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Showing 1 to 20 of 175 Records
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1984 (10) TMI 251 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... we lend credence to the contention of the State, the pernicious effects referred to above would ensue offending his freedom enshrined in Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The conduct of the petitioner complained of has no interconnection nor lend colour of reasonable relation to the duty of the petitioner as a member of the cadre and the link of unbecoming conduct is snapped of. Therefore, the conduct of the petitioner does not come within the sweep of Rule 3 of Discipline Rules. We are, therefore, of opinion that the respondents travelled beyond the bounds of their power. The enquiry into the private conduct of the petitioner is without authority or in excess of law. We have no hesitation to hold that the impugned action is beyond Rule 3(1) of the Discipline Rules. Accordingly, we quash the G.O. Ms. No. 2620/G. A. D., dated June 25, 1983 and allow W.P. No. 5552/83 with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 500/- We dismiss W.P. No. 6568/83, but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1984 (10) TMI 250 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ppellant was guilty of indulging in the corrupt practice of 'undue influence'. 19. Mr. Garg, appearing for the appellant, submitted that the allegation of attacking or harassing the voters or driving them out is a make-believe story but he has not been able to show as to why the allegation deposed to by the witnesses should be disbelieved particularly when the independent witnesses examined by the respondent have positively proved the presence of the appellant. 20. After a careful perusal and discussion of the evidence we entirely agree with the conclusions arrived at by the High Court and hold that there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court so as to take a different view. In our opinion, it is not a case where two views were possible so that the appellant could be given benefit of doubt. 21. For the reasons given above, the judgment of the High Court is upheld and the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
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1984 (10) TMI 249 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e meaning of Section 2(ii)(m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The first and the fourth respondents are, therefore, liable to be convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Food Adulteration Act, 1954. So far as respondents 2 and 3 are concerned, there is nothing to indicate that they were incharge of or were in any way responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm. Their acquittal is confirmed. Respondents 1 and 4 are convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and each of them is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of three months and a fine of ₹ 2,000/- each. In default of payment of fine they shall suffer a imprisonment for a further term of one month. We are imposing the minimum sentence of imprisonment prescribed by the proviso to Section 16(1) as the offence was committed quite some years ago and we are now interfering with an order of acquittal and this appears to be a first offence.
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1984 (10) TMI 248 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... de myself to this angle of vision. In construing both statutory provisions as well as provisions giving remedy provided under special statute, efforts should be made that patent injustice and inequity which repels commonsense and which defeats the purpose of the statute, should be avoided. In this case I find it difficult to declare respondent No. 1 who has admittedly received less votes than the appellant to have been duly elected. 35. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case as I have indicated hereinbefore, I am of the opinion that even proceeding on the basis that the views expressed by majority of the learned judges in Jabar Singh's case is correct, upon which I must proceed for the purpose of this case but which I still feel should be reconsidered by a larger Bench, on the analogy of the decision in the case of Janardan Dattuappa Bondre, Etc. v. Govind prasad Shiv prasad Choudhary and Ors. Etc. (supra) I would allow this appeal with no order as to costs.
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1984 (10) TMI 247 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is not necessary to quash them, but it is obvious that, since we have quashed G.O. Ms. No. 783 dt. 30-4-1981, these guidelines will now be no longer effective and operative. 50. In the result, the writ appeal, and the writ petitions which have been filed for quashing G.O. Ms. No. 783 dt. 30-4-1981 are allowed. 51. W. P. Nos. 6401 of 1981, 10427, 1,0497 and 105 of 1982, 1653, 3892 and 5320 of 1983 which have been filed by the respective petitioners for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Government to implement G.O. Ms. No. 783 dt. 30-4-1981 must stand rejected in the view we have taken. 52. Since G.O. Ms. No. 783dt.,30-4-1981 has been quashed by us, the consequence is that any list made on the basis of that Government Order will also automatically become ineffective. The appointing authorities are now directed to make fresh fists of seniority in the respective cadres in the light of the above decision. 53. There will be no order as to costs. 54. Order accordingly.
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1984 (10) TMI 246 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... wife or dependent child which are available to him for his residential accommodation or into which he has already moved, he cannot maintain an application under Section 14A(1) of the Act. (3) Even if the other premises owned by him either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child are not reasonably suitable for his accommodation, he cannot maintain an application under Section 14A(1) but must file an application on the ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. 19. In the result, this Appeal must succeed. We accordingly allow this Appeal and reverse the order of the Delhi High Court dismissing Civil Revision Petition No. 854 of 1981 filed by the Appellant and allow the said revision petition and dismiss the Eviction Suit No. E 798 of 1976 filed by the Respondent in the Court of the Rent Controller, Delhi. 20. The Respondent will pay to the Appellant the costs of this Appeal which, we quantify at ₹ 800.
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1984 (10) TMI 245 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... disposed of ex parte on February 23,1982. On the same day, he moved an application pointing out that his information about the date was incorrect. This seems to be a bona fide assertion not seriously controverted. The Labour Court was therefore in error in rejecting this request promptly made. We are therefore, satisfied that both the Labour Court and the High Court were in error in rejecting the application even on merits. 11. This appeal accordingly succeeds and is allowed and the ex parte award made by the Labour Court is set aside as well as the decision of the High Court rejecting the writ petition is also quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the Labour Court for proceeding further according to law after giving both the parties opportunities to lead the evidence. There will be no Order as to costs of hearing in this Court. As the matter is an old one, the Labour Court is directed to give top priority to it and dispose it of within four months from today.
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1984 (10) TMI 244 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... icle 226 of the Constitution, and it is only appropriate that a petitioner whose writ petition is dismissed in limine should know what are the precise reasons for the adverse order, whether the writ petition has been rejected on the ground of laches or other preliminary ground or on the merits of the controversy, and what are the reasons of the High Court therefor. We may add that a brief statement of reasons rendered by the High Court, when dismissing the writ petition in limine, is of great assistance also to this Court when the judgment and order of the High Court are sought to he brought here by a petition for special leave to appeal. To sum up, we think it desirable that the High Court, when dismissing in limine, should set forth a brief statement of the reasons for its order instead of disposing of the proceeding by the single word "dismissed". Upon the considerations set forth earlier, we dismiss the appeal but without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed
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1984 (10) TMI 243 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d Board in Tamil Nadu where his service free of charge were required. Justice Sen would dismiss the appeal without the slightest reduction in punishment. Having given the matter our anxious consideration, looking to the gravity of the misconduct and keeping in view the motto that the punishment must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, we direct that the appellant M. Veerabhadra Rao shall be suspended from practice for a period of five years that is upto and inclusive of October 31, 1989. To that extent we vary the order both of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council as well as the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India. Accordingly this appeal fails and is dismissed and the punishment of reprimand imposed upon the appellant is varied and he is suspended from practice for a period of five years i.e. upto and inclusive of October 31, 1989. The appellant shall pay the costs of the respondent quantified at ₹ 3,000. Appeal dismissed.
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1984 (10) TMI 242 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... isions of another Act unless the provisions in one have bearing on the provisions of the other. No such provision is brought to our notice. The contention that since the Act is not expressly made applicable to newspaper establishments by the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 as it has made certain laws applicable by sections 3, 14 and 15 thereof, the Act should not be applied to the editorial staff has also no merit. We are satisfied that section 2(9) of the Act clearly brings them within the scope of the Act. On an examination of the provisions of the Act, we are of the view that the persons employed for wages in the administrative section and the editorial section of each of the printing presses in question are employees as defined in section 2(9) of the Act and the demand made by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation is a justified one. In the result the appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed
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1984 (10) TMI 241 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dge, which is sought to be impugned before us, has been referred to by the Full Bench but has not been commented upon. The next case referred to by Mr. Parekh was a decision of a Division Bench of this court in the case of Sarangpur Cotton Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1957 31 ITR 698. That decision pertained to the construction of section 18A(5) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which provided for payment of simple interest by the Central Government in certain cases. Section 18A of that Act deals with advance payment of tax. The scheme of advance payment of income-tax under the Indian Income-tax Act is, however, completely different from the scheme of the provisions pertaining to the provisional assessment in the said Act and hence that decision, with respect, has no application to the case before us. The conclusion arrived at by the learned trial judge, in our opinion, is correct and we see no reason to interfere with it in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1984 (10) TMI 240 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... holding that section 64(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was applicable on the facts of the case and, therefore, the income of the minor children from the share in the firm of M/s. Sunrise Industries had to be included in the assessee's individual assessment ? " The question of law referred in I.T.R.C. No. 85/78 is " Whether the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that section 64(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is not applicable to the facts of the case and, therefore, the income of the minor children from the share in the firm of Messrs Gajanana Cloth Stores had to be excluded from the assessee's individual assessment ? " Our answer to the question referred in I.T.R.C. No. 89/76 is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Our answer to the question referred in I.T.R.C. No. 90/76 is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Our answer to the question referred in I.T.R.C. No. 85/78 is in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
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1984 (10) TMI 239 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... release agents. The fact that the licensing authority itself considered silicone emulsion-mould release agent as falling under Serial No. 22-31/V (though the evidence for this is not the licence of the appellant but of two other parties-but this should make no difference) is a factor in the appellants’ favour. The Government of India’s Order-in-Revision cited by the Departmental Representative relies heavily on the index to the policy book which, as we ,have been, has no legal force. It is also relevant to note that the licence was governed by the April, 1971-March, 1972 Policy during which period the goods were not banned for import. 7. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, we hold that the imports were validly effected by the appellants against the licences produced. In the result, the appeals are allowed with consequential relief to the appellants which shall be granted to them’ within three months from the date of communication of this order.
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1984 (10) TMI 238 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... being in question to examine if that would involve a question of law. 5. In the case considered by the Madras High Court the question for decision was whether disputed portion of premises formed part of tenancy granted to a tenant, subject to right of other tenants or occupants of the premises. In para 4 of the Judgment, Their Lordships have stated. “We are inclined to think that the question is not purely a factual one, but is one relating to the propriety of the legal conclusion that could be arrived at on the basis of proved facts. That is a question of law which is open to review in second appeal.” No legal conclusion arising from facts calls for determination in the present appeal. The nature of the Max HD-10 stapler was the subject-matter of decision of the Tribunal and its consequences do not admit of a controversy. 6. In the above view no question of law survives for reference to the High Court. The Reference Application is accordingly rejected.
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1984 (10) TMI 237 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... being in question to examine if that would involve a question of law. 5. In the case considered by the Madras High Court the question for decision was whether disputed portion of premises formed part of tenancy granted to a tenant, subject to right of other tenants or occupants of the premises. In para 4 of the Judgment, Their Lordships have stated. “We are inclined to think that the question is not purely a factual one, but is one relating to the propriety of the legal conclusion that could be arrived at on the basis of proved facts. That is a question of law which is open to review in second appeal.” No legal conclusion arising from facts calls for determination in the present appeal. The nature of the Max HD-10 stapler was the subject-matter of decision of the Tribunal and its consequences do not admit of a controversy. 6. In the above view no question of law survives for reference to the High Court. The Reference Application is accordingly rejected.
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1984 (10) TMI 236 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... st incurred by the appellant. The cost incurred according to the appellant was ₹ 34,000/-. The above observation of the Board implies tacit acceptance of the cost of the conveyance and therefore, the Board was unjustified in imposing a fine of ₹ 35,000/-. The fine that may be imposed in lieu of confiscation on the owner of a conveyance of the category mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 115 of the Customs Act, 1962 should not be confiscatory in nature, particularly when no personal penalty was imposed on the owner and in the absence of evidence that the conveyance was being repeatedly used as a means of transport in the smuggling of any goods or in the carriage of smuggled goods. 10. Taking all aspects into consideration, while upholding the confiscation, I reduce the fine amount in lieu of confiscation from ₹ 35,000/- to ₹ 20,000/-. Subject to the above modification in the amount of fine, this appeal fails and the same is rejected.
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1984 (10) TMI 235 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) that the second order of the A.C. dated 27-9-1982 is really a review of an order of his predecessor which he is not competent to do so. 6. The reference to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the Bawa Potteries case is of no assistance wherein the High Court was interpreting the powers for issue of a less charge demand after an assessment has been completed by the proper officer. In that context the Court had noted that a limited power of review is built into the Act because of the provisions of Section 11A. This does not mean that where a matter has been concluded by a formal and definitive order of an A.C., it could be reviewed by his successor because the former did not interpret the provisions of law correctly. 7. In the result the appeal is dismissed. The department is directed to grant consequential relief as contained in the order of the Collector (Appeals), within three months from the date of receipt of this order.
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1984 (10) TMI 234 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... ly storage tanks because for the purpose of unloading, the dock should be considered as a place of unloading. The liability to account for the manifested cargo ceases when the manifested quantity is discharged at the place of landing which in the instant case was the dock and not the storage tanks. The Customs for the purpose of imposing penalty under Section 116 have taken the quantity received at the storage tanks and not the quantity discharged at the dock and therefore, the very basis adopted for determining the shortage is itself incorrect and as such no penalty could be imposed on the steamer agents for the shortage if any found at the storage tank. 7. After careful consideration of all the aspects I allow this appeal and set aside the orders passed by the Dy. Collector and the Appellate Collector and direct that the appellants be given consequential relief by way of refund of penalty, if paid, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of this order.
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1984 (10) TMI 233 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... l, and this, let it be remembered, when the dispute was whether or not the vegetable product should be classed as an oil, and not as in our case, whether the hardened oil should be assessed under item 12 or under item 68. 27. The true understanding of the two judgments, in my opinion, can produce only one conclusion, and that is, that the hardened technical oil is the same thing as the oil from which it is made. It is clearly akin to the oil, a homologue, a product of scientific modification but unaltered in its essential character. These judgments apply totally and unequivocally to the case before us. And in view of this verdict, no reference to a larger bench can be made or ought to be made. All decisions to the contrary must yield to these judgments of the Court. 28. I, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the orders of the Collector (Appeals). The hardened oil shall be assessed under item 12 and consequential relief, if any, shall be given without delay.
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1984 (10) TMI 232 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... of Central Excise, K.R. Puram Range, Bangalore in favour of Sharavathy Petro Chemicals Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore and another from the Superintendent of Central Excise, Range I, Madras I Division, in favour of Raj Lubricants, indicating that the removals of TOFS from the appellant’s factory to the respective units had been used for the manufacture of transformer oil. These certificates would indicate that the department is satisfied about the actual use of TOFS which was removed from the appellants’ factory and the attendant documentation that is necessary before such a certification can be made was available to the certifying officers. We agree that, AR-3A not being statutorily prescribed, removal on gate passes instead of AR-3A; is not an irregularily of a serious nature. The two precedents cited by the appellants lend support to a liberal view being taken in such circumstances. 7. In the result, we allow the appeal with consequential benefit to the appellants.
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