|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 241 Records
-
1984 (11) TMI 356 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... end the liability for an offence committed under the Act to any individual it has to be specifically averred in the petition of complaint that particular person is personally guilty of any act of commission or omission which tantamounts to an offence punishable under the Act." 10. Taking into consideration the fact that there was no averment in the complaint that one or any of the partners were guilty of any specific act of omission or commission which would tantamount to an offence under Section 9(1) sub-clauses (b) or (bb) of the Act, their Lordships quashed the criminal proceedings initiated against the partners. 11. Accordingly I hold that the complaint in the present case taken at its face value does not make out a prima facie case against the petitioners. As such, proceedings pending against the petitioners herein STC Nos. 398, 399 of 1983, 134 and 212 of 1984 on the file of the Additional Munsif Magistrate, Adoni are quashed. The petitions are allowed accordingly.
-
1984 (11) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... source of information had not been mentioned. On behalf of the appellant, counsel drew our attention to Section 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. This point was examined by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar ILR (1910) Cal 259. We are of the opinion that a proper reading of that decision would indicate that for a proper verification of an affidavit of a petition based on certain information, the source should be indicated but we do not wish to examine this question any further because no objection at the initial stage was taken and specially in view of this Court's decision in Ziyauddin Burhanuddin v. Brijmohan Ramdas AIR1975SC1788 (supra) and in Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh 1972 2SCR742 . On an appropriate occasion, this question may require a fuller consideration. 67. The decision of the learned Trial Judge is set aside and the appeal is allowed. Respondent No. 3 will pay the costs of this appeal.
-
1984 (11) TMI 354 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ants on the ground floor and 1 out of the 3 tenants on the first floor, we do not see any justification for evicting the appellant from the premises in his occupation. The landlord's requirement, such as it is. is more than adequately met by the eviction of those 4 tenants. 18. It is doubtful whether the respondent would have at all succeeded in any one of the 7 cases if. the trial court had correctly appreciated the effect of suppression of the material documentary evidence by him. But. the eviction decrees passed against 6 out of the 7 tenants are now an accomplished fact and those matters, having been finally determined, cannot be reopened. 19. For these reasons, be allow this appeal and set aside the judgments of the High Court, the Appellate Authority and the trial Court. The respondent's petition for eviction of the appellant will stand dismissed. Respondent shall pay to the appellant the costs of all the three Courts, which we quantify at rupees five thousand.
-
1984 (11) TMI 353 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
... ...
... ... ..... vision Bench of the Madras High Court in Devaki Ammal v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty 1973 91ITR24(Mad) , in which case that court had struck down the same provision accepting the very ground urged before us. So far, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not set at rest the controversy on the validity of section 34(1)(c) of the Act on which there is a difference of opinion among the High Courts in the country Even otherwise, the constitutionality of the provision touches a large number of persons in the country and the interests of the Revenue considerably. We are, therefore, of the opinion that these cases involve a substantial question of law on general importance and the same needs to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. We accordingly grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to to the Hon'ble Supreme Court under articles 133(1) and 134A of the Con situation to the petitioners and direct the Registrar to issue them the necessary certificate with expedition.
-
1984 (11) TMI 352 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... a distinctive character the law will restrain a competitor from using that others name. A line must be drawn somewhere between honest and dishonest trading, between fair and unfair competition. In this case there can be no quarrel with "81". The real mischief is in the adoption of the name "B.K" which is associated with the plaintiffs' business, if not goods. (58) For these reasons I would allow the appeal and issue an injunction against the defendants, U.B.H.T. Enterprises, restraining them, their servants, agents, representatives and dealers from manufacturing, selling or offering for sale or otherwise dealing in cycle bells under the mark "B.K.-31' or "B.K." or any other mark which may be identical or deceptively similar to the house mark "B.K." of the plaintiffs till the decision of the suit. Costs will abide the event. (59) I would, however, add that nothing said here will prejudice the parties' case at the trial.
-
1984 (11) TMI 351 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... clear case following from the manner in which sales-tax is collected under law. The sales-tax is not chargeable when one registered dealer sells to another registered dealer who furnishes an ST-I form. This is the scheme of taxation under the Act. 8. It follows, that in this particular case, the D.G. of S & D could not insist on the sales-tax being paid by the registered dealer purchasing the goods. Such a charge would be contrary to law and would amount to a criminal offence u/s 50(g) of the Act. 9. As the D.G. of S & D seems to be unwittingly committing the offence, we have no hesitation but to issue a writ directing that the sale to the petitioner will be without charging sales-tax provided that a valid ST-I form is supplied by the purchasing dealer. That has already been done, so we would allow the petition. Similar petitions have previously been allowed and we would expect this practice to come to an end as a Govt. dept. cannot be a party to a criminal offence.
-
1984 (11) TMI 350 - ITAT CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... s like transformers, in our view, the prohibition would apply only where such machinery is independent machinery by itself and not a part and parcel of other types of machineries which are entitled to extra shift allowance. As in this case it is not disputed that the transformer is regarded as integral part of the textile machinery, we hold that the grant of extra shift allowance is justified. There is no merit in the department’s objection on this point. We reject this claim of the department. 9. For the assessment year 1980-81, the department’s objections are identical, except that the question of extra shift allowance in respect of transformers does not arise and has not been raised. For the reasons stated earlier in regard to the three items, namely, investment allowance, the eligibility of relief under section 80J and the requirement of Form No. 10D, we reject the department’s objections for this year also. 10. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
-
1984 (11) TMI 349 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n the issues raised by the appellant are no longer live and it is not the practice of this Court to decide questions of more academic importance. We must, however, hasten to add that the High Court is right in its view that Shri Charan Singh's appointment as the Prime Minister could not be said to be conditional upon his seeking a mandate of the Lok Sabha. Our Constitution knows no such hybrid thing as a "Prime Minister subjected to a condition of defeasance". Conditions imposed by the President may create considerations of political morality or conventional propriety but not of constitutional validity. The High Court is also right that it was not necessary for Shri Charan Singh and his ministers to take a fresh oath after being called upon by the President to continue in office as a caretaker Government. Thus, the continuation in office of Shri Charan Singh and his ministers was not unconstitutional. For these reasons, the appsal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed
-
1984 (11) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... afeguards available under Chapter 111 of the Constitution were suspended on the revocation of the Emergency, the Act ought to have been amended or, better still, a new legislation ought to have been introduced so as to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. We trust that, in the light of our judgment and the judgment of the High Court, the State Legislature will introduce a carefully conceived legislation on the subject at an early date. The slumlords, who have trespassed on public and private properties, must be evicted and expeditious steps taken to prevent them exploiting any further the helpless member of the community who are virtually at their mercy. Not only have these defiant law-breakers constructed unauthorised structures on private and public properties but, as stated in the objects and Reasons of the Act, they have been collecting extortionate rents from the tenants of such properties, Earlier the State Government acts the better. M.L.A Appeals dismissed
-
1984 (11) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he had jurisdiction to try that Sessions Case. The Judgment of the High Court setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the respondent on the ground that the VIth Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to try Sessions Case No. 17/79, must consequently be held to be erroneous. 5. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Judgment of the High Court and direct that the appeal preferred by the respondent shall be heard by the High Court on merits and it shall be disposed of in accordance with law. 6. Since the respondent had addressed a communication to this court requesting that a lawyer may be appointed to represent him in the appeal before us, we requested Miss Kamini Jaiswal and Mr. Kapil Sibbal, Senior Advocate, to appear on behalf of the respondent and to assist the Court. We are grateful to Miss Kamini Jaiswal and Mr. Kapil Sibbal for the assistance which they have been good enough to render to us at the hearing of the appeal.
-
1984 (11) TMI 346 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ank to hold the money subject to further order of the I.-T. authorities. The State Bank was wrongful in withholding the money for that period. It was only on 18th Oct., 1978 that the said order of attachment was withdrawn and the bank was directed to release the money. Earlier thereto the State Bank of India was directed by the Reserve Bank of India and the Ministry of Finance to furnish all particulars regarding deposit of bank notes to the I.-T. department as soon as such notice were received. The respondents contended that such communication was made by the respondent 1 in public interest. Under the circumstances, this instant case falls within one of the exceptions as enumerated above. In any event this Court being of the opinion that the claim by way of damages for interest simpliciter by the petitioner could not be entertained under the writ jurisdiction of this Court, this application is liable to be dismissed. Hence the rule is discharged. All interim orders vacated.
-
1984 (11) TMI 345 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... aning which will prevent human suffering and degradation. 'Tlle case also raises the further question whether a Division Bench of three Judges can purport to over rule the JUDGMENT of a Division Bench of two judges merely because three is larger than two. The Court sits in Divisions of two and three judges for the sake of convenience and it may be in-appropriate for a Division Bench of three judges to purport to overrule the decision of a Division Bench of two judges. Vide Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.( 1944 (2) ALL ER. 293) It may be otherwise where a full Bench or a Constitution Bench does so. We do not however desire to embark upon this question in this case. In the present case we are satisfied that an over all view of all the circumstances appears to us to entitle the petitioner to invoke the protection of Art. 21 of the Constitution. We accordingly quash the sentence of death and substitute in its place the sentence of imprisonment for life. Petition allowed.
-
1984 (11) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... is demanding from them a sum of Rs. One lakh and odd towards the lease for the few days that they ran the liquor shop after April 1, 1984 under the orders of Calcutta High Court, calculated at the rate of ₹ 25 lakhs per year. We are unable to see any justification for the demand since the lease as sanctioned and as confirmed is admittedly for the entire period April 1, 1984 to March 31, 1985 for ₹ 30 lakhs. The demand is directed to be withdrawn. The appeal is allowed in the terms indicated. A notice will however issue to George Joseph to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of court for breaching the undertaking given by him. A nonbailable warrant will also issue for his production before us. Since the real Samuel has disclaimed all responsibility in the matter and since we do not know who was the person who represented himself as Samuel before the Calcutta High Court, we are unable to award costs against anyone. Appeal disposed of accordingly
-
1984 (11) TMI 343 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... t-levy or erroneous refund in consequence of an assessment, and are, hence, inapplicable. 24. In the instant appeal as well. Rule 10 that was sought to be relied upon was the same as the one applied in the aforesaid decisions. There was no assessment-much less a short-levy resulting from it. The commencement of the period of limitation in terms of Rule 10 confirms its inapplicability to a review of a previous approval to a price or classification list, and it must be held that, such a power cannot be inferred from it. The decisions in 1981 (8) E.L.T. 565 1981 ECR 480 (Madras Rubber Factory v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise) ; 1983 (12) E.L.T. 34 (Indo Organic Chemicals v. Union of India) and 1977 E.L.T. 144 (Kazanchi Paper and Board Mills v. Superintendent of C.E., Kanpur) lay it down that no such review is competent. 25. In the premises, I, for one, would like to allow the Appeal. 26. In accordance with the view of the majority, the appeal is rejected.
-
1984 (11) TMI 342 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... n Appeal No. 74/80-A in the case of Precision Bearing (India). These are all decisions that are governed by provisions of the Explanation inserted in sub-clause (ii) of clause (d) of the amended Section 4(4) of the Act by Section 47 of the Finance Act, 1982, for periods subsequent to 1-10-1975. The distinction between these cases and those governed by the old Section 4 was, in fact, drawn in the case at S. No. 4 supra, in para 7 of the judgment. The decisions do not, in the circumstances, apply to periods prior to 1-10-1975, if admittedly, the aforesaid Explanation cannot apply. Indeed, the necessity for a retrospective enactment of the Explanation by Finance Act, 1982, itself, goes to show that but for such enactment, assessable value cannot include the duty refunded. Nor can the Explanation be read into the old Section 4. 46. For the period prior to 1-10-1975, therefore, the Appeal has to be allowed. In accordance with the view of the majority, the appeal is rejected.
-
1984 (11) TMI 341 - CEGAT BOMBAY
... ...
... ... ..... idered as Customs duty, because no duty was chargeable or leviable on the goods not imported into India, the payment in question cannot be considered as the payment towards duty or made in pursuance of an assessment contemplated by Sec. 27(17). 27. The Customs Act nowhere lays down any limitation for refund of the amounts which are not Customs duty. In the matter of refund of the amount which the authorities are not legally entitled to retain, what is to be considered is not whether the Act permits refund, but whether the Act prohibits. Since there is no prohibition in the Act prohibiting the Officers of the Custom from refunding the amount which are not Customs duty, I reject the contention of Shri Gidwani that the authorities created under the Act have no right to order refund except under Section 27 of the Act. 28. In the result this appeal is allowed. The orders passed by the authorities below are set aside. The appellants shall be granted consequential relief.
-
1984 (11) TMI 340 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE (APPEALS), CALCUTTA
... ...
... ... ..... dt. was never confirmed by the Assistant Collector. 3. The above contentions of the appellants that the demand for duty on the samples has never been confirmed by the Assistant Collector and the demand raised by the Supdt. in his letter, dated 15-9-1978 is time barred appear to be true. The R.G. 1 point for jute manufacture being at the baling stage, unless there is a Trade Notice requiring the appellants to show the samples drawn at the Loom stage in the G.I and R.T. 12, there is no justification in demanding the duty. This is more so because the left-over materials are returned to the Process House for re-processing for the manufacture of jute products. On these grounds namely time-bar and absence of any instruction for showing the samples drawn for internal test in the R.G. I and for the reason that the left over materials are returned to the Process House, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Assistant Collector is set aside with direction to grant the refund.
-
1984 (11) TMI 339 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE (APPEALS), MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... nly after erection and not before. Again, I note that by cutting the steel plates or drilling holes in angles and columns and rivetting and fastening them, the identity of the original plates or column or angles are not entirely lost and no transformation takes place, so as to bring into existence a new and altogether different article, having a distrinct name, character or use. Applying the test of what constitutes manufacture as laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of DCM and South Bihar Sugar Mills, I am of the view that respondents had not manufactured goods, when they subjected the raw materials to the process of cutting or drilling holes or welding. 13. In this view of the matter, I hold that the Department has not established with conclusive evidence that respondents had manufactured excisable goods, which were classifiable under T.I. 68. The impugned order of the Deputy Collector, in my opinion, is correct in law and on facts. The application is rejected.
-
1984 (11) TMI 338 - CEGAT MADRAS
... ...
... ... ..... addition of Sodium sulphate at the recovery stage of closed circuit is a measure of convenience, the black liquid which contains organic carbonaceous matter and during burning Sodium sulphate gets reduced to Sodium sulphide and with the addition of lime, Sodium hydroxide is produced. This along with Sodium sulphate is taken to the digester where, as observed earlier, sodium sulphide is formed and assists in the process of digestion. We do not think that the stage at which Sodium sulphate is added should make any difference to its being treated as raw material when we note that the addition at the recovery stage is a matter of convenience and not one for the purpose of recovery of Sodium hydroxide. 5. In the result, we order that the items referred to in para 3 supra, viz. Alum (in part), Sodium sulphide lye. Sodium sulphate, Daicol (Gaur gums) and Fluo solid lime, be allowed the benefit of Notification No. 201/79, as amended by Notification No. 105/82 and allow Appeal.
-
1984 (11) TMI 337 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... ke a table fan, the screws or bolts which attach the blades to the rotor would be “transmitting power” and would, therefore, not be “fasteners” but “fan parts”; whereas the screws or bolts which attach the guard to the body of the fan would remain “fasteners”. An argument which leads to such illogical results obviously cannot be accepted. 37. We have already observed that no question arises, in this case regarding the application of Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules. Further, in the view which we have taken, the question whether the time limits in the Central Excise Rules would apply to a refund claim where there could be said to be a common mistake of law, does not arise. It is therefore not necessary to discuss these aspects. 38. In the result, we find that the Board’s orders which are the subject matters of the three appeals before us were correct. We, accordingly, confirm those orders and reject these three appeals.
........
|
