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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 209 Records
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1983 (4) TMI 303 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . as already stated, is a substantive au., which by S. 4 states that all debts shall stand discharged and all execution proceedings shall abate. A debt which ripened. into a decree in Bombay cannot be declared to have been discharged by the taw of Tamil Nadu State which is only the place of lex loci solutions. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that. the Act will not be applicable to decrees passed outside the State of Tamil Nadu. and which have been transferred to the State of Tamil Nadu for execution. 15. In the "'result, we dismiss the revision petition. There will be, no order as to costs. K.B.N. Singh, C.J. 16. After the judgment has been delivered an oral prayer for a certificate has been made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner. We are not satisfied that there is any substantial question of law of general importance in this case, which, in our opinion needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence. the prayer is rejected. 17. Petition dismissed.
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1983 (4) TMI 302 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , 1979 is set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court to the extent herein indicated is accepted. Let a writ of certiorari be issued quashing and setting aside the seniority list dated June 14, 1974. It is further hereby declared that the seniority lists of 1963 and 1967/68 were valid and hold the field till 1969 and their revision can be made in respect of members who joined service after 1969 and the period subsequent to 1969. The Panel for promotion in respect of 102 officers included in E-in-C's proceedings No. 65020/EE/74/EIR dated January 13, 1975 is quashed and set aside. All the promotions given subsequent to the filing of the petition in the High Court are subject to this decision and must be readjusted by drawing up a fresh panel for promotion keeping in view the 1963 and 1967/68 seniority list of AEE in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. 39. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 301 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in the counter-affidavit in the earlier part of our judgment. On the facts in these cases, the fixation of rates of admission to different classes cannot be said to be unreasonable nor beset with illegality. The refusal in one case remained unchallenged. Under these circumstances, we hold that the petitioner did not make out any case for the issuance of the writs as prayed for. The foundation was laid only on shifting sand and consequently collapsed. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250/- in each. Oral representation for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 150. The learned counsel for the petitioners makes an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134-A of the Constitution of India. We do not think that we can rightly certify under Article 133(1) of the Constitution that this is a fit case for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The oral application is rejected. 151. Petitions dismissed.
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1983 (4) TMI 300 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t between the parties. The respondent was under an obligation to pay the amount of the bid. The High Court gives remission to the respondent on an untenable ground that presumably the opening of the liquor vend at Gulwati had adversely affected the liquor trade of the respondent. The proportion of remission is worked out on the basis that the bid for Gulwati vend would be directly proportionate to the loss presumably suffered by the respondent. This assumption is wholly untenable. There is no material for reaching this conclusion. The High Court could not have converted writ petition into a suit for recovery of damages and that too without recording a finding that there was any breach of contract. We are satisfied that the High Court was in error in granting the relief. 11. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court is dismissed with costs throughout.
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1983 (4) TMI 299 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... existing. The mere fact that the Reserve Bank of India had authorised or permitted to the collection of such compound interest or that the Bank which is charging such a compound interest is a Nationalised Bank, would not, in our opinion, be a sufficient justification to permit the banks to collect compound interest from an agriculturist. 17. We have seen the contrary view taken by the Madras High Court in Indian Bank v. Gurukal, AIR 1982 Mad 296). But that judgment, in our view fails to give effect to the above-noted Tamil Nadu amendment and in particular to Explanation No. 1. In this view, we are not able to agree with the decision of the Madras High Court in Indian Bank Tiruvannamalai v. V.A Gurukal (supra). 18. We accordingly direct a decree to be passed in favour of the plaintiff-bank calculating interest payable to it by the defendants-agriculturists at the fate of 5 simple interest per annum only. Subject to the above, the Second Appeal is dismissed but without costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 298 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the wide discretion given to the Judge. Judicial discretion was what prevented the outlawing of the sentence of death even as an alternative penalty for murder. Even so the Court took care to declare that it could only be imposed in the 'rarest of rare' cases. 36. Judged in the light shed by Maneka Gandhi and Bachan Singh, it is impossible to uphold Section 303 as valid. Section 303 excludes judicial discretion. The scales of justice are removed from the hands of the Judge so soon as he pronounces the accused guilty of the offence. So final, so irrevocable and so irresistible is the sentence of death that no law which provides for it without involvement of the judicial mind can be said to be fair, just and reasonable. Such a law must necessarily be stigmatised as arbitrary and oppressive. Section 303 is such a law and it must go the way of all bad laws. I agree with my Lord Chief Justice that Section 303, Indian Penal Code, must be struck down as unconstitutional.
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1983 (4) TMI 297 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... attracted. Moreover, the said application was filed when the suit was pending in the trial Court. Any transfer by Mst. Chhoto in favour of the applicants, Jit Ram and others, in the year 1967 was of no consequence because it is immaterial whether the order, Annexure A-1, was passed by the Collector at the instance of Mst. Chhoto or her transferees. The bar is being claimed on the basis of the order of the Collector having not been challenged by the plaintiffs by way of a regular suit. As stated earlier, it is not disputed that the applicants have entered into the possession of the land is pursuance of the said order of the Collector and the plaintiffs are no more in possession thereof. Thus, their suit for the declaration could not be decreed in view of the subsequent events. 10. As a result of the above discussion, this appeal fails and is dismissed as having become infructuous with no order as to costs. The civil miscellaneous application is allowed. 11. Order accordingly.
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1983 (4) TMI 296 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the Court, but if the detaining authority does not consider relevant circumstances, or considers wholly irrelevant circumstances, then such a subjective satisfaction would be vitiated. In quashing such an order the Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction. If relevant material was taken into consideration then, of course, the Court would have no jurisdiction to come to the conclusion that, on the material as placed before the detaining authority, an order of detention under the Gatepost Act ought not to be passed. In the present case that question does not arise. Here admittedly some material was not taken into consideration. In our view the said material was very relevant and ought to have been considered by the detaining authority before passing the impugned order. This being so, the order of detention had to be quashed. (15) It was for the aforesaid reasons that the writ petitions filed by the petitioners were allowed by us.
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1983 (4) TMI 295 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... before the District Judge) have indulged in telling lies and making reckless allegation of fabrication and manipulation of records against the College Authorities and how in fact the boot is on their leg. It is a sad commentary on the scruples of these three young gentlemen who are on the threshold of their carriers. In fact, at one stage we were inclined to refer the District Judge's report both to the Medical Council as well as the Bar Council for appropriate action but we refrained from doing so as the petitioners' counsel both on behalf of his clients as well as on his own behalf tendered unqualified apology and sought mercy from the Court. We, however, part with the case with a heavy heart expressing our strong disapproval of their conduct and behaviour but direct that the petitioners will pay a sum of ₹ 2,500 each as by way of costs to the respondents. The two S.L.Ps and C.M.P. are thus dismissed with the aforesaid direction in regard to payment of costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 294 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... not able to process the application pending before him and in view of the admission of the Government that the letter stands withdrawn. So, there is no necessity to grant relief in regard to the declaration that the letter dated 25th October, 1982 contains directions, which are illegal and void. As far as the second prayer relating to issue of writ of mandamus is concerned, which asks for respondent No. 2 to grant the eligibility certificate as the petitioner has failed to prove any existing right, a further duty to perform an obligation flowing from such right does not arise and, therefore, writ mandamus also prayed for by the petitioner cannot be issued. 60. In view of our conclusions, we hold that the petitioner has failed to make out a case and prove his right to claim any relief in this petition. Therefore, the petition fails and stand dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged. However, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to the costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 293 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on must be determined as on 10.1.1967 on the aforementioned computation chart. The State and the subordinate officers responsible for this work are directed by a writ of mandamus to complete this computation by July 31, 1983 and by that date pension payment order correct and consistent with the direction herein given shall be issued without fail to the petitioner. The State is also directed by a mandamus of this Court to pay the arrears of pension on the afore-mentioned computation within the same period with interest at 6 from 10.1.67. As the officers of the State have harassed the petitioner which we feel is intentional, deliberate and motivated, therefore, we are constrained to award exemplary costs quantified at ₹ 25,000 to be paid to the petitioner before July 31, 1983. We propose to leave no one in doubt that the slightest failure or deviation in the time schedule in carrying out this mandamus will be unquestionably visited with contempt action. Petition allowed.
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1983 (4) TMI 292 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... usion is arrived at by the High Court and it is wholly unsustainable. 12. The High Court was equally in error in holding that the second appeal was not incompetent because the first appellate court had also made an order dismissing the appeal on contest. That part of the order of the first appellate court was contrary to law and without jurisdiction and non-est, once the learned Judge held the appeal before him had abated. For these reasons we are satisfied that the Division Bench of the Court was in error in allowing the Letters Patent Appeal and its decision is contrary to law and unsustainable and must be quashed and set aside. 13. Accordingly, this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the decision of the High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 48 of 1961 dated May 14, 1965 is quashed and set aside and the decision of the learned Single Judge dated March 23, 1961 in M.A.E. No. 55 of 1959 is restored. As the respondents have not appeared, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 291 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Corporation was unauthorised or illegal. In that view of the matter, the judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat impugned in this case must be set aside on this aspect of the matter and the appeal is thus allowed and the respondent's suit dismissed. We express no opinion on the other point of delegation. The parties will bear, in the facts and circumstances of the case, their own costs throughout. We have proceeded on the construction of the powers of the Municipality in the situation mentioned herein before. We must, however, observe that learned Advocate for the appellant assured us that in view of the fact that the infringement in question was not of a very significant nature, i.e. building certain railings or walls, if it could be regularised on a proper application by the respondent, the Corporation or the Municipality concerned will see that the same is done and the railings or the walls on the infringing part are not removed or demolished. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (4) TMI 290 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eturn on investment or a reasonable rate of profit can not be the sine qua non of the validity of the order of the Government fixing the maximum fares which the operators may collect from their passengers. It cannot also be said that merely because a business becomes uneconomical as a consequence of a new levy, the new levy would amount to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on the said business. It is, however, open to the State Government to make any modifications in the fares if it feels that there is a need to do so. But the impugned levy cannot be struck down on the ground that the operation of the stage carriages has become uneconomical after the introduction of the impugned levy. Moreover the material placed by the petitioners is not also sufficient to decide whether the business has really become uneconomical or not. We do not, therefore, find any merit in this ground also. In the result these petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs.
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1983 (4) TMI 289 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s under the Customs Act, is a Tribunal. Thus, for the purpose of judicial notice the erstwhile Revisionary Authority and the present Appellate Tribunal stand on the same footing and in fact, the Appellate Tribunal has merely stepped into the shoe of the Revisionary Authority though with total segregation from the executive stream. Thus, for the purpose of precedentary value, a decision of the Government of India is to be treated at par with a decision of any other Bench of the Tribunal. This position is with the exception that the Tribunal can depart from the Government of India’s earlier decision only for cogent reasons, such as fresh facts are brought on records or the process of manufacture has changed or the relevant tariff entry has undergone modification or subsequent to the Government of India decision, or where there has been an authoritative pronouncement by any High Court or the Supreme Court of India. (See J.K. Synthetic v. Union of India - 1981 E.L.T. 328).
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1983 (4) TMI 288 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... h a view to avoiding piece-meal assessment of laboratory chemicals of which importations may be made with a large variety of chemicals in each consignment. A doubt was raised whether the goods in question, namely, carmine SS should be excluded from the scope of sub-heading 19 on the ground that it was used more as a stain than as a chemical used in reactions. We, however, feel that so long as its use in laboratories is established (as has abundantly been done by the certificates produced), the scope of the expression “laboratory chemicals” should not be unduly narrowed down. We, therefore, hold that the goods were eligible for assessment under Heading No. 29.01/45(19), for purposes of basic Customs duty, and order that appropriate relief by way of refund should be given. So far as the levy of countervailing duty is concerned, as there is no corresponding provision in the Central Excise Tariff, and in view of the appellants’ own submission, no relief is due.
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1983 (4) TMI 287 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... asonably or irrationally or capriciously fails to satisfy himself, notwithstanding reasonable explanations rendered by the carrier, the penalty under the Section cannot be validly imposed. On the other hand, if the order imposing penalty is reasonably based on a rational consideration of the relevant circumstances, this Court will not interfere with it in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution......” 13. We find that the liability of the Master of the vessel, and through him that of his agent, is not altered in any way because of the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 (including Hague Rules). 14. No evidence has been adduced in support of the plea that shortage occurred after discharge of the goods from the vessel. Delay in holding the survey by the steamer agents (i.e., the appellants themselves) will not absolve them of their responsibility to satisfactorily account for the goods. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1983 (4) TMI 286 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s wife was a separate assessee of income-tax or that she was independent of him. Section 16(2) lays down as to who must make a declaration in respect of various situations. Hindu Undivided Family mentioned in sub-clause (g) of Section 16(2) is one of them. Therefore, in view of Section 16(7) the Appellant was bound to declare ornaments even though they belonged to his wife and by not so doing he rendered himself liable to action under the Gold (Control) Act. We, therefore, hold that the confiscation was correct. 7. We have also considered the plea that the fine of ₹ 15,000 in respect of 2200 gms of gold is harsh as no deliberate offence was committed. Considering that though an offence has been committed and confiscation is justified the offence has not been committed due to deliberate defiance of law, we are of the opinion that a lenient view may be taken. We, therefore, reduce the fine to ₹ 5000/- only. Consequential relief may be given to the Appellant.
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1983 (4) TMI 285 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... rejection. 9. We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant as well as the Department and we are of the opinion that in a case of this kind, instead of taking up a plea that the appellants ought to have insisted on taking of the samples if they had so desired, the Customs authorities themselves could have drawn the sample for test to nullify the claim of the appellants about the character of the oil being Light Diesel Oil. The Department not having drawn any samples of the oil on their own for conducting a test to establish the character of the oil and to establish the correct description of the oil, it would not be proper to draw any adverse inference by totally ignoring the certificate from suppliers produced by the appellants. 10. In the light of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case where the benefit of doubt could be given to the appellants. The appeal is accordingly allowed and impugned order is set aside.
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1983 (4) TMI 284 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nt Collector acting as a Presiding Officer draws its source of power from Rule 10 and thus he would be governed by the existing provisions of law. To illustrate, if a member on the Bench retires after hearing a case but before passing an order, in that matter, we fear there cannot be a vested right under the cover of which he can pass an order after his retirement even though the case was heard by him before his retirement. In this regard a Full Bench of Punjab High Court in the case of National Planners Ltd. v. Contributors - AIR 1958 Punjab 230, has held that repeal of a statute giving jurisdictions to an authority, deprives it of the right to pronounce judgment in a proceeding previously pending unless the pending proceedings are saved by the repealing provisions or by a general Act regulating repeal. Since the matter requires a detailed analysis and comments which is not possible in this short note, therefore, we propose to deal with it at length in some other editorial.
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