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Showing 1 to 20 of 167 Records
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1983 (5) TMI 272 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ated that he would cause grievous injuries. It is one of those borderline cases where one may with equal justification infer that the common intention was to commit murder or to cause grievous injury. But the benefit of any such doubt must go to the accused. In the circumstances, we conclude, but not with out hesitation, that the common intention of the accused has not been established, beyond reasonable doubt, to be to cause the death of the deceased. But it certainly was to cause grievous injuries to the deceased. The conviction of Rana Partap and Sat Pal under Section 302 read with Section 34 and the sentence of life imprisonment are therefore set aside and instead they are convicted under Section 326 read with Section 34 and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years each. So far Manmohan is concerned, the three stab injuries inflicted by him are sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death. His conviction and sentence are confirmed.
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1983 (5) TMI 271 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... public generally and not a particular class There is a public purpose which animates its activities. It works for the benefit of the community. It .exists for public benefit and not for the benefit of his members. The proceeds from fees in Private O.P.D. are applied for the purposes of a charity. They are used for balancing the cost and not to make profits out of the Private O.P.D. The fees are not appropriate by the members for their private benefit. The Society can best be described' by the epithets Fitz-Gibbon L.J. used in 1898. It is 'unselnsh' "benevolent", "public", "philanthropic" in its purposes. (36) For these reasons I hold that the lands and buildings of Private O.P.D. squarely and fairly fall within the four corners of Sub-section (4) of Section 115 and Therefore exempt from general tax The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The assessment is quashed and set aside. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
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1983 (5) TMI 270 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he cannot claim benefit under Section 1 of the Limitation Act but where the Court itself wrongly holds the petition to be not maintainable then the words 'or other cause of like nature' in Section 14 must be read as the convey something 'ejusdem generis' or analogous with the preceding words relating to the defect of jurisdiction. In Prayagdas Shankerlal Maheshri v. Mt. Indirabai. AIR 1948 Nag 189, also it was held that the fundamental position contemplated by Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act is that the person seeking to avail himself of its provisions should be prosecuting a proceeding founded upon some cause of action in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature was unable to entertain it. 7. As a result of the above discussion, this appeal succeeds and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial Court decreeing the plaintiff's suit is restored with costs. 8. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (5) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... . 35. We have earlier held that no statutory provision deprives the defendant-appellant of his right to file the present appeal. We have carefully considered the facts and circumstances of this case and the facts of this case also do not attract any well-recognised principle of equity to deprive the appellant of his very valuable statutory right of appeal. The various passages from Halsbury relied on by Mr. Nariman which we have earlier quoted lend support to the view that the defendant-appellant in the instant case by reason of its conduct or otherwise is not estopped or has not become disentitled to file the appeal. 36. In the result the appeal has to be allowed. We, therefore, set aside the judgment and decree of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the appeal of the defendant-appellant on the ground of maintainability. We remand the appeal to the High Court for decision on merits. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs.
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1983 (5) TMI 268 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he ceiling of 45 days in which cattle must pass through the State of Madhya Pradesh. In the case of cattle belonging to residents of Madhya Pradesh, the grazing rate is levied for a period of one year. There is no reason why the charge should be levied for 45 days in the case of persons belonging to other States. The apprehension that cattle, if allowed to graze in the same place for a longtime, may destroy the pasture and foliage altogether is taken care of by the other rules which prescribe that the cattle may not graze in the same grazing unit for more than a month. In the circumstances, we quash the levy of higher grazing rates in the case of cattle belonging to persons of States other than Madhya Pradesh and direct the respondents to levy the same rates as they do in the case of cattle belonging to residents of Madhya Pradesh. The limit of stay of 45 days is also declared unconstitutional. The writ petitions are allowed accordingly. The petitioners will get their costs.
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1983 (5) TMI 267 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ociety. The prospects of getting a suitable match for his own daughter have perhaps been marred in view of the stigma in the wake of the finding of guilt recorded against him in the context of such an offence. Taking into account the cumulative effect of these circumstances, and an overall view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the ends of Justice will be satisfied if the substantive sentence imposed by the High Court for the offence under Sec. 376 read with Sec. 511 is reduced from one of 2-1/2 years' R. I., to one of 15 months' R.I. The sentence of fine, and in default of fine, will be course remain undisturbed. So also the sentence imposed in the context of the offence under Sec. 342 and Sec 354 of the Indian Penal Code will remain intact. Subject to the modification in the sentence to the aforesaid extent the appeal fails and is dismissed The appellant shall surrender in order to undergo the sentence. The bail bonds will stand cancelled. Appeal dismissed.
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1983 (5) TMI 266 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o title to the land by the purported sale by Ashoklal. The direction for restoring possession to Janardhan was rightly given. A revision petition and a writ petition to the High Court at the instance of the petitioners failed. We find that the High Court was right in rejecting both the A petitions. These were all the contentions in this appeal and as we find no merit in it, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. When this Court issued notice, appellants were directed to deposit ₹ 1500 for costs of respondent. Respondent came here in rags and urged that he was too poor to engage a counsel. We therefore direct that the amount of ₹ 1500 deposited in this Court by appellants be paid to respondent. We record our appreciation of assistance to the Court by Mr. Jitendra Sharma who appeared amicus curie at the request made by the Court while granting special leave. He should withdraw the amount and take all steps to pay the same to the respondent. Appeal dismissed.
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1983 (5) TMI 265 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of general importance needing to be decided by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we refuse the certificate sought for and dismiss the oral application made by Sri Sundaraswarny. Sri Sundaraswamy, however, submitted that petitioner intends to move the Supreme Court for grant of Special Leave and for an order of stay of our judgment in appeal and that therefore the operation of our judgment in these appeals be stayed for a period of eight weeks from today as else petitioner would, even before he has had an opportunity of moving the Supreme Court for special leave. have to stop the additional services which he is operating pursuant to the order of the learned Chief Justice. This prayer is opposed by the learned counsel for appellants. We, however, consider the prayer of Sri Sundaraswamy reasonable. We, accordingly, stay the operation of our judgment in these appeals for a period of 8 weeks from today so as to enable the petitioner to move the Supreme Court. 27. Order accordingly.
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1983 (5) TMI 264 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tions. It is no authority for the proposition that Election Rules providing election by secret ballot were approved or upheld. In fact there was no challenge to it. (26) Rule 6, Therefore, is void and is of no effect. The Election Rules are so worded that the other rules cannot independently stand. For the above reasons. Issue No. 1 is held partly in favor f the plaintiffs. Issue No. 7 (27) The result is that the suit of the plaintiffs succeeds. The plaintiffs are granted a decree for declaration that the impugned Election Rules framed by the Executive Committee of the Council called "The Rules of Election of the Members of the Executive Committee of the Council" are void and of no effect. The plaintiffs are also granted a decree for declaration that Articles 3, Ii, 33, 38, 40(a) and 47 (in so far as they debar the Associate Members or the Institution Members from voting right) are void and of no effect. In this contest, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1983 (5) TMI 263 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... her relations, it is separate property, and if the coparcener dies without leaving male issue, it passes to his heirs by succession." We are, therefore, of the view that the Lower Courts were wrong in refusing to grant a decree in favour of the plaintiff as regards property described by them as ancestral property’. The defendants were collaterals of Bua Singh and as regards them the property was not ’ancestral property’ and hence the plaintiff was the preferential heir. The plaintiff was entitled to a decree in respect of all the plaints properties. The judgments and decrees of the learned Subordinate Judge, District Judge and High Court are set aside and there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff for all the plaint properties. The plaintiff is also entitled to get her costs through out from the defendants. The defendants will pay the court fee due to the Government in the suit, appeal, second appeal and the appeal to this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1983 (5) TMI 262 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ion is not only controlled but there is sufficient guidelines in the Act and the Rules and therefore, the High Court was in error in striking down the amended Rule 81. 24. It was in passing urged that there is no provision for notice before N.A. assessment is levied. We would expect revenue authority ordinarily to hear the person affected by the order levying N. A. assessment or at the time of its appeal or revision, but on this count the demand cannot be struck down because when a demand is served, it can be objected to and the decision, is appealable. It cannot be said that the Rule would be had as it does not inhere the principles of natural justice. 25. The decisions of the High Court were not sought to be supported on any other ground. Accordingly, these appeals must succeed. 26. All the appeals are allowed and the judgments of the High Court in both the groups are quashed and set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed with costs throughout.
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1983 (5) TMI 261 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and that the design is not new or original design. Issue No. I is held in favor of the petitioner and against Wimco. . (19) Issue No. 2 For a complete determination of the issue, I am obliged to express though with my finding on issue No. 1, this issue does not arise. The defendants in 'the suit have admittedly introduced in the market the match boxes like Annexure 'X" to the plaint. Those are match boxes of similar size with identical pattern/ design in a rectangular/form with multiple diamond-shaped-spots. It would be an infringement if the design of Wimco had not been cancelled. I hold issue No. 2 accordingly. (20) Relief C.O. 8/81 succeeds. The Design No. 146498 dated January 5, 1978 in class 5 of the Schedule under the Design Act, 1911 is hereby ordered to be cancelled. The Controller of Designs, Calcutta be intimated accordingly. Suit No. 415 of 1981 of Wimco is hereby dismissed. On the peculiar facts of these cases, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1983 (5) TMI 260 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ular class of producers with reference to a particular description of goods, it would not be correct, in our view, to say that the rate of duty fixed by the notification is a concessional rate of duty. A concessional rate of duty would be one which lowers the uniformly applicable rate of duty in specified circumstances. Such not being the case here, we hold that the notification in question viz., 164/75, dated 15-7-1975 as amended by Notification No. 49/76, dated 16-3-1976 did not fix any concessional rate of duty. 14. In the light of the foregoing discussions, we reject the appeal and direct that the relief granted by the Appellate Collector be granted to the respondents within two months from the date of communication of this order. In respect of such goods on which duty was initially paid through RG-23 account, the refund of duty in cash or by cheque is not permissible in terms of Rule 56A; the amount involved shall be credited to the said account of the respondents.
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1983 (5) TMI 259 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ether the contention taken by the appellants, i.e., that there would be loss in certain trips and gains in certain other trips, is true or not. We do not think and believe that the department intends to make any unlawful gain on unjust enrichment. We strongly feel that it is improper to take into consideration only the losses and not the gains particularly in the absence of allegation of mala fide or wanton negligence on the part of the appellants or their agents. Therefore, we are constrained to set aside the order passed by the Appellate Collector and remand the case to him for fresh consideration in the light of the observations contained in this order. The Appellate Collector shall permit the appellants to produce fresh evidence and he is also at liberty to make fresh enquiry. 12. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the matter is remanded to the Appellate Collector for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observation contained in this order.
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1983 (5) TMI 258 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... of the importers in getting the clearances in hot-haste despite what seemingly appeared to be a case of substantial enhancement on the part of the Assistant Collector leads to an unescapable inference, that that valuation was far below the actual price and there was every justification for the Collector to undertake a review. 18. We do not, therefore, find any infirmity in the orders passed by the Collector or in the procedure adopted by him. The imposition of penalty is also justified, on account of the facts highlighted by the Collector, in his order, inasmuch as the machines which were imported on the representation that they were meant to be gifts for children, have admittedly been not used for the declared purpose, so much so that even their location was not divulged during hearing. It is thus a glaring case of misuse and mis-representation and deserving of no leniency. Both the appeals have, therefore, no merit and deserve dismissal and are dismissed accordingly.
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1983 (5) TMI 257 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... e rules made thereunder in relation to it, no extraneous considerations can be thought of for purposes of justifying such a tax or a demand. We are of the view that the Judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Civil Appeal No. 262 of 1971 is the necessary information which the Revenue secured for them to act in accordance with the taxing statute, viz., the Central Excise Act and the rules framed thereunder. The decision of the Supreme Court is in the nature of information which justified further action of the Central Excise Department to get into the net taxation the issue which has annual assessment. Beyond this, the Revenue cannot take advantage of the decision of the Supreme Court." 8. Following the principles enunciated by Their Lordships, we find that the Department cannot justify the late issue of a demand because of proceeding in the Madras High Court even if related issues are assumed to have been raised in the Court. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals.
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1983 (5) TMI 256 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... Chief Controller of Imports and Exports only clarifies whether there is a firm commitment which cannot be altered, it would be accepted for purpose of import licensing, as already provided in the Policy Book itself. In the light of the conditions of licensing which have existed in this country for over 30 years by now, the reference to date of shipment, whether the goods are imported under a specific licence or an O.G.L., is a fundamental one. In the light of Section 55 of the Indian Contracts Act, 1872, in the conditions existing in the country regarding licensing we feel that the contract is a voidable one. In any case, even if it is not a voidable one, it is open to the appellant-firm to seek compensation from the exporter for any loss including fines in lieu of confiscation suffered by him. We accordingly find that the importation was not covered by the licence produced by the appellant-firm for clearance of the imported synthetic camphor powder. The appeal is dismissed.
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1983 (5) TMI 255 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... appropriate authority i.e., the Collector (Appeals). 22. The records in these appeals shall be returned to the respective appellants for being presented, if they so choose, before the appropriate authority, i.e., the Collector of Customs (Appeals). Since these appellants had preferred appeals to the Central Board of Excise and Customs or to this Tribunal in the belief that these were the proper appellate authorities, the Collector (Appeals) shall for the purposes of computing limitation, take into consideration the date of receipt of these appeals in the office of the Central Board of Excise and Customs or as the case may be, in the Registry of this Tribunal. If the appellants choose to pursue these appeal before the Collector (Appeals), they shall present them within 15 (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the appeal papers by the respective parties on return of the papers by the Registry of this Tribunal. A copy of this order shall be kept in each of the files.
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1983 (5) TMI 254 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... find that there is admittedly a difference of 7.684 K.L. of oil as ascertained by the dip readings taken in the storage tank and those taken in the tank wagons. Evidently, this shortage cannot be ascribed to transit loss because the transit was yet to take place. It cannot also be described to be a storage loss because storage loss could, in the nature of things, be determined only over a period of time with reference to quantity stored on a particular date and the quantity ascertained at a later date which was not the situation here. The shortage can, therefore, be described only as an operational loss. While the departmental Representative has contended that there is no provision to deal with operational losses, the appellants have not been able to show any Rule or authority which specifically authorises remission of duty on such operational losses. We are, therefore, unable to accept the appellants’ contention in this behalf and in the result, we reject the appeal.
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1983 (5) TMI 253 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... -. From the provisions of Section 78 and the notification issued by the Government of India, it is clear that the Additional Collector of Central Excise is an officer below the rank of a Collector of Central Excise under Section 80 (amended). Therefore, an appeal against an order or decision of the Gold Control Officer lower in rank than a Collector of Central Excise lies to the Collector (Appeals) and not to the Appellate Tribunal. 4. For the reasons set out above, we hold that this appeal does not lie to the Appellate Tribunal and, therefore, we direct that the appeal papers shall be returned to the appellant for being presented, if he so chooses before the appropriate authority, i.e., the Collector (Appeals). The Collector (Appeals) shall, however, not reject the appeal on the ground of limitation if the appeal is presented within 15 (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the appeal papers by the appellant on return of the papers by the Registry of this Tribunal.
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