for the post in question once before cannot be construed as amounting to a disqualification. It is also to be noticed that under section 16-F(4) of the Act it is the Director who is authorised to make the appointment of a Principal and not the Deputy Director. There is, therefore, no ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. In view of the foregoing, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 299 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... se of individual claim or claim of seniority by one person against specified others, but a question of interpretation of a provision and which interpretation could be given because it would be binding on the Union of India, the presence of others is unnecessary. Union of India would have merely to give effect to the decision of this Court. Therefore, the absence of those who may by our interpretation be adversely affected in the facts and circumstances of the case need not be necessarily here and if the relief could have been granted, the same would not have been denied on the ground that proper parties were not before the court. But the second reason why we should not examine this contention is that we are not inclined to grant any relief and the matter ends there. Having examined the matter from all angles, we find no substance in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and therefore all the petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 298 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ding before the State Governments and the Government of India for an inexplicably long period. The latest instance is to be found in Cri. Writ Petition Nos.345-348 of 1983, from which it would appear that petitions filed under Art. 161 of the Constitution are pending before the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir for anything between 5 to 8 years. A pernicious impression seems to be growing that whatever the courts may decide, one can always turn to the executive for defeating the verdict of the Court by resorting to delaying tactics. Undoubtedly, the executive has the power, in appropriate cases, to act under the aforesaid provisions but, if we may remind, all exercise of power is preconditioned by the duty to be fair and quick. Delay defeats justice. On the question as to whether the death sentence should not be allowed to be executed in this case, we shall pronounce later after hearing the parties. In the meanwhile, notice will go to the Government of Punjab. Order accordingly.
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1983 (3) TMI 297 - ORRISA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e definition is with a view to bringing within its fold all types of fact-situations we may here refer to what O. Connor, J. said in Baxter v. An. Way (1909) 8 CLR 626 -- "The claim of all legislatures is to project their minds as far as possible into the future and to provide in terms as general as possible for all contingencies likely to arise in the application of the law.........." 22, This Full Bench was constituted, to consider the correctness of the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court (the leading judgment wherein was delivered by one of us) in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1980) 50 Cut LT 34 (1980 Tax LR NOC 140). We have come to the same conclusions as the Divisional Bench on the points raised before it. 22A. All the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners having failed, the writ petitions have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. On the facts and circumstances of the cases, there would be no order as to costs.
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